

RESEARCH

Theories of Violence

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The current study examined the identity and interest-group theories in the context of domestic violence and hate crimes. Identity and the roles with which people define themselves, especially if the roles are violent in nature, can lead to elevated levels of domestic violence. Interest-group theory argues that by placing groups with different norms and values against each other, violence, especially visible in hate crimes, will reach elevated levels. In addition, counter-violence methods were discussed in regard to both theories that have been mentioned. For counter-violence, strategies and policy are two effective measures to reduce these types of violence. Through this discussion, it will be shown that violence is a learned behavior and something that can be controlled by alleviating factors such as negative labels or negative socialization involved in these theories.

Keywords: symbolic interaction theory; identity theory; interest-group theory; domestic violence; hate crime

Violence is an act that attempts to minimize the importance of those in the out-group, and multiple theories attempt to explain the causes of violence. One of these theories is the identity theory of symbolic interaction. According to Peter Hall (2016), "Symbolic interaction is a theoretical perspective that has roots in pragmatism with its emphasis on activity, processes, and dissolving dualisms." In this sense, symbolic interaction is the idea that people find importance based on the interactions that they have with the environment. The identity theory, formulated by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in 1979, argues that the meanings that people give themselves develop from the roles that they fulfill. This theory argues that people divide their world into an in-group and an out-group, and might "discriminate against the out-group, thus enhancing their self-image" (McLeod, 2008). This clear division can contribute to violence against those seen as "other". The interest-group theory, developed by Thorsten Sellin (1938), is a type of conflict theory. In this framework, Sellin suggests that during periods of rapid social change, violence occurs because groups with different norms and values come closer together. In interest-group theory, violence consists of acts between groups with differing norms to assert power over another group. The cause of violence in this theory would be an attempt to maintain the norms of each group, even when they conflict with other groups.

Identity theories and interest-group theories have a lot in common. One similarity is the fact that both differentiate and discriminate against those seen as "other" using in-groups and out-groups. Another similarity is the idea that the values and norms of the group are of greater importance than individual ideologies. Identity theory posits the idea that labeling oneself into a group places a great importance on these groups and consequently, shapes the way that a person views themselves. In interest-group theory, the values and norms of the group act as the ultimate determinant in conflicts with other groups, even if an individual does not always believe in those ideals. Another similarity is the idea that in both identity and interest-group theories, an individual is likely to believe the group norms and values at a greater level the more entrenched they feel in the group.

Identity theory comes up in many places, be it a student who feels the need to constantly be in the library because that is what a "good student" does, or a police officer who becomes violent when they are not at work because the violent activities of their job generalize to their home life. Police and correctional officers are some of the strongest examples of identity theory. Officers, even those who, like Shane Bauer (2018), at the beginning of the job, feel that they have no proclivity for violence, have a stronger tendency to be domestic abusers. For their job, officers maintain a tough, macho attitude. They feel that they must use violence, be it tackling an assailant or, in some severe cases, using their guns or tasers to minimize threats. Police officers label themselves as such, and thus, the violence that is admirable in their line of work begins to integrate itself into their personal lives. As this label grows into a stronger part of their identity, so too does the violence that comes with it. Because of this, it is not uncommon for officers to begin to use this violence against partners, some

even going so far as shooting a partner. To illustrate, Bauer (2018) notes that although he viewed himself as anything but a macho man, during his time as a correctional officer, his views towards both himself and the prisoners had changed. This change in his values arose from the labels he placed upon himself and the way that correctional officers are expected to act in a workplace setting. This theory is very applicable to domestic violence because people who view themselves as violent or appear violent to others are more likely to act in violent manners. Police officers are not the only perpetrators of domestic violence, but the majority of people who commit this crime are seen leading violent lifestyles by their peers.

The ability to measure who is considered violent is very difficult, but by evaluating the labels that a person is defined by, especially if they are violent, it is easier to predict who will commit domestic violence and other violent crimes. Interest-group theory can often explain hate crimes because, during times of cultural change, the differences between groups of contrasting ideals often seem so great and insurmountable that members of each group may see violence as the only option to push their values onto other groups. One example of hate crimes resulting from interest-groups is the Greensboro sit-ins that took place during the Civil Rights Movement. Christopher Schmidt (2017) stated that “students began to see tangible results as a growing number of restaurants desegregated” but these results led to violent actions from people who opposed the movement. This violence came from a range of people but the harshest perpetrators were the members of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). Members of the KKK felt that the Civil Rights Movement was in direct opposition to their values and the norms which society had followed for many years, and thus they reacted by attacking black members of the community, especially those who were leaders in the Civil Rights Movement. The interest-group theory applies directly to hate crimes because when a person believes their values are being threatened, they feel it is imperative to do whatever it takes to make sure that the cultural change that is threatening those values is stagnated, and protect the norms that are already in place. This idea of doing whatever it takes can lead to violence such as that performed by the KKK and other hate groups around the world. Hate crimes are relatively easy to predict by criminologists and those within a community because if rapid social change is occurring, hate crimes will often occur when those changes are becoming apparent in society. Hate crime is harder to measure using this theory because there are instances of hate crimes occurring even after the social change is complete, such as KKK violence after slavery was abolished. Interest-group theory is well suited to explain hate crimes because it explains the way that societal norms can influence an individual to act out against members of groups fighting for social change. The violence occurring from both of these theories can be deterred utilizing counter-violence measures that alleviate conflicts within society.

Strategy is the best method to avoid violence in the identity theory. Strategies can be put in place to remove the connotations of violence with certain labels. If the police officer example holds true, when police officers see themselves more as protectors of society and less as crime fighters, then this label alleviates some of the negative associations between the job and violence. If this method of removing the significance of violence can apply to other labels, people who identify with these types of labels would be less likely to view themselves as violent and would become less violent as a result. Interest-group theory lends itself well to policy changes to eradicate violence during social changes. If the policy were to make social change move somewhat slower, it would potentially allow any opposing groups to cope with the gradual changes. Although violence exists even if social change is slower, Gérard Roland (n.d) argues that by gradually enacting change and allowing time for experimentation, violence is less likely to occur.

To conclude, in an earlier paper, I previously argued that human nature is good. As such, I discussed *What is Violence* by Anthony Arblaster (1975) and his focus on “actual, not metaphorical, violence for which human beings are responsible.” While I still believe that individuals are inherently peaceful, I believe that society often breeds violence by creating an “us versus them” mentality that can cause individuals to react violently. In this sense, my theoretical approach to violence necessitates a specification for an individual and their response to the societal factors that are present surrounding them. I would argue that the groups or labels with which a person defines themselves are the root cause of conflict and violence, especially when those groups become more important to a person than their sense of self and ideas of individualism.

Competing Interests

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RESEARCH

From Philanthropy to Investment: Considering the New Role of the Private Sector in Global Development

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Global development, as a subject of academic research, is a broad concept that has historically been concerned with notions of economic development. More recently, however, the term 'development' has come to include a more holistic and multi-disciplinary sense of human development – a combination of economic growth, alleviating poverty, and improving living conditions, particularly within previously colonized or 'developing' countries. This paper analyzes the success and capabilities of private sector investment in addressing development issues – particularly with regard to the Sustainable Development Goals, which act as a set of codified development aims established by the United Nations and ratified by all of its 193 member states.

Keywords: Social Entrepreneurship; Private Sector-Led Development; Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); Creating Shared Value; Corporate Social Responsibility

Introduction

Global development, as a subject of academic research, is a broad concept that has historically been concerned with notions of economic development. More recently, however, the term 'development' has come to include a more holistic and multi-disciplinary sense of human development – a combination of economic growth, alleviating poverty, and improving living conditions, particularly within previously colonized, or 'developing' countries. This paper analyzes the success and capabilities of private sector investment in addressing development issues – particularly with regard to the Sustainable Development Goals, which act as a set of codified development aims established by the United Nations and ratified by all of its 193 member states. Traditionally, the agenda of global development has not only been the goal but also the responsibility of the public sector – namely state governments, international organizations and other non-governmental organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank. However, there has been a significant change in global business attitudes over the last 25 years.

For the first time, there is a noticeable and increasing trend of efforts made for global development from within the *private* sector. Today, over \$2 trillion in business investment is benchmarked to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹ All Fortune 500 firms have Corporate Social Responsibility departments, and over half of them directly engage with the SDG goals as a part of their social community policy.² This paper will evaluate the potential for significant global development impacts of the private sector shift toward traditionally public sector roles.

