

THE MAKING OF MODERN IRAN

State and society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941

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TRIUMPHS AND TRAVAILS OF AUTHORITARIAN MODERNISATION IN IRAN

Mehrzaad Boroujerdi

Introduction

Over one hundred years ago, in the final year of the nineteenth century (1899), a number of enlightened statesmen established the School of Political Science with the aim of training a corps of foreign-service officers. Muhammad Ali Furughi (Zaka al-Mulk) (1876–1942), an erudite dean of the school and later prime minister of Iran, explained the difficulty the School faced in formulating its curriculum. One of the courses in the curriculum of this state-sponsored school was to be jurisprudence. However, the ulama opposed the idea that jurisprudence be taught in a non-seminary environment or that the instructor be anyone but a cleric. The clergy could not fathom the idea of teaching jurisprudence in a school catering to '*fokuli*' (one wearing European dress) – students who wore hats, sat on chairs and listened to Western teachers. Furughi recalls that the school had difficulty recruiting a cleric and finally had to convince the ulama that the teaching of jurisprudence in the school was needed so that diplomats dispatched to the 'lands of infidels' had knowledge of the Shari'a.¹

This anecdote sheds much light on the ironies characterising the process of secularisation in twentieth-century Iran.² At a glance, this anecdote reminds us of the political vulnerabilities felt by a new class of emerging secular elites who confronted the religious sensitivities and archaic beliefs of some of their countrymen. Upon a deeper look, this story demonstrates how secularism acquired a duplicitous and non-revolutionary nature in twentieth-century Iran. One can contend that to understand why Iranian secularism acquired such traits, we must look at the process of state-building and at the intellectual ambience of Iran during the 1920s and 1930s, decades which mark the state-society's transition from an antiquated empire into a modern state.

Bonapartist etatism

The profound changes introduced into Iranian society during the 1920s and 1930s – the aspiration to modernise, social mobility, a written constitution, a popularly elected parliament – were in many ways products of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1909). Yet despite such 'progress', the destruction of the revolutionary forces, the cruelty of brigands and tribal chieftains, the interest of imperialist powers in Iranian oil (discovered in 1908) and the State's feeble international position during the First World War soon prompted many Iranians to dream of having a strong and effective central government.

However, as Karl Marx remarked in his essay, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', 'as ever, weakness had taken refuge in a belief in miracles, [and] had fancied the enemy overcome when he was only conjured away in imagination'.³ In such an ambience, the rise of Riza Khan/Shah's 'Bonapartist' regime became possible. Considering secularism as the necessary precursor to nationalism, this strong-willed military man did not shy away from resorting to regulatory ordinances, legitimated by imperial fiat, to advance his agenda. Inspired by the social imperatives and political impetus of the day, he embarked on a nationalist state-building project aimed at piercing primordial bonds of ethnicity, faith and kinship; weakening his political opponents; and creating new forms of civic consciousness.

Riza Shah was a firm believer in the secular *raison d'être* of the state, the necessity of law and order, the importance of subduing tribal particularisms, and the indispensability of an authoritative leader at the helm. In his travelogues to Khuzistan and Mazandaran,⁴ written in 1924 and 1926, he reveals his respect for predecessors who sought to make Persia a stable and prosperous empire – Shah Isma'il (r. 1501–1524), Shah Abbas (r. 1587–1629), Nader Shah (r. 1729–1747) and Karim Khan Zand (r. 1747–1779).⁵ Yet Riza Khan/Shah denounces the founder of the Safavid dynasty, Shah Isma'il, for yielding too easily to Shi'i groups and Shi'ite sentiments.⁶ He criticises another Safavid ruler, Shah Abbas, for the 'unforgivable mistake' of mixing politics with religion.⁷ Nor does Riza Khan/Shah mince his words about the clerics of his own era whom he describes as a bunch of imbecilic status-seekers.⁸ Riza Shah's strong preference for a secular system of government is clear: 'There is no doubt that religion and politics are two holy principles whose precise details should be known and observed by all enlightened leaders. However, the mixing of these two is neither advantageous to religion nor to administrative politics since such a fusion weakens religion and leads to the decline of politics.'⁹

