

**Characterizing the Construct of Organizational Unity of Effort  
In the Interagency National Security Policy Process**

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# CHARACTERIZING THE CONSTRUCT OF ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY OF EFFORT IN THE INTERAGENCY NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS

By

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Human Development

(ABSTRACT)

The sea state changes that have occurred in the global security arena since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union dramatically transformed the U.S. interagency national security process. More recently, the tragic events of 9-11 have further refocused national security endeavors inward to homeland security imperatives while Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have revalidated the need effective interagency coordination.

This research represents a “first cut” at characterizing the construct of unity of effort in the interagency national security process by identifying attributes of this organizational virtue. The intent was to examine the dimensionality of the construct and thus facilitate theory building by consolidating extant knowledge and identifying key success factors as well as elements threatening operational success. This study focused on the interagency national security policy process and was intended to accommodate a wider understanding of unity of effort as it applies to that area of endeavor. Multiple interviews, focus groups, and surveys from 448 military and civilian adult respondents were used in the analysis. Content analysis, analysis of variance, and principle component analysis were the primary analytic methods used.

The most conceptually sound factor structure for organizational unity of effort consisted of four factors: (a) *Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics*, (b) *Leadership and Decision Making Structure*, (c) *Strategic Orientation*, and (d) *Organizational Infrastructure and Resources*. The detailed examination of this construct produced clearly acceptable internal reliability coefficients on all scales and relatively strong evidence of construct validity in the related factor analyses. Separate internal factor structures were investigated for two test groups drawn from the sample population. Although there was not perfect fidelity in the two derived factor structures, sufficient internal structures emerged that strongly validated the underlying factor structure for organizational unity of effort. This factor structure remained relatively stable when examined for selected demographic sub-groups drawn from the larger sample.

The clear relationships of this factor construct revealed strong empirical support for a theoretical basis for the construct of organizational unity of effort. Moreover, the results of this study offer the potential for development of a simple and valid conceptualization of organizational unity of effort. It is hoped that this research serves to advance a conceptual framework that helps the interagency national security community evaluate unity of effort in the national security policy process and create new or reconfigure existing organizational entities in response to threats to U.S. national security.

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## CHAPTER I

## Introduction

*Introduction to the National Security Mission*

National security is among the most fundamental, if not the most important, of national purposes (Johnson, Libicki & Treverton, 2003; Joint Publication 1, 2000). Fundamental U.S. national security and defense responsibilities are codified in the Constitution of the United States. The Preamble to the Constitution specifically cites the need “to provide for the Common Defence” of the nation. Further, Article I, Section 8 provides Congress with the power and responsibility “to provide for the common Defence and general welfare of the United States” and gives Congress the power to declare war, raise and support armies and navies, and make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces (Constitution of the United States). Moving to the executive function, Article II designates the President as the Commander and Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and the Militia of the states when called into Federal service.

The actual development and execution of national security policy and strategy involves the interaction of the highest levels of U.S. civilian and military authorities, most notably, the President and the members of the National Security Council and a wide array of military and executive offices, agencies, and organizations (Marcella, 2001; Whittaker, Smith & McKune, 2002; See also Joint Publication 1, 2000 and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Overview of National Security Strategy, n.d.).

Since 1989, the character of the global security environment has changed markedly and has had a concomitant effect on the U.S. national security policymaking process (Bunn, Mosher & Sokolsky, 2001; Johnson et al., 2003; Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). The dramatic change in the global security environment is generally ascribed to the break-up of the Soviet Union, the end of Cold War, and the emergence of a multi-polar, regionally-oriented geo-strategic environment that developed in the wake of the Cold War’s demise (Bunn et al.; Davis, Gompert, Hillstead & Johnson, 1998; Garafano & Metz, 2000; Johnson et al.; Kuglar, 2001; Lessons Learned, U.S.S. Cole, 2001; U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century, 2000). Perhaps more compelling, the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 (“9-11”) dramatically served to accentuate the magnitude of change in the character of the national security environment, to include the changed nature of threats with which the United States appears destined to contend (Flournoy, 2001; Gold, 2001; Kuglar; Nielson & Kuehl, 1999; Qiao & Wang, 1999; Spencer, 2001).<sup>1</sup> The events of September 11<sup>th</sup> not only reveal a compelling view of the nature of the now and future threats to U.S. national security interests, but also provide a clarion call for urgent action--both nationally and internationally--to effectively respond to the threat.

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<sup>1</sup> Virtually every national security document, journal article, and op-ed piece that has been written in the last decade has included an obligatory lay down of validated and potential threats to U.S. national security. The sources cited herein, while representative of the broader field, to some degree, have been selected for inclusion in this study because of their comprehensive treatment of the threat array confronting the United States.

National security policy and strategy, to be both relevant and effective, must be focused, coordinated, approved, and implemented within the bureaucratic structure of the Federal government. However, as the global security environment has evolved and the nature of the threats to U.S. national security have changed--most especially with respect to homeland defense and homeland security since the events of September 11, 2001--the number of departments, agencies, offices, and organizations charged with national security responsibilities and functions has increased dramatically (Davis, 2002; U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). Most notably, on November 25, 2002, the cabinet level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formally established to provide executive direction and oversight over 22 federal agencies and offices directly involved in homeland security (National Immigration Law Center, 2002). Actual operations of the department commenced on January 24, 2003. Nonetheless, as a consequence of these sea-state changes, the lines of distinction between the instruments of national power have become increasingly blurred and the numbers of agencies that have a role in providing for the nation's national security have increased. As a result, the development and execution of national security policy and strategy have become increasingly multi-agency or, in the current lexicon of national security, "interagency" in character.

In a general sense, although specialization and division of labor improve social performance, lessons from public administration, business administration, sports teams performance, military tactics, and joint organization/practices have established the need for centralized direction (e.g. military commanders, CEOs, coaches, etc.). However, unlike most social or bureaucratic structures, within the interagency national security policy community, there is no single centralized authority. National security (to include national defense, homeland defense and homeland security, strategic logistics, foreign affairs, and international trade and commerce) is composed of many elements, many foci, and many leaders. Unlike a symphony orchestra that achieves harmony under the baton of a single conductor, unity of effort and harmonization of the diverse elements in the interagency national security policy community is extremely difficult when the "conductors" reside in the executive branch, the legislative branch, the commercial sector, and state and local governments (J.E. Toth, personal communication, May 3, 2003). Moreover, as previously noted, the breadth and depth of multi-agency and interagency involvement in national security dramatically expanded following 9-11.

Achieving unified action within the U.S. national security policymaking organizational framework is extremely difficult and perfection is impossible, but dampening the dissonance is not (J.E. Toth, personal communication, May 3, 2003). Unlike the situation in the larger realm of organizational behavior, my research has established that there is no comprehensive body of knowledge addressing unity of effort or unified action as an organizational virtue, especially so within the interagency national security arena. Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that unified action and harmonization of the many diverse offices, agencies, and departments with responsibilities in national security is critical to assure the American nation enjoys strong national security.

This research seeks to explore and define the coordinated processes and functioning of the interagency national security policy making community by examining the construct of unity of effort as an enduring organizational virtue to be embraced in the accomplishment of the national security mission.

### *Introduction to the Interagency*

The development and implementation of national security policy and strategy is carried out within what is known as the interagency arena, or more commonly, “The Interagency” (E. Kjonnerod, personal communication, January 3, 2002). Within the interagency arena, the bureaucratic process for the development and execution of national security policy is termed the interagency process (Marcella, 2001; Whittaker et al., 2002).

As noted earlier, at the national level or “seat of government,” this process involves the interaction of literally the entire U.S. Government. In addition to the President and the other members of the National Security Council, on the military side, the interagency process is supported by senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the respective military services, the Chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and JCS), regional combatant commanders (until recently referred to as “CINCs”), and an increasing number of executive departments, agencies, and offices possessing specific national security responsibilities (Joint Publication 1, 2000; Marcella, 2001; National Security Presidential Directive-1, 2001; Whittaker et al., 2002). On the civilian side, the principal actors in the national security policy process include the Vice-President and the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, as well as senior officials from the Department of State (Marcella; Whittaker et al.).

The principal coordinating agency for national security policy and strategy at the national level is the National Security Council (NSC). The President chairs the NSC. The other statutory members of the NSC are the Vice-President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the statutory military advisor to the NSC, providing professional military advice and recommendations. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) serves as the NSC’s statutory intelligence advisor (Marcella, 2001; Whittaker et al., 2002).

The NSC functions to advise and assist the President in the development and execution of national security policy and strategy by guiding and coordinating interagency participation in strategic assessments and by presenting for decision those assessments and options that reflect all relevant government agencies and considerations (National Security Act of 1947; Joint Publication 1, 2000). Equally important, the NSC also coordinates the dissemination and monitors the implementation of Presidential and other high-level national security decisions among the appropriate government agencies. The NSC also has the primary responsibility for integrating the economic and military instruments of national power abroad. Finally, the NSC prepares, disseminates, and supervises execution of Presidential national security decisions and directives, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), and other directives that provide for military and/or government agency action (Joint Publication 1; Marcella, 2001; Whittaker et al., 2002).

Outside Washington, key participants in the national security policy process include the military’s combatant commanders who oversee geographical areas of responsibility and the President’s ambassadors, who look after U.S. national security interests at individual sovereign nation states (Marcella, 2001).

Notwithstanding the implied effectiveness of the NSC process, there is a growing perception, both inside and outside of the Federal government, that the interagency national security policy process is broken and, due to a wide array of challenges, has not achieved the level of coordination and effectiveness necessary to properly execute the critical national security function (Deutch, Kanter & Scowcroft, 2000; Marcella, 2001). Critics of the interagency national security policy process argue that the national security interagency community is incapable of achieving true unity of effort in planning and executing national security strategy and policy at both the seat of government and at the regional level of endeavor (Bridis, 2001; Bunn et al., 2001; Tucker, 2000).

The interagency national security policy process has been selected as the subject for this research for a number of cogent reasons. First, the interagency national security process involves a large number of separate offices, agencies, and organizations within the U.S. Government (USG), especially since the events of 9/11 and the concomitant shift in the thrust of U.S. national security imperatives. Attempting to harmonize the actions of such a diverse array of organizational entities is problematic in itself.

As just one case in point, in his classic study of the Governmental Model as evidenced in the conduct of major national security operations, Allison (1971), makes the case that there is no single, dominant actor in the process. Rather, argues Allison,

The Governmental (or Bureaucratic Politics Model) sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players – players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single rational choice, but by the pulling and hauling that is politics. (p. 144)

Some 18 years later, Allison (1989), noted that,

Government decisions are made and government actions emerge neither as the calculated choice of a unified group, nor as the formal summary of leaders' preferences . . . [decisions are made within a context of] inordinate uncertainty about what must be done, the necessity that something be done, and the crucial consequences of whatever is done. (p.124)

A decade and half later, Rast (2004), in her study on policy failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia (2004) reaffirms Allison's earlier observations similarly noting that a wide array of actors influence the decision-making process through a dynamic bargaining process that is impacted by a number of operative factors.

Secondly, the majority of the governmental agencies involved in the national security policy process are bureaucratic entities, some with historical origins as old as the founding of the republic itself. As a consequence, the majority of these governmental entities values their independence, have long-established organizational cultures, and even longer

memories (Marcella, 2001). Allison (1971) makes the observation, that bureaucratic decision-making is fundamentally a political process that exhibits three fundamental characteristics: (a) “a diversity of goals and values that must be reconciled before a decision can be reached,” (b) “the presence of competing clusters of people within the main group who are identified with each of alternative goals and policies,” and (c) “the relative power of these different groups of people included as relevant to the final decision as the appeal of goals they seek or the cogency and wisdom of their arguments” (p. 157).

Third, being governmental bodies, every agency, office and/or department in the interagency is, by definition, *political* to one degree or another, especially with respect to such concerns as budgets and funding, real or perceived power, and in some cases, survival. Johnson (2000), for example, posits the policies and policy recommendations generated in the executive branch tend to be “. . . the by product of bureaucratic turf battles and expedient compromises between bureaucratic chieftains than as the product of reasoned analysis of how most effectively and efficiently to carry out the policy commitments of the elected chief executive or to serve the public interest” (§ 3).

Fourth, moving beyond the purely “national” locus of national security effort and into the international realm of endeavor, the broader national security mission extends to and includes a wide array of non-U.S. governmental (USG) agencies and organizations. This cast of international and transnational actors includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), international governmental organizations (IGOs), alliances and coalitions, and national and transnational businesses. Taken to this level of endeavor, the interagency process may be viewed as the *ultimate* (or close to it) manifestation of “jointness” and a potentially rich source of research.

Additionally, within the interagency national security policy process itself, this research addresses unity of effort at what Marcella (2001) describes as the conceptualization, articulation, and budgeting levels of policy endeavor at the seat of national government. As such, this research focuses on the complex process of policy development and strategic-level decision-making and not the effectiveness of implementation activities and outcomes at the operational or tactical levels of endeavor.

### *Unity of Effort – The Cardinal Virtue*

In all collaborative endeavors, the accomplishment of the primary mission or attainment of the specified goal is paramount (Industrial College of the Armed Forces [ICAF], 2003). Some 2500 years ago, the Chinese strategic theorist Sun Tzu recognized and wrote of the importance of unity of effort, how to attain it, and the risks involved in not attaining it (Fishel, 1996). Sun Tzu noted, “He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious” (Griffith, 1963, p. 86).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Both Sun Tzu and the 19<sup>th</sup> Century military Theorist Karl Von Clausewitz recognized and wrote extensively of the importance of unity of effort and unity of command of the adversary and how best to attack, disrupt, and exploit it. That, however, is not my purpose in this research. Nonetheless it underscores the long-recognized importance of unified effort.



In any collaborative or cooperative endeavor, unified action is required to efficiently and effectively achieve the desired goal, aim, or objective of that endeavor. Fishel, for example, notes that, “achieving unity of effort is often elusive and that the premier pitfall is in the failure to reach agreement on the desired end state or strategic objective” (p. 178).

Unity of effort goes before unified action. Said differently, unified action requires organizational unity of effort. Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) observes that, “unity of effort [in the national security arena] requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and among nations in any alliance or coalition” (p. vii). Unified action, on the other hand, refers to the broad scope of activities, such as synchronization or integration of operations, of the various governmental and nongovernmental agencies participating in the undertaking of interest (Joint Publication 0-2). In essence, unity of effort seeks harmony of aim and action essential to the effective employment of all elements and instruments of national power in the execution of the national security mission (Toth, 2003).

Within the interagency national security policy community, attainment of the overarching goal may require an enduring or ongoing effort, such as the National Security Council process, or it may be characterized by transitory missions or tasks, such as humanitarian or relief operations or the Y2K effort. Regardless of the nature of the mission, achievement of unity of effort in a collaborative or joint endeavor involves the melding of a wide array of dynamics to attain unified action.

The construct of organizational unity of effort will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2. However, it will be useful to briefly summarize selected major components of unity of effort at this time to provide an initial framework for inquiry.

As previously noted, an organization generally operates through a structural division of labor by grouping people and establishing authorities, responsibilities and relationships among them (ICAF, 2003). Unity of effort in this respect essentially establishes who does what to whom. Such factors as geographic area, function, timing, targets or objectives, or any combination thereof can delineate organizational effort and impact the ability to achieve unity of effort (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Moreover, organizations are unique in that they must be capable of serving both ends and means, both of which can change over the course of time.

Unity of effort also involves process. By process, I mean the pattern of effort or action established to cause things to happen and involves such activities as decision-making, planning, coordinating, resourcing, and managing information (Toth, 2003).

Personality also impacts the ability to achieve organizational unity of effort. Personality involves the human dimension whereby people work well together or not. Fishel (1996), for example, notes that, “Interagency coordination can founder on the shoals of turf battles, *personality conflicts* [italics added], and petty disputes as well as on real policy disagreements” (p.182). In those instances where the process becomes deficient or dysfunctional, personality frequently emerges as the dominant aspect of control. While dysfunctional interagency

performance can be affected by changes in organization or process, Toth (2003) suggests that changing out people can be equally or more effective in influencing organizational performance.

Conceptual unity involves the “essential harmony” of the various elements of a collective effort as a whole (Toth, 2003, p. 2). Within the Interagency, conceptual unity serves to allow all parties in the effort to agree upon the desired effect or outcome and requires common visualization among the key players of what is to be done and how. Through its attainment, conceptual unity contributes to the harmonious employment of the elements of national power toward common goals or objectives.

In the broadest conceptual terms, however, the fundamental problem remains how to achieve unity of effort through a “joint” endeavor wherein separate, discrete organizations or *systems* come together and interact as a larger *system of systems* in the pursuit of common objectives. Upon closer inspection, the real challenge involves achieving synergy of discrete systems in a collective or collaborative endeavor while assuring the independence and viability of the constituent systems.

In summary, unity of effort at the strategic and operational levels of the interagency national security community requires coordination and communication among numerous governmental organizations and agencies within the executive branch, between the legislative and executive branches, and, on occasion, among nations involved in an alliance or coalition (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Clearly, because of the complexity of issues, the accelerated pace of the operating tempo, and the immense stakes involved in attaining and maintaining satisfactory levels of national security, unity of effort remains a primary, although elusive, goal of the interagency process.

This research begins to fill this gap in knowledge by analyzing and assimilating existing research and proposing a conceptual definition and empirical validation of the concept of unity of effort with a view to identifying and bounding potentially fruitful areas of future empirical investigation.

### *Research Impetuses*

In conducting preliminary research into the concept of organizational unity of effort, it became clear early in the process that the construct of unity of effort is either established as (a) an “end state” to be achieved through organizational processes, (b) extolled as a principle or concept to be adhered to in the planning and execution of organizational functions, or, (c) less frequently, a “virtue” to be pursued or embraced. With respect to potential areas of inquiry, unity of effort as a desired entity was most prevalent in the literature attending the military endeavor and, more specifically, joint military endeavor. However, with few exceptions in joint military doctrinal literature, the concept does not appear to have been adequately defined and, more importantly, has not been explored conceptually as a construct. Chapter 2 of this research presents a conceptual analysis of the literature to inform development of a rational model of unity of effort. In the following three chapters, two studies are presented. The first of these studies seeks to establish the importance of these elements and identify critical factors related to the attainment of unified action and to establish the nomological network of attributes or

variables related to unity of effort. By so doing, this study seeks to illuminate and hopefully contribute to the empirical validation the underlying theoretical structure and “latent” processes of organizational unity of effort.

The second study seeks simply to identify and explore external conditions or contextual variables that appear to impose the greatest pressures on “disunity” of effort and, as a result, have a significant impact on the achievement of unified action in a collaborative or joint undertaking.

In the former instance, reliance will be placed upon the literature review, individual and group interviews, and a major quantitative research effort. In the latter study, the review of the literature and individual and group interviews will primarily serve to inform the research.

### *Statement of the Problem*

For the purposes of this research, success in the interagency national security policy process is closely identified with achieving “unity of effort.” While there are indeed some inferences as to the attributes and characteristics of unity of effort, what comprises unity of effort is largely anecdotal in nature and, in my opinion, loosely postulated. Given the increasing reliance on the interagency process to realize vital national security objectives, the overarching challenge to be addressed in this work is characterizing the construct of unity of effort that underlies or embodies U.S. national security policy within an interagency context. If this construct is indeed integral to the interagency process, it demands exploration, explanation, and validation. Indeed, I argue that such a construct formulation is fundamental and imperative to facilitating success in the interagency process. The present research aims to operationally define and empirically measure the elusive construct of “unity of effort.” Rationally characterizing this construct is vital to public scrutiny, development, and progress.

### *Research Questions*

This study poses four fundamental questions.

1. What constitutes unity of effort in a collaborative or “joint” endeavor? This question focuses on the identification of the fundamental attributes or components of the construct of unity of effort.
2. Which attributes or components of unity of effort are perceived to be of greatest importance or criticality in achieving unity of effort (e.g. effective unified action) in a joint, interagency or multinational collaborative endeavor? Potential answers to this question assume even greater importance when considered in light of ad hoc, crisis-response collaborative endeavors where time is of the essence.
3. To what degree are the perceptions of unity of effort different as a function of agency affiliation?
4. What external conditions or contextual variables have the greatest retarding or inhibiting impact on the achievement of unity of effort (and unified action) in a collaborative or joint undertaking?

### *Purpose of the Study*

The purpose of this study had three dimensions. First, this research sought to identify and quantify the dimensions of unity of effort as they apply to a joint or collaborative organizational endeavor. To this end, this inquiry sought to identify dimensions or attributes of unity of effort, determine a relative measure of their importance in facilitating unified action, and assess the degree to which environmental or contextual variables facilitate or exacerbate the attainment of unity of effort in joint organizational endeavors.

Second, utilizing the research findings, a rationally derived model based on principal component analysis was developed to assess joint organizational performance. This model will focus on the interagency national security community as its subject and seek to explore the central question of achieving unity of effort in national security policy development and execution. Accordingly, appropriate policy recommendations will be developed specifically to enhance the attainment of unity of effort in interagency national security policy development and execution.

Finally, although the principal focus of model application is intended to be the interagency national security process within the United States, it is hoped that the model will achieve sufficient theoretical soundness and adaptability to be generalized to a wider array of applications. Envisioned applications include such collaborative endeavors as multi-national alliances and coalitions, trans-national business corporations, and community development activities.

### *Significance of the Study*

This research effort will fulfill several needs. First, because few prior studies of unified action in interagency operations exist, this research will serve to identify and characterize the nature of unity of effort in the interagency realm. Additionally, this research will seek to quantify the various dimensions of unity of effort and determine the degree to which they serve as drivers of or inhibitors to unified action in collaborative organizational endeavors. Finally, this research will develop specific policy recommendations for achieving and enhancing unity of effort in the interagency national security policy process. This will serve to assist senior national security decision makers and staffers in framing national security policies and processes. It is expected that stakeholders in the interagency national security community will have an interest in how to enhance the organization and process by which national security policies are developed and executed.

Second, through the development of an appropriate model with sufficient theoretical soundness, generalization of the research findings to other joint or collaborative endeavors might be possible. Adaptability of such a model would prove to be extremely useful to a wider array of collaborative endeavors such as, multi-national alliances and coalitions, trans-national business corporations, and community development endeavors. However, as Saitta (1998) suggested in his study of contract instructors at the National Fire Academy, every agency or organization “will have different organizational cultures, missions, goals and objectives, and operational policies” (p. 9). Thus, potential findings should be used with great caution.

Finally, this research will add to the body of knowledge that seeks to define and understand the dynamics of interagency national security operations specifically and other joint, interagency, and collaborative organizational endeavors that come together and interact in the pursuit of common aims, goals, or objectives.

#### *Acronyms and Abbreviations*

Appendix D contains a listing of acronyms and abbreviations of those terms that are unique to the military or to the national security policy process.

#### *Summary*

This chapter has provided an introduction to the interagency process and addressed the background, the problem statement, the purpose, the research questions, and the significance of the research. The next chapter analyzes the relevant literature.

## CHAPTER II

### Review of the Literature

#### *Introduction*

This chapter provides a review of the literature pertinent to this study. The review provides a functional background of the interagency national security structure and its associated policy development and implementation process, the role of unity of effort in facilitating that process, a delineation of candidate attributes of unity of effort within the interagency national security policymaking process and identification of pressures for disunity (i.e. external, environmental, or contextual variables) that might impact the attainment of unity of effort in the interagency national security policymaking process. This literature review is intended to provide a grounding for the study and a base that facilitates the analysis phase.

#### *The Interagency National Security Policymaking Process*

Before examining the construct of unity of effort in detail, it will be necessary to describe in some detail the interagency national security structure. Additionally, I will provide a general overview of the policy development and implementation process for national security. This examination is necessary to gain an understanding of the dynamic context within which the organizational virtue of unity of effort is intended to play an important facilitating role.

#### *Origins and History*

The earliest origins of the “interagency process” lie in the efforts of the United States to achieve strategic integration of both national and Allied elements of power during World War II (Marcella, 2001). These efforts extended to such tasks as mobilizing the economic and societal strengths of the country, forging and nurturing worldwide alliances, planning, resourcing and conducting both joint and combined operations, and making tough allocation decisions with respect to national resources. As a result of the complex experience of waging a global war on several fronts simultaneously and the realities of the international environment that followed in the years immediately after the cessation of hostilities, a number of structural and institutional changes occurred in the U.S. national security policymaking arena. These included the creation of a National Military Establishment and, subsequently, a Department of Defense; an independent air force; a revitalized and modernized Department of State; a central intelligence program and an agency to run it; a unified military command system, and a series of alliances, such as NATO, SEATO, and ANZUS, among others (Marcella, 2001; Whittaker et al., 2002).

From its earliest origins, the interagency process--along with the organizational structure and mission of the National Security Council--has evolved through a succession of U.S. Presidents, with each President tailoring both the NSC and interagency process to fit his leadership and management style (Whittaker et al., 2002).

### *The Process Today*

Constitutionally, the President has the ultimate authority and responsibility for national defense. Beginning in 1947 with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Secretary of Defense has functioned as the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense (DOD) (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Overview of the National Security Structure, n.d.). The Department of State (DOS) is the lead foreign affairs agency and the Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. Additionally, the State Department also provides support to foreign affairs activities of other U.S. Government agencies, including the Commerce Department and the Agency for International Development (AID). Perhaps most importantly, the State Department is responsible for leading interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy (Whittaker et al., 2002).

Tucker (2000) maintains that there are three salient characteristics of the interagency process: it is a network disguised as a hierarchy; it incorporates different decision modes and speeds; and it possesses both horizontal and vertical dimensions.

With respect to the first dimension, organizationally the interagency is a hierarchy. The President sits at the top with a Principals Committee (PC) comprised of cabinet officials immediately below him and a Deputies Committee (DC) consisting of the next tier of department, agency or office officials below that (Whittaker et al, 2002). On occasion, and especially in the cases of a crisis intervention, an Executive Committee (ExComm) may be formed (Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA) program, 2003). The ExComm, generally consisting of officials drawn from the next one or two levels of the bureaucracy, is responsible for bringing together representatives from all agencies and organizations with a role in the operation, to include those agencies and organizations not normally part of the NSC structure or process. The ExComm is responsible for supervising the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in a national security crisis intervention (White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, 1997). This approach was first implemented during the U.S. intervention to restore order in Haiti and has generally proven effective in clarifying agency responsibilities, strengthening agency accountability, and developing viable policy options for consideration by senior policy makers (White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations; Hawley, 2003).

Below the Deputies Committee (or the ExComm, if operational) are interagency working groups, termed Policy Coordinating Committees (PCC's) in the Bush administration (The White House, 2001; Hawley). Theoretically, both direction and information flows down through the hierarchy while policy options for decision flow up. Tucker (2000), however, maintains that there is, in reality, very little that holds the hierarchy together. Rather, maintains Tucker, "Ultimately only the President has authority, and he has competing priorities" (p. 70).

Tucker (2000) maintains that the dual nature of the interagency process--hierarchy and network--is actually an important source of strength. Noting both the weaknesses and strengths of each dimension, Tucker nonetheless concludes that neither the hierarchical nor the network structure works best for every situation and that the respective organizational structures renders one or the other more appropriate for different functions. For example, Tucker maintains that the

hierarchical structure provides for speed and decisiveness while a network offers the advantages of adaptability and resilience. Conversely, notes Tucker, hierarchical structure is prone to sclerosis and long-term risk while networks can be uncontrollable and susceptible to short-term risk. Tucker concludes that hierarchical structure is better for short-term, crisis type situations while networks offer more advantages in addressing protracted problems in rapidly changing environments.