Background

In September 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted at the United Nations (UN) Development Summit to serve as a 15-year plan of action for all countries and people. The SDGs include 17 specific goals and 169 associated targets that set out quantitative objectives across the "social, economic, and environmental dimensions" of sustainable development, all to be achieved by 2030.³ 'No Poverty', 'Good Health and Well-being', 'Affordable and Clean Energy', 'Gender Equality', and 'Decent Work and Economic Growth' are just a few examples amongst the collection of goals, each with its own list of targets that are measured with indicators.⁴ The achievement of these goals would have immense implications for global development. As the UN itself explains, they are "the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all."⁵ While each of the 17 goals focuses

¹ Dan Banik and Jason Miklian, "New Business: The Private Sector as a New Global Development Player", *Global Policy Journal*, Global Policy Journal, 24 Nov. 2017.

² *Ibid.*

³ Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, "Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", *United Nations*, United Nations, 2015.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

on a different aspect of global development, all are interconnected. A discussion of how to achieve them by 2030 is not complete without fully considering the role of the private sector, along with the public, in addressing the challenges that they face.

The interest of the private sector in becoming such a partner in international development is growing, reinforced by “new and evolving official programs, financing, partnerships and narratives.”⁶ This trend is supported by a large body of academic work including, but not limited to, the Price Waterhouse Coopers Sustainable Development Goal Engagement Survey (PwC SDG Engagement Survey) – which generated 986 business responses and 2,015 consumer responses. Highlights from the report are as follows: 71% of businesses say they are already planning how they will engage with the goals; 41% of businesses say they will embed Sustainable Development Goals into strategy and the way they do business; 90% of citizens say it’s important for business to sign up to the SDGs; and, 78% of citizens say they are more likely to buy the goods and services of a company that have sign up to achieve the SDGs.⁷

Businesses as a New Global Development Actor

Not only have businesses and investors expressed an interest in supporting fulfillment of the Sustainable Development Goals, but there is also an increasing volume of actors actively pursuing specific ventures that will do so. As Jenny Vaughn, Human Rights Director of Business for Social Responsibility, explained:

Development assistance from official donors was \$153 billion in 2018. That pales in comparison with the value of private sector investment, which was more than seven times that amount during the same period.⁸

The private sector is becoming an increasingly present – and dynamic – actor on the global development stage. In 2018, the Global Sustainable Development Goal Awards were created to recognize specific companies that have developed new products and services and are uniquely positioned for global growth and impact; the winners act as case studies in SDG leadership. Such winners include:

Such winners include Azuri, which has created a pay-as-you-go solar home system with integrated AI technology that has allowed over 100,000 households gain access to lighting and media services, acting as an affordable and eco-friendly alternative for African customers in energy poverty.

Please note that there are abundant example cases for each of the 17 goals – more of which can be found on the Global SDG 2018 Award Winners website – but for the sake of brevity, the above business has been highlighted to showcase specific efforts with quantitative impacts.⁹

Economic Considerations

With this trend of companies and investors becoming increasingly engaged in development problems and the private sector gaining experience with development issues, there is now a noticeable shift toward development efforts that create both business value and social good – a phenomenon that Michael Porter has termed “Shared Value”, in that it generates business and economic value while also addressing key environmental and social issues.¹⁰ The concept of Creating Shared Value (CSV) can be defined as

[p]olicies and operating practices that enhance the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic and social conditions in the communities in which it operates.¹¹

By better aligning business initiatives with sustainable development goals, the private sector opens itself up to many ways to serve new needs, gain efficiency, create differentiation, and expand market opportunities.¹² The business case for aligning business goals with social-improvement initiatives has been bolstered by new research on how SDG-specific compliance can create market opportunities and grow profits. For example, the non-profit Business and Sustainable Development Commission claims that the fulfillment of four key objectives alone – food and agriculture, cities, energy and materials, and health and well-being – will create \$12 trillion in business revenue by 2030.¹³ Mark Malloch-Brown, Chair of the Business and

⁶ Cheryl McEwan et al., “Enrolling the Private Sector in Community Development: Magic Bullet or Sleight of Hand?”, *Development and Change*, vol. 48, no. 1, 2017, p. 29., doi:10.1111/dech.12283.

⁷ Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), “SDG Engagement Survey – New Global Goals: Are They Business Critical?”, *PwC Global*, PwC Network, 2015.

⁸ Jenny Vaughan, “How Business Can Affect Human Rights: 4 Lessons from Peacebuilding and Development”, *GreenBiz*, GreenBiz Group Inc., 3 Sept. 2019.

⁹ The Global SDG Awards, “2018 Award Winners”, *Global SDG Awards*, 2018.

¹⁰ Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, “Creating Shared Value”, *Harvard Business Review* 89, nos. 1–2, January–February 2011, p. 62.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 66.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 67.

¹³ “Better Business, Better World”, *The Report of the Business & Sustainable Development Commission*, Business and Sustainable Development Commission, Jan. 2017, p. 12.

Sustainable Development Commission, said the biggest “prize” for the private sector that engages in sustainable development is a much bigger global economy, an increase of 10–30%, which would represent a “quantum leap” in making “today’s poor tomorrow’s consumers and workers.”¹⁴ This return in investment is viewed by Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever, as one of the key benefits, as he explains: “we have seen this on climate action, which influence 13 of the 17 SDGs, where businesses that actively take into account this issue enjoy 18% higher returns on investment.”¹⁵ Unilever and its Sustainable Living brands, which mirror the goals of the SDGs, grow 30% faster on average than the rest of the company.¹⁶

Overall, economic gains from achieving the goals could add substantially to the total return on investment expected for the private sector’s involvement in such development. For example, as the Sustainable Development Commission explains:

Better health and education will increase labor productivity. Reduced social inequality and environmental stress will reduce political uncertainty, lowering business risks and multiplying returns on investment.¹⁷

In this way, SDG compliance offers a compelling growth strategy for individual businesses and the global private sector industry as a whole.

While the business case for sustainable development is strong, there is debate as to how equal the engagement by companies and investors will be in regard to all 17 goals. Data collected from the PwC SDG Engagement Survey shows that corporate efforts dedicated to SDG engagement is not evenly dispersed across all 17 goals; overall, when you look at the objectives that companies are prioritizing investment in, it is clear that they are identifying specific areas where they expect their business itself to excel and grow (See **Figure 1**). This effect of taking a shared-value approach to sustainable business practices has garnered some criticism due to the demarcation of self-interested initiatives as a driving factor for increased




Figure 1: Business Impact on the SDGs and Potential Opportunities.¹⁸

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 14.

¹⁵ Paul Polman, “Why Sustainable Development Makes Good Business Sense”, *Business & Sustainable Development Commission*, BSDC, 2015.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ PwC SDG Engagement Survey, p. 10.

private-sector involvement with global development strategies. Taking this factor into consideration – namely that business is seemingly set to focus on a portion of total SDGs that do offer proportionate benefits to the expected costs of such engagement – the question arises of how to show the private sector that all 17 of the goals are relevant to business itself.

Addressing Criticisms from an Economic Point-of-View

The PwC SDG Engagement survey points to a “fear of the unknown and the inability to measure and evaluate how SDGs will impact a company” as primary reasons for this hesitation to engage with all 17 of the goals.¹⁹ This is understandable, given that both the establishment of the SDGs and the role of the private sector as a global development actor are both relatively new developments. When making business decisions, a company must consider a number of factors including time, money, risks, and benefits. How to assess impact will be fundamental to valuing the positive and negative contributions a business makes toward the SDGs – or as one suggestion from the survey explains: “A standardized tool for gap analysis, monitoring, reporting and measurement would be most relevant for industry benchmarking, or best practices sharing.”²⁰

PwC has formulated one such tool – its Total Impact Measurement and Management (TIMM) framework – for informing the development of business policy in coherence to the goals while also offering a holistic view of what businesses need to understand in terms of risk, identifying opportunities, and maintaining a positive impact on society. The PwC website offers a number of case studies where this framework has already been implemented. For example, consider their Food & Beverage Scenario – a real-world business case that addresses the question: should barley be imported or should an alternative, locally grown crop be grown for the brewery?²¹ (See **Figures 2a** and **2b**). In this case, the TIMM perspective allows the private-sector actor to develop a clearer long-term strategy for the business and help engage with stakeholders on the basis of “a more credible analysis of the impacts of business decisions.”²² This framework is invaluable, because it quantifies the seemingly qualitative effects of aligning a business model with the SDGs. The ability to trace SDG engagement to specific deliverables is essential to making sustainable development more approachable for businesses. At the UN General Assembly in September 2019, 140 banks signed up to support the UN’s Principles for Responsible Banking, an agreement to work on “more consistent ways of measuring sustainability”; and on October 16th 2019, the members of the new Global Investors for Sustainable Development Alliance – which consists of chief executives from 30 of the world’s biggest companies – committed to “scale up and speed up” their efforts to align their businesses with the 17 goals and to the creation of common standards for measuring the impact of SDG investments.²³




Figure 2a: Option 1 (Food and Beverage Scenario) – Import Barley.²⁴
Upside: Less consumption of water, which is a scarce resource of the local community.
Downside: Higher GHG emissions; Lower investment in new infrastructure.