Riza Khan/Shah opted for secularism with good reason: he could not base his legitimacy either on the Shi'ite-mystic pedigree of the Safavids (1501–1722) or the tribal lineage and alliances of the Qajars (1795–1925).¹⁰ He could only hope to acquire legitimacy through economic rejuvenation and raising the banner of secular nationalism. The secularism that Riza Khan/Shah had in mind, alas, was anything but democratic and pluralistic. He preferred the model of a 'benevolent dictator' who would uplift his society by gradual modernisation and secularisation.¹¹ Less than a year after declaring himself as the new King, Riza Shah – who considered

himself as Iran's saviour – demonstrated his newly found imperial arrogance and regal egoism by claiming that 'the people of Iran begged me through the Constituent Assembly to take charge of this country'. He commented, 'before me, the Iranian state was just an empty word. . . . In Iran, the King of the country has to force the cabinet to work and familiarise the parliament with its duties. He also has to force the merchants, landowners, urbanites, and even peasants to work.'¹² In short, the man who wanted to play a hero's role considered everyone and everything around him to be grotesquely inept or mediocre at best.

To accomplish his goals, Riza Shah relied on the military's philosophy – discipline and power. The pages of his travelogues indicate that he regarded military service as 'the biggest and most important school for uplifting both the bodies and the spirits of citizens'. True to his military reasoning, Riza Shah confesses that he finds everything in life, including politics, to be like a 'cannon ball' fired in one's direction. If instead of moving forward, you succumb to fear, retreat or escape you have accepted defeat.¹³ Hence, not surprisingly, he viewed the armed forces as the pillar of modern secularism and used them to subdue such foes as the Qajar aristocracy, marauding bandits, tribal warlords, leftist movements and Shi'ite clergy.¹⁴

Riza Shah insisted adamantly that militant nationalism should replace Islam as the principle of social cohesion. At this conjuncture, nationalism had outpaced all other competing political ideologies, not just in Iran but in India (i.e. the Congress Party), Turkey (i.e. the Young Turks) and Egypt (i.e. the Wafd Party) as well. The appeal of nationalism in Iran was not limited only to the traditional bureaucratic elite and their offspring. On the contrary, even such seasoned and progressive members of the literati as Muhammad Taqi Malik al-Shu'ara Bahar, Mirzadih Eshqi, Muhammad Farrukhi Yazdi, Sayyid Ashraf al-Din Husayni Gilani (Nasim-i Shomal), Ahmad Kasravi, Abu'l Qasim Lahuti, Arif Qazvini and Prince Suliyman Mirza Iskandari at one time or another approved of Sayyid Ziya and Riza Khan/Shah's nationalist platform and the need for a strong central government. What stirred the embers of nationalism for many Iranians was a century of embarrassment and defeat, as well as unsatisfied expectations and violated dreams. Evidence of nationalist sentiments took numerous forms – sympathy for Ottomans and Germany during the First World War, Germany and Italy during the Second World War, the high-pitched rhetoric directed against the British, calls for pan-Iranism, preoccupation with language as the basis of Iranian identity, and the emphasis on pre-Islamic Iranian history.¹⁵

Riza Shah, however, was smart enough to realise that in order to heighten national consciousness among his subjects he needed to do more than just beef up the army, bolster bloated historical myths, and fabricate and fetishise Iran's glorious past. He also had to deliver on the economic front. Consequently he pursued an etatist policy, which viewed the state as independent of and superior to civil society. What enticed him to embark on a project of industrialisation was the backwardness of the means of production and the feebleness of capitalist classes. Fortuitously, Riza Shah's regime benefited from oil revenues that increased more than sixfold from £600,000 in 1921 to £4 million in 1940. Meanwhile, a sixteenfold increase in the state's budget made possible the overhaul of the

administrative, educational, fiscal, judicial, communication and transportation systems, and the inauguration of various social-work projects.¹⁶