Tucker (2000) also maintains that the interagency process consists of two decision modes: crisis management and long-term planning. These decision processes each possesses different requirements and occur at varying speeds. Thus, argues Tucker, crisis management cannot be effectively addressed by the deliberate pace that characterizes long-term planning, while longer-duration national security problems and issues benefit from the long-term planning approach that promotes and facilitates the emergence of new ideas and assures sufficient time to prepare for effective implementation.

Finally, Tucker (2000) makes the case that the national security policymaking process demands both horizontal and vertical interagency coordination. The vertical dimension involves coordination between the national strategic level in Washington and the operational/tactical levels in the field. Tucker sees the vertical coordinative process as critical to responding to crisis situations and managing contingencies. Tucker views this as a two-way street, with Washington providing clear guidance and direction down to the field agencies and the field agencies transmitting operational options, costs, and risks back up the chain. Horizontal coordination, on the other hand, involves coordination and cooperation between agencies and organizations at each level of endeavor.

Tucker (2000) cites the well-established vertical coordination process in the State Department as an exemplar to be emulated. Tucker notes the “stovepipe” linkage between the State Department’s headquarters in Washington and the array of embassies around the globe encourages and facilitates the involvement of field activities worldwide in the policy development process.

Tucker (2000) also maintains that this vertical coordination process is lacking in the military, arguing that “the military . . . has not accepted this vertical dialogue, at least with civilians, as part of its future operational style” (p. 70). In defense of the military’s operational style, Tucker suggests that the military may view the speed or operational tempo of future operations as rendering such dialogue impossible and cautions that the pace of operations may “present policymakers with faits accomplis, and thus determine policy” (p. 72). Nonetheless, in Tucker’s view, the military should improve its ability to coordinate vertically while cautioning that the military has a “tendency to mask operational capabilities and possibilities from civilian decisionmakers for fear that such knowledge will encourage civilian meddling in operations” (p. 72).

#### *The Interagency National Security Policymaking Process: The Past as Prelude*

In viewing the interagency national security policymaking process from a strategic perspective, the historical record suggests that performance has been mixed at best. On one



hand, the interagency national security process has, on occasion, proven itself flexible, adaptive, and decisive (Tucker, 2000). Perhaps the most recent example of a national security interagency effort that achieved a high degree of success was the Y2K effort, instituted to assure that critical computer systems would not fail when the United States entered the year 2001 and internal clocks in computer systems failed or reverted to the year 1901. Other notable examples of successful interagency national security crisis interventions include Operation JUST CAUSE, the 1989 military incursion and follow-on interagency operation to restore a democratic form of government in Panama and the multinational peacekeeping operation in Haiti between 1993 and 1995 (Hayes & Weatley, 1996; Mendel & Bradford, 1995.).

On the other hand, there is ample evidence that interagency performance, especially as it concerns coordination and achieving unity of effort in national security crisis interventions, is far from optimal (Tucker, 2000).

Lute (1998), in his assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. responses to complex contingency operations, notes that there are three fundamental levels of endeavor with respect to unity of effort: strategic (national and/or international policy), operational (theater) and tactical (field operations). Lute maintains that coordination in response to complex emergencies tends to be most effective at the tactical level and least effective at the strategic level, arguing that there are too few national innovations in responding to complex emergencies and that international mechanisms for coordination response efforts are ad hoc in nature and susceptible to changing interests. Thus, at best the result is inefficient operations. At worst, concludes Lute, these conditions serve to exacerbate the situation.

As early as 1961, an internal draft Joint Staff memorandum addressing interagency coordination noted, “In the past it has been extremely difficult to achieve coordinated interdepartmental planning” (U.S. Joint Staff Memorandum, 1961). Some 37 years later, a similar concern was voiced by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in its report on the Army After Next (AAN) experimentation (1998). TRADOC observed that, “the diversity of the interagency, with each agency having its own culture, hierarchy, bias, misperceptions, and unique perspectives, makes unity of effort difficult” (p. 8). The AAN report goes on to add that these problems are compounded by “low technical and procedural interoperability, and the absence of a common vision” (p. 8). This array of problems, concludes the Army report, effectively serves to create “formidable obstacles” to interagency coordination (p. 8). As a means of summary, the Joint Staff memo concludes that, for interagency coordination to be a reality, “. . . these inhibitions of other governmental agencies must in some way be overcome.”

The challenges inherent in attempting to bring different agencies and organizations together for concerted action, especially in a crisis situation, have also been recognized at the joint military level of endeavor. One of the “Capstone”<sup>1</sup> joint publications, Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, (2001) posits that, “various agencies’ different and sometimes conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decisionmaking techniques make unity of effort a challenge . . . .” (p. I-11). Similar concerns with respect to the interagency process were raised

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<sup>1</sup> Capstone joint publications provide visionary and/or overarching conceptual direction that guides the conduct of joint warfare by the United States armed forces and that shapes the development of joint doctrine.

in both *Joint Vision 2010* (1996) and *Joint Vision 2020* (2000). This related set of publications, also within the category of “capstone” documents, articulates the vision for future joint warfighting as envisioned by the two previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the joint military-interagency interface, challenges to the effectiveness of interagency national security operations exist due to the disparity of organizations and their respective capabilities, authorities, objectives, and organizational structures (Joint Publication 3-33, 1999). As a result of these types of perceived deficiencies and resultant ineffectiveness of interagency responses to complex contingency operations in Somalia, Haiti, Slavonia and Bosnia, the Clinton Administration released Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) in 1997 to provide policy direction and establish procedures for interagency responses to these unique forms of national security interventions (Langford, 1999).

More recently, in May 2001, in supporting testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the findings of the Crouch-Gehman Commission (more commonly referred to as “The Cole Commission”),<sup>2</sup> General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated the need for better unity of effort among DOD offices and agencies providing anti-terrorism resources, policy, oversight, and direction involved with combating terrorism (2001b). Additionally, in June 2002, the Government Accounting Office (GAO), in their assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in combating terrorism, noted that, while coordinative efforts indeed crossed a number of organizational boundaries, they nonetheless failed to effectively coordinate the activities of the 40-plus federal agencies involved in the effort (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002).

Turning to more specific dimensions of the interagency challenge, one major impediment to interagency effectiveness in developing and executing national security policy is the bureaucratic structure of the U.S. Government.

Mendel and Bradford (1995) in comparing and contrasting the performance of the Departments of Defense and State, observed that, within the State Department structure, the country ambassador is responsible for the synchronization and execution of U.S. national security and foreign policy within a single host country. The Department of Defense, however, has a fundamentally different structure for deploying and employing the military instrument of national power, relying instead on five expansive geographic regions or Areas of Responsibility (AOR’s)<sup>3</sup> under the command of a unified or “combatant commander.” Mendel and Bradford

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<sup>2</sup> The Cole Commission Report (2001) speaking specifically to the problems involved in force protection in foreign countries, noted that, “the execution of the engagement element of the National Security Strategy lacks an effective coordinated interagency process, which results in a fragmented engagement program that may not provide optimal support to in-transit units.”

<sup>3</sup> These five geographic AOR’s are United States Pacific Command (PACOM); United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); United States European Command (EUCOM); United States Central Command (CENTCOM); and United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM). In addition to these geographic Combatant Commands, the United States has also established four “functional” commands: United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM); United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM); United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM); and United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

make the case that military mission areas<sup>4</sup> frequently extend well beyond a single country and are “inherently regional in nature” (p. 7). As a result, these unified commanders look at their AOR’s across country borders in a regional sense. Thus, argue Mendel and Bradford, success in these regionally-oriented operations demands “synchronized application of the skills and resources of many agencies in addition to military forces” (p. 7). More broadly, Mendel and Bradford argue that a clear need exists for regional commanders to be able to integrate interagency resources in contingency planning as well as concepts for supporting other agencies of the USG in their planning and operations.<sup>5</sup>

Tucker (2000) offers a different dimension to the capabilities issue, noting that the State Department, “values flexibility and its ability to respond to daily changes in a situation more than it values planning while the CIA is reluctant to coordinate for security reasons and the former U.S. Information Agency held Defense and the CIA at arms length for fear that it would be seen as a mere dispenser of propaganda” (p. 66).

The problem of interagency cooperation at the regional/operational level is compounded by the fact that regional commanders do not exercise formal authority over U.S. Government agencies during peacetime nor are they responsible for pulling U.S. regional interagency operations together (Mendel & Bradford, 1995).<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, regional commanders are required to provide support to a wide array of USG and international agencies within the boundaries of their expansive regional commands. This support is provided within foreign policy guidelines but without the benefit of the very specific command relationships that normally “frame” a theater of war (Mendel & Bradford, p. 7).

A second major factor that impacts current interagency effectiveness is the divided responsibility for planning at the National Security Council (NSC) level and execution at the operational level, either regionally or within a host nation.

The NSC is generally viewed as the locus of responsibility for interagency efforts from the national level or “seat of government” (Mendel & Bradford, 1995). In reality, the NSC facilitates policy and strategy development at the national or strategic level; it does not execute policy in the field. The problem, argue Mendel and Bradford, is that “there is seldom definite guidance to the unified commanders with respect to interagency cooperation and integration” (p. 2). As a result, maintain Mendel and Bradford, the regional combatant commanders tend to respond with a predominantly military solution, effecting formal interagency coordination later in the process as the operational situation develops. Historically, these types of situations were

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<sup>4</sup> These operations include counter-drug, control of weapons proliferation, counter-terrorism and insurgency, security assistance, peace enforcement, shows of force, and attacks and raids (Mendel and Bradford, 1995).

<sup>5</sup> Contingency planning refers to operational plans for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic sub-areas of a regional combatant command (Joint Publication 1-02, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> In time of war, however, Regional Commanders-in-Chief do exercise command over all USG agencies within their respective AOR’s.

further compounded by the absence of joint publications and service doctrine that provided specific guidance or techniques for building interagency teamwork and integrating capabilities (Mendel & Bradford).

Hawley (2003) views the problems with interagency planning as resulting from major disconnects in linkages between the three levels of national security endeavor, that is, between the strategic, operational, and in-county tactical levels of operations. Hawley maintains that planning mechanisms among these levels are “. . . routinely disconnected and [agencies] do not normally coordinate with one another, thereby creating unnecessary difficulties in operations on the ground” (p. 9).

On a more positive note, however, Mendel and Bradford (1995) note that the regional unified commanders are indeed beginning to rethink their regional strategies with an eye towards the interagency. They note that, because of the nature of the threat--including major regional contingencies (MRC's) in the Balkans, Korea and Iraq and political instability prompted by arms proliferation, narcoterrorism, insurgency, warlordism, and militant religious fundamentalism--there is a growing recognition that U.S. planning for and response to such threats requires, to varying degrees, at least a regional interagency effort.

Hawley (2003) also maintains that there is inconsistent application of best practices in planning. Hawley argues that,

Few agency planners, including the military, understand what it takes to craft a useful strategic approach that presents options for intervention. While there is general agreement on the value of interagency planning, there are significant differences in how agency planners understand “planning.” Some see planning as spelling out a mission to accomplish an objective, a concept of operations, tasks and timelines. Others see it as a protocol outlining a division-of-labor for organizing a response. Still other agency officials see it as figuring out a list of actions that must be accomplished in the near future. The application of best practices in policy planning is very inconsistent across the board, and most agency planning approaches are not relevant to actual policy planning. (p. 9)

Mendel and Bradford (1995) see the planning challenge in a somewhat different light, suggesting that the lack of common planning systems within the interagency is the critical issue. Mendel and Bradford note that few U.S. Government agencies in the interagency national security community possess the capacity for effective strategic planning and that this inability to effectively plan at the strategic level impacts the ability to interface and work with the regional unified commanders.

Another critical weakness is the uneven application of effective management models at the strategic level of endeavor (Hawley, 2003). Hawley attributes this particular weakness to what he characterizes as “gross differences” in interagency management between recent presidential administrations (p. 9), while Whittaker et al. (2002) suggests that the range and complexity of issues that are involved also increase the difficulties in managing the interagency national security policymaking process. Joint Publication 3-57 (2001) adds that the management

task is further compounded by the fact that each participating organization brings its own policies and practices to the interagency national security process.

Lute (1998) suggests that the management challenges of the national security policymaking process suffer from the absence of an institutionalized approach or systematic process to formulate policy, develop consensus for multinational operations, provide resources, or integrate civilian and military organizations in an overall effort. In his foreword to Lute's assessment of U.S. capacity to respond to complex emergencies (1998), former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwon notes, "There is a belief in some departments in Washington that if you can do operations at the high end of the conflict spectrum, then you automatically can be successful at the lower end. Such misguided thinking could result in mission failure and risk unnecessary casualties" (p. vi). Lute points to Somalia as one glaring example where a major gap between policymaking and execution ultimately led to the premature withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1994.

Another major roadblock to an effective interagency national security process is the lack of effective communications. As previously noted, Tucker (2000), suggested that the military establishment experiences major problems with the interagency process because it has not acknowledged the need for "vertical dialogue" with the civilian elements of the interagency. Further, Tucker maintains that envisioned changes in the military as a result of the what has become known as the *Revolution in Military Affairs* do not seem likely to embrace this requirement as part of its "operational style" (p. 72).<sup>7</sup> Hawley (2003) notes that there is flawed communication between intelligence and policy. He states that, "While discourse between the intelligence community and policy-planning groups is critical, these discussions are often inadequate for providing useful situation assessments, political forecasts, and planning scenarios . . . ." (p. 9). Additionally, Hawley notes that intelligence capacity is limited and that it takes time to get both collection and analysis activities up and functioning in the event of a new crisis.

Tucker (2000) identifies another challenge to achieving true unity of effort within the interagency. Tucker suggests that the military has a tendency to view interagency coordination problems as essentially analogous to interoperability and joint problems between the armed services. As a result, maintains Tucker, the military sees "jointness" as having resolved many of the inter-service rivalries that pre-dated the Goldwater-Nichols Act and that a similar effort is all that is required to achieve equal success within the interagency community.<sup>8</sup> The problem, warns

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<sup>7</sup> The Revolution in Military Affairs (or RMA) involves the introduction of advanced sensors, communications, and information processing technology to the conduct of warfare. These technological advances are expected to allow U.S. armed forces to see and attack enemy formations throughout the depth and height of what is termed "the battlespace," therein enabling U.S. forces to win quickly and decisively or, in merely demonstrating such capabilities, deterring the onset of armed conflict (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Report on the Army After Next, 1998).

<sup>8</sup> The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-143), more commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act is widely considered to be the most comprehensive and sweeping reform of the National defense Establishment since the National Security Act of 1947. The act mandated directed a total overhaul of the existing national defense structure and significantly increased the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The act also increased the command authorities of the respective combatant commanders, giving them greater authority with respect to the organization and utilization of assigned military forces.

Tucker, is that military officers from the different services have much more in common than do representatives from the different agencies that comprise the interagency national security community. In the end, concludes Tucker, any interagency effectiveness that is achieved is likely to be totally different from what the military has achieved through “jointness.”

Interestingly, Tucker (2000) argues that interagency coordination should be different than the jointness experienced by the military. To this end, Tucker argues,

It would be a fatal error to seek interagency coordination by centralizing or homogenizing the interagency process by . . . creating an interagency national security civil service, establishing interagency “czars,” especially if they have budget authority, or pushing for too much unity and integration. Because their functions are different, military officers, spies, diplomats, and lawyers see problems and their solutions differently . . . . To succeed, the US government needs them all and needs vigorous advocates for each. The best way to increase interagency coordination will be the one that promotes coordination while respecting these differences and enhancing their forceful expression. (p. 74)

Turning to the operational or regional levels of national security concern and the effectiveness of interagency operations at the point of execution or “in the field,” operational evidence suggests that the United States has achieved greater success in interagency cooperation and unity of effort than at the seat of national government.

Focusing on the regional level of interagency effectiveness, Bunn et al. (2001) note that, “The transition to a formalized process for thinking about employing military capabilities in strategic regional conflicts has been slow and is far from complete” (p. 2). They argue that one major reason for this is that the military structures developed to deter the Soviet Union created organizational stovepipes that impede adaptation to the new strategic environment. Thus, concludes Bunn and her colleagues,

Any new approaches to the asymmetric threat will have to cut across these structures. To overcome these impediments and develop an integrated approach to planning for future strategic regional conflicts, the national security community should institute a formal process that injects these issues into exercises and war planning. (p. 2)

Despite the sea state changes in the global security environment since the end of the Cold War, Bunn et al. (2001) also make the case that the conduct of strategic warfare by regional adversaries remains a distinct possibility. However, they note that, “The United States has not yet replaced Cold War structures, plans, and procedures that are inappropriate for today’s strategic warfare” (p. 2). As a consequence, argue Bunn and her colleagues, U.S. planning for the regional mission does not, in fact, reflect the changed security environment.

## *Unity of Effort in the Interagency National Security Policymaking Process*

### *Introduction*

This section will detail the general findings of the literature review, address the generally recognized value of unity and effort and unified action in the interagency process, discuss the most common alternative terminologies that appear to reflect the underlying virtue of unity of effort that are contained in the literature, and examine the concept of “jointness” in the U.S. military as a useful framework to help characterize interagency unity of effort. Finally, an operational definition of interagency unity of effort will be delineated to guide the larger research effort to identify and characterize potential attributes of unity of effort.

At the outset, even a cursory review of the literature establishes that unity of effort, *per se*, is infrequently discussed as a conceptual construct. Significantly, in researching the literature in the broader realm of organizational behavior there were very few direct references to unity of effort, *per se*. Bethel, Atwater, Smith, Stackman, and Riggs (1971), in their classic text on industrial organization and management, do not address the term at all. Similarly, Bolman and Deal (1991), in their landmark study of organizational reframing do not address the construct at all, while Katz and Kahn (1978) likewise fail to directly address unity of organizational effort as a desired organizational virtue.

Three additional functional domains were also examined: Multinational business enterprises, community, and teams. Where appropriate, research from these specific areas of inquiry has been included, but, once again, unity of effort as an organizational virtue was rarely addressed. Moreover, in the realm of teams and teamwork, it was found that that many of the research challenges associated with characterizing unity of effort in a general sense also exist with respect to characterizing the effectiveness of teams. Fleishman, (as cited in Brannick & Prince, 1997), contends that relatively little research has been conducted on the measurement of team processes and outcomes. Similarly, Dickinson and McIntyre (1997) argue that, while a great deal of research has been devoted to team training and performance, little or no research has been accomplished with respect to the components of teamwork and, more particularly, in the measures of those components. Nonetheless, because of the close structural affinity of teams to interagency national security organizational entities and the potential commonality of attributes of teamwork to unity of effort, I was able to draw more heavily on research in this domain.

Narrowing the focus of the review to the national security arena, unity of effort was more frequently cited as a desired organizational goal or outcome. The majority of literature in this area consisted of government reports, reports of independent “think tanks” specializing in national security, and Congressional testimony. To a lesser degree, media commentary on the effectiveness of interagency operations also provided insights into the construct of unity of effort.

Finally, the one domain of organizational endeavor that clearly embraced and valued the principle of unity of effort as a desired organizational (and operational) outcome and, coincidentally, offered the most insight into the construct of unity of effort with respect to its

component attributes was joint military operations. In this respect, the most valuable source was the joint visionary and doctrinal literature developed to guide the planning, resourcing, and conduct of joint, interagency, and multinational (alliance/coalition) operations. To a lesser degree, Congressional testimony of senior military leaders and insights offered by informed observers of the interagency national security process provided supplemental research sources.

Based on this outcome, I made the decision to focus on the latter three areas of interest for the majority of research findings, with the inquiry being intensified as my research progressed from the domain of teams to the realms of military and interagency operations.

### *Jointness*

From a definitional perspective, “joint” in the military endeavor connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001; Joint Publication 1-02, 2001). Within the U.S. military instrument, unity of effort is seen as achievable by joint endeavor among and between the various armed forces or Services. This “end state” is referred to as “jointness” and the attainment of effective joint endeavor is the principal focus of contemporary operations and doctrinal guidelines within the U.S. military establishment (Joint Vision 2020, 2000). As such, “jointness” occupies a distinctive niche in the discussion of collaborative military endeavors and, by extension, interagency unity of effort.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2002) defines jointness as the ability of the different branches of the U.S. military to communicate and coordinate their efforts on the battlefield, while Babbin (2003) takes a somewhat narrower view noting that jointness involves the combining of elements of one or more services to train and fight together, usually for specific missions. In its broadest application, however, “jointness” involves the attainment of unity of effort across service, agency, and national lines (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2003). Joint Publication 3-33 (1999) maintains that,

The strength in joint operations and jointness as an entity is that everybody brings their own core competencies and core capabilities to the table or to the operation, and you pick from those the strengths you need to meld together for whatever specific task you’re asked to carry out. (p. II-7)

Therefore, an understanding of “jointness” from the military perspective, its relationship to attainment of unity of effort in the military endeavor, and its potential utility to national security endeavors is valuable in understanding how unity of effort might be realized in the broader realm of interagency national security policy formulation and implementation.

The U.S. military has a long and distinguished record of both joint and combined (allied) operational endeavor extending back to the American Revolution where the Continental forces of General George Washington combined with the ground and naval forces of our ally France to defeat the British forces at Yorktown and secure American independence (Beaumont, 1993; Jones, 1992).



Joint operations were likewise evident in the Mexican War, as evidenced by joint naval and army operations at Vera Cruz and during the American Civil War where Union army and navy forces conducted numerous amphibious and riverine operations on the Eastern and Southern coasts of the nation as well as on the inland waterways of the country (Beaumont, 1993; Jones, 1992; Stucky, 1994).

Joint operations also characterized the Spanish American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and peacekeeping operations in Central America in the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century and, reached a high point of development in World War II with joint Army/Navy/Air Force campaigns in the Central and Southwest Pacific and European theaters of war (Beaumont, 1993).

“Jointness” took on totally new dimensions and an increased sense of urgency following U.S. operations (“URGENT FURY”) in Grenada in 1982 (Kreisher, 2001). As a result of deficiencies in achieving unified action in that strategic operation, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, more popularly known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act undertook the largest reorientation of U.S. operational endeavor by strengthening the demand for effective joint operations. Since that time, the evolution of joint command and control, joint doctrine and the execution of several major and successful joint operations have vindicated the enforcement of joint operations as a staple of American military endeavor. Joint doctrine has matured significantly in the past 17 years and, in the view of officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, joint warfighting has, in large measure become the “American way of war” (Cebrowski & Barnett, 2003; Echevarria, 2004; Fishel, 1996).

### *Challenges to Research*

In researching the conceptual foundations of unity of effort to determine the basic attributes of the construct, three realities quickly became evident. First, no formal definition of the construct exists, especially within the context of the national security policymaking process and the broader interagency structure. Secondly, and somewhat ironically, it was clear that many informed observers and authorities in the interagency national security community clearly recognized the value of some form of unified effort as a *conceptual* principal to be embraced as well as an *outcome* to be attained. Finally, and perhaps most importantly with respect to the conduct of the research, there exists a wide array of seemingly related terms that are routinely employed in discussing unity of effort. Moreover, my review strongly suggest these specific terms are viewed as synonymous or interchangeable with unity of effort as conceptual constructs.

These three general conditions pose major challenges in attempting to comprehensively characterize interagency unity of effort. As a consequence, it became apparent to me that a necessary first step in characterizing unity of effort was to deal with these variously defined dimensions of organizational performance. That being accomplished, I could then attempt to develop and articulate a more precise and useful characterization of unity of effort appropriate to the interagency community.

As previously noted, the literature addressing organizational unity of effort employed a variety of terms, to include, *teamwork*, *coordination*, *cooperation*, *collaboration*, *synchronization*, *integration*, *synergy*, and *interoperability*, among others. In analyzing these

various entities, I concluded that some were more properly viewed as outcomes, while others were more properly to be considered processes. Based on this determination, for the purposes of this research, I developed a model that establishes unity of effort as a fundamental organizational virtue that underlies or permeates the broader set of organizational efforts that are undertaken to achieve desired outcomes. In this sense, unity of effort may also be viewed as an organizational outcome, albeit an abstract organizational outcome to be achieved as opposed to actions undertaken to achieve that end.

With this basic framework established, addressing the *fit* of these terms with respect to unity of effort became less contentious. For example, in the cases of interoperability and synergy, these can properly be viewed as outcomes that could be facilitated through effective unity of effort. At the next level, while recognizing that such entities as teamwork, cooperation, coordination, collaboration, synchronization, and integration could also be considered as outcomes, these are, more properly processes or actions to be undertaken to achieve unity of effort. Said differently, individuals working in a joint or multi-agency endeavor can take some form of action to coordinate, cooperate, synchronize, collaborate, or integrate and, in so doing realize some measure of teamwork, synergy, or interoperability. A brief review of these terms should serve to make this point.

### *Interoperability*

Interoperability is a concept usually associated with mechanical systems and interchangeable parts. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Mish, 1997) defines interoperability as the "ability of a system (as a weapons system) to use the parts or equipment of another system" (p. 612). From the military perspective, however, interoperability also involves forces, units, and systems of all the Services being able to operate effectively (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Joint Publication 1-02 (2001) defines interoperability as "The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together" (p. 215). In the United States military establishment, joint operations demand maximum interoperability. Equally as important, interoperability is also viewed as a critical element in achieving unity of effort between multinational forces (MNFs) (Joint Publication 0-2).

Interoperability in military operations is attained by the development and use of joint doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs); development of joint plans; conduct of joint training and exercises; the existence of a materiel development fielding process (of compatible and complementary systems); the establishment of working groups; and the employment of liaison (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Additionally, especially in the case of multinational force operations, the development and use of a lexicon of mutually agreed upon terminology to ensure enhanced operability and maximum understanding by all parties is deemed essential (Joint Publication 3-57, 2001).

### *Synergy*

Similar to interoperability, synergy is a highly desired outcome in collaborative military endeavors. Merriam-Webster (Mish, 1997) defines synergy as "combined action or operation "

(p. 1196). While the U.S. Military establishment has not developed a formal definition of synergy, per se, Joint Publication 1 (2000) notes that synergy is the result of “synchronized and integrated action” (p. i). Speaking more directly to unity of effort, Joint Publication 1 also notes that synergy “. . . maximizes combat capability in unified action”(p. viii). Joint Publication 0-2 (2001), in speaking specifically to the attainment of unified action in an interagency context notes that, “The synergy derived from combining each organizations culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills is the strength of the interagency process” (p. I-11).

Joint Publication 3-33, *Joint Force Capabilities* (1999) makes the case that, “The goal of synchronized employment is to effectively use each participating element against the highest priority mission and to achieve the highest possible level of synergy among all participating elements” (p. I-3).

Equally interesting, the literature suggests that outcomes, such as synergy and interoperability, once achieved as ends in themselves, also contribute to the attainment of unified action or unity of effort. For example, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) maintains that, “Unified action synchronizes and/or integrates joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting operations with the operations of government agencies, NGOs, and IOs to achieve unity of effort in the operational area” (p. viii). In this sense, then, these factors may also be properly considered as intermediate means to the larger end of unity of effort.