¹⁹ PwC SDG Engagement Survey, p. 26.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p. 27.

²¹ Price Water House Coopers, “Total Impact Measurement and Management”, PwC, PwC Network, 2018.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, “Global Business Chiefs Pledge to Boost Sustainable Development”, *Financial Times*, Financial Times, 16 Oct. 2019.

²⁴ Price Water House Coopers, “Total Impact Measurement and Management – Food and Beverage Scenario”, PwC, PwC Network, 2018.




Figure 2b: Option 2 (Food and Beverage Scenario) – Grow and Source Locally.²⁵

Upside: Communities benefit more (jobs, health etc.); Investment in new infrastructure; Lower GHG emissions.

Downside: Higher consumption of scarce water resource and associated health impacts.

Philosophical Considerations

The shared-value approach case for sustainable development makes good business sense; it opens up new opportunities and big efficiency gains, drives innovation, and enhances reputations.²⁶ However, to some scholars and other prominent actors in the field of global development, shared-value essentially means self-interest. According to Laura Gitman, Chief Operating Officer at Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), the shared-value approach to global development has “given permission for companies to care about society only when it provides benefits to them.”²⁷ Such critiques ultimately raise concerns over the extent to which the global community should rely on a business case for developmental goals and what can be done to ensure that SDGs without a strong business case are not disregarded. However, there do exist compelling arguments for the incorporation of the objectives into a business plan other than that it simply makes good business sense.

One such argument is the growing sense of urgency surrounding sustainable development. As explained in the “Private-Sector Collaboration for Sustainable Development” report, published by BSR:

In the past year, it has become increasingly clear that the world is changing fast—and profoundly. We are faced with challenges such as catastrophic climate change, increasing inequalities, and the rapid emergence of new technologies that disrupt societies and raise new, fundamental ethical questions.²⁸

This sense of urgency is something that companies such as Deloitte have taken notice of. On October 15th 2019, *Forbes* published an article in which Deloitte representatives stated that, “there [is] a growing expectation that business must play its role in delivering improvements in the lives of customers and employees, and protecting the environment for us all.”²⁹ This shift in responsibility agency – away from a siloed, public-sector sustainable development approach toward one that not only incorporates, but actively involves the private sector – is a phenomenon that many of the primary actors in the realm of development have taken note of.

Constructing a Moral Argument for the Business Case

Aside from increasing changes in expectations and agency, there also exists a moral case perspective which argues that businesses should prioritize the SDGs in order to become more responsible global citizens – even if they do not yet have a

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ “Better Business, Better World”, p. 12.

²⁷ Laura Gitman, “When the Business Case and Shared Value Aren’t Enough”, *Business for Social Responsibility*, BSR, 2017.

²⁸ Sara Enright, Cecile Oger, Peder Michael Pruzan-Jorgensen, and Angie Farrag-Thibault, *Private-Sector Collaboration for Sustainable Development*, Report, BSR, 2018.

²⁹ Sharon Thorne, “Protecting Our Future: Moving From Talk To Action On The Sustainable Development Goals”, *Forbes*, *Forbes Magazine*, 15 Oct. 2019.

comprehensive legal responsibility to do so. The shift in responsibility agency, in which private sector actors are increasingly expected to assume an active role in sustainable development, is significant because it speaks to a shift in moral agency as well. The moral argument here is essentially that, since a corporation is an organization with the legal rights and duties of an individual, then “a corporation has rights and duties toward the greater societal good, too.”³⁰ As the Internet Encyclopædia of Philosophy (IEP) explains, “we evaluate people and groups as responsible or not, depending on how seriously they take their responsibilities.”³¹ This argument differs from the economically-based CSV approach, in that private sector actors should not align their business initiatives with the SDGs simply because it can generate economic returns, but that they should do so because it is also in the best interest of society.

The global community has shared values that can be better provided for by the involvement of the private sector in development roles. Since the private sector is by definition self-interested and controlled, there will always be a debate about the true intention behind private participation in development. However, if embedding global development considerations and sustainable practices in core business strategy can contribute to broader prosperity, while also generating a profit for those actors who do so, perhaps the means do not matter as much as the end result. Furthermore, the private sector is not the only global development actor that might take an interest in motives other than pure altruism.

The public sector actors who have traditionally held responsibility for global development initiatives are not without their own alternative intentions. For example, the United States National Security Strategy views global development as a vital tool for matters of US security. The policy, as released in 2017, outlines a nationalistic development strategy that prioritizes specific development assistance that best supports America’s national interests.³² Such interests include competing with other countries for global influence; stabilizing states and regions which the US considers fragile or weak, in order to limit security threats to the US itself; and supporting American values.³³

There are a multitude of reasons why both members of the public and private sector might choose to engage in global development initiatives. However, if the moral agency for sustainable, global development is expanding to include the private sector as a responsibility-bearer, this would have immense implications for the entire global community. This increased support from companies for the SDGs could result in the normalization of sustainable businesses practices, a change that would have significant global development impacts for years to come.

Conclusions: The Future of Sustainable Development

Advancement of the Sustainable Development Goals by the private sector is not only backed by economic reasoning – in that it has large expected return on investments for companies that engage them – but also by moral reasoning as well – it is the duty of private sector actors, as members of the global community, to actively pursue the shared value outputs associated with the accomplishment of the SDGs.

The world has 13 years before the deadline it has set for itself to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals – the realization of which affects global public and private actors alike. It would be imprudent to assume that corporations and investors can do (on their own and in the next several years) what governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international development organizations have been challenged with for the majority of the last century. However, development agencies posit that shared-value approaches can be instrumental in reducing poverty in the developing world and therefore it is important to form strategic partnerships with the private sector to achieve this objective.³⁴

For the United Nations, partnership with the private sector is seen to have bestowed “more business credibility and authority”; extended the UN’s ability to fulfil its mandates through increased resources; and “provided access to private sector skills and management talents.”³⁵ For the private sector, partnerships have “increased corporate influence in global policy making and at the national level”; “brought direct financial returns”, such as tax breaks and market penetration, as well as indirect financial benefits through brand and image promotion; and enhanced “corporate authority and legitimacy” through association with UN and other bodies.³⁶

Looking forward, it is necessary to clearly establish the roles, aims, and responsibilities of development actors and the private sector, as well as delineate successful mechanisms for cooperation on shared goals. The increasing alignment of shared interests and values between the public and private sectors offers an opportunity that should not be missed: it can be used not only to foster new partnership but to ensure that partnership is truly in the interests of sustainable global development. Moreover, for communities directly affected by the realization of the SDGs – particularly those located in the global south or in developing nations – there are clear advantages in partnerships that bring together extra resources and

³⁰ Laura Gitman, “When the Business Case and Shared Value Aren’t Enough”.

³¹ Garrath Williams, “Responsibility,” *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ISSN 2161-0002. 2019.

³² Adva Saldinger, “What the US National Security Strategy Says about Global Development”, Devex, 19 Dec. 2017.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Priyan Senevirathna, “Creating Shared Value through Partnerships in Agricultural Production in Sri Lanka”, *Geoforum*, vol. 90, 2018, pp. 219.

³⁵ Buse and Walt, “Global Public–Private Partnerships: Part II – What are the Health Issues for Global Governance”, *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, World Health Organization, 2000, 78 (5), p. 706.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

targeted programs that have the potential to benefit large populations. As we approach 2030, we will be able to assess if such achievements made in securing and aligning efforts for the initiatives not only help with the full realization of the SDGs but also alter the way in which public and private actors think about global development as a shared value and shared endeavor – a systemic change that would impact business and society on a global scale.

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RESEARCH

The M16 in Vietnam: A History of the Weapon's Effectiveness in the Vietnam War and the Necessity of its Creation

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Based off the AR-15 and necessitated by the need for a superior weapon to that of the enemy, the M16 made its debut in the Vietnam War. The M16 was an icon for protagonists in movies and TV, a symbol for democracy, and it became the image for American or NATO forces for decades to come. It is still in service today as the standard issue weapon for 85 sovereign nations, including the United States. Few doubt the efficacy of the weapon's later, more advanced models in the Gulf War, the invasion of Grenada, or the war in Afghanistan. The Vietnam War, however, was the debut of the M16. However, the weapon's effectiveness has faced scrutiny within the context of the Vietnam War. So, the question remains: was the M16 an effective weapon in the Vietnam War, and was it a necessary implementation?