While this policy of etatism did not produce free-market capitalism or political assertiveness by private entrepreneurs, arguably, members of the latter group found greater opportunities for making money due to greater incorporation into the global economy, the state's industrialisation drive, urbanisation, the rising percentage of sedentary population, the service sector's rapid expansion, reform of the banking and financial systems,¹⁷ and improvements in communication and transportation systems that resulted from the introduction of such changing technologies of everyday life as electricity, cars, trains, telephone, national newspapers and radio.¹⁸

According to a study conducted by Iran's National Bank, the occupational breakdown of the 14.9 million Iranian citizens between 1937 and 1938 was as follows: unemployed 2.6 per cent; industrial sector 6 per cent; service sector 20.6 per cent; agriculture and animal husbandry 64.8 per cent; and other 6 per cent. The data reveal that 17.7 per cent of the country's population lived in urban centres and that 30 per cent of Iranian urbanites were involved in the business and the commercial sector.¹⁹ As late as 1938 there were only six cities in Iran – Isfahan, Kirmanshah, Mashhad, Shiraz, Tabriz and Tehran – that had a population in excess of 100,000.²⁰ Although these six cities comprised only 7.4 per cent of Iran's population, they established themselves as major employment sites. Together, these cities accounted for 22 per cent of all service-sector employees and 33 per cent of all government employees in the country.²¹

In addition to urbanisation and the changing composition of the labour force, two other factors also paved the way for and perpetuated Riza Shah's secularist drive. First, the clerical establishment experienced a dramatic decline in its power base. While the number of theology students decreased from 5984 during the 1924 to 1925 academic year to 784 in 1940 to 1941,²² the number of students enrolled at state schools rose from 74,000 in 1925 to 1926 to 355,500 in 1940 to 1941.²³ During 1923 to 1940, Iran's educational budget witnessed a twenty-threefold increase – from 6.5 million to 155 million rials.²⁴ By 1941, there were 5000 college graduates – 1000 of them educated overseas, 10,000 high-school graduates, 25,000 junior-high-school graduates and 65,000 primary-school graduates.²⁵ Secular education influenced relatively small numbers of citizens because of the tremendous number of obstacles it had to overcome. Yet the increase in literacy and the circulation of new reading materials created a milieu in which the secular approach to knowledge could no longer be disregarded.²⁶ Moreover, education provided a ladder of social mobility for thousands of young Iranians not enjoying aristocratic or clerical pedigree. While the learned religious institutions did not wither away, the absorption of a growing number of educated Iranians into the state structure did not escape the clergy's attention.

Second, religion ceased to be the sole or primary means of legitimacy for the political opposition. The emergence of various secular political movements, professional syndicates, intellectual circles and socio-political journals helped to facilitate further political participation. While consolidating his rule (1921–1925),

Riza Shah recognised the need to compromise with the existing religious culture and with the ulama.²⁷ The goodwill he generated for himself when he abandoned his campaign for republicanism in 1924 in response to the ulama's pressure proved rewarding, as he secured the support of such clerical leaders as Sayyid Muhammad Bihbahani, Sayyid Abu'l Qasim Kashani, Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabataba'i, Sheikh Abd al-Karim Ha'iri Yazdi and Ayatollah Sayyid Hasan Mudarris in abolishing Qajar rule and declaring himself as the new King.²⁸

Riza Shah's rapport with the ulama, however, soured in 1928 when he used an accident involving his wife, who was insulted in Qum for not covering herself adequately, as a pretext to subdue the clerical establishment. Such actions as registering deeds (1923), imposing the new headgear (1927), passing a new Civil Code (1928), declaring divorce and marriage to be civil affairs (1931), establishing the first school of theology (1932), limiting the clerics' control over endowment (*vaqf*) properties (1933), using solar instead of lunar calendar months (1935), abolishing the veil (1936), restricting permissible religious practices during Islamic holy months, and secularising the commercial, administrative and judicial apparatuses, transformed a courteous relationship into an adversarial one.