### *Teamwork*

A significant amount of research into the effectiveness of team performance has been conducted in recent years. This research has embraced such domains as aviation crew performance (Wiener, Kanski & Helmrich, 1993), military unit effectiveness (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Grossman, 1991), and business and industrial performance (Sundstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, 1990).<sup>9</sup> It should also be noted, however, that a significant majority of the research conducted on teams focused on team performance of a functional responsibility or task for a host organization as opposed to tasks specifically designed for laboratory studies (Brannick & Prince, 1997).

Brannick and Prince (1997) conclude that there are three levels of analysis with respect to teams: individual, team, and organizational. Additionally, Brannick and Prince maintain that there are also functional delineations of research on teams. These include input (task, equip, training), process (throughput) and output (product, outcome).

Despite the extensive research conducted on teams and teamwork to date, Dickinson and McIntyre (1997) argue that a great deal of that research has been devoted to team training and performance with little or no research being accomplished with respect to the elemental

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<sup>9</sup> It should be noted that research into teams suggests there are fundamental differences between groups and teams and that these distinctions that are not always clear (Brannick & Prince, 1997). Hackman (as cited in Goodman and Associates, 1986), for example, notes that a group is much broader in scope than a team and possesses more applications in social and organizational forms. Hackman posits that a group is more a generic label and makes a distinction between groups and “work groups” that can be more accurately defined by specific criteria, to include differentiated roles and tasks.

components of teamwork and, more particularly, in the measures of those components. In a similar vein, Salas, Dickinson, Converse and Tannenbam (1992) found that the vast majority of research has focused on the influence of task, individual, and team characteristics on team performance. Perhaps more important, research conducted by Goodman, Ravlin, and Argote (1986) indicates that significantly more research is required on team models, especially with respect to interrelationships among variables. As previously discussed, Fleishman noted, “Despite the reliance of many organizations on teams to accomplish important goals, surprisingly little research has been conducted on the measurement of team process and outcome” (cited in Brannick & Prince, 1997, p. ix).

In summary, research into team performance established that input variables are important determinants of team performance and must be considered in a comprehensive theory of teams. However, in this specific case, identification and understanding of the components or attributes of unity of effort and their measures are needed to fully explain the mechanisms by which input variables determine team performance in the interagency national security policymaking process.

Merriam-Webster (Mish, 1997) defines teamwork as “work done by several associates with each doing a part but all subordinating personal prominence to the efficiency of the whole” (p. 1209). In their research on team effectiveness, Brannick and Prince (1997) define a team as “two or more people with different tasks who work together adaptively to achieve specified and shared goals” (p. 4) while Mathieu and Day (1997) note that teams exist to the degree that the efforts of different individuals are integrated and coordinated.

Brannick and Prince (1997) argue that teams always include specific functional requirements. The first of these is simultaneity. This requirement posits that team members do something at the same time. The second requirement for team structure is sequencing which involves the output of one team member becoming the input to another member’s tasks. Finally, argue Brannick and Prince, a team involves both elements together. Brannick and Prince also note that functions performed by a team are generally distinctive in character and frequently interchangeable.

The concept of teamwork embodies a number of attributes that characterize unity of effort. Rather than address these under the rubric of *teamwork*, they will be incorporated into the appropriate discussions of specific attributes.

One additional thought with respect to teams and teamwork and their relationship to unity of effort: Brannick and Prince (1997) opine that teams generally possess a history as well as a future, whereas groups are usually brought together for specific purposes and then disbanded. They do note, however, that some teams are brought together for relatively short-term, specific tasks, such as aircrews, while others are created for much longer periods of time. Thus, the view of a team that assembles for a specific purpose more closely resembles a central intent of this research, that being the establishment of new, ad hoc, and often temporary organizational entities, from existing, more firmly established offices, organizations, and agencies. For the purposes of my research, it concerns those executive agencies and nongovernmental organizations involved in the interagency national security policymaking process.

Turning to the joint military operational domain, teamwork is a central tenet of joint military operations and is repeatedly cited as a desired organizational and operational outcome (Joint Publication 1 (2000); Joint Publication 0-2 (2001); Joint Vision 2010 (1996); Joint Vision 2020 (2000)). Joint Publication 1 takes the most universal perspective noting that Americans respond to and respect teamwork as an important value and that this unique phenomenon provides a solid basis for the military to build effective joint teams.

In considering the value of teamwork, the joint publications collectively address several attributes of unit of effort as they apply to the joint military endeavor. Joint Publication 0-2, for example, makes the case that unity of command is a critical element in achieving the level of teamwork necessary to achieve unified action while Joint Publication 1 makes the case that successful teamwork results from cooperative efforts based on demonstrated competence and a willing attitude to achieve common goals.

Further, Joint Publication 1 (2000) maintains that successful teamwork requires delegation of authority--commensurate with responsibility--and that it is necessary to build and maintain trust and confidence based on competence. Teamwork also involves cooperation. Joint Publication 1 maintains that the nature of modern warfare requires cooperation by teams to compete successfully with an adversary. Further, Joint Publication 1 argues that true cooperation requires team players to share credit with all team members and cautions that higher levels of command should not attempt to mandate cooperation.

With respect to the human dimension of unity of effort, physical and moral courage is considered to be the foundational inspiration for teamwork (Joint Publication 1, 2000). Moral courage involves risk-taking, tenacity, standing-up for the right and accepting full responsibility for one's decisions and actions, or, conversely, ones refusal to make a decision or to take action. Physical courage speaks for itself.

### *Collaboration, Cooperation and Coordination*

The organizational processes of collaboration, cooperation, and coordination were repeatedly cited in the literature as a common surrogate for unity of effort. The literature on unity of effort clearly establishes that these three processes more properly *contribute to* the attainment of unity of effort. Of the three processes, coordination clearly merged as the most frequently cited essential for organizational effectiveness and will be addressed in a separate section.

Collaboration refers to the process or ability of working together (Guralnick, 1970). In examining the role of collaboration within the more narrowly focused national security interagency process, joint doctrinal publications note that building successful collaborations is essential to achieving unity of effort and that collaboration provides a firm basis for understanding between the U.S. military and NGOs/IOs involved in national security endeavors. General Henry Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1997/1998), in writing on the relationship between the U.S. military and foreign policy, notes that, given the contemporary geostrategic environment, "Never before has the need for closer collaboration between military leaders and diplomatic community been more crucial" (p. 77).

Within the arena of joint military operations, cooperation is also viewed as playing an important unifying role. In its most basic form, cooperation may be considered as an association of persons for common benefit or the action of cooperating (Mish, 1997). Bethel et al. (1971), in their study of industrial organization management, it is important to note that they model the elements of coordination and characterize cooperation as a process that contributes to the process of coordination while Mathieu and Day (1997), in their study on nuclear power plant teams, characterize cooperation as the extent to which employees from different departments interpersonally get along with each other.

In the joint military arena, Joint Publication 1 (2000) posits that cooperation is seen as critical to the successful performance of teams in achieving stated goals while Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations* (Volume I) (1996) notes that “An atmosphere of cooperation can ultimately contribute to unity of effort” and that the “. . . pursuit of consensus in the interagency process should be viewed as a means--not an end to the process” (p. I-3).

At the regional or combatant command level, Joint Publication 1 (2000) points out that cooperation among the combatant commanders and supporting joint force and component commanders--within the framework of unity of effort directed and arranged at the national level--is crucial to mission accomplishment. As one example, in their analysis of interagency operations at the combatant command or operational level outside the continental United States, Mendel and Bradford (1995), identified the need for “interdisciplinary cooperation” within U.S. Government agencies in the planning and execution of operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, noting that, “The Federal Government did not establish a routine for coordinating interagency effort to assist Panama” (p. 8). Mendel and Bradford also advance the view that U.S. experience in Somalia in 1993 also served to clearly establish that “. . . mastering interagency *cooperation* [italics added] is fundamental to success in military operations” (p. 6).

Interestingly, cooperation was also characterized as a process that can be at odds with competition, both of which are seen as central human characteristics (Joint Publication 1, 2000). Nonetheless, Joint Publication 1, the capstone joint doctrinal publication of the U.S. military, maintains that the nature of modern warfare indeed requires cooperation with a team to compete successfully with an adversary. Joint Publication 1 goes on to make the important point that cooperation should not be mandated by higher levels of command. On the contrary, Joint Publication 1 notes that true cooperation it requires team players to share credit with all team members.

### *Synchronization*

Synchronization refers to the process of arranging events to happen at the same time (Mish, 1997). In the context of military operations, synchronization refers to “The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time” (Joint Publication 1-02, 2001, p. 415).

In considering the relationship between the military and the interagency national security process, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) makes the case that military operations must be

synchronized and/or integrated with those of other agencies of the USG, as well as with foreign forces, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and other involved regional organizations.

Synchronization is considered to be an outcome of effective unified action (see below). Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) notes that, “Unified action synchronizes and/or integrates joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting operations with the operations of government agencies, NGOs, and IOs to achieve unity of effort in the operational area” (p. viii). Similarly, the unclassified White House White Paper on managing complex contingency operations (1997) notes that, “. . . military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts” (Background section, ¶ 7).

### *Integration*

Integration refers to the process of bringing or putting together parts or elements into a complete or unified entity for some established purpose (Guralnik, 1970). In their research into team effectiveness, Mathieu and Day (1997) note that integration involves the contributions of different individuals to a unified team effort. From a military perspective, integration is viewed as “The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole” (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001, p. G-7).

While research failed to establish a formal definition of integration with respect to the interagency national security process, the necessity for integration and an appreciation of actions required to achieve it, was nonetheless widely acknowledged (Whittaker et al., 2002). For example, in its White House White Paper on managing complex contingency operations (1997), the Clinton Administration identified the necessity to “. . . integrate all components of a U.S. response . . . at the policy level and facilitate the creation and coordinating mechanisms at the operational level. . .” (Intent of the PDD section, ¶ 1).<sup>10</sup> The White Paper also notes that, “To foster a durable peace or stability . . . and to maximize the effect of judicious military deployments, the civilian components of an operation must be integrated closely with the military components” (Background section, ¶ 6). This same theme is included in the briefing report for Clinton Administration’s National Security Strategy (1999), observing that, “success [in the national security realm] requires an integrated approach that brings to bear all capabilities . . . .”

Integration within the military and interagency arenas is largely viewed as a function of coordination and the melding organizational processes such as planning. Noting that the flexibility and range of modern military forces requires integration to achieve unity of effort, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) posits that integration is achievable through joint operation planning

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<sup>10</sup> PDD-56 is a classified document. In order to provide amplifying guidance and expand the distribution of the essential elements of the directive, The White House released a White Paper that essentially serves as an implementing instrument at the unclassified level.

and assimilation of forces, capabilities, and systems to enable their employment in a single, cohesive operation rather than a set of operations.

Engaging a somewhat broader interagency perspective, Joint Publication 4-05, *Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning* (1995), posits that integration is achieved through effective use of planning and execution processes that provide for timely and thorough coordination within the chain of command and among DOD, other federal agencies, and the civil sector. Further, Joint Publication 4-05, in its discussion of national mobilization planning, notes that unity of effort “demands the integrated efforts of the nation’s military and supporting resource areas towards achievement of common objectives established by the President” (p. II-1).

Manwaring (2002), in his examination of multi-agency, multinational operations argues that clarity, unity, and effectiveness can be achieved through the integration of coalition military, internal organization, and nongovernmental organization processes with U.S. political-military planning and implementation processes.

### *Unified Action*

The compelling necessity for effective unified action in the military endeavor was noted by General of the Armies and future president of the United States Dwight David Eisenhower as far back as post-World War II. Eisenhower opined, “If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concerted effort” (cited in Shelton, 2001a, p. 13).

However, the functional relationship between unified action and unity of effort is difficult to characterize. For example, the literature on the national security interagency process does not directly address the functional relationship between unified action and unity of effort, while the doctrinal literature on joint warfare regarded unified action as both an input as well as an outcome. In his prefatory comments to the publication of Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, (2001) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry Shelton noted, “The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. Unified action *resulting from* [italics added] clear command relationships and *unity of effort* [italics added] is crucial to making this possible” (signature page).

On the other hand, it can be argued that unified action contributes to unity of effort. As one example, Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the United States*, defines unified action as “the broad scope of activities taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or JTF’s under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands *for the purpose of achieving unity of effort* [italics added] in mission accomplishment” (p. V-7). Moreover, one could also make a case that other desirable organizational outcomes, such as synergy, interoperability, and integration obtain from unified action.

In summary, in contrasting to unity of effort to unified action, depending on how one interprets the research, one could make an equally strong case that unified action is an outcome of unity of effort. In the end, I believe the preponderance of research in the joint doctrinal



publications makes the stronger case for characterizing unified action as an input to unity of effort and that is how I have elected to view the relationship.

Notwithstanding the previous excursion on bifurcation, within the U.S. military establishment, “unified action” is a broadly generic term that refers to the wide scope of activities (including synchronization, integration, and/or interoperability) undertaken by governmental and nongovernmental agencies within the unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces (JTFs) under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001; Joint Publication 1-02, 2001). Broadly speaking, unified action (a) involves concepts, relationships and processes, (b) is concerned with effective employment of resources, and (c) stresses a team approach to unified action, joint warfare and team warfare and (Joint Publication 0-2; Joint Publication 1). Further, it can also be argued that that achieving unified action is facilitated by identifying the common interest and pursuing that motivation above all intervening considerations (ICAF, 2003).

Unified action also requires unified direction. Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) notes that,

For U.S. military operations, unified direction normally is accomplished by establishing a joint force, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning a mission or objective to the joint force commander (JFC), establishing command relationships, assigning and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. (p. I-5)

Turning one last time to the input-output relationship between unified action and unity of effort, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) argues that, at the strategic level, unified action within the military instrument of national power is intended to support national strategic unity of effort through close coordination of the military instrument with the other instruments of national power. Stepping down to the operational level, Joint Publication 0-2 notes that, “Unified action [emphasis in the original] synchronizes and/or integrates joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting operations with the operations of government agencies, NGOs, and IOs *to achieve unity of effort* [italics added] in the operational area” (p. viii).

### *Conceptual Foundations of Unity of Effort*

At the most fundamental level of inquiry, Park, Gowan, and Hwang (2002) note that unity of effort must exist to enable participants in a collaborative endeavor to overcome organizational differences and work together efficiently and effectively to accomplish the goals of the organization. Fishel (1995), in his study of low intensity conflict (LIC), makes a similar case, maintaining that unity of effort facilitates attainment of organizational objectives and outcomes.

As previously noted in Chapter 1, within the military, interagency, and multinational realms of endeavor, unity of effort is seen as an absolute necessity for the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

Notwithstanding the generally positive regard afforded unity of effort as an organizational virtue, Toth (2003) cautions that, in both the international and national political dimensions, it is seldom possible to achieve true singleness of direction. On the one hand, Toth warns that there are inevitable frictions that arise as due to competing aims and needs of participating organizations. At the other end of the spectrum are the individual foibles and personalities that can impact the conduct of interagency coordination. While disunity of effort may not be totally eliminated, maintains Toth, it must, nonetheless, be effectively managed to achieve established national security goals and objectives. To this end, as I noted in Chapter 1, Toth concludes that purpose, process, personality, “conceptual unity,” and trust are important areas of overriding interest in assessing the efficacy and effectiveness of unity of effort.

### *Operational Definition*

I have *operationalized* the construct of unity of effort to fit the specific requirements of this research. Accordingly, *unity of effort is that organizational virtue which results in the maximum operational effect of each agency, organization or office involved in the planning and execution of national security policy.*<sup>11</sup> Expressed differently, unity of effort results from the synergistic effects that result from the coordinated and integrated action of the agencies, organizations, and offices involved in the interagency national security policy process.

### *Historical Evolution*

The conduct of warfare has long been guided by fundamental precepts or principles. The classical Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu, developed and presented an initial set of principles of war over 2500 years ago, but it was not until the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth centuries that general principles of war were more widely addressed and studied (U.S. Air Force Manual I-1, 1992). The first modern codification of the Principles of War was accomplished by the British military theorist and historian, Colonel J.F.C. Fuller in 1916. Originally consisting of eight “strategical principles,” additional principles were added in subsequent years (U.S. Air Force Manual I-1). The United States Army adopted the existing set of nine principles in 1921 and formally codified them in its doctrinal publications. Today, the principles of war have been embraced by all the Services in one form or another and are considered to be “the enduring bedrock of U.S. military doctrine” to guide the conduct of warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war (Joint Publication 1, 2000, p. B-1).

### *The Principles of War*

The Principles of War are at the top of the hierarchy of principles that guide the planning and execution of military operations.<sup>12</sup> However, as the conduct of warfare has changed over time, the fundamental principles of war originally developed for continental or land warfare

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<sup>11</sup> This definition inherently recognizes the unique, yet complimentary competencies and capabilities that each entity brings to the interagency arena. Further, this definition is deemed operative at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of interagency endeavor.

<sup>12</sup> The nine principles of war adopted by the U.S. military establishment are objective, offensive, surprise, unity of command, maneuver, mass, economy of force, security, and simplicity.

expanded and evolved to more precisely address other environments or milieus of warfare. These applications include naval warfare, aerospace warfare, military operations other than war (MOOTW), multinational military operations, and interagency operations. It is not the purpose of this research to explore the various adaptations in the original principles of war. However, research into the subject of unity of effort revealed that fundamental conceptual principles developed to guide the general conduct of military operations also serve to illuminate, albeit indirectly, both the character and attributes of unity of effort. Interestingly, with respect to formal codification as approved U.S. doctrine, unity of effort is not numbered among the nine principle of war embraced by the U.S military establishment. Instead, the closest conceptual principle is *unity of command*. In light of this circumstance and because of its direct relevance to unity of effort, unity of command will subsequently be addressed in a separate section.

Unity of effort can also be viewed from the perspective of concentration. In his study of the principles of war, Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart (1991) noted that, “The principles of war . . . can be condensed into a single word – ‘concentration’” (p. 334). Toth (2003) expands on this concept by noting that, “Concentration in the strategic sense is the focus of available energy on one outcome” (p.1). This principle, notes Toth, can involve the power of several nations operating in coalition, the various armed Services operating jointly within a nation’s military instrument, the various arms of a single military Service operating within a commander’s concept of operations, or, in the case of the Interagency, “...the various instruments of national power operating in harmony within a nation” (Toth, 2003, p. 1).

### *Principles of MOOTW*

With the increase in peace operations that began in earnest in the mid-1980’s and increased in frequency in the 1990’s, six Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) were developed and promulgated within the U.S. military establishment. Reduced to basics, these principles were essentially the principles of war adapted to situations short of war that nonetheless required the use of U.S. military forces (Joint Publication 3-07, 1995). The definitions of these principles take into account the unique political nature of MOOTW as well as the quasi-combat nature of the operations themselves.

Most significantly, unlike the longer established principles of war, the principles of MOOTW include unity of effort as a distinct principle (Joint Publication 1, 2000; Joint Publication 3-07, 1995).<sup>13</sup> The principle of unity of effort as applied to MOOTW requires, among other things, ensuring that “all means dedicated to the MOOTW are directed to a common purpose” and that command arrangements for both military and nonmilitary organizations be carefully defined and articulated (Joint Publication 1, 2000, p. B-2).

### *Fundamentals of Joint Warfare*

The traditional principles of war were largely developed and advocated to increase the likelihood of successful outcomes from military operations. However, as the concept of

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<sup>13</sup> In addition to unity of effort, the remaining principles of MOOTW are: objective, legitimacy, security, restraint and perseverance (Joint Publication 3-07, 1995).

“jointness” at the operational level of war gained ascendancy following the passage and implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the principles of war, as well as operational military experience, provided the basis for the development of fundamentals of joint warfare (Joint Publication 1, 2000).

Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, is the capstone doctrinal publication articulating the strategic warfighting philosophy of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Mendel & Bradford, 1995). These precepts include fundamentals of Joint Warfare that specifically serve to guide *joint* operations conducted by the Armed Forces of the United States. Perhaps more importantly, Joint Publication 1 addresses not only the conduct of joint operations, but also interagency, and multinational operations as well.

Conspicuously heading the list of joint warfare fundamentals is unity of effort. Joint Publication 1 (2000) points out that military campaigns are joint by nature and require the joint employment of forces at all levels of war – strategic, operational, and tactical. The fundamentals of joint warfare continue the focus established in the principles of war and MOOTW with respect to common objective, coordination, and unified command. The fundamentals of joint warfare also stress that unified action of subordinate component commands within the theater of operations be assured by virtue of the theater command structure and the strategies that are developed and executed. Finally, Joint Publication 1 argues that unified action under the leadership of combatant or theater commander encompasses military, interagency, multinational, and non-governmental organizations in the execution of campaign plans.

#### *Principles of Multinational Operations Unity of Effort*

With respect to achieving unity of effort in multinational endeavors, U.S. experience has led to the development and doctrinal codification of several principles that, while directly relevant to multinational unity of effort, are also equally instructive with respect to unity of effort in the interagency national security process. First among these principles is the need for a common understanding of the overall aim or mission and the concept of operation for attaining it (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Second, there is a requirement for a coordinated policy, especially with respect to formal authority over the various national elements involved. Third, there exists a requirement to establish and maintain trust and confidence among multinational forces. In addition to these principles, experience has established that multinational force collaboration to achieve unity of effort also requires information sharing and interoperability between multinational forces (MNFs) as well as simple plans (Joint Publication 0-2).

In addition to principles specifically focusing on multinational unity of effort, U.S. joint doctrine for multinational endeavor also identifies four tenets for multinational cooperation that are deemed to be attributes of unity of effort in the broader context. Grouped under the overarching goal of achieving mutual confidence, these include (a) respect for each multinational partner’s culture, religion, customs, history, and values; (b) establishing rapport; (c) acquiring a knowledge of each multinational partner’s doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values and (d) patience in developing partnerships with multinational partners (Joint Publication 3-16, 2000).

*Unity of Effort and the Interagency National Security Policymaking Process**Introduction*

The purpose, object, or aim of all collaborative endeavors is the effect desired (Toth, 2003). As previously noted, within the interagency national security arena, this purpose may involve a constant ongoing effort, such as the National Security Council process or transitory crises, missions, or tasks, such as a humanitarian or relief operations.

As I noted earlier, one of the major challenges in examining the construct of unity of effort within the interagency national security community is the relative dearth of discussion on the subject. There is a significant body of literature within the interagency national security community that recognizes a need for increased effectiveness of interagency performance (Barnes, 2002; Hawley, 2003; Mendel & Bradford, 1995; Miller, 1993; Tucker, 2000; Whittaker et al., 2002). However, there is very little direct reference to unity of effort as a desired organizational virtue. Indeed, the literature contains repeated references to such terms as “unity of action,” “coordination,” “cooperation,” “collaboration,” “integration,” and, within the joint doctrinal literature, “fully integrated armed forces/Joint Team.” That said, the available literature addressing unity of effort in the national security interagency process is nonetheless instructive in establishing the importance of unity of effort in the interagency national security effort and suggests that there is a growing recognition of the criticality of unity of effort in the development and execution of national security policy.

As early as 1993, Miller (1993) pointed out that national security challenges were no longer the province of any single department or agency within the U.S. Government. As a consequence, argued Miller, a multi-agency approach was required to bring the U.S. Government’s “full problem-solving potential to bear” (p.18). In an October 2000 speech to the Conference of the Law and Policy Relating to National Security Activities in Outer Space, Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche argued that one of the major themes for U.S. efforts in space was unity of effort (Roche, 2002). Roche noted, “By this I mean we [Air Force] must lead the effort but work joint/interagency space issues as well” (Introduction section, ¶ 14). Roche also argued that modernization of space systems likewise requires unity of effort to be successful, noting that,

The former distinctions between black programs, white space, military, civil and commercial are growing increasingly blurred and becoming virtually boundary-less--again like the seas. We must insure our space architectures remain sufficiently capable to support our military missions as well as our civil users . . . . (Space Modernization Requires Unity of Effort section, ¶ 2)

Finally, concluded Roche, “With strong unity of effort and assured access to space, our space control operations will enable us to maintain air and space superiority” (Introduction section, ¶ 14).

More recently, John W. McGaw, Director of the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security

offered the opinion that, “The proposed organization [Department of Homeland Security] will bring unity of effort and unity of command to homeland security with clear lines of authority to get the job done” (Transportation Security Agency, 2003).

### *National Strategic Unity of Effort*

Taken at the flood, the national security strategy development process involves a clear understanding of the desired national security policy goals. The clear articulation of both overarching aims and derivative military, diplomatic, economic, political, and informational objectives result in strategic focus and are fundamental prerequisites for unity of effort at the national level and provide the foundation for cooperation and unified action at the regional or local level of endeavor (Joint Publication 1, 2000).

The President, advised by the National Security Council, is responsible for national strategic unity of effort (Joint Chiefs of Staff Overview of National Security Structure, n.d.; Joint Publication 0-2, 2001; Toth, 2003; Whittaker et al., 2002). Additionally, the Constitution (as previously noted) as well as Federal law, international law, and national interests impact national unified action in the arena of national security (Joint Publication 0-2; Toth).

At the operational level of national endeavor within the interagency national security community, unity of effort allows organizations involved in the interagency national security process to overcome organizational differences in order to work together effectively, efficiently, and collaboratively to accomplish the stated goals, mission, or purpose of the organization. Returning to an earlier example, the Clinton Administration’s National Security Strategy (1999) noted that, “success [in the national security realm] requires an integrated approach that brings to bear all capabilities” (p. 4). A similar view is evident in Joint Publication 4-05, the doctrinal publication on national mobilization. Joint Publication 4-05 (1995) notes that unity of effort “demands the integrated efforts of the nation’s military and supporting resource areas towards achievement of common objectives established by the President” (p. II-1).

It should be noted, however, that national strategic unity of effort as a requirement at the operational level is not universally acknowledged. Mendel and Bradford (1995), based on their detailed study of Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1999, arrive at a somewhat different conclusion, arguing that most U.S. government agencies at the operational level do not sense the need for or see a problem integrating interagency capabilities. Rather, argue Mendel and Bradford, many organizations work quite effectively within their respective domains, having little need to operate beyond the reach of an ambassador’s country team within in a host nation.

### *National Strategic Military Unity of Effort*

At the next subordinate level of national security endeavor, unified action within the military instrument of national power is expected to directly support national strategic unity of effort through the development of supporting military objectives and the close coordination of the military instrument with the other instruments of national power nationally and, ultimately, in theaters of operation (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

Similar to the President's role in forging unity of effort at the national strategic level, the Secretary of Defense is responsible [to the President] for national military unity of effort, to include creating, supporting, and employing military capabilities. Internally, unity of effort among the respective military Services at the national level is derived from the authority of the both the President and the Secretary of Defense, by the strategic planning of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by cross-Service efforts by the Military Departments (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

However, in *Joint Vision 2020* (2000), the visionary blueprint for the transformation of the U.S military instrument, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, argues strongly for the necessity for achieving of interagency coordination or unity of effort.<sup>14</sup> As one example, *Joint Vision 2020* recognizes that, "The primary challenge of Interagency operations is to achieve unity of effort despite the diverse cultures, competing interests, and differing priorities of the participating organizations, many of whom guard their relative independence, freedom of action, and impartiality" (p.18). At a more specific level of endeavor, specifically that involving efforts to thwart terrorist attacks, in analyzing the lessons learned from the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole, the DoD U.S.S. Cole Commission Report (2001) (Hereinafter cited as The Cole Commission Report) noted that "combating terrorism is so important that it demands complete unity of effort at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense". Additionally, the Cole Commission Report noted that, "Unity of effort among the offices and agencies in the DoD providing resources, policy, oversight and direction is critical to truly gain the initiative over a very adaptive, persistent, patient, and tenacious terrorist" (p. 1). The report continues, "This unity of effort extends also to the coordination of engagement activities across U.S. Government agencies, including developing the security capabilities of host nations to help protect U.S. forces and balancing the range and frequency of activities among all agencies" (p 1.)