Keywords: M16; Vietnam War; Effective; America

The loudest sound in a firefight is your weapon going "click." In an instant you realize that the one thing that might protect you from the enemy has failed, and you're in a race against time. You drop to your knees and disassemble your rifle in a desperate attempt to clear the jam and stay alive. When you look up, you see a pair of eyes filled with pure hatred for you, staring down the sights of an AK-47. He doesn't know your name, but he knows your flag, and he flinches only from the recoil of his weapon as he mercilessly guns you down. You stare off, seeing the skyline of a city you can't pronounce, dying in someone else's country, bleeding out beside your broken M16.

This morbid scene was quite often the reality for many infantrymen in the United States Army and Marine Corps during the conflict in Vietnam. It's no secret that the United States was greatly underprepared for a war against such a formidable opponent in such an adverse environment. Guerilla warfare tactics and disease killed thousands of unwilling young men, but neither were so terrifying as having your own life flash before your eyes as you watched your only line of defense go down in your hands. Fighting a war in a jungle was difficult, but it was even more so due to the soldiers' lack of access to adequate weaponry. As evidence will suggest throughout this analysis, the M16's reliability early in the war was questionable at best and, in many cases, proved to be suicidal. A Vietnam veteran told a Time Magazine reporter in 1967, "We left with 72 men in our platoon and came back with 19, [sic] Believe it or not, you know what killed most of us? Our own rifle. Practically every one of our dead was found with his (M16) torn down next to him where he had been trying to fix it."¹

Based off the AR-15 and necessitated by the need for a superior weapon to that of the enemy, the M16 made its debut in the Vietnam War. The M16 was an icon for protagonists in movies and TV, a symbol for democracy, and it became the image for American or NATO forces for decades to come. It is still in service today as the standard issue weapon for 85 sovereign nations, including the United States.² Few doubt the efficacy of the weapon's later, more advanced models in the Gulf War, the invasion of Grenada, or the war in Afghanistan. The Vietnam War, however, was the debut of the M16. However, the weapon's effectiveness has faced scrutiny within the context of the Vietnam War. So, the question remains: was the M16 an effective weapon in the Vietnam War, and was it a necessary implementation?

It is important to look at the design and the intention of the M16 before judging the performance. During World War II and the Korean War, the most common standard issue weapons were the M1 Garand, the M1A1 Carbine, and the M1921 submachine gun, also known as the Thompson Submachine Gun. The M1, the most common weapon, was a clip-fed semiautomatic

¹ "Defense: Under Fire". Time; 09 June 1967.

² "Colt M16A2" Militaryfactory.com; 2003.

rifle that sported a variation of heavy ammunition types, including the .30-06 Springfield and the 7.62 × 51 mm NATO.³ These ammunition types would rip through small cover, like wooden walls and thin metals, but they presented their own drawbacks. The 7.62 was a heavy round, and soldiers found it difficult to maneuver through a battlefield and retain their stamina while carrying scores of heavy clips. The bullet's weight also slowed its velocity, which caused its trajectory to drop and made it vulnerable to wind resistance. 7.62-fed weapons are still in use today, so the bullet setback was not the main call for an upgrade for the M1. A major reason an upgrade was needed was the weapon's ammunition capacity and reload speed. Reloading the M1 was time-consuming and had to be done with careful precision. A bent clip or a loose bullet could create jams and malfunctions. At a maximum of 8 rounds per clip, soldiers needed to excel at reloading quickly. Switching from a clip-fed weapon to a magazine-fed weapon not only increased the round capacity but made reloads easier and faster.

Speed, accuracy, and ease of use were not the only things required of a new service weapon. If that were the case, the M14, another 7.62 × 51 mm weapon predating the M16 by about 15 years, would have fit all of these qualifications quite handily. This would have been the ideal weapon to have in Vietnam, especially since the soldiers trained with the M14 stateside in basic training. M14s were capable of operating in semi-automatic and fully automatic firing modes. A larger round being shot through a longer barrel packed a much larger punch against an enemy who carried 7.62 ammunition themselves, not to mention its versatility at mid-range and long-range engagements. The M14's shortcomings rested in its unwieldy, almost uncontrollable, fully automatic setting. The kickback of the weapon was simply too strong for the recoil to be manageable. The Army attempted to resolve these issues by manufacturing models with heavier barrels, muzzle brakes, and even a foldable bipod on the front to maintain accuracy. All of these attempts failed to cure the unreliability of the M14 and maintained its inferiority to the Browning Automatic Weapon (BAR) as a squad automatic rifle. However, the problems did not end there. The heavier round made it difficult to carry enough ammunition to maintain fire superiority over the Soviet-engineered AK-47, the weapon of choice for the Vietnamese.⁴ It was outclassed, and thus forced the military to create a new weapon: the M16.

If the only issue at hand was that the United States had inferior weapons to the AK-47, why would the military not just adopt the Kalashnikov AK-47 as a standard issue rifle? They were relatively cheap to manufacture; in present day, there are over one hundred million Kalashnikov firearms, which is one fifth of the entire world supply of firearms. This strategy may also have yielded the benefit of using captured enemy munitions against them.⁵ The U.S. military's goal was not to match the enemy's ability, but rather to create a superior rifle. Using Soviet weapons would not tip the scales.

Besides these small details, some immediate, more measurable advantages presented themselves in the M16. The M16 was ergonomically a superior weapon to the AK-47 in almost every way. Reloads on the M16 were faster, getting empty weapons and vulnerable soldiers back into the fight much quicker.⁶ This was mostly due to the general design of the weapon, since the M16 had a magazine well that guided the user's hand. It was also due to the fact that when the rifle ran out of ammunition, the bolt locked to the rear, indicating the need to reload. The AK-47 lacked such a feature, making it difficult to quickly tell when you needed to reload. The selector switch, which the user could manipulate to set the weapon to safe, semi-automatic, or full auto, was much easier to access on the M16 as well. The selector lever on the AK-47 was on the right side, and was designed to be very large, requiring the user's full right hand to manipulate. As opposed to the M16, which had just a small switch on the left side, accessible by the user's thumb while holding the pistol grip.⁷

These features were minor when compared to actual use of the weapon in combat, specifically the ability to hit a target. A study was conducted on the performance of the M16 and AK-47 by the United States Army in May of 1990, overseen by Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Weaver Jr. The study concluded that an M16A1's probability to hit a target without any aiming errors was 100% up to 300 meters, 73% at 600 meters, and 39% at 800. Rates for the AK-47 were 94% at 300 meters, 54% at 600 meters, and 31% at 800 meters.⁸ This is due to the heavier cartridge that the AK-47 sports, combined with its inferior and unreliable iron sights. However, a comparison of accuracy is not all that can be done to test the effectiveness of the M16.

Penetrative ability also mattered, and the AK-47 did seem to outshine the M16 by blasting through almost anything in front of it. That might sound like an advantage to the credit of the AK-47, but that is not necessarily true in the context of war. Research suggested that a smaller, faster moving round, would do more damage than a heavier round. The creator of the original M16, Eugene Stoner, explained that while smaller bullets are more stable while flying through the air, they become unpredictable after making contact with a target.⁹ This can cause more internal damage, which is more likely to

³ Thompson, Leroy (2012). *The M1 Garand*. Oxford: Osprey. p. 33.

⁴ Bruce, Robert. "M14 Vs. M16 in Vietnam." *Small ARms Review*.

⁵ Killicoat, Phillip (April 2007). "Weaponomics: The Global Market for Assault Rifles" (PDF). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4202 (Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 10). Oxford University. P. 3.

⁶ <http://www.military-sf.com/ROF.htm> Rates of fire By William S. Frisbee Jr.

⁷ <http://www.tactical-life.com/magazines/special-weapons/in-praise-of-the-m16-rifle/?scrape=true> Tactical Life. In Praise of the M16 Rifle. Why it's become the longest serving rifle in the recent US military history! By Chuck Taylor. June 13th 2009.

⁸ Weaver, Jr., Jonathan M. (May 1990). "USMAA Technical Report No. 461 – System Error Budgets, Target Distributions and Hitting Performance Estimates for General Purpose Rifles and Sniper Rifles of 7.62 × 51 mm and Larger Calibers" (PDF). *dtic.mil*. United States Army.

⁹ Fallows, James. "M-16: A Bureaucratic Horror Story." *The Atlantic*, Atlantic Media Company, 7 Nov. 2017.

result in a fatality. This means that even a poorly aimed shot, as long as it makes contact with an enemy, can still potentially do more damage than a bigger bullet.

Dr. Martin L. Fackler conducted tests at the Wound Ballistics Laboratory in San Francisco, California in 1990, and determined that while the AK-47's penetrative power was superior, it actually caused less damage to the human body. His studies confirmed what Eugene Stoner had envisioned with his weapon design. The large mass of 7.62 rounds propelled it clean through flesh, creating a clear path that could be easily patched up. A shot from the M16, however, with its lighter round, would create more internal bleeding. Once the lighter round hit a solid target, it tumbled, which created massive internal bleeding. This could not be fixed during a firefight and required surgery to repair.¹⁰ Even if the shooter missed a vital organ, there was still a chance that the round would bounce around inside the victim's body and cause enough damage to kill him later.