None the less, a variety of social factors and political considerations tampered the depth and pace of secularism. Riza Shah could not afford to be as bold as Atatürk in denigrating the clerics or turning Islam into a private religion. The paucity of mass media, the significant cultural gap between urban and rural areas, the buoyancy of folk beliefs and customs, the financial independence of the Shi'ite clergy, and the ability of the common people to continue fulfilling their recurrent and routine religious practices and obligations made the quest towards secularism ambivalent and partial. The cautious and incremental character of Iranian secularism is evidenced by the secular reformers' position on the issue of women's rights. While veiling was abolished in Turkey in 1924, this did not happen in Iran until the beginning of 1936. While Turkish women were enfranchised in 1934, Iranian women had to wait as late as 1962 for the right to vote in national elections. The deferred nature of Iranian women's enfranchisement may perhaps be attributed to the patriarchal disposition of that society and the hefty political weight of Iranian clerics.

Towards a secular 'Republic of Letters'

Most observers of Iranian politics maintain that during Riza Shah's rule, Iran experienced political centralisation and economic development but little cultural and intellectual creativity. The lack of intellectual vitality is generally attributed to such factors as the state's monological discourse, its use of censorship and repression against critics, its reliance on propaganda, and its ability to co-opt a great number of the literati. However, one can question such a conventional wisdom by maintaining that despite the state's use of censorship and repression, Iranians did indeed benefit from an era of intellectual thriving during this period.

If the intellectuals of the Qajar era were by and large dissident intellectuals, a great number of those during the Riza Shah period may be aptly described as intellectual statesmen. While tempting, attributing their participation in government

merely to their careerist dispositions is crude. Instead, one may contend that many of these intellectuals – Mahmud Afshar, Malik al-Shu'ara Bahar, Ali Dashti, Ali Akbar Davar, Abbas Iqbal Ashtiyani, Suliyman Mirza Iskandari, Qasim Ghani, Zaka al-Mulk Furughi, Mahdi Quli Hidayat, Ali Asghar Hikmat, Ahmad Kasravi, Ahmad Matin-Doostani, Sayyid Fakhr al-Din Shadman, Hasan Pirniya (Mushir al-Dawlah), Ali Akbar Siyasi, Isa Sadiq and Sayyid Hasan Taqizadah – were convinced of the wisdom of Plato's edict: If the enlightened refuse to take part in government, the unfit will occupy the seats of power. In other words, these intellectuals and other members of their generation – committed as they were to such ideals as constitutionalism, nationalism and secularism – believed that the best way to improve the lot of their fellow citizens was through designing and implementing progressive public policies.²⁹

While early secularisation in Iran may have been a state-led enterprise, one must draw attention to the budding and diffused social forces that also participated in this development. This period's 'Republic of Letters' provides some important indices of this perforce dispersed movement of secularisation. The literature of this period, which took its demeanour in part from European romanticism and Soviet social realism, reveals a new interest in social criticism and secular subjects – i.e. workers' and women's rights, the indispensability of freedom, and scientific as contrasted with religious trends.³⁰ Moreover, the practice of lampooning clerics for their antediluvian views, corrupt manners, putrid beliefs and reactionary politics, became more commonplace. Secular thinking was abundant in the pages of such important newspapers and journals as *Iran-i Javan* (1921), *Qam-i Biyustum* edited by Mirzadih Eshqi (1921–1924), *Tuffan* edited by Farrukhi Yazdi (1921), *Shafaq-i Surkh* edited by Ali Dashti (1922), *Namih Javanan* edited by Ibrahim Khvajah-Nuri (1923), *Mard-i Azad* edited by Isa Sadiq (1923), *Farangistan* edited by Husayn Muqaddam (1924), *Ayandih* edited by Mahmud Afshar (1925), and *Tajaddud-i Iran* edited by Mirza Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i (1927).³¹