### *Regional/Operational Unity of Effort*

The continuing changes in the global national security environment require that the military and multiple U.S. Government agencies work effectively to overcome regional instabilities and counter the threat of regional war (Manwaring, 2002; Mendel & Bradford, 1995).

Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) posits that, "Unified action within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic unity of effort through close coordination with the other instruments of national power as they apply within the theater environment and its unity of effort" (p. IV-5).

Based on their case study of the Panamanian incursion, Mendel and Bradford (1995) argue that the critical catalyst for coordinating multi-agency capability to achieve unity of effort is provided by the leadership of the unified combatant commanders at the regional level of effort. Commanders of combatant commands (CoComs) exercise combatant command (command

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<sup>14</sup> Air Force General Richard Myers is the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having taken office on October 15, 2001.

authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are directly responsible to the National Command Authorities (NCA)<sup>15</sup> for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions. Joint Publication 0-2 posits that,

. . . combatant commanders are in pivotal positions to ensure that unified actions are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the NCA in coordination with other authorities (i.e., alliance or coalition leadership). Combatant commanders should ensure that their unified action synchronizes and/or integrates joint and single-Service operations with the actions of supporting combatant commands, other military forces (multinational operations), and nonmilitary organizations (Department of Defense [DoD] and other federal government agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA] and the Agency for International Development; the UN; and NGOs and IOs). (p. I-5)

However, despite the significant regional responsibilities of the unified commanders, it must not be overlooked that the U.S. Ambassador is directly responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all U.S. Government (USG) elements in each foreign or host nation, except those under the direct command of a combatant commander (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Doctrinally, in addition to effecting all military coordination and cooperation, geographic combatant commanders are responsible for coordinating with U.S. ambassadors in their geographic area of responsibility (as necessary) across the range of military operation (Joint Publication 0-2).

### *Conceptual Unity*

Finally, overlying all three levels of endeavor as well as spanning each level horizontally is the connective tissue of conceptual unity. Toth (2003), in crafting the case for conceptual unity in the interagency national security policymaking process, argues that conceptual unity involves the “essential harmony” of the various elements of a collective effort as a whole. Within the interagency national security process, conceptual unity, if properly conceived, articulated, and pursued, serves to allow all parties to the effort to agree upon the desired effect or outcome and requires common visualization among the key players of what is to be done and how. Through its attainment, conceptual unity contributes to the harmonious employment of the various elements of national or multinational power toward common goals or objectives (Toth).

Hawley (2003) advances a similar thought, noting that all instruments of national power must be harmonized to achieve success in interagency national security crisis interventions. Hawley notes that success in this type of undertaking relies on the use of,

. . . all appropriate means to achieve mission success, yet each instrument of government action is limited. Hence, they must be carefully planned to play in concert to complement each other’s effects. This is akin to “being in tune” across the mission

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<sup>15</sup> The National Command Authorities are the President of the United States in his role as Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of Defense.



throughout the intervention to strengthen operational performance. If they are not in harmony, the intervention will under perform, and the risks of failure will increase. (p.12)

### *Attributes of Unity of Effort*

#### *Introduction*

As articulated in Chapter 1, the fundamental aim of this research is to characterize the organizational virtue of unity of effort by identifying and clarifying its individual attributes or components.<sup>16</sup> In the following section, I will endeavor to identify and discuss potential attributes of unity of effort based on a survey of the literature and the conduct of both interviews and focus groups consisting of individuals with mid- to senior-level experience in the interagency national security policy community. Prior to commencing the above research efforts, I developed the following framework to guide and document my inquiry. Where appropriate, a general introduction or discussion is provided following which the specific attribute or component of interest will be addressed, first in terms appropriate to the strategic/national level of endeavor, then, subsequently, at the joint military, interagency, and multinational levels of endeavor.

#### *Unity of Command*

As previously noted, unity of effort is not one of the principles of war doctrinally subscribed to by the U.S. military. Instead, the principle of unity of command has been embraced at the highest level of the military's hierarchy of principles. Long considered one of the key elements in achieving effective coordination between and among military organizations engaged in a common operation or executing a common mission, unity of command is a fundamental tenet of warfare and is considered to be central to achieving unity of effort (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). As Napoleon I accurately noted, "Nothing is so important in war as an undivided command" (D'Aguilar 1837/1987, p. 76).

There are several dimensions to the principle of unity of command that are of interest to this research effort. At the general level of inquiry, the principle of unity of command instructs practitioners of warfare to "Ensure unity of effort for every objective under one responsible commander" (U.S. Air Force Manual I-1, 1992, p.12). Implicit in this articulation is the emphasis on focusing all efforts toward a common goal or objective, the necessity for effective coordination, and the requirement for a unified command. At the strategic level of endeavor, the common goal is generally a national political purpose as well as one or more broad strategic objectives that derive from that purpose. Fishel (1995), in his study of low intensity conflict (LIC), notes that current U.S. doctrine embraces the principle of unity of command as essential for achieving contributory objectives in the pursuit of a desired outcome or end state, while Jones (1987) warns that divided commands increase the risk of failure because of a lack of coordination of effort and agreement as to the objective.

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<sup>16</sup> *Virtue* in the organizational context specific to this research refers to "a beneficial quality or power of a thing" (Mish, 1997, p. 1320).

In considering unified command of joint operations, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) notes that unity of command provides the foundation for trust, coordination, and teamwork necessary for achieving unified action and that its attainment requires clear delineation of responsibility. To this end, Joint Publication 0-2 recommends the formal designation of a single joint force commander (JFC) at the appropriate level of endeavor, imbued with the requisite authority to accomplish all assigned tasks and to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Further, Joint Publication 0-2 strongly maintains that unity of command can best be facilitated and unity of effort fostered through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.

The above view is not universal. Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) also points out that some observers hold the view that achieving unity of command in interagency and/or multinational operations may not be possible. At the interagency level, factors such as organizational culture, power relationships, institutional allegiance, and/or organizational reward and punishment systems may preclude the establishment of unified command. An additional structural challenge to unity of command is the disparity of organizations with respect to capability, authority, objectives, and organization (White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, (1997); Joint Publication 3-33, 1999; Langford, 1999). Similarly, Fishel (1996), observes that,

Among the Anglo-American principles of war, unity of command is nearly paramount. Yet in interagency operations and coalition warfare, unity of command often is impossible to achieve. As a result, unity of effort may well be the only realistic goal. (p.175)

In the closely related area of multinational operations, Fishel (1995) warns that the fragmented nature of contemporary multinational military endeavors makes the attainment of unity of command extremely difficult. Such factors as national pride, cultural peculiarities, and other unique political and diplomatic imperatives necessary to craft and maintain an alliance or coalition serve to create this fragmented situation. Nonetheless, even though unity of command as visualized by the U.S. military might not be possible, unity of effort can still be realized through effective coordination (Fishel; Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

Similarly, The U.S. Army, in its main doctrinal publication addressing medical operations in low-intensity operations (FM 8-42), notes that military officers cannot “command” per se in ad hoc organizations that integrate the efforts of military, government, and civilian agencies. Rather, recommends the Army, in lieu of “command” as understand in a military environment, leaders will have to persuade and compromise, expand their knowledge of interagency and multinational operations, and rely on “force of logic” to create unity of effort (U.S. Army, 1997).

Turning to the area of domestic emergencies and homeland security, at the lowest or tactical level of endeavor, the foundation for unified command at the local level is initially established through state and local incident command systems (ICS). The U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (2001) (hereafter cited as USG CONPLAN), maintains that ICSs activated at the outset of an emergency response evolve into

“Unified Command” when the magnitude of the crisis exceeds the capabilities and resources of local incident command or multiple jurisdictions become involved (p. 16).<sup>17</sup> As emergency or crisis response situations develop and mature and additional levels of support are brought into the operation, multi-agency command posts (CPs) or operations centers can be established and operated to integrate multi-agency personnel and resources, effect multi-agency coordination, and achieve unified command.

### *Directive Authority*

Authority, and more specifically, directive authority, was found to play an important role in achieving interagency unity of effort. Directive authority in the national security arena involves the legal or operational authority to compel cooperation, control resources, mediate disputes between participating agencies, structure organizational elements, and manage the implementation of approved strategies (Mendel & Bradford, 1995; Joint Chiefs of Staff Overview of National Security Structure, n.d.). Reduced to basics, directive authority concerns the question of “who’s in charge?”

From a legal perspective, directive authority at the national strategic level of engagement is codified in U.S.C. Title 10 and DoD Directives. These instruments spell out the relationship between the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services. Within the joint military endeavor, unified direction is viewed as the first essential in achieving unified military or joint action and basically emanates from the formal command and control relationships and command authorities established in law, Department of Defense and Service directives, and doctrine. (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

Within the interagency realm, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) was issued by President Clinton in May 1997 to respond to and provide specific directive authority for interagency responses to complex contingency operations (Langford, 1999; White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, 1997). PDD-56 was promulgated because of concern about the perceived lack of effective interagency response to what was then termed complex contingency operations. Indeed, PDD-56 was one of the very earliest attempts to provide strategic direction for interagency responses to unfolding national security and foreign policy crises. More recently, addressing the then-impending establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Barnes (2002) noted that the agency head should have “clear, unquestioned, and plenary authority” over all personnel, functions, and responsibilities of every element in the agency, including the authority to transfer functions and powers on his/her own authority from one element of the agency to another.

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<sup>17</sup> In December, 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released its National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP constitutes “...a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters and other emergencies that occur” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p. 1). For all intents and purposes, it replaces the USG Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan. However, because of its late release with respect to the finalization of this research, I have not addressed the NRP in detail in this research.

At the regional or operational level of endeavor, Mendel and Bradford (1995), in their examination of Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1991 noted that success in the low intensity operations characteristic of the Panama operation requires the artful blending of military and civilian resources, skills, and directive authority. To this end, regional or operational combatant commanders possess a number of options for exercising command authority. Doctrinally, these specific options, delineated in detail in Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (2001), are intended to promote both unity of effort and unity of command in military national security endeavors.

Directive authority was found to be important in multinational operations as well. Within this domain, the clear definition and understanding of authorities within the overall coalition or alliance structure was found to be critical to success (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Perhaps of greater importance, Joint Publication 0-2 posits that achieving this goal requires the intentional development and articulation of coordinated policy that specifically addresses formal authority over the respective elements of the multinational force.

### *Lines of Authority*

Closely related to directive authority, lines of authority refers to the formal chain of command established for the purpose of exercising directive authority. As a general precept, chains of command should be as simple and uncomplicated as possible (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

In considering the formal lines of authority that enhance unity of command within the interagency structure, the need for a general sharpening of interagency lines of authority has long been advocated as a means to reduce interagency competition (Livingston, 2001). Barnes (2002) maintains that a clear and unambiguous line of command authority and accountability from the President to the most junior individual involved in operational matters is required. Additionally, Barnes opines that subordinates must have full responsibility and authority to plan and conduct operations in their functional areas of responsibility under the sole direction of the agency head and the President. The key, maintains Barnes, is that no individual is required to report to more than one person with respect to operational matters. Barnes goes on to note that subordinate commanders, directors, etc. must be subordinate to and report only to the Agency head and that these subordinate chains of command meet only at the level of the head of agency.

With respect to the subordinate operational elements, Barnes (2002) argues that no subordinate leader should have a role in or authority over planning for the conduct of actual operations at the tactical level. Rather, maintains Barnes, such leaders should be responsible for support and administration of elements under their aegis and providing the necessary forces to the appropriate leaders to execute the operational mission.

### *Delegation of Authority*

Delegation in the general sense refers to the act of empowering another to act in one's place (Mish, 1997). Delegation of authority within the military and joint contexts refers to the action by which a commander assigns part of his or her authority commensurate with the assigned task to a subordinate commander. Implicit in this definition is the understanding that

ultimate responsibility for a mission or a task cannot be relinquished. On the contrary delegation of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. It is imperative, however, that the extent of the authority delegated be clearly stated or delineated (Joint Publication 1-02, 2001).

The clear articulation and unambiguous understanding of the manner in which formal authority is delegated within an organization contributes to both unity of command and unity of effort (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001; Joint Publication 3-33, 1999). Joint Publication 1 (2000), for example, maintains that successful teamwork necessarily requires delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility and that delegation of authority is necessary to build and maintain trust and confidence based on competence. Delegation of authority was viewed as being an important element in obtaining best effort and greatest initiative among members of a military team. Additionally, Joint Publication 1 noted that delegation is especially important in those cases where specialized expertise is considered to be an essential building block in a collaborative endeavor.

### *Centralized Leadership*

Closely related to directive authority, research suggests that centralized leadership is an essential element in developing an organizational framework that facilitates the creation and maintenance of organizational unity of effort. Centralized leadership is viewed as an essential element in developing a framework to support unified effort (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). Within the context of the interagency national security policy process, centralized leadership does not necessarily refer to the designation of a single individual or organizational position that oversees the execution of a national security mission. Rather, centralized leadership refers to vesting an organization or agency as the single, high-level Federal focal point for policy and coordination (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T, 2002).

As early as September, 2001, Spencer (2001), in his analysis of government efforts to protect the U.S. from attack recommended that a central authority be established in the White House Office to organize Federal agencies to deal with the homeland threat and to establish clear operational lines for the use of the military in homeland defense. Eventually, the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, both established under the provisions of Executive Order 13228, provided the initial centralized leadership to coordinate homeland security efforts at the Federal, state and local levels of government, as well as private sector entities (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002).

In 2001, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted inquiries into the Y2K conversion effort, combating terrorism, and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to identify elements deemed critical to unifying operational efforts. One such element was centralized leadership (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). In March 2002, in its inquiry into the challenges likely to face the new Department of Homeland Security, the GAO noted the “prevalence of gaps, duplication and overlaps driven in large part by the absence of central policy focal points . . .” (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T, 2002, p. 3). The U.S. Department of Defense U.S.S. Cole Commission Report (2001), in its inquiry into the terrorist attack of the U.S.S. Cole, noted a problem specifically with the centralized direction of force protection efforts. As a result, the Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense develop an

organization that would more cohesively align policy and resources within the Department of Defense to combat terrorism. As a measure of how important the Commission viewed this imperative, the Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense designate one of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense to oversee these functions (Cole Commission Report; Shelton, 2001b).

A similar need for centralized leadership is documented in the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (USG CONPLAN) (2001). This plan calls for the designation of lead Federal agencies (LFAs) to ensure multi-agency coordination and tailored, time-phased deployment of Federal assets. The goal of LFA designation is the seamless integration of all Federal, state, and local assets. As previously noted, the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, were, in large measure, created to specifically provide this level of centralized leadership for top-to-bottom national homeland security efforts (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002).

Hawley (2003), in his assessment of U.S. capability to respond specifically to complex contingency operations, also noted the need for centralized leadership. Structurally, Hawley maintains that the National Security Council should lead interagency national security efforts at the national level. Hawley argues that consensus management in the national security policymaking process is critical to an effective planning effort, that the NSC possesses a broad view not usually characteristic among agency officials, and that it can play a decisive role in bringing closure to policy planning disputes.

In terms of providing direct leadership, Hawley (2003) argues that there must be someone in charge of the interagency process, opining that, "There should be no doubt about which senior official in the executive branch is leading the interagency planning effort and that this person is accountable . . . for the success of the mission" (p. 13). It should be noted that this contention runs counter to the view that organizational entities (offices, departments, agencies, etc.) should be designated as focal points for interagency operations, not positions or "persons," per se. Nonetheless, Hawley argues that that official must be appropriately empowered to fix accountability on personnel in other agencies for performance within their assigned areas of responsibility. Additionally, argues Hawley, placing responsibility on key officials with the appropriate power serves to stimulate action in the overall interagency process.

Turning to interagency endeavors involving multinational organizations, citing the Kosovo intervention as a case in point, Hawley (2003) opines that unified civilian leadership over both military and civilian endeavors is essential to interagency mission success, especially in those instances where multinational and multilateral operations are required. Additionally, Hawley notes that strong coalition leadership and effective management is critical to a national security intervention involving a coalition. Hawley notes that a coalition operation is

. . . always ad hoc and inherently fragile. A "standing coalition" is a planning fantasy. Each intervention is essentially a "pick-up game" where willing participants come to play in an ad hoc fashion. . . . Cohesion is essential to success;

yet unity can be quite fragile compared to the adversary's will and determination. . . . capable coalition leadership and effective management are central to success . . . . (p. 13)

## *Organization*

### *Introduction.*

In its most fundamental form, organization may be properly considered as architecture for action (Toth, 2003). Organization provides the best framework for fulfilling organizational functions and provides for the division of labor by grouping people and establishing authorities, responsibilities, and relationships among them. Said differently, organization serves to determine who does what to whom. Moreover, organization is unique in that it must be capable of serving both ends and means, both of which can change over the course of time (ICAF, 2003; Toth, 2003).

Effective organization helps to achieve a number of desired outcomes. Of immediate interest to this research, a sound organizational structure serves to provide for unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). In a purely military sense, organization establishes chains of command as well as command and support relationships in a military force (U.S.M.C. War Room Report 4-03, 2003). At the same time, organization can also serve as a vehicle for socialization, providing a source for group identity (U.S.M.C. War Room Report 4-03). Additionally, organization is a means to provide the actual capabilities that each agency or organization brings to the operation at hand (Joint Publication 3-33, 1999).

From a hierarchical perspective, organization provides continuity from the highest to the lowest level of endeavor (U.S.M.C. War Room Report 4-03, 2003). Organizational effort can also be broken out by geographic area, function, timing, targets or objectives, or any combination thereof (Toth, 2003). As noted earlier, the U.S. strategic structure for national security, foreign policy, and diplomacy is geographically oriented with ambassadors appointed to individual nations at the operational level and regional bureaus established within the Department of State at the national level. That said, it should also be noted that, within an embassy, there are also direct functional components representing such agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, Customs, Treasury, and the Department of Defense.

Within the military arena, the structural organization for executing the National Security Strategy (NSS), the recently formulated Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy (NMS) are all geographic and functional in character, with unified military commanders directing regional areas of responsibility (AORs) or unified commands with specific functional missions. The functional combatant commands usually involve continuing operations that cross-cut across geographic areas without respect to actual geographic boundaries of the combatant commands (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

Major considerations to be addressed in developing organizational structures include complexity, flexibility, and span of control. In considering the experience derived from

multinational endeavors, experience has shown that simplicity of the structure is critical to forming functional, effective organizations (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Additionally, organization is a means to provide for operational flexibility. Echeloned organizations of an Army, for example, provide commanders with great flexibility in selecting appropriate force for the full range of military operations (Joint Publication 3-33, 1999) while joint force organizations have the potential flexibility to meet planned phases of contemplated operations and any developments that could change plans (Joint Publication 0-2). Finally, span of control was identified as an important variable in sizing an organization to achieve optimal effectiveness (Joint Publication 0-2; Joint Publication 3-57, 2001).

### *Organizational Concepts.*

Organizational concepts or structures are seen as playing a useful role in achieving organizational unity of effort. In so doing, organizational constructs can take on a wide array of configurations. Military organizational options, for instance, can be structured in response to the specific mission to be accomplished or the function to be performed. As one example, a regional combatant commander charged with the planning and execution of a national security mission within his or her region can structure the implementing organization as a single service force, as a joint force (JTF), as a multinational or coalition force (CJTF), or as a combination of the above (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

At the interagency level of endeavor, there is likewise a wide array of organizational concepts that can be employed to facilitate unity of effort. These options include the conventional National Security Council (NSC) organization, the appointment of special directors or administrators (i.e. "Czars") to superintend the execution of specialized responsibilities, the establishment of coordination centers, the appointment of Blue Ribbon Panels or commissions, and/or the designation of lead Federal agencies (LFA's) (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2003).

As previously discussed in some detail, the NSC was created to advise the President on the integration of foreign, military, and domestic policy in support of national interests. By way of review, the NSC is the major coordinating agency within the executive branch for national security and consists of a formal hierarchy of interagency communities and committees and coordinating subgroups seeking consensus on policy recommendations. The NSC oversees the day-to-day national security policymaking process as well as coordinating strategic responses to national security crises. However, the staff of the NSC, although expert in national security issues, do not possess formal implementation authority (Marcella, 2001; Whittaker et al., 2002).

Another option for organization is the appointment of a single executive agent or coordinating authority, depending on the establishing charter. "Czars" are individuals chartered by law or Presidential executive order (EO) to integrate and/or coordinate selected interagency missions or actions. One prominent example is the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. This position was established in law (Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1998 and the Law Enforcement Act of 1994) and its organization and activities detailed in Executive Orders 12880, 12992, and 13023. Under the provisions of the executive order, the Director is responsible for setting priorities; implementing a national strategy (to include long-term goals and measurable



objectives); certifying Federal drug control budgets for the Departments of Defense, State, Transportation, Justice, Energy, Treasury, and Homeland Security, the Veterans Administration, and others; and serving as the President's chief drug control spokesman (Toth, 2003).

A second illustrative example is the Chairman of the President's Council on Year 2000 (Y2K) Conversion (established by Executive Order 13073) to ensure that Federal systems were ready for the date change occasioned by the transition into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. This interagency responsibility extended to interfacing with partners (mostly states) for important federal services, promoting preparation among businesses and other governments, and coordinating exchange of information within and among more than 20 functional sectors, largely relying upon trade associations and other umbrella organizations (Toth, 2003). More recent examples include the Director of the Office of State and Local Coordination in the White Office of Homeland Security, responsible for improving cooperation and collaboration with the private sector and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Homeland Security, responsible for creating and fostering strategic relationships (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, 2002). Other examples include individuals chartered to oversee Federal infrastructure protection and counter-terrorism programs.

Interestingly, Hillyard (2002), in his assessment of organizational options for homeland security, makes the case that attempting to structure a homeland security agency by first focusing on the threat and the mission violates a basic principle for successful organization. Hillyard suggests that,

Answers built on czars, realignments of bureaucracies, creation of new bureaucracies and facilitation of existing federal, state, local, and nongovernmental organizations address the immediate. When framed as answers for threats against which the nation has no coherent response, all such answers hold a certain logic. But all such answers logically solve the wrong question. (p. 75)

A third organizational option for interagency unity of effort is the establishment of coordination centers. The establishment and operation of local and state multi-agency coordination centers and command posts (CPs) to integrate multi-agency personnel and resources in managing emergency responses to disasters and incidents of terrorism, and centralized coordination centers at the Federal level of response are recommended to coordinate responses to domestic incidents and provide effective interagency coordination (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, 2002).

At the local level of operational interest, unity of effort can be attained in an interagency setting through the melding of coordination centers and emergency management. Reduced to basics, emergency management involves the linkage of local and state emergency operations centers (EOCs) and Federal EOCs at the regional and national level. This organizational construct, along with time-tested emergency incident management procedures, processes, and techniques provide for multi-agency coordination of personnel and resources in complex or multiple incidents. As one example of how coordination centers employing pre-established and standardized emergency management procedures can facilitate interagency response to a crisis situation one might consider the very basic requirement to provide logistics support and

resources at an emergency incident. Under the basic tenets of emergency management, requests for these types of support are processed through designated coordination centers. They are filled at the lowest level possible, then, if unsatisfied, requests move-up through a hierarchy of coordination centers until filled.

At the national level, for example, under the provisions of the Federal Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (USG CONPLAN) (2001), a joint operations center (JOC) under a Federal one-scene commander (OSC) will be established to insure conflicts are resolved, overall objectives for the incident are established, and strategies are selected for use of critical resources.

Taking a longer view of the requirement for centralized coordination from the national level, Nye (2002), in his commentary on the proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security, seconded a recommendation by the National Research Council (NRC) to create an Institute for Homeland Security. This particular institution would be outside the Federal pay structure and regulations and would be in direct support of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House and the [then] proposed Department of Homeland Security. Coordination functions envisioned include coordination with the private and non-profit sectors; systems-wide planning; identifying and addressing shortcomings, gaps, and overlaps (seams) in U.S. systems and infrastructures (transportation, energy, communications); recommending changes in policies, budgets, etc.; conducting studies of special vulnerabilities as required by OHS and DHS, and developing “intelligence with a small i” (Nye).

A fourth organization concept involves the appointment of Blue Ribbon Panels to study specific national security problems. These types of organizational options are essentially joint task forces oriented on a specific functional requirement (Toth, 2003). Recent examples include the Reagan Administration’s Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1988), the National Defense Panel (NDP) (1997) that addressed national security requirements of the Clinton administration (with a view towards the government’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century (The Hart-Rudman Commission).

As previously addressed in the discussion of centralized leadership, one of the more frequently employed organizational options in the national security arena involves the designation of lead agencies (LFA’s) within the Federal government. Examples include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for disaster response/recovery and the Department of State (DOS) for foreign aid. As stated earlier, the goal of LFA designation is the seamless integration of all Federal, state, and local assets to improve coordination and prevent inefficiencies and ineffectiveness (USG CONPLAN, 2001).

The designation of LFAs to address domestic terrorism is a central element of the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (USG CONPLAN)(2001). Under the plan, lead Federal agencies will be designated to ensure multi-agency coordination and tailored, time-phased deployment of Federal assets in response to domestic terrorism incidents.

However, in March 2002, the GAO, in its inquiry into programs to combat terrorism noted the “prevalence of gaps, duplication and overlaps driven in large part by the absence of central policy focal points...” (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T, 2002, p.3). As a result, the GAO recommended the creation of a single, high-level Federal focal point for policy and coordination (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T; See also U.S. GAO Report 01-660T, 2001). A similar recommendation was offered by the Cole Commission, urging the Secretary of Defense to designate an organization to more cohesively align policy and resources within DoD to combat terrorism and to designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense to oversee these functions (Cole Commission Report, 2001).

### *Liaison.*

The use of liaison officers and elements emerged as a potential enhancer of organizational unity of effort. Liaison involves the act of communicating for the purposes of establishing and maintaining mutual understanding and cooperation between two or more organizational entities (Mish, 1997). Within the realm of joint doctrine, liaison involves both contact and communications (between elements of military units) for the purpose of ensuring both mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (Joint Publication 1-02, 2001). In speaking to possible means to attain unified action, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) points out that liaison both facilitates coordination and promotes interoperability and strongly recommends establishing working groups at other organizational entities to enhance the likelihood of successful joint endeavor.