Mechanical superiorities, however, were not enough to ensure victory in a battle. If soldiers do not feel like their efforts are making a difference, their morale (or lack thereof) can turn the tides in the enemy's favor. The M16 boosted the confidence of soldiers. The ability to lay down effective fire compared to the automatic riflemen beside them made them more self-assured that their role in their squads was as valuable as others, which is incredibly important on the battlefield. Samuel L. A. Marshall, a combat historian during the 1940s and 1950s, conducted a study that concluded that nearly four fifths of combat soldiers in the European theater of World War II never fired their weapons during battle.¹¹ The BAR, a squad-level, shoulder-fired machine gun used in the Second World War, was a weapon of incredible stopping power. There would typically be one or two per squad of twelve men, and engagements would often begin by the BAR man opening fire first to produce the most casualties as early as possible. Firing would begin with him, and spread out from there, which meant that the nearer a man was to the BAR, the more likely he was to fire. Many believed that using the semi-automatic M1 was futile because of the raw power behind the BAR. John Keegan, a prominent military historian, writes in his book, *The Face of Battle*, "Infantrymen, however well-trained and well-armed, however resolute, however ready to kill, remain erratic agents of death. Unless centrally directed, they will choose, perhaps badly, their own targets, will open and cease fire individually, will be put off their aim by the enemy's return of fire, will be distracted by the wounding of those near them, will yield to fear or excitement, will fire high, low, or wide."

Most infantrymen could not see their targets but knew generally where they were and would often either fire blindly or hold fire entirely. The BAR man, in contrast, could suppress an area with relative ease, which discouraged anyone else from even trying. Because of how powerful the BAR was, many ambushes would be over as soon as they started; there was often no need for anybody else to participate in the action. This was a problem that needed remedy, and the M16 offered a solution. With all the advantages of automatic fire, recoil control, and ballistic reliability, soldiers felt that their efforts were contributing more to the fight than just shooting leaves and grass.

The M16 proved to be a superior weapon to that of the enemy's AK-47. The M16 excelled in crucial comparisons between the two rifles – namely in accuracy at long range, accuracy in fully automatic fire, quick reload capabilities, its lighter weight (both for the rifle itself and for its ammunition), and the damage possible against an enemy force. Having the M16 also gave American soldiers an edge over the Viet Minh because it served to boost soldiers' confidence during a firefight, which helped eliminate complete reliance on the squad's machine guns. In many ways, the M16 was superior to the weapons used by the enemy, but the tests to determine so were mostly done in closed environments. To determine how reliable the weapon truly was, testing environments must match the environment of war as closely as possible. Initially, the M16 was notorious for jamming frequently. The House Committee on Armed Services conducted a series of reliability tests on the M16. Stoppages were recorded at 3.3%, with 33 total stoppages from five rifles fired 200 times each.¹² In the same hearing before Congress, a representative from the Air Force also claimed that they recorded, "Of the total malfunctions 78.7% were in the category of failure of bolt to go forward." The most common reason for stoppages was improper, or an entire lack of, lubrication.¹³ Why was this number so high? What was wrong with the M16 that did not occur with the M14 or M1 Garand? The biggest problem was the advertisement of the M16 as a "self-cleaning weapon" by Colt, its manufacturer.¹⁴ This sowed a false sense of reliability in the weapon. Few soldiers, if any, went through the trouble of cleaning out the barrel or chamber of their rifles. This problem was made worse by the mechanical design of the M16.

The M16's "internal piston" design used combustion to move the internal parts, as opposed to gas pistons that were common in machine guns, including the AK-47. This made the M16 lighter, but much hotter. The internal piston design also forced any byproducts of the miniature explosion, such as carbon and vaporized metal, into the receiver. This required soldiers to clean their weapons more frequently than those using gas-piston weapons. Heat from frequently firing the

¹⁰ The Effects Of Small Arms On The Human Body, By Martin L. Fackler, Md Archived 2012-02-18 at the Wayback Machine (PDF).

¹¹ Burdett, Thomas F. (June 15, 2010). "Bibliography: Marshall, Samuel Lyman Atwood." *Handbook of Texas Online*.

¹² Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Armed Services, Issue 14, Part 1. United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1969. Page 2326.

¹³ Major Thomas P. Ehrhart Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer. US Army. 2009.

¹⁴ Bruce, Robert (April 2002). "M14 vs. M16 in Vietnam." *Small Arms Review*. 5(7).

weapon could cause whatever lubricant was available to burn off very quickly. Dirt, dust, and debris can prevent all moving components within the weapon from moving freely. Carbon buildup from gunshot residue within the chamber was a culprit, but also consider the environment the weapon was used in— a jungle is certainly not a place you would want to take such a delicate instrument, especially one that was not regularly maintained. As a result of this false advertisement by Colt and the government's rush to get soldiers armed and shipped overseas in the first years of the war, soldiers were not issued cleaning kits for their weapons, nor were they provided lubricant. Regular cleaning and proper lubrication are paramount to making sure a weapon will fire reliably, but many men had neither. But this is just once piece of the larger puzzle. An unclean weapon caused countless stoppages, but the inability to quickly and efficiently clear those stoppages was what killed so many men.

The M16 lacked a component that allowed a soldier to manually close the bolt. If the bolt is not entirely closed, the shot will misfire. With bolt action weapons, common throughout World War II and the Korean War, soldiers could manually push the bolt fully forward. This was not the case with the M16, because its bolt was fully encased by the upper receiver, manipulated by the charging handle, which could only be pulled backward. There was a proposal to include a mechanism in the original AR-15, the M16's prototype, to manually close the bolt, but the proposal was rejected as useless. A representative from the Air Force, in the 1969 congressional hearing, claimed that a manual bolt closing device was unnecessary. He claimed that, after three years of testing, none of the problems found could have been remedied by a bolt closing device. The Marine Corps, Army, and the creator of the weapon all agreed that the bolt closing device was unnecessary. The problems that arose during the early years of the Vietnam War would soon prove them correct, but only by technicality. The problems with the M16 would not have been remedied by a manual bolt closing device, but they could be temporarily fixed long enough to keep soldiers alive so they could fix the problems later.

Misfire was a serious problem. Without a manual bolt closing device, a soldier with a jam would have to tear down the entire weapon and fix the weapon with their hands. Another common reason that a weapon system would go down was because of something called "failure to extract."¹⁵ This occurred when the spent cartridge from a fired round would not eject from the upper receiver, and a new round would be loaded in, jamming the spent cartridge into the chamber with the brass casing still inside. Soldiers would have to shove rods down the barrel of their rifles to attempt to knock the empty cartridges out, similar to a Revolutionary War soldier with a musket. These issues happened often and were the cause of men's deaths more often than necessary. Since many military officials considered a manual bolt closing device unnecessary, there was no alternative to this dangerous and time-consuming task. The improved model M16A1, issued to the armed services in 1969,¹⁶ finally included a manual bolt closing device – the forward assist.¹⁷

The M16A1 was one of the first models to improve upon the original M16. The forward assist was one of many critical improvements, because it finally offered a solution to a problem that plagued the Army and Marine Corps for almost three years. The forward assist was a small button the right side of the rifle that, when struck with enough force, would push the bolt as far forward as possible. In many cases, the bolt would not lock in completely as a result of debris or lack of lubrication. The forward assist offered a temporary, field expedient solution to this problem. It offered what the government had claimed was unnecessary – a manual bolt closing device. The manufacturers also implemented a chrome-plated chamber that would reduce corrosion, and therefore stoppages.

In April of 1967, twelve chrome plated M16s were shipped to Vietnam for evaluation, but when the Army Weapons Command technical team arrived in Vietnam in May of 1967, only two of these rifles could be found. No tests were, or could have been, conducted to determine how effective the chrome-plated design was. Because of the lack of convincing evidence, the Army delayed its decision to implement chrome-plating on the interior of the M16. This would have made the weapon's debut more successful and is what eventually helped make the M16A1 a much more appealing weapon. The third of the major changes was not actually a change to the rifle itself, but rather a rifle accessory. The Army started to issue thirty-round magazines instead of the iconic twenty-round magazines that soldiers carried in the beginning of the war. The Army also made these magazines out of cheaper materials, so that they could be cheaply made en masse, and made the springs within the magazine stainless steel to resist rust.

These fixes could help solve problems when they arose, or delay issues that might have occurred, but would preventing these problems altogether not be better? The Army thought so, and in July of 1969 soldiers were issued cleaning kits for their rifles, as well as instructions on how to clean them.¹⁸ DA Pam 750-30, the official army regulation on weapon maintenance, gave step-by-step directions on what to check for and what might be done to correct any issues. The regulation included small nuggets of advice, such as to- "inspect your ammo when you load the magazines. Never load dented or dirty

¹⁵ Chivers, C.J. "How Reliable Is the M-16 Rifle?" *The New York Times*, The New York Times, 2 Nov. 2009.