Third, thanks to a number of technological innovations and cultural shifts, secular ways of thinking and discourse became increasingly accessible to an audience beyond the political elite. The inauguration of new mediums of mass communication – telephone (1926), *Ittelaat* newspaper (1926), cinemas,³² PARS News Agency (1934), Tehran radio (1940) – and the rise of new political constituencies – socialist parties and trade unions – contributed to the formation of a new audience. Meanwhile, the politicisation of the arts, language (change of the alphabet controversy), literature, poetry and theatre set in motion a drastic change in the societal perception of the role and function of artists, poets and writers.³³ The ability of prose to somewhat rival poetry in social significance and the popularity of writing in a simple and accessible style further legitimised secular thought in Iran.³⁴ The ideas and ideals of the secular elite may not have reached the provincial peasants, but they were no longer limited to the cosmopolitan types either.

Finally, appreciating irony, one may argue that even Riza Shah's increasing political repression was not entirely calamitous for Iran's cultural life. When the

political pressure from the state became too much to bear, many intellectuals of the day decided to devote themselves fully to historical, literary and folkloric research. Inadvertently, this resulted in the outpouring of sophisticated works on Iran's historiography, literature and anthropology.³⁵ This attention to and search for one's own history and heritage was supplemented by criticisms of apish imitation of the West as articulated in such literary masterpieces of this era as Muhammad Ali Jamalzadah's *Yaki bud Yaki Nabud* (1921), Hasan Muqaddam's *Ja'far Khan az Farang Amadah* (1921), and Murtaza Mushfiq Kazimi's *Tehran-i Makhuf* (1922).

The legacy of autocratic secularisation

Riza Shah's ideology is best termed 'autocratic secular nationalism'. While he failed to establish pluralism or a truly parliamentary political system which held the executive branch accountable, his reign (1921–1941) helped to settle some of the unresolved debates of the previous era. Similarly, notwithstanding his autocratic statecraft, the fact that Riza Shah's reforms laid the foundation for the formation of a secular state machinery and nurtured a new secular urban middle class – composed of academics, administrators, bankers, merchants, doctors, intellectuals, judges, lawyers, managers, military officers and public prosecutors – is incontestable.³⁶ The ascendancy and preponderance of this new class of a secular political elite outlived the 'benevolent dictator'. In other words, Riza Khan/Shah rendered Iranian politics into a predominantly secular practice, the present backlash notwithstanding. His secularisation of the educational and the judicial systems changed the shape of social thought in Iran. During his reign, the clash between the religiously inclined and the secular forces was resolved in favour of the latter.

Despite its imperious ideological pretensions, Riza Shah's style of statecraft also relied on a heavy dosage of pragmatism. He denigrated the religious classes but tolerated them nevertheless. He believed in a secular approach to politics but never called officially for a separation of religion and state. He ruled with an iron fist but never abolished the parliament. His overdose on economic etatism no doubt led to corruption and yet managed to modernise the means and forces of production more than during any other period.³⁷

In short, despite the ambivalent feelings of Iranians towards Riza Shah's authoritarian secularism, by providing much of the appurtenances of modernity he managed to alter the shape of the country's social, political and economic formation.

Notes

- 1 Muhammad Ali Furughi (Zaka al-Mulk), *Maqalat-i Furughi*, vol. 1 (2nd edn) (Tehran: Tous, 1354/1975–1976), pp. 340–341.
- 2 Throughout this paper I have in mind Émile Durkheim's definition of *secularisation* – as a process of laicisation whereby many fields of life's decisions are carried out without reference to religion. Hence secularisation refers to the disengagement of religion from political life, aesthetic life, etc. By *secularism*, I mean a doctrine, spirit, or consciousness advocating the temporal (as opposed to the sacred) foundation of 'individual ideas,