Turning to the realm of multinational operations, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) maintains that liaison, as well as multinational doctrine, training, and exercises facilitates unity of effort. Similarly, the military’s doctrinal guide to civil-military operations, Joint Publication 3-57 (2001) notes that establishing and maintaining effective liaison with all participating agencies is critical to achieving unity of effort and that lower level civil-military operations necessarily involve liaison and coordination among U.S., multinational, indigenous security forces, as well as Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) or International Organizations (IO)s.

### *Roles and Responsibilities.*

Organizational roles and responsibilities also emerged as a potential attribute of unity of effort in the interagency arena (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002; Whittaker et al., 2002). In its assessment of U.S. government efforts to unify the homeland security mission, the GAO found that a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities was a critical unifying element. Not surprisingly, the GAO went on record as recommending that roles and responsibilities be clearly delineated in a national homeland security strategy (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). In separate testimony before Congress, the GAO repeated its recommendation that a definitive national strategy be developed and implemented to clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of Federal, state, and local governments in protecting against terrorist attacks (U.S. GAO Report 02-549T, 2002).

In characterizing the importance of clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, despite the generally acknowledged success of the Y2K conversion interagency effort, with specific

respect to organizational responsibilities within this particular interagency endeavor, DeVost (2000) was critical of mitigation procedures and techniques employed in response to known or suspected systems incidents, contending that it was not always clear exactly who was responsible for responding to specific incidents or systems failure that occurred nor were there procedures in place to effect the coordination necessary prior to and during a response. DeVost went on to note,

I'm still not convinced that within the U.S. government, that we even know how to organize for a response to a critical infrastructure attack. Is it FEMA that responds? Is it the FBI? Who is involved when it comes to responding to a critical infrastructure failure. (p. 5)

In the joint military sphere, a clear delineation of responsibility is deemed to be essential in assuring effective unity of command (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). As one measure of the importance the joint community attaches to this relationship, in the introductory section of its War Studies program syllabus (2003), the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) notes that, "War and its deterrence are primary functions of government and its constituent parts, both military and civilian, and all must learn their individual roles" (p. ix). Further, Joint Publication 0-2 makes the case that unity of command can be facilitated and unity of effort fostered through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities. Further, Joint Publication 0-2 states that, "in order to successfully undertake local area operations, the roles and responsibilities among various Federal agencies, combatant commanders, state and local governments, county teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly understood" (p. I-10).

In the interagency arena, in 2002, the GAO examined the extent to which homeland security efforts represented a unified approach (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). As part of this inquiry, the GAO revisited its assessments of the Y2K conversion effort, combating terrorism initiatives, and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to identify elements deemed essential to organizational unifying efforts. One specific element highlighted by the GAO was the delineation of roles and responsibilities (U.S. GAO Report 02-610). In another inquiry, the GAO noted that the coordination of roles and responsibilities, both public and private, was seen as a major challenge, yet nonetheless necessary for the implementation of a national strategy for homeland security (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, 2002). Clarity of roles and responsibilities among the various agencies engaged in homeland security was advocated "to leverage collaboration . . . and to establish accountability to meet national goals" (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, p. 5).

Hawley (2003), in his focused assessment of the U.S. capacity to respond to complex contingency operations advanced a slightly different case, suggesting that every agency and actor with a role in an interagency national security policy making endeavor must participate or play a role regardless of actual degree of involvement. Hawley expands on this point, noting that, in the end, a diverse group of agency planners own the actual instruments of government action involved in the process and must, therefore, be involved in the planning process. Hawley argues

that, “Strategies for key mission areas of political, humanitarian, security and stability, rule of law, and legitimate political economy are all interconnected and have to be crafted in concert with one another” (p. 12).

Moreover, Hawley (2003) argues that national security intervention operations necessarily require the involvement of several coalitions to successfully execute the various functional responsibilities. Thus, notes Hawley, an interagency national security operation--and most especially a crisis intervention-- requires separate coalitions to steer international action and support, conduct security operations, provide relief, provide public security and justice, and support post-conflict reconstruction. Taken in the aggregate, the bottom line is that each of these separate coalitions has distinct, often separate roles and responsibilities to be executed in the broader interagency endeavor.

#### *Command and Control Frameworks.*

The requirement for effective command and control (C2) frameworks, policies, and procedures was identified at nearly every level of endeavor as contributing to unity of effort.

In his prefatory comments to the publication of Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, (2001), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton noted that, “The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. Unified action resulting from clear command relationships and unity of effort is crucial to making this possible” (signature page). This view is also reflected and codified in joint military doctrine as well. As one example, Joint Publication 0-2 makes the case that unity of command can be facilitated and unity of effort fostered through an unambiguous chain of command, well-defined command relationships, and clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.

At the interagency level, the Federal Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (USG CONPLAN) (2001) cites the need for a unified command and control network for the preparation and execution of plans and orders.<sup>18</sup> As previously noted, the fundamental purpose of C2 is to organize and unify multiple functional disciplines with multi-jurisdictional responsibilities on an emergency incident scene, under a single functional organization. The challenge, maintain the authors, is “to integrate the different types of management systems and approaches” of the different participating agencies and organizations “. . . into a comprehensive and unified response to meet the unique requirements of each incident” (p. 15).

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<sup>18</sup> In December, 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released its National Response Plan for unified responses to terrorists attacks, major disasters, and other national emergencies. More to the point, the plan specifies the implementation of the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS). The NIMS provides for a nationwide template to enable Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to “work together effectively and efficiently to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents regardless of cause, size, or complexity” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004, p .1).

Similarly, Fishel (1996) concluded that, "The environment of modern conflict has a tendency to place U.S. military forces into situations where the U.S. command structure is less than totally clear" (p. 182).

As suggested in the previous discussion of organizational options, at the incident level, formal incident command systems (ICS), including the establishment of multi-agency command posts (CPs) function as the initial C2 systems for emergency responses to a wide array of natural and manmade disasters and terrorist incidents (USG CONPLAN, 2001). Additionally, the CONPLAN notes that, because Federal, state, and local emergency response organizations are likely to manage C2 activities somewhat differently due to such variables as organizational history, complexity of the crisis, and capabilities and resources, management of Federal, state, and local responses must, to a degree, reflect an "inherent flexibility in order to effectively address the entire spectrum of capabilities and resources across the United States" (p. 15).

### *Operational Processes*

Unity of effort also involves process (Brannick & Prince, 1997; Mathieu & Day, 1997; Toth, 2003). Process in this context refers to the pattern of effort or action established to cause things to happen and involves such activities as decision making, planning, coordinating, resourcing, and managing information (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). In the interagency arena, the potential array of procedures and processes that were viewed as having an impact on organizational effectiveness and, by extension, unity of effort, ran the gamut from decision-making procedures to transitional procedures. For example, transition procedures were viewed as essential to ensure operational effectiveness during the "stand-up" of new organizations and to allow Congress time to work out its institutional committee structure for oversight and agency appropriations (Barnes, 2002).<sup>19</sup> Transitional procedures to facilitate the planning required to transition into follow-on operations and/or effect the transfer of responsibility to host governments in the case of international engagements were also seen as critical.

In addition to procedures, the research suggests that process in the interagency national security arena also serves to reduce the occasionally overwhelming complexity of a national security crisis situation (Hawley, 2003). Presidential Decision Directive 56, for example, advocates effective management practices as a key component of unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations involved in complex contingency operations (White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, 1997). Similarly, Hawley maintains that sound organizational processes, such as comprehensive situation assessments, crisis scenarios, mission analyses, and strategic projections can greatly assist interagency planners in understanding a crisis, its internal dynamics, key trend indicators, and the scope or scale of the crisis. Effective policies and procedures also allow for the early

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<sup>19</sup> As one example of this type of requirement, Barnes (2002) in his examination of the proposed Department of Homeland Security recommended that Congress establish transition rules and authorities, with specific expiration dates, to provide flexibility during initial organization or reorganization, and to protect against unforeseen and/or unfair effects of enabling legislation. One such procedure suggested by Barnes would allow transfer of funds for the first 2 years of an organization's existence and expenditure by other elements by the executive branch through additional legislation, formal reprogramming, prior notice to Congress or reimbursement between agencies.

identification and resolution of issues attending the missions, objectives, agency responsibilities, timing and synchronization, and resource allocation. Additionally, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) notes that decision making models and procedures must be flexible and responsive to the situation.

Another procedural area that impacts interagency effectiveness is cross-assignment of personnel. Hawley (2003) notes that there are few, if any organizational incentives for civilian and military officials to strengthen interagency competencies. Hawley maintains that, "Agency personnel career tracks and assignment policies discourage those who have taken broadening assignments away from mainstream career paths" (p. 10). Moreover, Hawley maintains that professional competence in interagency skills is woefully inadequate and near universal and that most individuals pressed into the process fail to understand their own professional limitation in policy planning and interagency coordination. As a consequence, Hawley argues that, at the senior levels, the skills and talents provided by cross assignment are critical to agency performance within the interagency arena. Barnes (2002) goes a bit further urging that cross-assignments should be required by law wherein operational personnel from one subordinate element are required to serve "substantial" tours of duty with other elements as a precondition to advancement.

Operational processes must be seen to be effective in resolving the requirements at hand. Hawley (2003) warns that complex national security emergencies, by their very nature, often raise a number of confusing and controversial issues. A similar concern was raised by DeVost (2000) who specifically questioned mitigation procedures and techniques employed in response to known or suspected incidents involving Y2K conversion systems of interests, asking if organizational learning with respect to setting-up coordination and communication directly enhanced preparations for actual infrastructure failures.

Finally, at the local level of operational interest, as has already been suggested, one of the means by which unity of effort can be attained in an interagency setting involves time-tested emergency management. These procedures, processes and techniques specifically provide for multi-agency coordination of personnel and resources in complex or multiple incidents. Emergency management involves the linkage of local and state emergency operations centers (EOCs) and Federal EOCs at the regional and national level.

### *Performance Measures*

Another attribute that possesses the potential to promote enhanced unity of effort is the development and implementation of performance measures. Presidential Decision Directive 56, for example, calls for the establishment of milestones and measures of effectiveness for success for the POL-MIL plan required in response to complex contingency operations (White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, 1997). The GAO, in its assessment of Federal efforts to unify the homeland security mission noted that performance measures were an important unifying element in developing and implementing a national homeland security strategy (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). Additionally, in assessing the challenges facing Federal leadership in establishing the Department of Homeland Security, the GAO noted that performance measures are important in order to ascertain when established

objectives have indeed been met (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, 2003). However, the reality may be more problematic than the vision. Brannick and Prince (1997), for example, in their research into team performance and measurement, conclude that while broad outcome measures exist and that individual tasks can be adequately delineated to the degree that individual performance can be evaluated, there is still a major gap in understanding the processes that occur within a team that “account for real differences in outcomes” (p. 3).

### *Doctrine*

Research into the interagency national security policy making process establishes that there is presently no substantive body of doctrine within the interagency community. Barnes (2002), in addressing the then-proposed Department of Homeland Security, recognized the value of standardized doctrinal procedures based on his experiences as a career military officer and called for the development of agency-wide common operational doctrine approved by officials in a single operational chain of command. However, the literature does not specifically address the value of doctrine in the interagency national security process to any significant degree, nor do there appear to be substantive recommendations for the development and application of doctrine to this requirement.

Doctrine plays a critical role in military endeavor, both at the Service and joint levels, as well as within the arena of combined or multinational military operations. Moreover, the development and employment of doctrine by the military has long been recognized as an important element of the military art. Joint Publication 1 (2000) notes that, “It [doctrine] provides the distilled insights and wisdom gained from experience in warfare and other operations requiring the use of the military instrument of power” (p. I-8). Accordingly, recognizing its expansive historical development and extensive real-world application and evaluation, doctrine’s utility can be assessed and its role in achieving unity of effort evaluated.

In the most general sense, doctrine is foundational in character. Doctrine fundamentally shapes the way the Armed Forces think about the use of the military instrument of power. As one example of how this relationship is viewed, the U.S. Air Force definition of doctrine characterizes it as “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives”(U.S. Air Force Document 1-1, 1997, p.1).

In the lexicon of the joint military domain, doctrine is considered to be the foundation for joint warfare and is defined as “broad principles that guide operations . . .” (Joint Publication 1, 2000, p. ii) and “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces” (Joint Publication 1, p. vi). Doctrine is also described as time-tested principles for successful military operations as well as contemporary lessons-learned taken together to exploit U.S. advantages against adversary vulnerabilities (Joint Publication 1) while Wright (2002) defines doctrine as those generally accepted rules, written and unwritten, that define best operational practice. Viewed holistically, doctrine promotes a common perspective that facilitates planning, training, and conducting military operations in both combat and non-combat situations.

Joint doctrine is based on extant capabilities and, along with supporting tactics, techniques and procedures, focuses on how to best employ U.S. Armed Forces to achieve



national objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of endeavor in both peace and war. Joint doctrine is keyed to the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) and provides the foundation for a team approach to warfare (Joint Publication 1, 2000). Joint Publication 1 proceeds to note that, “Though neither policy nor strategy, joint doctrine serves to make U.S. policy and strategy effective in the application of U.S. military power” (p. I-8).<sup>20</sup> Joint doctrine enables the Armed Forces to conduct the most effective joint activities and achieve unified action. Additionally, Joint doctrine mandates that joint operations be guided by the principles of war including adaptation of the principles of war to military operations other than war (MOOTW) and the fundamentals of joint warfare.

Joint doctrine is considered to be authoritative guidance based on the capabilities of the Service or force involved and will be followed except when a responsible commander determines that exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. Therefore, joint doctrine takes precedence over individual Service doctrines, which, in turn, are expected to be consistent with joint doctrine. Joint Publication 1 (2000) goes on to note that doctrine must be “universally understood and practiced” (preface) and that the knowledge and use of joint doctrine equates to success on the battlefield.

Equally important with respect to attaining unity of effort, joint doctrine is also seen as an “engine of change” by its proponents (Joint Publication 1, 2000, p. I-9). Joint Publication 1 makes the point that joint doctrine is an important element in implementing change as forces come together to train and build effective joint teams. It facilitates the development of a common joint culture, which then serves to integrate the respective Service cultures and doctrines. The joint doctrine development process provides a conceptual basis by which the Armed Forces assess, review, and revise their respective service doctrine and concepts. The application of joint doctrine in training and leader development also encourages the development of new and innovative capabilities that improve upon existing capabilities.

Moreover, the process is deliberate, experience-based and considered crucial to effectiveness (Joint Publication 1). Wright (2002), in his study of doctrine and its role in force transformation, views doctrine as an intermediate value on a continuum between tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) (rules for small unit/individual operations) and strategy (rules of military action as part of overall national policy).

Finally, with respect to multinational operations, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) recognizes that multinational doctrine, as well as training, exercises, and liaison between multinational forces facilitates unity of effort. In the multinational operational arena, the same basic guidance that applies to joint doctrine also applies. Units engaged in multinational operations are expected to follow doctrine ratified by the U.S. Nevertheless, Joint Publication 1 permits the option of following multinational doctrine where deemed applicable.

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<sup>20</sup> Toth takes a somewhat darker view of doctrine at the national level. He argues that it is not possible to have doctrine at the national/strategic level of endeavor. Rather, maintains Toth, one can describe elements involved in the process and define them, but may not be able to respond to unfolding events. He believes that doctrine is most useful at the tactical level and may have utility at the operational level, but in the end, he sees doctrine as more properly a “rear view mirror.” In lieu of doctrine at the national level, he argues that posture is a more appropriate mechanism (J.E. Toth, personal communication, June 19, 2002).

### *Shared End State*

#### *Strategic Organizational Vision.*

My research strongly suggests that strategic organizational vision contributes to the attainment of interagency unity of effort. In this context, vision involves the development and articulation of a set of cogent strategies and plans that identify objectives, concepts and resources (Mendel & Bradford, 1995). Raach and Kass (1995), in their study of interagency processes, noted that a “coherent vision” contributes to a shared end state and that a vision is required specifically to articulate and educate non-military players on the feasibility of potential options and courses of action and where the cooperative employment of power can be the most effective. Furthermore, Raach and Kass make the point that a sense of vision is required to integrate and unify educational endeavors. Similarly, Mendel and Bradford posit that vision is an important means of making other government agencies aware of military intentions, capabilities, and support requirements.

Manwaring (2002) notes that political vision and agreement on planned operations are important factors in multi-agency and multinational operations, observing that, “agreement regarding a strategic or operational end game is a necessary condition for unity of effort . . . ” (p. 23). Accordingly, Manwaring argues that, as a conceptual requirement, the first pillar of success in multi-agency and multinational operations is the development of “a realistic ‘game plan,’ strategic vision, a philosophy, or theory of engagement . . . ” (p. 29).

The GAO, in its study of unifying efforts for homeland security also cited the linkage between organizational vision and strategy (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). The GAO noted that a number of Federal, state, and local agencies were proactively taking action to bolster homeland security in their respective areas of responsibility, but that these agencies were expecting the Office of Homeland Security to develop both a strategy and a vision to help clarify additional organizational responsibilities that might be necessary.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (1998), in its analysis of future organizational requirements for the U.S. Army noted that the very diversity of the interagency community makes coordination and unity of effort difficult to achieve within the interagency community. Because of factors such as organizational culture, hierarchy, bias, misperceptions, and unique perspectives, a common vision was seen as one means to increase the likelihood of achieving unity of effort.

More recently, Rast (2004) concluded that less than optimum outcomes were realized in Bosnia and Kosovo in the late 1990s specifically due to the lack of strategic vision.

#### *Clearly Defined Strategy.*

The articulation of a clearly defined strategy to guide interagency national security operations has long been recognized. Whittaker et al. (2002) argue that specific mission areas for the departments and agencies involved in the interagency national security process should be

clarified. Additionally, Whittaker and his colleagues maintain that component strategies developed that include capabilities and resource requirements should be incorporated into a single integrated strategy. As early as May 1997, Presidential Decision Directive 56 for managing complex contingency operations called attention to the necessity of developing strategies early in the interagency planning process.

More recently, in 2001, the GAO examined the extent to which homeland security efforts represented a truly unified approach (U.S. GAO Report 01-822, 2001). Subsequently, in 2002, the GAO conducted inquiries into several major interagency programs to identify key elements that served to unify efforts within government organizations (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). One of these findings was the necessity for a clearly defined strategy, to include establishment of priorities (U.S. GAO Report 02-610). Based on its findings, the GAO recommended the establishment of a national strategy for homeland security as an integral element of a framework to support a more unified effort (U.S. GAO Report 02-610). Components of this strategy were identified as including long-term national priorities; objectives, and performance measures; organizational responsibilities; and key definitions. Similarly, in a subsequent inquiry into management challenges facing homeland security, the GAO observed,

The federal government's effort to strengthen homeland security will require a well-articulated strategy to accomplish agencies' missions and activities, to create a transition planning focus for DHS, and to leverage certain key success factors for organizational success to ensure mission accountability and sustainability over time. (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, 2003, p. 34)

Moreover, in testimony before Congress concerning preparation against terrorist attacks, the GAO cited the need for a national strategy to improve readiness and enhance partnerships among Federal, state, and local governments (U.S. GAO Report 02-549T, 2002). Similarly, in Congressional testimony in 2002 on the proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security, the GAO identified the need for a new department to focus on "developing a national strategy" (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T, 2002, p. 2). This strategy, argued the GAO, should clarify appropriate roles and responsibilities of Federal, state, and local entities and establish goals and performance measures to guide efforts. The GAO noted that, although federal agencies were indeed undertaking homeland security initiatives, without a national strategy, they could not assess how well the initiatives would support the overarching goals as well as other involved agencies (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). As a result, concluded the GAO, in the realm of homeland security, agencies at all levels and the private sector were waiting for further guidance before taking additional action (U.S. GAO Report 02-610).

In terms of national security activities involving other nations, clearly defined and articulated strategies are likewise seen as an important consideration. Whittaker et al. (2002) point out that, "Strategies usually are required for consulting with friends and allies, and developing multilateral consensus on strategic objectives and operational activities" (p. 17).

#### *Organizational Mission Definition.*

The clear and unambiguous delineation of the overarching purpose for which an organization is created also supports unity of effort. Not surprisingly, the focus on "mission"

was manifest in the military doctrinal literature and near non-existent in the interagency arena. Whittaker et al. (2002) did address the role of “mission” in the interagency and argue that mission areas for the departments and agencies involved in the interagency national security policy making process must be clearly articulated, clarified, coordinated, and integrated.<sup>21</sup> In addressing the more specific realm of complex contingency operations, Presidential Decision Directive 56 (1997) noted the criticality of identifying and articulating appropriate missions and tasks for involved U.S. Government agencies. A similar need to articulate “a clear, overarching mission...” was identified by the General Accounting Office in its assessment of the proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T, 2002, p. 2).

#### *Presidential Directives.*

Through the years, presidents have sought to guide and control the interagency process through presidential decision directives. These instruments have taken a wide array of forms and been identified by many different appellations through the various administrations, such as Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) (Clinton), Presidential Decision Memorandums (PDMs) (Reagan), and National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) and Presidential Homeland Security Decisions (HSPDs) (George W. Bush).

Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), for example, detailed the Clinton Administration’s attempt to adapt conventional National Security Council efforts to the business of dealing with the rush of complex emergencies that erupted after the fall of the Berlin Wall. PDD-56 sought to integrate the political, military, humanitarian, economic, and other dimensions of USG planning for those specific types of operations. Seeking to capture lessons-learned from past operations in Somalia, Haiti, Slavonia, and Bosnia, PDD-56 sought to guide the development of an integrated intervention strategy by specifying integrated planning and execution practices (Langford, 1999).

#### *Goals and Objectives.*

Clearly defined and articulated U.S. national security policy objectives contribute towards achieving organizational unity of effort. Joint Publication 0-2 (2001), for example, points out that, “The integration of political, economic, informational and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of government” (p. I-10). Additionally, Joint Publication 0-2 posits that, in debating the potential employment of all instruments of national power, interagency national security policy planners and decision makers must consider the overarching political aim and contributory political and military objectives and recognize which agencies are best postured to contribute to the attainment of these objectives.

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<sup>21</sup> Similar to the challenge of terminology with respect to characterizing unity of effort, terminology also plays a role in characterizing organizational missions. Various terms are used to describe this entity, to include mission, aim, goal, end state, and purpose. I will address these various facets of “mission” in subsequent sections, however, for the purposes of this research thrust, the term “mission” will be used to represent the other related terms.

However, one of the realities of the interagency national security policymaking process is that every agency involved in the effort possesses its own unique organizational objectives (Joint Publication 3-33, 1999). The recognition of this reality and its impact on the effective management of complex contingency operations was yet another reason why the Clinton administration developed and issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 in 1997 to provide overarching national political and military objectives and more definitive direction for interagency responses to complex contingency operations. Joint Publication 3-33 maintains a similar view and offers the suggestion that unity of effort should be considered from the perspective of each agency involved in the effort and that specific efforts be directed to accommodate each player's organizational objectives.

Fishel (1996) frames the question of goals and objectives in terms of "end state" and considers the end state to more accurately consist of a range of acceptable outcomes. Fishel describes the "end state" as the "descriptive outcome of the operation . . ." (p. 177) and notes that the end state is prescriptive with respect to planning. Fishel considers the "end state" as being broader than an objective and more of a "painting of the landscape on which the objective is located" (p. 177). Whittaker et al. (2002) take a similarly broader view, suggesting that, in addition to the clear articulation of U.S. national security policy objectives, they must be also be directly linked to U.S. national interests.

Of equal importance with respect to achieving unity of effort, Fishel (1996) argues that an end state in itself is insufficient for achieving unity of effort. Rather, maintains Fishel, it is essential that the desired end state be agreed upon by the key decision makers in the effort. Fishel argues that differing conceptions of the end state make a successful outcome problematic, noting that, "it does little good for the commander to envision an end state while his subordinate air and naval commanders envision different end states" (p. 179). In summary, Fishel cautions that even if an end state is established, success of the endeavor is not guaranteed. By the same token, argues Fishel, without an end state there can be no unity of effort.

### *Values.*

One potential attribute of unity of effort suggested by the research concerns the degree to which interagency personnel have a knowledge of and respect for the organizational values of participating agencies. In its inquiry into the relationship between values, motivation, and performance, researchers from the Lazarus Corporation characterize values as the worth or significance that one gives to people, things or ideas (Lazarus, 2002). Although the primary interest of the Lazarus research is individual values, based on its research, the study concluded that major projects or programs can fail due to poorly understood or misaligned values between organizations and people.

The Lazarus research (2002) also found that organizational values tend to fall into one of three major categories. These groups include organizations whose value systems are oriented towards (a) technology, machinery, or equipment; (b) towards concepts or ideas; or (c) towards people. As a result, argue the Lazarus researchers, organizations will demonstrate their value

systems in what they do first and what they do repeatedly. In the end, the congruence between organizational value sets and personal value sets drives worker motivation and organizational performance.

Along the same lines, Collins and Porras (1994) and Wilson (1989) have identified common fundamental principles that they see as being at the heart of those world-class corporations and leading public organizations that have successfully endured over the years. One principle common to both arenas of endeavor is a focus directed primarily towards the institution directly and only secondarily on the specific mission, product or service provided by the institution. Said differently, “. . . while missions, products, and services may change, institutions endure” (Hillyard, 2002, p. 75).

A second major theme uncovered by Collins and Porras (1994) and Wilson (1989) is an appreciation for people and their contributions to the institution. Further, recognizing the relationship between organizations and their personnel, Collins and Porras and Wilson argue that core ideologies that endure generation after generation maintains and advances the organization as an institution and minimizes instability and chaos.

For example, in the joint military endeavor, the recognition and embracement of “joint values” is seen as a positive good in realizing unified action in the conduct of joint operations (Joint Publication 1, 2000). Joint Publication 1 goes on to note, “War is a human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules” (p. viii). Therefore, based on experience gained in combat, values are the bedrock of combat success.

In the interagency dimension, in its testimony before Congress on the proposed Department of Homeland Security, the GAO urged “. . . the new department” to focus on “. . . articulating . . . core values” (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T, 2002. p.2).

### *Knowledge.*

In examining the construct of unity of effort, knowledge of other agencies emerged as both a potential attribute of unity of effort and a contributor to a shared end state.

Turning first to the realm of military operations, one of fundamentals of joint warfare is knowledge of self and knowledge of the adversary. Joint Publication 1 (2001) argues that, at a minimum, knowledge of self requires “a full and frank appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of all friendly forces” (p. III-12). Similarly, argues Joint Publication 1, commanders of joint forces, “. . . must also have a clear appreciation of friendly centers of gravity which are their key sources of strength, so that operations may assure their protection from adversary attack” (p. III-12). Joint Publication 3-33 (1999), the U.S. military’s doctrinal guide to joint force capabilities, reinforces this contention, noting that familiarity with the capabilities of organizations is important to joint force commanders and their staffs in order to capitalize on the potential contributions of other units as force multipliers.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Intelligence was one area that emerged as being of especial importance with respect to knowledge of capabilities. Joint Publication 3-33 (1995), for example, in pointing out the criticality of intelligence assets, makes

Joint Publication 1 (2001) makes the case that, in joint matters, the true experts of capabilities and limitations are the commanders or leaders and staff of component forces. These individuals best know the unique capabilities that their respective forces bring to the common mission and how those capabilities can best serve the overall commander in achieving joint or mutual objectives. Moreover, commanders of component forces are expected to know how the capabilities of their forces mesh with the forces of other components and can be an integral element in integrating the capabilities of all forces assigned to the joint mission.