¹⁶ Ezell, Edward Clinton (1983). *Small Arms of the World*. New York: Stackpole Books. Pp. 46–47. ISBN 978-0-88029-601-4.

¹⁷ Report of the M16 rifle review panel. Department of the Army. DTIC. 1 June 1968.

¹⁸ *Full text of "DA Pam 750-30."* 28 June 1968.

ammo...," and to "clean your rifle every chance you get – 3–5 times a day's not too often in some cases. Cleanliness is a must – and it may save your life!" This was not an exaggeration. It could quite literally save your life.

Between 1967 and 1968, the death toll of American soldiers jumped from 11,363 to 16,899. The following year, when the M16A1 was made standard issue, the death toll fell back down to 11,780.¹⁹ 1968 was the year with the most American casualties. Afterwards, just two years later in 1971, the numbers steadily declined to 2,357.²⁰ Was this due to the improvements made on the M16? The improvements made on the weapon system were crucial to its effectiveness, however there is a lack of evidence that this was a largely contributing factor. During 1968, the Tet Offensive created a rippling effect in the figures of casualties at the time. 1968 had more casualties than any other year, but also had the greatest number of troops in Vietnam compared to any other year, at 536,100 troops.²¹ The year following, there were 475,200 American troops in Vietnam. This means that in 1968, 3.1% of American troops were killed in combat, and in 1969, that number dropped to 2.4%. If one was to compare the ratio of soldiers killed in action to the number of soldiers in

Vietnam, the results would be a steady decline since 1969. The number of foreign soldiers aiding the United States against North Vietnam either remained about the same, or decreased, depending on the country. While the improvements made upon the M16 were crucial in this time, many other major factors contributed to these figures, mainly the Tet Offensive of 1968.

In its early years, the M16 fell short of expectations for a number of reasons. Its unreliability in combat situations could often be traced back to mechanical malfunctions, namely "failure to eject." This issue could have been avoided if men had been given tools and instruction on how to maintain their equipment. Without proper lubrication, taking such a temperamental instrument to a jungle was simply a recipe for disaster. Nevertheless, even with the M16's life threatening problems, its later models would end up proving to be reliable and effective. No previous weapon used in American wars could possibly outclass the AK-47 that the enemy most often used. The only option to improve the effectiveness of infantrymen was to make improvements on the work the Army had already laid out in the development of not only the AR-15, but of other automatic magazine-fed weapons. Midway through the war, the Department of Defense began issuing the M16A1 and maintenance supplies. This solved almost all the problems associated with the previous model, the M16. Having functional, safe weapons also boosted the morale of troops, giving them the confidence that their efforts were making a difference in the war they were forced into. The problem of soldiers not believing their efforts on the battlefield was solved by the increased ammunition capacity from the M1 Garand, the most common weapon used in World War II, as well as the fully automatic feature. No longer did men have to rely almost entirely on machine gun fire to succeed in an ambush or to suppress an enemy fighting position. The M16's lighter caliber made whatever wound it created much deadlier than the heavier counterpart of the M14, because of the ballistic behaviors the M16 displays when hitting a hard target. Even the best combat medics cannot treat internal bleeding.

The shortcomings of the M16 were not entirely the fault of the weapon's design. Improper maintenance equipment and the lack of instruction on how to properly care for it exaggerated the problems that were inherent to its design. The mechanical improvements on the M16A1 significantly reduced weapon malfunctions. The M16 and M16A1 were effective weapon systems because of their ability to outclass the weapons of the enemy and to boost the morale of American soldiers, however their implementation was only a decisive factor in the outcomes of small engagements, not the war itself. With that, I can firmly conclude that the M16 in the Vietnam War was an ineffective weapon until its reformation and re-release with proper instructions and supplies in the last chapter of the war.

Competing Interests

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²¹ Defense, Dept. of. "Vietnam War Allied Troop Levels 1960–73." *Vietnam War Allied Troop Levels 1960–73*, Dec. 2008, www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwatl.htm.

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RESEARCH

A Critique of Hobbes's State of Nature

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In this essay, I analyze Hobbes's formulation of what a state of nature would be like and assess whether or not that formulation is compelling. In doing this, I review his three principal reasons for conflict within the state of nature. I argue that his mechanistic reduction of human behavior and motivation is over-generalized and focus on the emphasis he places on instrumental power. I then review his description of zero-sum mentality in relation to trust between individuals and attempt to articulate a phenomenology of trust that appreciates the complexity of human interactions. Finally, I assess the validity of Hobbes's claim that moral consensus would cease to exist in a state of nature in the absence of a state apparatus. I attempt to refute his reasoning by making an appeal to human empathy and its moral dimensions in relation to glory-seeking behavior that Hobbes stipulates.

Keywords: Philosophy; Hobbes; Human Behavior; Morality

1. Introduction

Life in a state of nature, according to Hobbes, would be nothing less than a war of all against all where the life of an individual is "...solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes, 1651; 2004, p. 77). In every way, this is a situation remedied by the establishment of civil society. At least, this is Hobbes's initiative, a justification for the marriage of security and political existence ruled by an all-powerful figurehead, a sovereign. This is Hobbes's notorious Leviathan. His philosophical project requires a psychological description of human beings that is conducive to a humanity that is sufficiently rational and capable of obeying the sovereign for the sake of peace (Piiirima, 2006, pp. 4). This conceptualization of humanity is neither fundamentally egoistic nor altruistic. It is effectively pluralistic in a way that reflects the heterogeneous environment of a state of nature whose atmosphere is saturated in adverse experiences and based on a principle uncertainty. It is a world necessarily inhabited by Hobbesian man whose moral existence, in the contractarian sense, is predicated on the authority of the state apparatus that is effectively illustrated by substantial penalties for violations of the social contract, of hierarchically imposed consensus, and intended harmony. Without this authority, individuals gravitate toward a state of perpetual conflict and depravity, endlessly fighting over resources whose scarcity is assured by diametric opposition between individuals. This is the presumed war of all born out of self-preservation.

In this essay, I will argue that Hobbes's state of nature is contingent on an over-generalized and mechanistic reduction of human behavior and motivation. I will consider the material and temporal constraints of our behaviors and the motivations behind them in light of their circumstantial quality. In particular, I will focus on the emphasis Hobbes places on instrumental power concerning competition within the state of nature. I will argue that he operates off a homogenous definition of instrumental power as it relates to his concept of felicity. In light of the complexity within the state of nature, a categorically heterogeneous conception of instrumental power is more suitable and better appreciates the depths of human agency. A phenomenology of trust will also be explored that appreciates the complexity of this agency in relation to diffidence. I will argue that Hobbes's concept of diffidence is contingent on a zero-sum mentality and fundamental reciprocity failure. I will attempt to refute these by demonstrating that they are ad hoc hypotheses arrived at by a mathematized methodology that Hobbes implements. I will then visit Hobbes's argument concerning the impossibility of moral consensus within the state of nature with regards to the phenomena of glory-seeking. I will demonstrate how the notion that moral consensus cannot happen in a state of nature, according to Hobbes, does not follow when one considers human sentiment and the innate empathetic capacity that informs human interactions. Now I will begin by considering Hobbes's first principal cause of conflict: competition.

2. Competition in Hobbes's State of Nature

Critics of Hobbes often accuse him of grossly oversimplifying the human psyche. This is, an appeal, no less, to a venerate description of the human mind that celebrates its irreducible complexity and indeterminate depth and potential. There is no room in this picture for beings wholly and reliably preoccupied with a continual struggle for existence in an egotistical fashion. However, Hobbes never intended to prove a presumption of human nature, but to provide a counterfactual justification for the state apparatus and a stable existence within political society (Piirimae, 2006, p. 4). The rhetorical emphasis he placed on the calamitous social and political dimensions of human behavior, often contingent on his materialism, usually dissuades readers from careful analysis of his constructive arguments (Browning, 2015, p. 17). His materialist description of human beings, which is described early on in his *Leviathan*, where he compares human organs to basic mechanical components, is a literary device that does just that (Wolff, 2016, p. 10).

Apart from his mechanistic materialism, however, his reduction of the felicitous motivations of human beings can be seen as problematic. He describes human behavior as a series of motions toward objects of desire at the risk of underestimating the remarkably complex and often unpredictable aspects of agentic capacities. Nevertheless, this reduction is a philosophical underpinning that informs the composition of conflict within his stipulated state of nature, particularly concerning competition and resource scarcity. He provides three principal reasons for conflict:

“So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for safety; and the Third, for Reputation” [*sic*] (Hobbes, 1651; 1991, p. 88).