- attitudes, beliefs, or interests'. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 3–8.
- 3 Robert C. Tucker (ed.), *The Marx–Engels Reader* (2nd edn) (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1978), p. 598.
 - 4 Although these travelogues are written in an autobiographical tone there is some disagreement among scholars as to whether Riza Shah was indeed the actual author. My reading of these books has convinced me that even acknowledging that these books were ghost-authored by one of Riza Shah's lieutenants should not make much of a difference since they seem to closely reflect his viewpoints. This conclusion can be supported on the basis of two additional sets of facts: (1) these books were published during the reign of the Pahlavi dynasty with official sanctioning from the Royal Court; and (2) the acts and deeds described in these travelogues are corroborated by other historical accounts and observers.
 - 5 Riza Shah-i Kabir, *Safamamah-yi Khuzistan, 1303* (n.p., 1362/1983–1984), p. 70.
 - 6 *Ibid.*, p. 108.
 - 7 Riza Shah-i Kabir, *Safamamah-yi Mazandaran, 1305* (Tehran: Markaz Puzhuhish va Nashr-i Farhang-i Siyasi Dawran-i Pahlavi, 1355/1976–1977), p. 53.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, p. 227.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, p. 53.
 - 10 Shahrugh Miskub, *Dastan-i adabiyat va sarguzasht-i ijtimā* (Tehran: Farzan-i Rouz, 1373/1994–1995), p. 11.
 - 11 Modernisation is used here as the process of economic and technological transformation of a given society.
 - 12 Riza Shah, *Safamamah-yi Mazandaran*, pp. 2, 8, 96.
 - 13 Riza Shah, *Safamamah-yi Khuzistan*, pp. 54, 92.
 - 14 To modernise the armed forces, Riza Shah undertook the following set of actions: establishment of a military training academy (1922), passage of the law on dispatching students to such military schools as St Cyr and École de Guerre (1922), establishment of an air force (1924), passage of the mandatory draft law (1925), and the establishment of the College of War (1935).
 - 15 I do not mean to suggest here that all of these were by-products of the Pahlavi era. For example, resorting to arguments regarding Iran's pre-Islamic glory may be dated back to Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani's *Ayanahyi sekandari* if not earlier.
 - 16 The state's budget increased from 19 million tumans in 1921 to 309 million tumans in 1940.
 - 17 I have in mind such initiatives as the reorganisation of government finances under the guidance of an American adviser (1922–1927), the formation of a School of Business (1926), and a Chamber of Commerce (1929).
 - 18 In one anecdote we are told that by 1928 there were 490 private automobiles, 1099 taxis and 459 rental carriages in Tehran. See Baqir Aqali, *Rouzshumar-i tarikh-i Iran*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Nashr-i Guftar, 1372/1993–1994), p. 231.
 - 19 The relatively low percentage of people living in urban centres may be attributed partly to the fact that the production methods of rural areas did not change much since Riza Shah's reforms did not really reach out to the rural areas (with the exception of the mandatory draft law). As such there was no pressing reason to migrate to the cities.
 - 20 During the twenty years of Riza Khan/Shah's rule Tehran's population more than doubled – from 210,000 in 1922 to 531,246 in 1940.
 - 21 All the above data are taken from Nasser Pakdaman (ed.), *Amar namih-yi iqtisad-i Iran dar aqaz-i jang jahani-i dovzum*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Faculty of Economics at Tehran University, 1355/1976–1977).
 - 22 Mikhail Ivanov, *Tarikh-i novin-i Iran* (n.p., Hizb-i Tudah-i Iran, 1356/1977–1978).
 - 23 Husayn Adibi, *Tabaq-i mutavasit-i jadid dar Iran* (Tehran: Jami'ah, 1358/1979–1980), p. 89.