Knowledge of self also demands that leaders possess expansive intellectual horizons and broad-based professional knowledge. To this end, Joint Publication 1 (2001) maintains that,

Leaders . . . must not only have mastered the essentials of their own Service capabilities, but also must understand the fundamentals of combat power represented by the other services. Beyond that, they must have a clear sense of how those capabilities are integrated for the conduct of joint and multinational operations. This individual professional growth, reinforced by military education and varied Service and joint assignments leads to a refined capability to command joint forces in peace and war. (p. III-13)

Unity of effort also appears to be influenced by knowledge of the adversary, threat, or enemy. This particular facet of knowledge involves an understanding, not only of potential capabilities of a foe, but also knowledge of enemy intentions (Joint Publication 1, 2001). Central to this understanding is an appreciation for the enemy's critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, centers of gravity, and possible courses of action.<sup>23</sup> In large measure, this understanding derives from accurate intelligence of the adversary and careful analysis and evaluation of that intelligence to plan and execute unified action to disrupt and exploit enemy intentions. As Joint Publication 1 concludes, "Knowing oneself and the enemy allows employment of friendly strength against the enemy's key vulnerabilities and avoids exposing friendly vulnerabilities to the enemy strengths" (p. III-14).

Perhaps equally important, optimization of this attribute necessarily involves the willingness and ability to share information and intelligence. This will be discussed in a later section.

In the interagency arena, the research suggests that an effective understanding of agency capabilities is critical in achieving unity of effort, but that the requirement is approached with less focus than in the military endeavor. Even with the overwhelmingly successful outcome of the Y2K conversion effort, with respect to organizational responsibilities within the interagency,

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the case that joint force commanders (JFCs) must have a firm understanding of the capabilities of national-level intelligence assets to achieve successful mission accomplishment.

<sup>23</sup> Joint Publication 1 (2001) defines Centers of Gravity are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight (p. 63). This conceptualization, originally formulated by Clausewitz, can readily be extended to any conflictual situation that pits two adversaries against each other.

DeVost (2000) maintains that it was not always clear exactly who was responsible for responding to specific incidents or systems failures nor how to effect the coordination that takes place prior to and during a response. Clearly, DeVost's observations suggest, at a minimum, a lack of understanding of both the roles and capabilities of USG agencies with mission responsibilities in the Y2K conversion effort.

Turning to the more specific question of the interagency national security process, and the integration of the military instrument with the other instruments of national power, Joint Publication 1 (2000) makes the case that the integration and interaction of the military with other agencies involved in executing a common mission ensures "mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations and consequences" of one another's actions (p. I-6). Further, maintains Joint Publication 1, this level of action and interaction also identifies ways that the various agencies can complement each other in the execution of the task at hand.

As a case in point, David Paul Miller (1993) in his study of interagency effectiveness, noted that, "the necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known what skills and resources one brings to the table" (p. 12). Moreover, Raach and Kass (1995), in their examination of interagency process, conclude that the military usually knows more about other participating agencies than the agencies know about the military. As a consequence of this unequal relationship, Raach and Kass posit that the military has the inherent responsibility for educating non-military players on capabilities and limitations, a contention seconded by Miller who notes that that this knowledge must necessarily include relevant theory about how force is applied; how the military assists other departments and agencies in accomplishing common goals, how actions by other departments and agencies can facilitate effective and efficient use of force, and where the military must leave off its role in order to achieve desired political outcomes. In other words, argues, Miller, the military has the fundamental responsibility to help other involved agencies understand what is feasible and what is not and where cooperative use of power can be effective.

With respect to the more specific, emergent mission of homeland security, Kuo (2002) in his research on the potential use of space to enhance homeland security against terrorism, likewise views knowledge as indispensable to the emerging homeland security mission.

Finally, in assessing the established tenets of multinational operations, as promulgated and practiced by the United States military, knowledge of multinational partners is viewed as a critical prerequisite to achieving unity of effort by alliance or coalition partners engaged in a common endeavor (Joint Publication 1, 2001). Along with patience and respect, knowledge of the culture, religion, history, customs, and values of multinational partners helps to build rapport and is essential to the success of multinational operations.

Raach and Kass (1995) also maintain that the accrual of knowledge is a highly effective means of building trust and that the key is to build a robust base of knowledge and apply it in ways that enhance the process without attempting to control it. This contention is supported by the joint experience as well. Joint Publication 1 (2001), for example, notes that a highly effective team is based on the trust and confidence team members have in each other. The publication goes on to argue, "Trust is based on mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team" (p. III-6).



### *Understanding.*

Moving slightly beyond the concept of knowledge as one element of a shared end state, one must also consider the concept of understanding. As Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) drives home most effectively: “. . . action will follow understanding” (p. I-11).

There appear to be two fundamental dimensions to the process of understanding. On the one hand, understanding involves a mental quality, act or state of a person who understands. This variously involves such areas as knowledge, comprehension, discernment, and sympathetic awareness (Guralnik, 1986). The second dimension of understanding also includes mutual comprehension and/or mutual agreement between parties with respect to ideas, intentions, and objectives. Perhaps more importantly, this level of understanding serves to “settle differences” and promote unity of effort. (Guralnik, 1986).

In terms of the first dimension, as we have just discussed, research suggests that a comprehension or understanding of the capabilities of the various agencies, offices, and organizations involved in the interagency national security process is an especially important consideration. I’ve chosen to address this particular facet of a shared end state in the previous discussion of *knowledge*.

Research suggests that a common understanding of overall aims or missions, tasks, concepts of operation, authorities, and organizational relationships is critical to attaining both unity of effort as well as unity of command. In the domain of joint military operations, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001), in addressing requirements for effective unity of command, makes the case that a clear definition and understanding of missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities of the units involved in the assigned operation is essential. Joint Publication 0-2 also maintains that it is critical that subordinate commanders, staff principles, and leaders of command and control nodes understand their respective authorities, their role in decision making and controlling, and their relationships with others. Further, Joint Publication 0-2 posits that understanding how military commanders and their staffs coordinate with other organizations is likewise integral to success in joint operations and unified actions.

At the interagency level, Whittaker et al. (2002), note that managing the interagency national security policymaking process involves a “shared understanding” of organizational goals and priorities. This understanding extends to such areas as bureaucratic interests, policy context, trade-offs, realistic time horizons, and assumptions. Whittaker et al. also suggest that understanding can be enhanced by gaining an appreciation of departmental preferences and by expanding individual frames of reference with respect to diplomatic, political, military, economic, humanitarian, development, and legal perspectives impacting the policy issue at hand.

Hawley (2003), however, makes the case that non-military instruments of government action are not well understood and that their effects on adversaries is essentially unknown. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, in its War Studies program syllabus (2003) notes that,

The coordinated interagency employment of all the instruments of

Power . . . requires professionals in each area of endeavor who understand the general nature and dynamics of the others, just as a carpenter must know enough about masonry, plumbing, and roofing to work with their representatives on the construction job site. (p. ix)

In the multinational arena “understanding” extends to efforts to achieve a common understanding of the overall aim or mission and the associated concept of operation for attaining it (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). Building successful collaborations, unity of effort, and a basis for understanding between the U.S. military and non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations (NGOs/IOs) also requires shared responsibility. Additionally, Manwaring (2002) takes the concept somewhat further, positing that understanding involves learning to understand friends as well as adversaries and potential adversaries culturally in order to more effectively influence their thought and behavior.

#### *Common Terminology.*

The development and use of common definitions and terminology emerged as a likely enhancer of interagency unity of effort. Costa (2002), in his examination of the potential value of a separate information service for the armed forces concluded that without a solid definitional construct, it is not possible to focus forces and achieve unity of action.

Hawley (2003), in his evaluation of U.S. responses to complex contingency operations suggests that the interagency policy planning process can be significantly advanced by the development of a distinctive lexicon for interagency products that facilitate realistic policy option development.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Hawley maintains that, “relevant concepts and special terms should capture what policy planning is all about and differentiate it from agency planning” (p.14). Hawley contends that a unique terminology array for interagency products will serve to facilitate the development of realistic policy options and support decision making. Otherwise, argues Hawley, “Reliance on conventional agency terms and concepts will derail useful progress . . .” (p. 14).

GAO studies on combating terrorism found that common definitions promoted effective agency and intergovernmental operations and permitted more accurate monitoring of expenditures at all levels of government (U.S. GAO Report 01-822, 2001; U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). Subsequent evaluation of U.S. Government interagency endeavors by the GAO found that certain key terms define and allow for consistent decision making across agencies. For example, the GAO found that “commonly accepted definitions help provide assurance that organizational, management, and budgetary decisions are made consistently across the organizations involved in a cross-cutting effort” (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002, p. 11). Similarly, in its inquiry into U.S. Government initiatives to unify homeland security efforts, the GAO found that, “commonly accepted or authoritative definitions of fundamental concepts, such as homeland security, will . . . be essential to integrate homeland security efforts effectively”

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<sup>24</sup> This lexicon included such terms as strategies for transformation, mission areas, and instruments of government action. The new products included comprehensive situation assessment, strategic projection and strategic approach” (Hawley, 2003, p.5).

(U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002, p.13). In this specific instance, the GAO argued that, lacking an official government definition of “homeland security,” the potential exists for an uncoordinated approach to homeland security caused by duplication of efforts or gaps in coverage, misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures. Moreover, the GAO found that that definitions of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism also varied from agency to agency. As one measure of the value that the GAO places on common definitions and terminology in the interagency homeland security arena, the GAO recommended that key definitions be included in a national strategy for homeland security. Finally, the GAO concluded that definitions also help enforce budget discipline and more accurate monitoring of agency expenditures.

U.S. experience in multinational operations also strongly suggests that a lexicon of mutually agreed upon terminology be developed and distributed to ensure enhanced operability and maximum understanding by all parties involved in a combined or multinational operation (Joint Publication 3-57, 2001). Captain Peter Feist, a German naval officer assigned to the NATO joint analysis team, noted, “Differences in defining terminology results in differences in procedures” (cited in Joint Publication 3-57, 2001, p. III-30).

Perhaps the most salient and instructive example of the definitional problem, e.g., where terminology and the nuances associated with subtle shadings of national linguistic peculiarities occur, is in the realm of peace operations. Originally, in the 1950’s, the term “peacekeeping” referred to providing an “interpositional” force to separate parties that had been in conflict and to supervise the keeping of a peace that they had signed (Sarafino, 1998). By the early 1990’s, however, the United Nations had broadened interposition to describe the different types of “peace” operations. Sarafino points out that the DoD uses the term “peace operations” as a subset of Operations Other than War (OOTW) or Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Congress, however, tends to retain the term “peacekeeping” (p. CRS-2).

Sarafino (1998) also makes the case that the term “Peacekeeping’ is a broad generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations and other international organizations undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace” (p. CRS-1).<sup>25</sup> Activities generally used to describe or characterize peacekeeping operations include (a) observers to monitor elections, (b) recreating police or civil defense forces for new governments in countries, (c) organizing humanitarian relief operations, and (d) monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict (Sarafino, 1998).

Finally, Raach and Kass (1995) note a different dimension of the terminology challenge, that of dialect. Raach and Kass note that, “Dialect, if not language, differs from agency to agency, and it is important to overcome varying cultures at the beginning” (p 12). Raach and

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<sup>25</sup> Sarafino states that, “The definitional problem derives from a semantic dilemma. No single term currently in use can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations. Use of any term with the word ‘peace’ conveys the misleading impression that there is no risk of danger in such operations” (p. CRS-2). In reality, notes Sarafino, certain types of peace operations have more closely resembled hostile situations resembling war.

Kass proceed to offer the opinion that, “When decisions are made questions must be asked to ensure that policies and concepts are stated in language that makes sense across the cultural lines of the agencies which will implement them” (pp.12-13).

### *Education and Training.*

Finally, one must consider the potential role of education and training in contributing to the knowledge and understandings required to effect interagency unity of effort within the national security arena. In terms of scope, the education and training discussion embraces both long-term strategic and operational education and training conducted across the interagency as the more tactically-oriented individual and collective education and training required once an interagency office, agency, team, or task force is actually created.

Manwaring (2002) in his study of the changing character of the global security environment argues that the post 9-11 security environment is far more complex and ambiguous than the environment that existed previous to September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. In Manwaring’s view, education, along with organizational solutions, are at the base of unity of effort. More specifically, Manwaring states that, “Unity of effort ultimately entails the comprehensive type of civil-military education and leader development that leads to effective diplomacy combined with effective military asst management” (p. 24). In a similar vein, McCausland and Martin (2001) point out that, “Today our strategic end states are less clear, and consequently, the intellectual transition for the tactical and operational levels to the strategic level is much more complex” (p. 22).

In the military realm, a panel chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1995 examined the role of professional military education (PME) in developing selected competencies desired in the military through the year 2010. One of the major findings of the panel was a requirement for attaining a strong sense of joint, interagency, non-governmental, and multinational cooperation. Addressing the purely joint requirements for education, Joint Publication 1 (2000) provides the doctrinal impetus for this endeavor, maintaining that individual professional growth, reinforced by military education and varied Service and joint assignments, leads to a refined ability to command joint forces in peace and war. Joint Publication 1 notes that,

The requirement to plan and conduct joint operations demands expanded intellectual horizons and broadened professional knowledge. Leaders . . . must not only have mastered the essentials of their own Service capabilities, but also must understand the fundamentals of combat power represented by the other Services. Beyond that, they must have a clear sense of how these capabilities are integrated into the conduct of joint and multinational operations. (p. III-13)

Education and training are also viewed as essential at the interagency level of national security endeavor. In 1997, in response to intervention challenges experienced in Somalia, Slavonia, and other locations, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) addressing the management of complex contingency operations. Langford (1999), in her assessment of the PDD-56 process, makes the case that, “Education is critical to breaking

down the ingrained barriers within the interagency system” (p. 143). PDD-56 formally mandated interagency training programs in complex contingency planning and operations to develop a cadre of officials familiar with the integrated planning process delineated in the PDD and to improve overall interagency performance in the future.<sup>26</sup> In addition to formal training interventions, PDD-56 mandated comprehensive after action reviews to assess interagency planning and coordination, both in Washington and in the field (White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, 1997). Hamblet and Kline (2000) make a similar case, arguing that, “Exposing leaders to the doctrine, attitudes, and capabilities of other agencies in an academic setting can build trust and confidence” (p. 95).

U.S. Marine Corps General Martin Steele (1999), writing on coalitions and interagency task forces, observed that, “a generalized shift must occur with interagency training and education” (p. 22). A similar position was taken by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton (2001a) who argued that interagency education can develop competent leaders and staff of future interagency working groups (IAWGs) and joint interagency task forces (JIATFs) who will be able to respond to and master the complex and rapidly evolving operations that will characterize the future national security environment. In Shelton’s view, true interagency effectiveness resides in leaders and staff who are well-grounded in the capabilities and doctrines of their respective services and well-versed in joint and interagency operations, melding the right mix of service/agency/department capabilities to fit the operational environment. Shelton goes on to note that senior military personnel must be adept at the management of “plug and play” forces that are provided by the military services, executive departments and agencies, and, where necessary, coalition partners.

Lieutenant General Richard Chilcoat, President of the National Defense University in Washington, in his closing remarks to the Innovations in National Security Education symposium (INSE) (2000), noted that future leaders will need to have a better understanding of joint, interagency, and multinational operations in the future. Most recently, Barnes (2002) reaffirmed the requirement for comprehensive education and training programs for the new Department of Homeland Security. Hamblet and Kline (2000) note that military education has, for the most part, emphasized interagency coordination and developed an exercise in complex contingency operations that includes players from other agencies, non-governmental organizations and host nations.

Turning to the formal and informal, ad hoc, “tactical” education and training that promotes understanding and unity of effort at the team or task force level, as previously noted, Raach and Kass (1995) contend that the military (by default) is responsible for educating non-military players on capabilities and limitations. Along the same lines, Miller (1993), in his study of interagency effectiveness noted that, “The necessary first step in shaping effective interagency groups is making known what skills and resources one brings to the table” (p. 12). Miller goes on to note that this knowledge must include relevant theory about how force is applied; how the military assists other departments and agencies in accomplishing common goals, how actions by

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<sup>26</sup> Responsibility for this education and training was assigned to the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., the National Foreign Affairs Training Center in Arlington, Virginia, and the Army War College in Carlisle Pennsylvania.

other departments and agencies can facilitate effective and efficient use of force, and where the military must leave off its role in order to achieve desired political outcomes.

Additionally, as noted previously, Raach and Kass maintain that the key to successful education and training in the interagency is to build a robust base of knowledge and apply it in ways that enhance the process without attempting to control it. Raach and Kass opine that “Education and marketing must be approached in ways that gain the willing support of other members of the interagency without undermining mutual trust” (p.12).

Many observers of senior joint and interagency education argue that education and training programs remain far from optimum. Garafano and Metz (2000) see a need for what they characterize as an educational transformation. Looking at professional military education (PME) with a wide aperture, Garafano and Metz contend that professional military educational institutions need to change their organizations, missions, and goals, arguing, “The current level of cross-pollination is too low to have a major impact” (Recommendation 2 section, para. 2). Thus, argue Garafano and Metz, any meaningful level of understanding between (senior military officers, diplomats, etc.) will require significant changes in the PME system.

Hawley (2003) is also critical of senior level national security education. Hawley maintains that dated educational curricula and weak faculty expertise adversely impact preparation for interagency national security policy assignments. Characterizing the education afforded senior military and civilians as far behind, misdirected, and not attentive to the contemporary interagency arena, he notes that, “ill-structured policy exercises reinforce erroneous lessons and send wrong messages about other agency roles and capabilities” (p. 10). Instead, Hawley suggests that teaching personnel must increase their understanding and experience in best practices in interagency planning and coalition operations, that international students must be more effectively integrated into exercises, and that training and exercise programs include more interagency and coalition scenarios.

Manwaring (2002) argues that civilian and military leaders involved in an interagency endeavor must be afforded the opportunity to develop the judgment and empathy necessary to work cooperatively and collegially. Although directed primarily towards the Army’s senior professional military education program, Manwaring’s recommendations have much broader applicability. Manwaring recommends that leaders at all levels be educated in the ways that force can be employed to achieve political ends, and the ways that political considerations affect the use of the force. Additionally, Manwaring urges that leaders at all levels be educated with respect to “ambiguity” to allow them to be fully prepared to deal with it in the operational environment. Manwaring argues that educational efforts should involve learning specifically geared to understanding the cultural dimensions of friends as well as adversaries and potential adversaries in order to more effectively influence their thought and behavior.

### *Coordination*

As discussed earlier, references to coordination and its role in achieving unity of effort were significantly more numerous than other processes, such as cooperation and collaboration.

Accordingly, I've elected to afford the attribute of coordination a separate discussion in recognition of its pervasive role in effecting organizational unity of effort.

From a fundamental definitional perspective, coordination involves the "harmonious functioning of parts for effective results" (Mish, 1997, p. 255). The Oxford English Dictionary (Simpson & Weiner, 1989) characterizes coordination as involving the simultaneous and ordered action of several individuals in the performance of specific complex tasks. However, Goodman et al. (1986) found that research on coordination, as a main effect specifically with respect to group decision techniques, is inconclusive, largely due to the "widely varying definitions of coordination" (p. 20). Goodman and his colleagues go on to conclude that coordination has no generally accepted meaning.

Inquiry into the literature on team performance disclosed that, although there were no specific references to unity of effort, per se, coordination was frequently identified as a critical element in the effective performance of teams (Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997; Mathieu & Day, 1997). Mathieu and Day, for example, maintain that coordination involves the effective sequencing of actions between departments within an organization to accomplish a common goal. Bowers, Braun, and Morgan (1997), in their study of team workload relevance and measurement also established that coordination was a major component of productive team performance. Further, their research established that coordination requirements had a major impact on both individual operator and task-oriented team workloads and that it involved both top down and bottom-up dynamics.

Dickinson and McIntyre (1997), in their effort to develop a framework for measuring teamwork effectiveness, concluded that, "Coordination reflects the execution of team activities, such that members respond as a function of the behavior of others" (p. 22). As a result, continue Dickinson and McIntyre, "Successful coordination implies the effective operation of other components of teamwork (communication, monitoring, and back-up)" (p. 22).

Bowers, et al. (1997) in their inquiry into team workloads found that, in the case of individual operator functions, task coordination involved interactive behaviors generated by the task at hand while team-level tasks necessitated top-down teamwork coordination that derived directly from team activities. Bowers et al. also concluded that coordinative behaviors stressed initiative and flexibility on the part of the individuals involved in the collaborative endeavors.

Stiner (1972) (cited in Goodman and Associates, 1986) notes that coordination in collaborative endeavors is influenced by group size and performance rewards, while Brannick and Prince (1997), in their impressive study of team performance measurement and evaluation, note that coordination is the "central feature of teamwork" and involves "some kind of adjustment that one or more of the team members makes so that the goal is reached" (p. 4).

Mathieu and Day (1997), in their research into nuclear power plant team effectiveness note that coordination essentially involves the sequencing of actions between different entities and that sub-group collaborative efforts are largely organized and coordinated primarily through department-level processes. Additionally Mathieu and Day, while acknowledging that research into coordination between different departments of the same organization has not been

extensively studied, salient factors in interdepartmental coordination include inconsistency in personal styles and formality of work structures.

Finally, it should be noted that Goodman and Associates (1986) caution that most of the research addressing the process of coordination in groups has been based on contingency theory (e.g. methods of coordination must match the environment and/or technology with which the group must cope).<sup>27</sup>

In considering the realm of military operations, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) notes that unity of effort requires coordination among government departments and agencies within the executive branch, between the executive and legislative branches, with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs) and among nations in any alliance or coalition. Joint Publication 0-2 makes the case that the very flexibility and range of modern military forces requires close coordination and integration to achieve unity of effort.

Coordination in the military arena also plays a pivotal role in achieving other organizational outcomes, such as integration. As noted earlier, in the joint military dimension, for example, Joint Publication 4-05 (1995) argues that effective integration is best achieved through effective use of planning and execution processes that provide for timely and thorough coordination within the chain of command and among the Department of Defense, other Federal agencies, and the civil sector.

With respect to the interagency national security process, national security analyst Michelle Flourney, in a presentation to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces on December 2001, noted that the interagency and homeland security are all about coordination and synchronization. Along similar lines, the DoD Cole Commission Report (2001) noted that, “the execution of the engagement element of the National Security Strategy lacks an effective coordinated interagency process, which results in a fragmented engagement program . . . “(Cole Commission Report, 2001, Unclassified Findings and Recommendations Summary, para. 2). The Commission went on to recommend that the Secretary of Defense support an interagency process to provide overall coordination of U.S. engagement activities overseas.

On a more operational level, the Cole Commission also concluded that the Department of Defense needs to spearhead an interagency coordinated approach to developing non-military host nation security efforts in order to enhance force protection for transiting U.S. forces. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and State coordinate to develop an approach with shared responsibilities to enhance host nation security capabilities that will assure increased security for U.S. forces. These requirements for more effective interagency coordination were echoed and further reinforced by General Henry Shelton (2001b, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 3, 2001. Shelton, in addition to reinforcing the Cole Commission’s recommendations

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<sup>27</sup> Contingency theory posits that methods of coordination must match the environment or technology with which the group must cope. More specifically, with respect to the effect of technology on group performance, Goodman et al. also note that this relationship is comprehensively addressed in sociotechnical theories (Goodman et al., 1986)



for better coordination of U.S. engagement activities across USG agencies, advocated undertaking actions to develop and enhance the security capabilities of host nations to protect U.S. forces.

Addressing the imperatives at the regional level, Mendel and Bradford (1995) also make the case that the critical catalyst for coordinating multi-agency capability to achieve unity of effort is provided by leadership of the unified commanders-in-chief at the regional level of effort.

Recognizing the importance of interagency coordination specifically, the military has developed a formal definition of interagency coordination as a means to enhance interagency cooperation and facilitate the attainment of multi-agency unity of effort. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, interagency coordination is “the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense, and engaged U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective” (Joint Publication 1-02, 2001, p. 211). Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) further postulates the important precept that, “In interagency and/or multinational environments where unity of command may not be possible, unity of effort can be achieved through effective coordination” (p. III-15).

Finally, in many instances, the joint literature referred to cooperation and coordination almost as a related set of actions to be taken to achieve unity of effort. For example, Joint Publication 3-33 *Joint Force Capabilities* (1999) notes that, “efforts of the armed forces of the United States include . . . coordinating and cooperating with other services and nations. . . .” (p. v) and that in the future, “. . . close coordination and cooperation between the Services, national agencies, and with other nations will assume even greater importance than they do today” (p. I-2). Similarly, Joint Publication 0-2 (2001) argues that, “Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation, which are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personnel limitations” (p. I-11).

### *Integrated, Comprehensive Planning*

Integrated, comprehensive, and centralized planning plays a critical role in facilitating unity of effort (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). As previously noted, two of the major, long-standing impediments to effective interagency performance included different agencies of the U.S. government not understanding systematic planning procedures and each agency having its own approach to problem solving. (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, 1961). As a result of these realities, Mendel and Bradford (1995) have concluded that the military generally gets the planning mission by default. It will also be recalled that one of the major impetuses to the Clinton administration’s release of Presidential Decision Directive – 56 was the observed lack of planning effectiveness in complex contingency operations. The PDD sought to incorporate effective planning mechanisms to achieve unity of effort (Hamblet & Kline, 2000).

Hamblet and Kline (2000) note that poor planning (and lack of interagency coordination) result in organizational frictions and frequently, failure, while Mendel and Bradford (1995) in their study of interagency effectiveness during operation JUST CAUSE, conducted in Panama in

1989, concluded that the lack of compatible strategic planning systems was a major factor in interagency performance. The key players in Operation JUST CAUSE were the Departments of State and Justice and the Agency for International Development (AID). Mendel and Bradford argue that these agencies should have been incorporated into the planning done by the military to assure mutual support and unity of effort. However, for security reasons, the military did not work outside Joint Staff channels. In the end, this situation posed a major impediment in subsequent coordination plans for restoring the government in Panama. Interestingly, Rast (2004), in her inquiry into interagency operations in Bosnia and Kosovo concluded that less than optimum outcomes were due, in no small measure, to the lack of an integrated interagency planning mechanism.

Several years later, Manwaring (2002), in his assessment of U.S. responses to complex contingency operations, noted that ad hoc problem solving and convoluted strategic planning impacted the U.S. response in Bosnia. Additionally, maintains Manwaring, “Independent uncoordinated planning called ‘stove-pipe’ activities, produced operational and tactical confusion and required additional improvisations to fix command and control arrangements, mission limits, supported and supporting logistical and personnel procedures, rules of engagement, and status of forces agreements” (p. 22).

Examining events from a more strategic perspective, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General George Joulwon observed that, “The planning focus in Washington has been on the “high end” of the conflict spectrum--that is, on trying to imagine the strategic circumstances of political war involving the United States--U.S. military forces have been decisively engaged in peace operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and other military operations at the lower end of conflict spectrum” (Cited in Lute (1988), p. vi). Additionally Lute himself maintains that U.S. planning and implementation for crisis response remain unacceptably ad hoc.