While his critics often accuse him of oversimplification with his concept of felicity, the complexity and unpredictable quality of agency inform his stipulation of competition in the state of nature. Competition for scarce resources invariably occurs as a result of a willingness to “motion” toward desirable objects (Hobbes, 1651; 1991, pp. 37–38). Despite variable physicality, our innate and inescapable mortality has a remarkably equalizing effect. However, we rarely observe this equality and often make fictitious downward comparisons. We assume that we are better than most. The idea that we are vulnerable, can pale in comparison to our inflated sense of invincibility. This causes us to view objects of desire as obtainable, but when “... two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies,” and to obtain desired objects, they aim to “destroy, or subdue one another” [*sic*] (Hobbes, 1651; 2004, p. 76). As a result, conflict ensues because of this competition for limited resources. Malnes (1993), however, rightly asserts that general scarcity is not the only cause of competition according to Hobbes. For instance, he does not imply that resources would be insufficient if properly distributed, however, equalized distribution would be insufficient “for the satisfaction of everyone’s unceasing drive to increase one’s instrumental power” (Piirimae, 2006, p. 6). The instrumentality of power, as it relates to personal security and insatiable desires, is a coercive force in its own right.

The net result of principle scarcity and instrumental power is a description that Hobbes believes is emblematic of all human interactions in a state of nature. However, this is a continuation of his mechanistic reduction of human behavior in a generalized form, and his conception of instrumental power is categorically homogenous as it relates to objectified desire and felicity. He recognizes that people pursue both immediate and future gratification, but he does not navigate the full complexity of these two extremities concerning a categorically heterogeneous conception of instrumental power as it relates to variable object scarcity. For instance, consider water in a desert; it can serve to quench an immediate thirst and satisfy one later if it is stored. There is a temporality inextricably linked to the desired object observed by an agent on some conscious level. What if, however, the rainy season comes early and there are plentiful quantities of water? The decision to store water could be altered by this event. This decision concerning the object of desire, water, is circumstantial and related to the relevant material conditions. Two very clear constraints to objects becoming desirable are their temporality and materiality. The word “constraint” is not meant to suggest a limited capacity for decision making, but rather, to appreciate the multiplicity of the temporal and material dimensions agents are cognizant of. To treat competition over an object of desire as a given is misplaced. This is because the competition is circumstantially bound, and the instrumentality of agentic power (i.e., the ability to obtain desired objects) is not necessarily conducive to competition as it relates to changeable environments, which, for Hobbesian man, are necessarily social ones. After all, Hobbes demonstrates how political society emerging out of a state of nature is contingent on a “construction arising out of the problems inherent in social interaction” (Browning, 2015, p. 14). Although Hobbes would argue that variation exists between periods of moderate and absolute scarcity, this does not falsify the aforementioned points considering the existence of the variable, non-static quality of interactions between agents. We can see how Hobbes’s formulation of desire-driven behavior as inevitably leading to competition is not convincing because of the circumstantially determined basis for decision-making. The generalizability of his classification of human behavior is constrained by his homogenous conception of instrumental power. Furthermore, the varying levels of complexity of object scarcity and human behavior are better encapsulated by a categorically heterogeneous conception of instrumental power.

3. Zero-sum Mentality, Trust, and Diffidence

Hobbes reasoned that from within a state of nature, diffidence, or lack of mutual trust between agents, would be the second principal cause of conflict. According to Piirimae (2006), agents are cognizant of two mutually exclusive conditional aspects of their existence. They have an innate tendency to compete for power, and natural superiority is non-existent in this competition. This refers to the equalizing effect of mortality salience that we can recall from earlier. In Hobbes's words:

“the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe” [*sic*] (Hobbes, 1651; 1991, p. 87).

An environment of mutual insecurity “drives people to attack one another by the logic of the situation” regardless of the discrepancy between actual and perceived motives (Ryan, 1996, p. 220). This situational logic, a rationale of insecurity stemming from fear, can be described as a zero-sum mentality, which refers to a persistent, and salient notion of one's gains equaling another's losses (Read, 1991, p. 506). The rationale operates off a behavioral profile of other agents—that they will attempt to compete for resources, and if need be, achieve this through violent means. How is it the case that from a zero-sum mentality we arrive at necessitated conflict? Hobbes reasoned that the reality of mutual distrust between agents within a state of nature suffices to justify anticipatory striking because it is mutually advantageous. We cannot be sure that another agent will be willing to partake in a peaceful affair if that agent feels that its life is in jeopardy. The uncertainty of events becomes a coercive conceptualization. Through anticipation of the actions of others, force is the most reasonable solution for obtaining resources (Hobbes, 1651; 2004, p. 76).

According to Kavka (1983), however, despite the appeal of anticipatory striking, Hobbes seems to ignore three consequential dangers. First, anticipatory striking leaves one open to a defensive attack. Second, one also risks identifying oneself to other potentially hostile agents. Third, even if one is successful and becomes considerably more powerful, one may become a more enticing target for glory seekers. The implications of these three dangers toward Hobbes's argument may seem damaging; however, contrary to Kavka's point, I would argue that Hobbes did not completely ignore these dangers. Instead, his postulation of death being among the worst evils and our innate extreme aversion to it deductively resulted in its own seemingly logical conclusion (i.e., an extreme fear of death can coerce us into taking extreme measures to avoid it). Hobbes did see, however, an intuitive method for avoiding this dilemma, which is the establishment of defensive coalitions (Kavka, 1983, p. 298). In effect, we are limited in our influence individually and matters “of control enter the discussion...for practical reasons: typically, the attainment of apparent goods depends on others” when our individual influence becomes incapable (Read, 1991, p. 508). There is a utility in the relationships we develop with other people when we find ourselves in a precarious position. The effectiveness of these coalitions, however, is significantly reduced by a fundamental problem of reciprocity failure. Even if a coalition develops out of mutual trust directed toward achieving a particular goal, there is no guarantee that group members will reciprocate. Hobbes argues that the possibility of an act of dissension from an agreement would be enough to destabilize and dissolve any contractual arrangement. From this, a war of all against all would ensue. For Hobbes, the only legitimate means of developing a stable, long-lasting contractual arrangement that prevents this is the implementation of a sovereign and subsequent state apparatus.

It is difficult to contest Hobbes's argument in this regard (i.e., the necessary existence of a sovereign and state apparatus) considering his aforementioned points concerning the fundamental problem of reciprocity failure. However, reciprocity failure is an ad hoc hypothesis considering that, without it, his claim that distrust makes the existence of a sovereign and state apparatus a necessity becomes somewhat doubtful. This is because he is making epistemological assumptions about human behavior that seem to be factual, not because they are, but because they need to be. Furthermore, a phenomenological perspective of trust with regards to the formation of defensive coalitions in a state of nature is more tenable with regards to sociality. Hobbes stipulates that individuals align with the state out of an awareness of its instrumentality, whereas Hegel, for instance, views the state as being “constitutive of individual identity” which includes social recognition as an individual develops a self-conscious identity (Browning, 2015, p. 5). Hegel's social constructionist perspective on the rational state is not entirely dissimilar from Hobbes's justification of the state but is considerably more flexible. This is not to suggest that theoretical flexibility is conducive to a necessarily correct argument, but that it is potentially symptomatic of one that lacks the rigidity that is seen in conclusions grounded on ad hoc premises. To clarify, consider that Hegel's dialectical perspective of human activity allows differentiated interpretations of reality, whereas Hobbes's materialism seems to deal with most social phenomena in an unchanging fashion (Browning, 2015, p. 5). Although Hobbes did not ignore the social dimensions of individuals, he reduces complex interactions in a way that resembles a mathematized methodology in his justification of political society (McNeilly, 1968, pp. 89–91). In effect, logical deductions stemming from axioms he generated, like the problem of reciprocity failure, for instance, led him to the necessary conclusions (McNeilly, 1968, pp. 180–191).

A phenomenological perspective of trust, as it relates to inter-subjectivity, is not going to view the development of defensive coalitional arrangements of any kind as contingent on zero-sum mentality in the Hobbesian sense. This is because of the centrality of a social context that it employs. Sociality, as it pertains to individuals immersed in the state of nature, is

a complex interaction, a multiplicity not subject to the certainty of a zero-sum mentality or the continuity in outcomes that Hobbes associates with it. Trust, in the Hobbesian sense, is homogeneous insofar as it reliably falters under the same stipulated conditions. Trust, in a phenomenological sense, is heterogeneous as it relates to the dynamic quality of an intersubjective process that is manifest as a social context specific to particular moments in time. In other words, trust between individuals is not a universal constant and is susceptible to change and often appropriated on a contextual basis. If trust were a universal constant then it would follow that a few dissenters could lead to the dissolution of trust between everyone, causing a war of all against all to ensue. One example of a social arrangement that requires trust is moral behavior, which is to say behavior grounded on moral principles. Hobbes argues, however, it is required that consensus as to what is considered moral behavior is achieved. If there is no consensus, a social contract cannot develop, and a war of all against all will ensue.