- 24 Ali Mirfetrus, *Guftoguha*, edited by Iraj Adibzadah and Nashriyah Kaveh (Essen Nim, 1988), p. 59.
- 25 Muhammad Riza Khalili Khu, *Towsi'i va nousazi-yi Iran dar dawrah-yi Riza Shah* (Tehran: Jahad-i Danishgahi, 1373/1994–1995), p. 16.
- 26 Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the formations of Tehran University (1935), the Iranian Academy (1935), adult literacy classes (1936), and the dispatch of both male and female students (beginning in 1930) to Europe.
- 27 The following examples testify to his manifestations of religiosity: taking part in *Ashura* ceremonies (1921); asking clerics to deliver sermons to uplift soldiers' spirits (1922), fasting during the month of Ramadan and commemorating Imam Ali's death with his Cabinet, going to Najaf and Karbala (1924), declaring a day of national mourning for the bombing of Mecca and Medina by the Saudi regime (1925), and exempting the clerics from the military draft (1925).
- 28 For an elaborate discussion of 'republicanism' see Majid Sharif Khuda'i, *Masalah-i jumhuriyat (dar dawrah-i Riza Khan)*. MA thesis (Tehran: Danishgah Tarbiyat Mudarris, 1371–1372/1992–1993).
- 29 I do not wish to suggest that they agreed about the causes of Iran's social ills. While some viewed religion as the problem, others attributed the 'decadence' to the country's political system. A third group held the Persian alphabet responsible due to its cumbersome character. Finally, a fourth group determined the inept educational system to be the real evildoer.
- 30 Even those who did not believe in the separation of religion from political life realised that the life of the modern citizen could not be reduced to religion alone. For example, the slogan adopted by one of the leading activist clerics of the time, Ayatollah Sayyid Hasan Mudarris, is revealing. He used to say, 'our politics is the same as our religion' but not 'our nationality is our faith'.
- 31 These publications advanced many of the secular issues and agendas previously raised in such political, social and literary journals as *Akhtar* (1875), *Qanun*, *Suri Esrafil*, *Now Bahar* (1910), *Iranshahr* (1922–1927), *Iran* (1916), *Tajaddud* by Sheikh Muhammad Khiyabani (1917), *Danishkadeh* by Malik al-Shu'ara Bahar (1918), *Kavib* (1918), and *Musavat* edited by Sayyid Muhammad Riza Musavat.
- 32 According to one account, by 1932 there were no fewer than thirty-two cinemas in Tehran. Jamshid Bihnam, *Iranian va andishihy-i tajaddud* (Tehran: Farzan-i Rouz, 1375/1996–1997), p. 57.
- 33 Riza Shah, who admired such classical poets as Hafiz, Sa'di and Firdowsi, used to dismiss the advocates of literary modernism as a bunch of insane people. See *Safarnamah-yi Mazandaran*, pp. 64, 68.
- 34 See Miskub, *Dastan-i adabiyat va sarguzasht-i ijtimā*.
- 35 One may mention such works as Ali Akbar Dihkhuda's *Lughatnamih*, Allānah Muhammad Qazvini's edition of the three-volume *Tarikh-i jahan gusha-i Juwayni*, Malik al-Shu'ara Bahar's *Sabk shinasi ya tatavvur-i nasr-i farsi*, Zaka al-Mulk Furughi's *Sayr-i hikmat dar Urupa*, Sadiq Hidayat's *Buq-i kur*, Ahmad Kasravi's *Tarikh-i Mashrutih Iran*, Husayn Kazimzadah Iranshahr's *Tajalliyat-i ifani ruh-i Iran*, Mushir al-Dawlah Pirmiya's *Iran-i bastani* and *Dastanha-yi Iran-i qadim*, Ibrahim Purdavud's translation of *Avesta*, and Nima Yushij's *Afsanah*.
- 36 The overhaul of the educational system (1925–1930), formation of the Ministry of Justice (1927) and the creation of the National Bank – *Bank Milli* (1928) contributed to the emergence of this new urban middle class.
- 37 On the eve of being sent into exile in 1941, Riza Shah's wealth amounted to 68 million tumans and 5200 parcels of land. Upon his death, the *Daily Telegraph* estimated his wealth to be around £129,317. See *Daily Telegraph* (18 September 1944).