Smith (2002), for example, in his study of the regional threats posed by China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea noted that planning lacks glamour but meets a vital need. Joint Publication 3-57 *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations* (2001), notes that, “Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations . . . creates unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission” (p. III-35). Whittaker et al. (2002) note that operational planning must be clarified and coordinated among the agencies and organizations involved in the process.

In considering the requirement for interventions involving multinational military forces, Joint Publication 3-57 (2001), the military doctrinal guide to civil-military operations, reinforces the criticality of harmonizing planning efforts, noting that the value of planning cannot be underestimated. Important considerations in multinational force planning include making multinational force members feel a part of the team and the development of standardization procedures to reduce uncertainty among multinational forces.

Effective, integrated planning at each level of endeavor achieves a number of outcomes that facilitate unity of effort. At the national/strategic level, improved national policy planning and implementation will serve to increase U.S. policy coherence and effectiveness while

avoiding pitfalls that characterize complex contingency operations. Along the same lines, Joint Publication 4-05 (1995), the joint military doctrinal guide to national mobilization planning, makes the general case that integrated planning processes provide for timely and thorough coordination of joint military operations within the chain of command and among DoD, other Federal agencies and the civil sector. Additionally, the development and preparation of joint plans facilitates the achievement of interoperability of joint forces and contributes to the development of trust among the participating organizations and agencies in an operation. (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

At the regional/operational level, Lute (1998) makes a similar point with respect to contingency plans, noting that such planning efforts serve to integrate and exploit civilian and military capabilities, expertise, and resources from the entire range of potential contributors. Additionally, argues Lute, effective planning allows the early engagement of other agencies and organizations in crises, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations. Also, it should be recalled that sound organization is also viewed as a means for achieving unity of effort, integrated and centralized planning and direction and decentralized execution (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

Hawley (2003) cites the value of an interagency planning process that serves to identify both immediate and longer-term policy questions early in the interagency process. By surfacing these issues to senior decision makers up-front, Hawley believes more effective support can be directed towards implementation at the operational and tactical (in-country) levels of endeavor.

Hawley (2003) also presses the point that effective interagency planning improves the overall quality of policy decisions. He notes that, "Since the clarification of policy issues is a core purpose of an interagency planning effort, most of the immediate and long-term policy questions are identified up front in the process and brought to Principals and Deputies when they must be addressed to support effective implementation at the operational and in-country tactical level" (p. 11).

More recently, the debate over the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also served to focus attention on the necessity for effective strategic planning to establish desired outcomes and key priorities and to assure the preparation of on-the-shelf, resource constrained contingency plans (Barnes, 2002; U.S. GAO Report 03-260, 2003).

Nye (2002), in his assessment of the effectiveness of the cabinet level Office of Homeland Security noted that the Director of the Office of Homeland Security had his hands full just managing day-to-day mission requirements that came to the organization's attention and had no time to conduct any meaningful planning. Accordingly, Nye urges the development of system-wide planning in homeland security.

As a matter of practical validation, three major planning endeavors in the interagency realm serve to highlight the criticality of the planning function in pursuing and achieving unity of effort and unified action as organizational outcomes at the interagency level. They include the PDD-56-directed political-military plan (POL-MIL planning process), the U.S. Government

Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), and the Federal Response Plan (FRP).

At the national strategic level, Presidential Decision Directive - 56 issued to address the management of complex contingency operations requires the development of a formal Political-Military (POL-MIL) implementation plan. The POL-MIL Plan, as envisioned by the crafters of PDD-56, is intended to contribute to unity of effort by coordinating, integrating, and accelerating all components of a U.S. response to a complex contingency crisis.<sup>28</sup> The goal of the planning function is to identify appropriate agencies' missions and tasks as well as critical funding (White House White Paper on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, 1997). Additionally, the planning process delineated in PDD-56 is also expected to facilitate the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms at the operational level (Joint Publication 3-33, 1999).

PDD-56 also directed the establishment of an Executive Committee (Ex Comm) for each major contingency operation to oversee planning and provide guidance for comprehensive political-military planning or civilian-military task forces or teams to do the plans, coordinate action, and monitor progress (Lute, 1998; Whittaker et al., 2002).

In 1995, the Clinton Administration released Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) as a means of implementing measures to reduce vulnerabilities and deter terrorism. PDD-39 essentially established a national strategy for both domestic and international terrorism and elaborated an interagency coordination mechanism and management structure to be undertaken by the Federal government to combat both domestic and international terrorism (USG CONPLAN, 2001). Built upon previous directives to combat terrorism, specific steps called out in PDD-39 included the promulgation of a clear public position; rapid and effective response to threats and acts; and directing the highest priority towards the development of self-sufficient capabilities to combat and manage consequences of terrorist acts involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

As previously addressed, one of the key measures that developed as a result of PDD-39 being implemented was the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN is essentially a coordinating plan providing overall guidance to Federal, state, and local agencies with respect to how the Federal government will respond to combat both domestic and international terrorism (USG CONPLAN, 2001). The CONPLAN "outlines an organized and unified capability for a timely coordinated response by Federal agencies to terrorist threats or acts" (p. 1). Agencies included in the CONPLAN include the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

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<sup>28</sup> The POL-MIL plan includes a comprehensive situation assessment, mission statement, agency objectives and desired end state, and includes an integrated concept of operations to synchronize participating agency efforts (White House White Paper on PDD-56, 1997).

In addition to establishing conceptual guidance for assessing and monitoring a developing threat and notifying appropriate Federal, state, and local agencies of the nature of those threats, the CONPLAN defined relationships between those structures under which the Federal government will marshal crisis and consequence management resources to a threatened or actual terrorist incident. Additionally, the plan provided guidance for deploying required advisory and technical resources to assist law enforcement agencies in facilitating interagency and interdepartmental coordination of a crisis and consequence management response (USG CONPLAN, 2001).

The CONPLAN addresses many areas that contribute to unity of effort, to include employment/deployment priorities, planning assumptions and considerations, training and exercises, resources and funding, and a concept of operations to include mission and command and control (C2). Additionally, The CONPLAN provides for the unification of Federal, state and local response, including the designation of lead Federal agencies (LFAs) to insure multi-organizational coordination. The goal established in the CONPLAN is seamless interaction of all Federal, state, and local agencies. Moreover, the CONPLAN includes coordination procedures at both the national level and field level and on-scene at the site of the incident.

The third major planning and coordinating mechanism at the national level is the Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP is the Federal government's plan of action for assisting affected states and local jurisdictions in the event of major disaster or emergency (USG CONPLAN, 2001). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the Federal agency responsible for the FRP. The FRP is the primary structural means utilized by FEMA to coordinate all Federal assistance to state and local governments for consequence management. The FRP is designed to address the consequences of any disaster or emergency situation in which there is a need for Federal assistance under the authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. FEMA uses the FRP to direct and control all Federal response efforts to manage consequences in domestic incidents for which the President of the United States has declared, or expressed intent to declare, an emergency (USG CONPLAN, 2001).

### *Trust and Confidence*

The ability to inspire trust and confidence across institutional lines appears to be an important element in achieving organizational unity of effort. In its broadest dimensions, trust may be viewed as a pivotal force in developing and maintaining a sense of belonging to a group or team. Hebert (1994) (cited in Robson, Leonidou, & Katsikeas (2002), Antecedent Variables section, para 1.) in his study of seven international joint ventures (IJVs), noted that trust was a key factor in IJV success. Hebert determined that trust is an antecedent variable and "processual" in character, along with control and supervision and organizational learning. Similarly, Joint Publication 1 (2000) maintains that highly effective teams are based on the trust and confidence team members have in each other, noting that, "Trust is based on mutual confidence resulting from honest efforts to learn about and understand the capabilities each member brings to the team" (p. III-6). In a similar vein, Toth (2003) contends that trust is the "essential glue" to achieve unity of effort. Further, and perhaps more importantly, Toth argues that without trust, the other elements of any collective endeavor are of little value. Additionally, trust is also viewed as essential in providing for flexibility in an organization (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

Trust appears to derive from a number of elements. Joint Publication 1 (2000) notes that trust and confidence are built by hard work, demonstrated competence and planning, and working together. Joint Publication 1 also argues that delegation of authority--commensurate with responsibility--is necessary to build and maintain trust and confidence and that delegation of authority derives from competence. Competence is considered to be the core of the profession of arms and includes technical abilities to perform the task to standard as well as the ability to integrate one or more skills with other skill sets in accordance with approved doctrine (Joint Publication 1). Additionally, the ability to accomplish effective planning is believed to enhance trust. (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

On a more individual level, personal integrity has also been identified as a cornerstone for building trust (Joint Publication 1, 2000). Reduced to basics, people must be able to count on others and know that they will do what they say, that is, carry out assigned tasks.

In the purely military area of endeavor, trust and confidence are seen as central to military unity of effort (Joint Publication 1 (2000). U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual-6 (FMFM-6) (1994) notes that clearly articulated intent and trust in subordinates by a commander are critical in maintaining the initiative and effecting decentralized control. Unity of command has been identified as providing a foundation for trust as well as coordination, and teamwork necessary for unified action (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001). However, Toth (2003) contends that unity of command without trust will not assure unity of effort, while trust without unity of command will. Toth provides a number of historical examples to support his conclusion, including the accomplishments of Eisenhower in the European theater and Nimitz in the Pacific theater during World War II. Indeed, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a lecture to the National War College (1950) noted the value of leadership, wisdom, and ability to inspire trust as important characteristics of interagency leadership.

Turning to the interagency arena, Tucker (2000) makes the case that cohesion and trust are necessary for effective interagency operations. To this end, he recommends relying on small groups of experts focused on single issues. Through frequent meetings and stable membership within the group, Tucker maintains that the group can develop levels of cohesion and trust and be far more effective than large groups that meet only occasionally and whose members also have responsibility for a large number of issues. He cites the successful experience of the small, cohesive interagency Counterterrorism within the executive branch group in the 1980's, success he equated to the ability of a small group to improve coordination on discrete issues. Additionally, Tucker notes that success of such groups also emanates from the support given to individual members by his or her Cabinet-level superior.

Raach and Kass (1995) maintain that, "An effective interagency process depends largely on trust among the participants, and developing trust depends on understanding and willingness to move the process along" (p.12). Further, Raach and Kass maintain that the key is to build a robust base of knowledge and apply it in ways that enhance the process without attempting to control it. Speaking specifically to the educational dimension of building trust, Raach and Kass note that, "Education and marketing must be approached in ways that gain the willing support of other members of the interagency without undermining mutual trust" (p. 12).

Raach and Kass (1995) suggest that, with the establishment of more formal standing interagency working groups, there is a requirement for more informal contact. This would include informal coordination, forward-looking exchanges, the forming of and participation in groups, and seeking out potential counterparts, even if it is only a handshake and an exchange of telephone numbers. As Raach and Kass point out, “Having the measure of one’s colleagues has great value” (p.12).

Finally, with respect to multinational unity of effort, U.S. experience has determined that the establishment and maintenance of trust and confidence among multinational forces is key to establishing and maintaining alliance and coalition unity of effort (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

### *Information and Intelligence Sharing*

The attribute of information sharing consists of several seemingly disparate components, to include the effectiveness of organizational communications, the availability and flow of information, to include classified information, and the impact of security classifications and clearances.

Dickinson and McIntyre (1997), in their study of team performance and measurement, make the case that individuals involved in a team endeavor must coordinate both their decisions and actions in order to attain shared goals or objectives and that this process necessarily involves “those behaviors that engender a sharing of information and a coordination of activities . . . ” (p. 19). Additionally, Dickinson and McIntyre posit that, while efforts to improve team performance must necessarily address individual performance, individuals are nonetheless dependent on other team members to provide necessary information and to coordinate activities.

To be useful, information – and more specifically intelligence -- must anticipate the needs of the commander or decisionmaker and should be timely, objective, usable, accurate, complete, relevant, and available to all who need it (Joint Publication 1, 2000). Cebrowski (cited in Joint Publication 3-33, 1999) in commenting on the flow of information in joint military endeavors observes that, “Information is a commodity, but it is not a consumable; its value increases with the number of people who have access to it” (p. IV-2).

U.S. experience with multinational forces has also led to the development of several principles intended to enhance interagency unity of effort involving multinational operations. In addition to a common understanding of the overall aim or mission and the concept of operation for attaining established goals, plain and effective communications and information sharing among multinational partners is deemed essential for developing and maintaining trust and confidence among multinational partners (Joint Publication 0-2, 2001).

With respect to the availability and flow of information and intelligence in the interagency national security community, information sharing between Federal agencies such as the FBI, CIA, and other intelligence-related agencies has long been viewed as a problem (U.S. GAO Letter to the Honorable Dave Camp and the Honorable Mac Thornberry, 2003 – Hereinafter cited as GAO Letter, 2003). In August 2003, the GAO found that no level of the government (Federal, state, local) viewed the information sharing process as effective, especially

with respect to information sharing within Federal agencies (U.S. GAO Report 03-760, 2003). Hillyard (2002) cites the problems engendered when a state adjutant-general is prohibited from sharing classified information with the state's governor, technically the commander-in-chief of the state's National Guard forces.

Whittaker et al. (2002) make a case that national security operations, most especially crises, "are characterized by . . . partial and sometimes confusing and conflicting information and intelligence . . ." (p. 21). Similarly, Senator Fred Thompson, ranking member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, noted in June 2002, "The areas of most immediate concern . . . have to do with the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information" (cited in Peters, 2000). In Operation JUST CAUSE, for example, security was a major consideration that largely restricted planning to the military realm and excluded the Departments of State and Justice and the Agency for International Development (AID) (Mendel & Bradford, 1995). More recently, inquiry into the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole cited the problems encountered by in-transit U.S. Navy units in obtaining intelligence support tailored to the terrorist threats in their respective areas of operation (The Cole Commission Report, 2001).

The GAO noted that information sharing with respect to threats, methods, and techniques of terrorists was not shared on a routine basis and that that information that was shared was neither timely, accurate or relevant (GAO Letter, 2003). Several barriers to information sharing were identified based on the GAO's national inquiry. These included: (a) inability of state and city officials to secure and protect classified information, (b) lack of Federal security clearances for state and local officials, and (c) a lack of integrated data bases (U.S. GAO Letter, 2003). Additionally, The GAO commented on complications to information sharing created by Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements (U.S. GAO Letter).

With respect to the findings (above), Peters (2000) also noted that the problem of information sharing is further compounded by the practice of data hoarding in stand-alone repositories. Hawley (2003) also maintains that the interagency national security community is plagued by outdated technologies and communications systems. Notes Hawley, "Interagency planners in Washington, down at the operational level and further out in the regions have little capacity to conduct interagency planning and coordination" (p. 10). Moreover, laments Hawley, these activities are not supported by interoperable databases to conduct cross-agency planning.

In the wake of the events of 9-11 and the subsequent initiatives to create a Department of Homeland Security, the requirements for and challenges to information and intelligence sharing in the proposed department have become a major area of concern. Barnes (2002), for example identified a need for a strategic planning process for the DHS to development on-shelf, resource constrained strategic plans at the classified level.

Confidentiality is one of the institutional requirements of the interagency national security process. Hawley (2003) has observed,

Interagency planners have to engage in a frank discourse and prepare suitable policy contingency options, however controversial, for consideration by policymakers. If these conversations became widely known to the public,



forthright opinions would be stifled and diplomatic efforts could be jeopardized.  
(p. 7)

Moreover, a staff study conducted by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives (1996) found that information security considerations may also have a legal dimension wherein certain functions, such as intelligence sharing may be forbidden between foreign and domestic intelligence agencies. The Honorable Robert L. Livingston, in speaking to the problems engendered by the lack of intelligence sharing in the interagency in a lecture before the Heritage Foundation in September 2001 noted, "It means sharpening our lines of responsibility and ceasing interagency competition in intelligence, law enforcement, and national defense. In order to mobilize offensively or defensively, we must assess and overhaul military and intelligence resources."

Hawley (2003) advocates that the interagency planning process has to enjoy strict confidentiality yet it should not be encumbered by burdensome security classification systems that tend to exclude important civilian planners and coalition partners. Whittaker et al. (2002) recommend the development of integrated national security policy documents that address communication between the agencies and departments involved in the process. Along the same lines, the U.S. Center for Research and Education on Science and Technology (U.S. CREST) (2000) concluded that a great deal of effort can be accomplished without exchange of classified information.

### *Resources*

Timely identification and allocation of resources emerged as an important consideration in achieving interagency unity of effort in the national security policymaking process. For example, in its 2002 inquiry into the Y2K conversion effort, combating terrorism, and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 to identify key elements deemed critical to unifying efforts in combating terrorism, the GAO highlighted funding as one of the critical elements in achieving unified action (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002). As a result, in its subsequent assessment of the effectiveness of extant and proposed homeland security initiatives, the GAO opined that the uncertainty about funding might impede a unified approach to homeland security (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002).

In a second study focusing primarily on the larger Federal-state-local relationships with respect to homeland security, the GAO testified on the relationship between funding and the choice and design of policy tools that have important consequences for both performance and accountability (U.S. GAO Report 02-549T, 2002). Citing such examples as grants, regulations, tax incentives, regional coordination, and partnerships, the GAO commented on the impact such resource tools might have to both motivate and mandate effective unified performance and concluded that, "Key to the national effort will be determining the appropriate level of funding in order that policies and tools can be designed and targeted to elicit a prompt, adequate, and sustainable response while protecting against federal funding being used as a substitute for state, local, or private sector funding that would have occurred without the federal assistance" (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002, p.7).

Despite this recognition, recent performance with respect to resourcing in the interagency arena have not been encouraging. Hawley (2003), for example, notes that there is no designated funding manager or funding line for routine, annual interagency funding requirements. As a consequence, argues Hawley, “The standard agency program and budget system works best for parochial agency requirements at the expense of any initiative for improved interagency capacity” (p.11). Moreover, Hawley maintains that there are huge funding inconsistencies among agencies in such areas as studies, exchange programs, experimentation, professional development, and training and exercises deemed necessary for improving the integration of civilian and military interagency efforts.

As one example of this inconsistent approach to interagency funding, under the provisions of PDD-39, Federal agencies involved in counter-terrorist operations or the resolution of terrorist incidents bear the costs of their own participation unless the President directs otherwise. Responsibility is subject to specific statutory authority to provide support without reimbursement (USG CONPLAN, 2001). More recently, in the discussions surrounding intelligence reform, while some critics maintain that the real issue is the actual conduct of operations, several observers opined that real problem with the intelligence community lies in resources. This group of observers contends that real problem with national intelligence operations is that fourteen agencies are involved in the mission with no single budgetary control mechanism to provide effective resource guidance and control (Friedman, 2004).

Several observers of the interagency process have offered specific recommendations to improve funding performance and accountability. Whittaker and his colleagues (2002), for example, recommend that integrated national security policies should specifically identify required assets, resources, and logistics support necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. Along similar lines, Nye (2002), in examining the proposed Department of Homeland Security urged that the Director, Office of Homeland Security be vested with the power to approve the budgets and programs of relevant agencies involved in homeland security. Similarly, in his recommendations to guide the creation of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Barnes (2002) urged a single budgetary process for the proposed department. Barnes recommended that monitoring and control execution be effected at the agency head level with operational-level commanders reporting directly to the heads of the respective agencies.

Hawley (2003) takes a longer view of the funding issue, noting that many interagency national security interventions consume large amounts of money over several years duration. Thus, argues Hawley, “A long-term financial strategy is essential to bringing together assesses and voluntary financial contributions to pay for deployments, relief activities, military operations, police missions, and elections, among other costly priorities” (p. 13). Otherwise, maintains Hawley, experience has shown that interagency national security interventions will not achieve desired expectations.

#### *Duration of Previous Relationships*

Regrettably, my research did not uncover extensive discussions with respect to the value of previous organizational relationships (per se) in achieving organizational unity of effort. There were, however, a significant number of references to the value of previous institutional

relationships in achieving effectiveness or efficiency in selected areas of functional endeavor (e.g. coordination, planning, information sharing, and actual field-level operations). For example, the GAO, in its assessment of management challenges inherent in creating the new Department of Homeland Security (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, 2003), found that previously existing relationships between agencies and organizations were beneficial in planning and conducting homeland security operations. As one case in point, the GAO cited the long-standing relationship between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and state and local governments and noted that the U.S. Department of Agriculture's relationships at the state and local levels "... made it easier to broaden the discussion to homeland security issues" (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, p. 29). The GAO also pointed to the value of U.S. government relationships with private and semi-governmental organizations. Highlighting the relationship between the Department of Health and Human Services and the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) and the American Hospital Association, the GAO concluded "... previously developed relationships with state and local governments were critical in developing the hospital preparedness grant program" (U.S. GAO Report 03-260, p. 29).

With respect to military operations, Fishel (1996) cited the operational effectiveness realized in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989 due to the long-standing planning and exercise relationship between XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg and the U.S. Army component Staff in Panama, allowing both organizations to share what Fishel termed "common world view" (p. 181).

### *Pressures for Disunity*

#### *Introduction*

The secondary goal of this research is to identify and evaluate external or contextual variables that serve to inhibit or retard the attainment of unity of effort in the interagency national security policymaking process.

Early in the research effort, it became clear that research into organizational unity of effort would necessarily have to proceed on two levels of effort. My initial (and principal) focus in conducting this study was to identify and characterize discrete attributes, elements, or components of organizational unity of effort. For this research thrust, my intent was to catalog, so to speak, those aspects of organizational unity of effort that lent themselves to some level of conscious management and/or control by organizational leadership and staffs. Said differently, I was most interested in characterizing the construct of unity to so that commanders, leaders, and managers and their staffs could take deliberate action to enhance unity of effort in organizational activities and operations.

Very quickly in the process, however, it became clear that there were a number of external or "contextual" variables that directly impacted or influenced the attainment of unity of effort, almost always in a negative way. I decided that intensive research into these factors was well beyond the scope of my planned research. Nonetheless, I felt compelled to at least identify these "pressures on disunity," if for no other reason than they constantly emerged from the

research. More importantly, though, they beg for further research and inquiry. I would humbly offer that each of the areas that I will discuss in the subsequent sections literally qualifies for dissertation-level research in its own right. A fellow educator once offered the wry observation that anything worth doing is worth doing superficially; I am about to demonstrate that approach.

### *Overview*

Goodman et al. (1986) argue that contextual variables “are central to an understanding of group performance . . .” (p. 22). Further, Goodman and his associates maintain that the very recognition that external conditions exist acknowledges that most group endeavors are accomplished within a larger social system. Studies by Tziner and Vardi (1982) and Lord and Rowzee (1979) (as cited in Goodman and Associates, 1986) suggest that orientation, coordination, and planning impacts group performance but that their effect is moderated by both group and/or situational variables. Nieva, Fleishman and Reick (1978), in their development of the Team Performance Model, include external conditions as one of the variables to team performance. Similarly, using an adaptation of the model developed by Nieva et al., Toquan, Macaulay, Westra, Fujita, and Murphy (1997), in their study of nuclear power plant team performance, also found that external conditions play an important role in team performance and effectiveness. Additionally, Gladstein (1984), in her assessment of sales team performance, found that external influences likewise impacted the performance of group tasks.

With respect to policy development and implementation, Rast (2004) in her study into interagency failings in Bosnia and Kosovo, noted that contextual variables or parameters frame the policy process and shape interagency dynamics and substantive outcomes.

Hawley (2003) warns that the pressures for disunity in the interagency national security process are “deep-seated” (p.8). Further, Hawley maintains that many of these pressures are systemic in nature, and include such tensions as policy preferences versus legal requirements, political ambiguity versus defined objectives, and short versus long-term time horizons. It is generally recognized that each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table (Joint Publication 3-57, 2001). However, research of the literature disclosed that there were few direct references to external variables as enhancers or inhibitors of the process. Nonetheless, there was sufficient information in the corpus of literature to allow the development of a rudimentary rational framework to support follow-on empirical research and analysis.

### *Group Size*

Group size appears to play a major role in generating disunity in group endeavors. Nieva et al. (1978), for example found that task coordination increases in difficulty with the addition of new group members and that group performance begins to decline with increases in group size. Other studies by Yetton and Bottger (1982), Grofman, Field, and Owen (1984) and Goodman (1979) (cited in Goodman and Associates, 1986) support this finding. Goodman found that: (a) organizations need some minimal level of manning to operate, (b) that above that point, there appears to be a range of group size that do not materially impact organizational performance, and (c) if group size becomes incongruent with actual task requirements, diminishing returns are to

be expected with the addition of more personnel.<sup>29</sup> Reduced to basics, Goodman opines that task requirements do indeed determine, to some discernible degree, the size which in turn affects performance or other established criteria.

### *Complexity*

Complexity in this endeavor refers to the complexity of the national security issue being addressed within the interagency process and, in response, the tasks that must be accomplished to successfully resolve the issue or issues of interest. Wood (1986) notes that there are three primary dimensions of task complexity: component, coordinative, and dynamic.

Interagency national security requirements are complex and multidimensional in nature (Hawley, 2003; Lute, 1998; Miller, 1993; Whittaker et al., 2002). The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Institute for International Economics, in a special report on policymaking for national security, maintains that future policy responses “will almost never fall within the purview of a single department or agency. From trade to the environment, from drug policy to education, the issues cut across established bureaucratic boundaries” (cited in Miller, p. 5). Whittaker et al. make a case that national security operations, most especially crises, are rendered more complex by requirements for multi-taskings and coordinating the activities of a wide array of both actors and interested parties. Additionally, argue Whittaker et al., “Some policy issues . . . involve multidimensional assessments of allies and friends, neutrals, international organizations, and affected populations” (p. 19). These complex issues include humanitarian relief, counter-terrorism, national reconciliation, cease-fires and stabilization efforts, and economic reform and restoration, to name a few.<sup>30</sup> Further, Hawley notes that many national security crises take place simultaneously, with as many as thirty in process on a given day, with ten of those directly affecting important U.S. security interests.

Lute (1998), in his assessment of the effectiveness of U.S. responses to complex contingency operations argues that the root problem in interagency coordination lies in the inherent complexity of the tasks that must be performed, and the actors who must perform those tasks. Lute identifies four major factors or multiple causes that contribute to the complexity of the interagency taskings: war, disease, hunger, and displacement, all magnified by the “politicization of the crisis” (p. 3). As a result, argues Lute, the objectives of a response operation vary widely from stopping war, to reconstruction, to establishing a market economy.

Lute also contends that the most complex operations responses fall into one of five major categories: Humanitarian; security; political; social; and economic. The last three involve such major goals as rebuilding nations and promoting democracy. Also, cautions Lute, several sub-tasks are necessarily involved in each endeavor. Because the taskings are both multi-dimensional and interdependent, Lute maintains that response operations are, by default,

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<sup>29</sup> It should be noted that Goodman’s studies focused on groups that were manual task oriented, such as mining crews and navy shipboard crews.

<sup>30</sup> Other complex operations include refugee/displaced persons return, imposition of the Rule of Law, atrocities and war crimes, and illicit criminal operations and corruption (Whittaker et al., 2002).

dynamic and require a long-term perspective. Thus concluded Lute, this equates to complexity and therefore contributes to the complexity of the broader interagency coordination process.