4. Morality in a State of Nature and Glory Seeking

The third principal cause of conflict within the state of nature, according to Hobbes, is glory. In particular, the pursuit of reputation (Hobbes, 1651; 1991, p. 88). Glory-seeking, according to Hobbes, is "joy, arising from imagination of a man's own power and ability" (Hobbes, 1651; 1991, p. 42). Piirimae (2006), argues that while typical interpretations of Hobbesian glory-seeking illustrate agents that are characteristically natural aggressors, this is not correct. Hobbes states clearly, that while some individuals do enjoy acts of conquest, glory-seeking behavior more generally pertains to everyone as it relates to its instrumentality. Therefore, glory-seeking is not a behavior emanating from an insatiable desire for conflict or a natural proclivity for violence, but an understanding of its practicality. In part, this is a consequence of the precarious environment that is Hobbes's state of nature. That said, Hobbes also identifies defensive glory-seeking (i.e., glory for the sake of self-defense) as an equalizing force, much like mortality salience, within the state of nature because it prevents natural aggressors from becoming too numerous and powerful (Piirimae, 2006, p. 8). However, glory-seeking, insofar as it is a cause of conflict within Hobbes's state of nature, is a destabilizing force that impedes security both individually and in groups, like defensive coalitions. Glory-seeking for individually relevant reasons, like defense, at the expense of others can also generally be considered unethical behavior; however, within the specific context of Hobbes's state of nature, justice becomes nil. According to Hobbes, justice and injustice do not exist in a state of nature because the state apparatus is non-existent (Wolff, 2016, p. 14). Further, since there is no justice or injustice, we cannot arrive at morals because they would have no functional purpose (Wolff, 2016, p. 14). Morals, in this sense, refer to a consensus as to what qualifies as moral conduct. Instead, Hobbes believes prudential Laws of Nature would exist—the second one being, for instance, a negative formulation of the golden rule articulated in the Bible (Wolff, 2016, p. 14). It reads: "...be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself" [sic] (Hobbes, 1651; 2004, p. 80). How can one arrive at this negative formulation of the golden rule without a moral consensus? It seems tenable that a moral system is needed before being able to establish such a law. For instance, a liberty granted within a small group in a state of nature might be not having to worry about being harmed by a fellow group member. There must be agreement among group members that not respecting this liberty would be wrong. Otherwise, why forbid the practice? Oxley (2011), argues that empathy is often involved in moral deliberation. Dual perspective-taking empathy, for instance, is where one imagines oneself in another's situation and then considers what the other person must feel in that situation. Through this process, we arrive at considerations that inform our moral deliberations (Oxley, 2011, p. 24). Hobbes's suggestion that we can arrive at the Second Law of Nature in the absence of moral consensus seems unreasonable when we consider the empathetic process that would have to occur in its implementation. The Second Law of Nature necessarily involves dual perspective-taking because it involves considering another's position as well as our own and is a process of conscious moral deliberation.

One could argue, however, that empathy does not necessarily have to play a role in developing the second law because it is more of a pragmatic principle than it is a moral one. One may not have to partake in perspective-taking to conclude that one would rather not be harmed. Mortality salience is more of an intuition than it is a perspective for consideration and moral deliberation. The fact that the second law may be followed could be the result of an implicit agreement arrived at through mutual mortality salience, without deliberation. What this rebuttal points to is not the lack of a moral system, but rather, perhaps, explicit communication of moral principles. That said, moral behavior is reinforced by reciprocation and not always continual deliberation. Nonverbal communication in this instance is just as valid as verbal communication insofar as moral principles are implied by reciprocated behaviors among people within the group. Also, worth noting, it is not so much that one would have to engage in perspective-taking to develop an aversion for being harmed, but that sustaining group cohesion is significantly aided by the empathetic process when one considers the well-being of others. Returning to the Hobbesian phenomena of glory-seeking, it seems unlikely that prudential Natural Laws would develop in an environment that facilitates glory-seeking behavior in the absence of moral deliberation via empathetic considerations. Considering that the perspective-taking process is intertwined with the Second Natural Law, for instance, it becomes somewhat nonsensical to suggest the simultaneous existence of both glory-seeking and a negative derivation of the golden rule without moral consensus. Although, Hobbes would argue that they can exist at the same time since the ones doing the

glory-seeking are, in effect, dissenting from any contractual obligations that would prohibit this behavior. Nonetheless, it seems dubious to suggest that Natural Laws, like the second one, would ever develop in the first place.

5. Conclusion

In this essay, I have demonstrated how Hobbes's stipulation of what a state of nature would be like is contingent on an oversimplified and over-generalized mechanistic reduction of human behavior and motivation. I reviewed his concept of diffidence and how it relates to an expressed zero-sum mentality and fundamental reciprocity failure. Furthermore, I demonstrated how both zero-sum mentality and reciprocity failure are ad hoc hypotheses that lack substance beyond their deductive qualities which stem from Hobbes's mathematized methodology. I also visited his argument concerning the nonexistence of moral consensus in a state of nature and the simultaneous existence of glory-seeking behavior. I illustrated how moral consensus does play a role in the relationships between individuals in a state of nature. While I did not set out to disprove Hobbes's articulation of what a human state of nature would consist of entirely, it is clear that he paints a rather incomplete picture. Regarding the intended purpose of his arguments, which is a counterfactual justification for the state apparatus, I do believe it is fair to conclude that he did not successfully do this insofar as a substantial portion of his argument is derived from epistemological assumptions of human behavior that were not entirely warranted or were, at times, insufficiently supported.

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CREATIVE SCHOLARSHIP

On Neoclassicism and the Numbing of the Negro Mind

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Neoclassical art of the 19th century utilized classical techniques that highlighted the norms of western culture. This umbrella of technique was applied to Americans of both European and African descent. Black neoclassical artists were constantly negotiating between the prescribed rules of the white art world and their unique personal experiences with black culture. As a result, Eurocentric constraints limited the African American voice and resulted in African Americans framing their perspective within a Eurocentric lens. "On Neoclassicism and the Numbing of the Negro Mind" is a commentary on the stifling effect of westernized expectations on black artists. This free-verse poem explores the relationship between white influences and the black artist while acknowledging the contradiction therein. The poem concludes by praising the enduring nature of black artists' unique perspective.

Keywords: Poetry; African American Art; African Studies; Cultural Writing; Black Culture

The Father runs his finger through my curls
and tells me of the ways that the pencil should feel
when I am to grab it and speak of
Michelangelo
or Washington or Zeus,
the men that spread ivory spores
through my blackened mind,
and corrupt the synapses of the back of my stem.

White men wrestle and bellow
in the back of my mind,
reminding me that they are idols
and I am an afterthought in the world of whiteness.
Crevices of the blackened mind once filled with tar
are now ridden with marble, limestone, and gravel.
I ponder these remedies in half-words
as my eyelids fall and open like the sun between clouds.

It is only when I rest
that I envision a darker world—
muddy fields with rough rocks and wild bears,
and blackbirds flying with no hurry.
But even in sleep,
they are blotched away in favor of white dandelions
and poop from bald eagles.

From my bed, I watch the Father
as he moves to my brother.
his legs clumsy, stumbling stilts,

hurrying in breath-rushed steps
towards the head of curls.
Oh, how he loves the curls
but denies the blackness that creates them.

The Father is a curious man.
He hacks blood and spews words from his mouth,
telling me from his cobbled teeth
the healing ways of whiteness.
He spits phlegm at the idea of black scars
and scoffs when I cry for the past,
proclaiming superiority over my fleeting thoughts
in favor of
the beauty of his intellect;
how white history will cure the world
and usher a period of enlightenment
and respect.

Yet his wan face speaks a paradox;
whiteness the cure but whiteness is sickness;
how is the sick to be cured by the sicker?
Don't doctors clean their hands
before operating on the ill?
Put me on display, Father.

But not by your hands,
for I only accept the darker world
to craft the image of the dark;
the strokes of brown pastels on canvas
and the etching of eternity into mahogany.

I picture the world through shadow
to bring forth the rough cuts and blunt blows,
the stained reds and brutal browns
that show that my art does not kneel,
that greatness is not whiteness.

There is ever a latency
of the dark intelligence
and the subdued blackbird.
Oh, how the bird strives to be unbound,
to be itself in the face of darkness,
and to know the face he holds
is not the only of its kind.

This is all that I wish for, Father;
for you to use your whiteness you love
to turn numbing into praising
and to bring forth darkness,
which the dumbed negro mind may say
that you created.

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