Lute (1998) also maintains that transitions in operations are likely to be awkward, with overlapping responsibilities. Based on his research, Lute characterizes the dynamics of operations as follows. Operations will progress in phases (like an emergency room patient), usually responding to changes on the ground. Then, the relative priority of tasks will change and players will change. To compound matters, Lute warns that the phases are not likely to be neatly or accurately defined.

Hawley (2003) noted a similar challenge in contingency operations. Hawley observes that, “Contingency operations are mostly multinational and multilateral, which means that an intervention usually requires several different coalitions to get the entire job done over the duration of the mission” (p. 6). As an example, Hawley points to the international mission in Kosovo where several coalitions were involved, to include the Contact Group for political affairs, the UN for civil administration, NATO for military activities and operations, OSCE for democratization initiatives, the UNHCR for humanitarian relief, and the EU for economic development.

Hawley (2003) also notes that interagency policy planners and decision makers frequently underestimate the degree of difficulty involved in responding to and addressing national security issues. Hawley notes,

We constantly underestimate the challenges that arise--wishful thinking often prevails and planning fantasies flourish. In any crisis, it is likely that the local situation is poorly understood, adversaries and difficult actors are misjudged, commitments by partners are misread, the nature of operational needs are underestimated, and projections about indigenous popular reaction and support are wrong. (p. 8)

Complexity also drives the need to assure some degree of operational flexibility to decision makers. Unlike agency planning processes where planners seek to write detailed plans to achieve agency objectives, interagency national security endeavors require the constant development and evaluation of choices (Hawley, 2003). As an example, the USG Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (USG CONPLAN) acknowledges that, because Federal, state, and local emergency response organizations are likely to manage command and control activities somewhat differently (as a function of organizational history, complexity of the crisis, and agency capabilities and resources), management of Federal, state, and local responses must, to a degree, reflect an “inherent flexibility in order to effectively address the entire spectrum of capabilities and resources across the United States”(USG CONPLAN, 2001, p.15).

Lute (1998) maintains that the implication for policy is clear: “These crises must be managed in the aggregate, as an integrated whole addressing all dimensions of the problem. The temptation to simplify policy by disaggregating the interrelated dimensions of the crisis will lead to inadequate coordination and inefficient response on the ground” (p. 5).

### *Uncertainty*

Contemporary national security challenges, in addition to being complex, are also characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity.

From a theoretical perspective, Argote (cited in Branick, Salas, & Prince, 1997) in his study of emergency rooms activities, found a level of interaction between the effectiveness of coordination and environmental uncertainty. Argote's research established that programmed coordination procedures were generally adequate to cope with conditions of low uncertainty but that these same procedures were ineffective when faced with conditions of high uncertainty.

Manwaring (2002), in his study of terrorism and regional conflicts, also commented on the uncertainty and lack of clarity that characterize these areas of interest. Manwaring found that,

. . . contemporary conflict is more than often not an intrastate affair that international law is only beginning to address. But, even if it were, there are no certain means of enforcement. It is part of one society against another. In these internal conflicts, there is normally no formal beginning or termination, no easily identifiable military formations to attack, no specific territory to take and hold, and no enforceable legal niceties to help control the situation, and, thus, no specific rules to guide the political and military leadership in any given peace enforcement mission or "counterterrorism" campaign." (p. 19)

As a consequence, notes Manwaring (2002), many of the legal protocols and informal rules that characterized the Cold War era, are no longer applicable. Manwaring observes,

Thus, there are virtually no rules. There is normally no formal declaration or termination of conflict, no easily identifiable enemy military formations to attack and destroy, no specific territory to take and hold, no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, no international legal niceties to help control the situation, and no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending authorities will be honored." (p. 13)

Manwaring (2002) further maintains that ambiguity, taken in combination with complexity mandates changes in how the U.S. approaches national security crises in order to achieve unity of effort. Manwaring argues that the application of "soft power" and the conduct of surgical operations by both military and law enforcement elements is called for. Additionally, Manwaring stresses that, at the level of multi-agency and multinational leadership and cooperation, contemporary national security requirements will demand the highest levels of civil-military and military-military diplomacy, cooperation, and coordination. Further, argues, Manwaring, well-organized, highly collegial, and carefully coordinated and conducted responses will be necessary to achieve unity of effort and mission success.

As previously noted in the discussion of attributes, Manwaring (2002) recommends new concepts in organization, planning, management practices, and doctrine to achieve unity of effort

under conditions of complexity and ambiguity. Failure to pursue these changes, warns Manwaring, will result in “strategic ambiguity” and “mission creep” (p. 20).

Uncertainty and ambiguity accrue not only from the external variables of the environment; they also emanate from organizational efforts that are generated in response to external influences. For example, the GAO, in their study of unifying efforts for homeland security in the wake of 9-11, noted that, while a number of Federal, state, and local agencies were proactively taking action to bolster homeland security in their respective areas of responsibility, uncertainty about additional roles for both state and local governments and how traditional missions of consequence management and public health and safety will need to be expanded were impacting efforts to achieve unity of effort from the top down (U.S. GAO Report 02-610, 2002).

### *Bureaucratic Culture*

In Chapter One, I introduced and briefly discussed the phenomenon of bureaucratic culture and “the Bureaucratic Politics model” and their manifestation in and influence on the interagency process. The following discussion expands upon that initial discussion.

#### *Organizational Interests.*

The interests or competing requirements that individual organizations bring to the interagency national security process can impact the effectiveness of planning and operations. Hawley (2003), for example, maintains that bureaucratic rivalries detract from the process of consensus-building critical to interagency success. Mendel and Bradford (1995) cite the U.S. experience in Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989 as a case in point. In that contingency operation, Mendel and Bradford suggest that the civil-military headquarters established during the operation lacked adequate civilian agency representation on the staff and that civilian agencies involved in the operation experienced major difficulties in overcoming narrow organizational interests in order to cooperate with military elements of the headquarters. Kuo (2002) noted a similar conflict in interests in the 1999 Kosovo incursion where General Wesley Clark was repeatedly required to reconcile organizational interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, Europe.

More recently, Hillyard (2002), in his assessment of the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS), observed that institutions possess a core ideology that remains relatively constant over time, even as missions, threats, evolve and change. Nonetheless concludes Hillyard, this core ideology can still be a potential inhibitor when creating interagency organizational entities such as task forces (IATF’s) or other ad hoc national security organizations. Rast (2004), in her study of interagency effectiveness in both Bosnia and Kosovo in the mid to late 1990s also identified dissimilar organizational cultures as contributing to less than optimal outcomes.

Closer to home, efforts by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to “transform” the U.S. military establishment have repeatedly foundered on the rocks of bureaucratic organizational interests. Writing in the Seattle Times on June 13, 2001, Philip Gold (2001), Director of Defense



and Aerospace Studies at Seattle's Discovery Institute, notes that, "The Pentagon, although not always wrong, responds to the two fundamental imperatives of any bureaucracy: protect your budget and your bureaucrats. The confrontation between statesmanship and bureaucracy is already ugly and it is going to get worse."

### *Sociocentrism.*

On a somewhat different level of analysis, Sociocentrism also emerged as an organizational variable that can contribute to either the success or failure of an organization's effectiveness in interagency national security operations. Sociocentrism can take many forms. In a positive sense, it manifests itself as patriotism, devotion, loyalty, esprit d'corps. Negatively, it can materialize as parochialism and chauvanism involving the narrow pursuit of institutional interests above the common good (Toth, 2003).

Toth (2003) argues that it is basic human nature to assume superiority or rightness of one's own group or organization. Ergo, argues Toth, this phenomenon is pervasive within and among religions, cultures, governments, and the military. Within the joint military area, service centric paradigms emerging from legally established roles and missions, long historical precedents, and even budget and turf battles have long plagued the conduct of joint military operations as inhibitors to unity of effort.

Similarly, Fishel (1996) maintains that, although U.S. armed forces have gotten better in conducting joint operations, parochialism has not gone away. Rather, argues Fishel, it still manifests itself in budget and doctrine battles and in conflict over roles and functions of the Services.

Sociocentrism is also no stranger to the interagency process and frequently manifests itself as competition within the interagency setting. Hawley (2003) maintains that "intense feuding" among agencies in the national security arena has "fudged or delayed key decisions, resulting in serious gaps and disconnects on the ground" (p. 6). Hawley also notes that rivalries can emerge between regional agencies and offices and functional entities at the point of direct intervention and between agencies designated as lead agencies and those relegated to a formal supporting role. Hawley makes the additional point that "agency-centric models for interagency management are impeded by discord, turf protection, inefficiency, planning failures, and unforeseen disconnects that can have sever adverse consequences for operational success" (p. 11).

On a more personal level, competition and cooperation are both central human characteristics, yet competition often mitigates against effective cooperation amongst personnel involved in an interagency endeavor (Joint Publication 1, 2000).

As noted earlier, organizational principles, beliefs, and values are critically important to an organization's effective performance. At the same time, however, they also influence the intensity of sociocentric orientations. Within the joint military arena, Joint Publication 1 (2000) makes a strong experientially-derived case that "joint values" influence the conduct of joint warfare (Preface). Joint Publication 1 goes on to note that, "War is a human undertaking that

does not respond to deterministic rules” (p. viii) and concludes that values are more properly the bedrock of combat success. A similar view was advanced by the GAO in testimony on the proposed Department of Homeland Security. The GAO urged that, “. . . the new department” focus on “. . . articulating . . . core values . . .” (U.S. GAO Report 02-886T, 2002, p. 2).

On a much broader scale, Manwaring (2002) identifies a number of issues that center on cultural awareness and understanding in coalition and multinational national security endeavors. To remedy this deficiency and enhance unity of effort, in addition to formal educational interventions, Manwaring recommends increased efforts in cultural awareness, such as military and civilian exchange programs, culture orientation programs, and combined multinational/multilateral exercises.

Similarly, Toth (2003) suggests that, while parochialism can never be eliminated, it can and must be managed in order to achieve unified action. Toth maintains that unified action is nonetheless an achievable outcome through the identification of the common organizational interest and pursuit of that motivation above all intervening bureaucratic considerations. However, cautions Toth, achieving this level of unified effort requires the ability to inspire trust and confidence across institutional lines. This requires a high degree of tact, tolerance, and objectivity on the part of the leader in charge.

Whittaker et al. (2002) recommend working towards a prudent consensus approach to interagency national security issues by strengthening interagency team identity, controlling internal politics among team members, fostering competitive and constructive debate, and forging a consensus approach for action.<sup>31</sup> Hawley (2003), on the other hand recommends a course of action that places the requirements of the policy-maker first and those of the agency second in priority. Hawley notes that, “Policy makers operate in an intensely political world, involving uncertain public opinion, relentless media scrutiny, and sensitive partner expectations” (p. 14). Thus, maintains Hawley, policy-makers are much more focused on success of the mission.

Hawley (2003) also argues that it is essential to focus on the Washington “interagency” and steer clear of tangential issues. Hawley urges that, “The spotlight should be on the critical need for unity-of-effort and avoid diversions involving politicized arguments about how best to run an administration, or comparing how one administration performed against another” (p. 14). Additionally, Hawley urges that interagency players steer clear of agency roles and missions and other contentious “turf” issues. Hawley succinctly sums up the reality of the situation by noting that, “The interagency has a ‘bigger role’” (p. 14).

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<sup>31</sup> This last prescriptive action involves building support with those sharing similar perspectives and introducing supporting material from outside actors not directly involved in the process, but who can affect final acceptance of policy decisions (e.g. congressmen, Capitol Hill and/or department staffers, and non-governmental and international organizations, etc.) Whittaker et al. (2002).

### *Tempo*

Tempo (or operational tempo--“OPTEMP”-- in the lexicon of the military) refers to the pace or speed on an unfolding national security crisis situation. Reduced to basics, the tempo of a national security crisis impacts the time available for the interagency national security community to recognize a crisis, organize, and respond to that crisis.

In their primer on the national security policy making process, Whittaker et al. (2002) recognized the impact of time on interagency national security policymaking processes and decision making noting that national security operations, most especially crises, “are characterized by fast moving events, pressure to act quickly to minimize damage or prevent crisis escalation . . .” (p. 21). Further, argue Whittaker and his colleagues, the effects of policy decisions and subsequent implementation, to include unintended consequences are impacted over time.

Similarly, Hawley (2003) observed a systemic tension between a rapid response and an organized response and that that tension directly contributed to disunity in interagency operations. Equally important, research into team performance found that stress on team personnel is one of the outcomes of a high operational tempo (Hollenbeck, Sego, Ilgen, Major, Hedlund & Phillips, 1997).

Interestingly, beyond the direct impact of tempo, Whittaker et al. (2002) posit that the effectiveness of interagency national security policy operations is impacted to varying degrees by media and press issues and Congressional concerns. In the end, Whittaker and his colleagues noted that parties involved in interagency national security policy deliberations must have an understanding of and focus on realistic time horizons.

### *Personalities (The Human Element)*

The human element can impact the attainment of unity of effort and, like sociocentrism, either contribute or detract from mission accomplishment. Personality involves the human dimension whereby people work well together or not. As previously noted in the discussion on organizational sociocentrism, cooperation can easily be subordinated to competition and this is equally valid at the interpersonal level (Joint Publication 1, 2000).

Toquan et al. (1997), in their exploratory study of nuclear power plant performance noted the influence of team member characteristics, including personality attributes on overall team performance. Toth (2003) makes the case that, in those instances where organizational processes become deficient or dysfunctional, personality frequently emerges as the dominant aspect of control. Similarly, Whittaker et al. (2002) posit that at the strategic level of endeavor, much of the effectiveness of the interagency national security policymaking process is dependent on the personalities and the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals who work for the President as well as the management style of the President himself.

Manwaring (2002), in his study of multi-agency operations in the emerging global security environment, maintains interpersonal and inter-organizational tensions are very real and

potentially crippling possibilities as a result of the ambiguity and confusion that attends multi-agency national security operations. Along similar lines, Fishel (1996) concluded that effective “interagency coordination can founder on the shoals of turf battles, personality conflicts, and petty disputes . . .” (p. 182). Tucker (2000) makes a case that informal personal contacts are important, if not decisive, in crafting agreement and building coalitions within the interagency community. Whittaker et al. (2002) note that participants in the interagency national security policymaking process, “are not immune to considerations of their professional reputations and careers” (p. 21), while Hawley (2003) opines that personality clashes likewise detract building consensus among principals and agencies involved in the process. Hawley notes that many of the senior agency officials involved in the interagency national security policymaking process are strong public figures and that personality clashes are inevitable.

Personal integrity is thought to be an essential element of unity of effort. As previously noted, integrity has been identified as the cornerstone for building trust. People must be able to count on others and know that they will do what they say, that is they must carry out assigned tasks in order to achieve established organizational goals and objectives (Joint Publication 1, 2001). Whittaker et al. (2002) note that professionalism and the constructive handling of disagreements are important to successful interagency national security operations.

With respect to remedies, Toth (2003) opines that, although changes in organization and process can impact dysfunctional interagency performance, changing out people can be equally or more effective in influencing organizational performance. Similarly, Hawley (2003) advises that, since the human factor cannot be distilled out of the process, effective interagency planning must be accomplished to moderate the effects of personality rivalries. Manwaring (2002) argues that, in addition to planning and organizational efforts, civilian and military leaders involved in an interagency endeavor must be afforded the opportunity to develop the judgment and empathy necessary to work cooperatively and collegially to assure successful planning and execution of operations. Moreover, Manwaring posits that the development of the requisite judgment and empathy is equally important to the proper utilization of the capabilities of the U.S. interagency players, relevant international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition civil and military elements. As previously noted, Manwaring recommends increased educational efforts, more mature doctrine, and increased multi-agency exercises as the primary means to create these opportunities.

### *Summary*

The foregoing analysis of the literature was deliberately broad in scope and limited in depth. This approach was selected primarily because preliminary research into the construct unity of effort suggested that little research has been conducted that specifically focused on the construct of unity of effort, per se, as an organizational virtue to be pursued and achieved in the course of realizing established organizational goals and missions. Yet, in the area of the interagency national security policymaking process, unity of effort is often articulated as a desired organizational goal. That said, however, the virtue itself is seldom adequately defined and the attributes of the construct are either ignored, or, when addressed, frequently used interchangeably and, more importantly, without due regard for their relative importance and utility in achieving organizational unity of effort.

This study has attempted to identify and characterize attributes or components of unity as they relate to national security. Admittedly, the treatment of the identified attributes has not been uniform in scope or depth, largely due to the factors delineated above. Nonetheless, a candidate set of attributes has emerged from this analysis of the literature and these provide a viable foundation for the follow-on research and analysis effort intended to validate the respective attributes of unity of effort and establish their relative importance. Hopefully, the potential synergistic effects of this dual approach will assist leaders and decision makers in the interagency national security arena to consciously develop one or more strategies to effectively bring disparate organizational elements together to execute an assigned national security mission and to prioritize the specific actions that promise to achieve unity of effort sooner rather than later in the life cycle of a national security organizational entity. This is especially critical in crisis types of situations where ad hoc organizations must be established and be expected to achieve functional capability in the minimum possible time.

## CHAPTER III

### Method

This chapter presents the methods and procedures used in the collection and analysis of the data for this research. Specifically, this chapter discusses the research sample, the selection of the research subjects for the study, the survey instrument, the research design, data collection procedures, data analysis, limitations and a summary.

#### *Purpose of the Study*

As previously introduced in Chapter 1, the purpose of this study was threefold in nature. First, the research sought to identify and quantify the dimensions of organizational unity of effort as they specifically apply to a joint or collaborative organizational endeavor. Second, based on research findings, I sought to develop a rational model to assess joint organizational performance. Third, I sought to develop a model with sufficient theoretical soundness and adaptability so as to be generalized for applications beyond the interagency national security policy community (e.g. multi-national alliances and coalitions, trans-national business corporations, and community action groups).

#### *General Research Design*

From a strategic perspective, this study is both descriptive and evaluative in nature in that it seeks to identify and characterize the phenomenon of organizational unity of effort, and, in the majority of research endeavors, seeks to obtain the perceptions and evaluations of US Government personnel directly involved in the interagency national security policy process. In this broader context, this study seeks to identify both problems that have been encountered in achieving unity of effort in the interagency arena as well as the operational dimensions of unity of effort by identifying attributes or components of unity of effort based on the experience of the population samples. The personnel selected for individual and focus groups interviews and those surveyed using a questionnaire were categorized according to professional affiliation (agency) and functional orientation (responsibilities) with respect to the national security policy process.

This research relied upon both descriptive and evaluative methods to answer the research questions. Figure 3-1 delineates the approach I pursued to address the research questions underlying this effort. The research involved three major steps. Initially, a literature search and interviews were conducted to facilitate the development and articulation of operational and conceptual definitions of organizational unity of effort and to identify and develop potential attributes or characteristics of the construct. This effort essentially determined what factors, forces, and influences contribute to unity of effort and how unity of effort might be realized in a collaborative or collective organizational undertaking. A depiction of my general research approach is provided at Figure 3-2.

Following these initial qualitative procedures, a preliminary quantitative analysis was conducted. A draft questionnaire was constructed. This instrument asked respondents to rate or score the candidate unity of effort attributes with respect to their contribution to the effectiveness of collaborative efforts in the arena of interagency national security policy development and

Figure 3-1

*Informing the Research Questions*

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



Figure 3-2

Research Approach





execution. The obtained scores were subjected to multivariate analysis (i.e. principal component analysis (PCA) to identify factors that characterized unity of effort and to derive scales (i.e. loadings) that measured unity of effort with high internal consistency. This initial questionnaire instrument was then administered as a pilot survey as detailed below.

Concurrent with the administration of the pilot survey, two focus groups were conducted for the same purposes as above. These groups consisted of researchers, professional staff, and adult educators from the National Defense University who have both educational/research and/or staff/field experience in interagency national security policy formulation and implementation.

Based on the outcomes of these preliminary activities, an operational definition of unity of effort was formulated and potential attribute items that describe or characterize unity of effort were identified.

At this point, it should be noted that, in the course of conducting the literature review, focus groups, and interviews, it became clear that the attainment of organizational unity of effort was also impacted by a number of external or environmental influences or variables, such as time available, complexity of the interagency mission, and the personalities of the principals at the senior leadership echelon. Based on the original research impetuses and questions guiding the research I made a conscious decision to include a rudimentary description of these factors in Chapter Two but to not pursue further extensive research into these variables as part of this research effort. That said, I would suggest that these forces and influences, which I have characterized as *pressures on disunity*, constitute a potentially rich research area that must be explored in depth.

Following analysis of focus group observations and pilot survey results, the questionnaire was revised and subsequently administered to a larger sample population as the principal survey instrument for this research effort. The details of this effort are also delineated below.

It should be noted that the original research design for this effort sought to account for a potential situation where the quantitative data obtained from the pilot survey failed to provide sufficient variation to allow for a statistically robust factor analysis of the follow-on major survey. To this end, a contingent multi-attribute utility analysis employing the Multi-Attribute Utility Technology (MAUT) was to be accomplished relying on high-level agents selected from the interagency national security policy community. This analysis, if implemented, was intended to numerically establish the relative importance of the factors of unity of effort derived from the principal component analysis by assigning weights to the factors derived from the initial (pilot) survey and numerically establishing their relative importance on a rational basis (Chareonwong & Cameron, n.d.). In accordance with this contingent plan, a work group consisting of at least twenty individuals with senior staff experience in national security interagency policy formulation and execution would be convened. As previously indicated, based on the data obtained from preliminary interviews, the literature review, and the PCA findings, these individuals would then assign location measures to the dimensions of unity of effort and weights to the attributes of unity of effort and numerically establish their relative importance on a rational basis.

As originally planned, the MAUT instrument was also to be used with the group of high-level agents to quantitatively establish the relative impact of contextual or external variables that are viewed as pressures on disunity or inhibitors to the attainment of organizational unity of effort. For the Multi-Attribute Utility analysis, the sample population was to be limited to senior executive personnel who possessed high-level planning and decision-making experience in the realm of interagency national security policy formulation and execution. Given the large number of potential survey subjects, the diverse nature and worldwide scope of the national security mission, and the urgency of the larger Homeland Security imperatives that have emerged in the wake of 9-11, I had planned to limit the survey to those personnel in the immediate National Capitol Region (NCR) of Washington, DC directly involved in the in the broader arena of U.S. national security policy development and implementation. Additionally, I planned to include personnel involved in the more specific, emerging arena of Homeland Security, including the more military dimension of Homeland Defense.

In any event, the data obtained from the pilot survey were sufficiently robust so as to allow development and administration of a second survey to a larger sample population and the MAUT option was discarded. More to the point, the data obtained from the follow-on survey were likewise of sufficient robustness to allow me to conduct both measurement and validation principal components analyses as the major quantitative research effort.

### *Literature Review*

A literature review was conducted to determine what other concepts and procedures other researchers have used in pursuing this or related lines of inquiry (Merriam & Simpson, 1995). The literature review focused on two broad sources. The first of these included publications addressing organizational behavior and performance. This domain extended to scholarly texts (to include textbooks) and articles in professional journals and bulletins addressing organizational performance (i.e., teams, teamwork, group performance, etc.). The second major research source focused on U.S. Government executive agency documents. Additional sources included reports of government (General Accounting Office; Congressional Research Office) and defense-oriented research organizations (“Think Tanks”) and doctrinal publications of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the respective military departments.

The basic purpose of the literature review was to summarize and integrate previous research and identify new areas of inquiry (Merriam & Simpson, 1995) with respect to identifying and characterizing those attributes or dimensions of unity of effort thought to be essential to the successful operation of established and ad hoc joint, multi-agency, or *cross-cutting* efforts. In addition, the literature review examined extant policies and procedures employed to achieve unity of effort across U.S. governmental agency boundaries. The literature review also extended to the areas of organizational behavior in general and team performance in specific.

Relevance of material selected for review and for eventual inclusion in this research was guided by criteria suggested by Merriam and Simpson (1995). To this end, I attempted to establish authors’ (to include organizations) authority on the subjects of interest, the timeliness of the sources, the degree of relevance of the sources to my research, and the quality of the sources.

As an ancillary effort of the literature review, the research approach also included an analysis of an extant survey addressing interagency education and training sponsored by the National Defense University (NDU) in June 2001. *Thoughtlink*, an independent contractor, conducted the survey between April and June 2001 (Loughran & Stahl, 2001). The survey involved interviews with 76 U.S. Government personnel from nine different USG agencies nominally involved in the planning and conduct of complex contingency operations (CCOs).<sup>1</sup> Of this population, Loughran and Stahl found that the average number of years of USG service was 21.5 and that 83% of the respondents reported that they spent 50% of their work in planning complex contingency operations.

Focused primarily on interagency education and training, the interviews also addressed interagency cooperation as a means of framing the survey. Significantly, Loughran and Stahl (2001) reported that 100% of the respondents believed that interagency coordination was essential to the successful completion of CCO missions and that coordination requirements were required beyond just the cadre of CCO planners and participants. During the course of their survey, although the term *unity of effort* was not articulated, Loughran and Stahl noted several characteristics or attributes of interagency coordination that also emerged as attributes of unity of effort in the literature review. More specifically, respondents noted the need for close and integrated cooperation between agencies; clear sets of agreed-upon objectives; transparency in conveying expectations and dynamics of agencies with respect to agency roles and resources; effective information and communications flow; strong individual relationships; trust; clear policies for funding; assignment of lead Federal agencies; senior leadership involvement; system (technology, networks, etc.) integration; advanced planning, long range strategic vision; shared understanding of the desired end state; and education and training as a means to enhance understanding and appreciation of agency capabilities, cultures, and processes (Loughran & Stahl).

### *Interviews*

Parallel with the conduct of the literature review, I conducted a small number of direct interviews with individuals known to possess extensive interagency experience. Although interviews only produce qualitative data and tend to be time-consuming and costly (Moore, 1994), I elected to pursue this research approach because, as a general technique, interviews possess the advantage of allowing for face-to-face encounters with individuals knowledgeable in the research area under scrutiny (Merriam & Simpson, 1995). Questions to guide the conduct of the interviews are at Appendix E. Direct interaction also offered the advantage of adaptability, which allowed me to alter the interview situation and fully exploit the responses of the subjects. Additionally, as Borg, Gall, and Gall (1993) point out, the interview technique allowed me to follow-up promising areas of inquiry in order to obtain as much information as possible and to attain greater clarity and understanding. Finally, the interview methodology allowed me to probe areas of interest in greater depth (Merriam & Simpson).

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<sup>1</sup> The nine agencies represented were the Department of State, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Treasury Department, the National Security Council, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Intelligence Council

It should also be noted that the interview technique allowed me to gather data when opportunities for observation of the phenomenon under investigation were limited. Moreover, interviews had the added dimension of allowing me to gather opinions and facts from participants while observing the personal characteristics of the participants (Merriam and Simpson, 1995). Thus, as Merriam and Simpson point out, utilizing a structured interview format allowed me to become “an extension of the schedule of questions” (p. 150). As a result of employing an interviewing technique, I was able to provide for clarification, restatement and explanation to elicit responses from participants (Merriam and Simpson).

Merriam and Simpson (1995) also note the use of the structured interview increases the consistency from one interview to the next and allows for the comparison of data at a later date. I found this to be true in my research endeavors, both with respect to subsequent individual interviews and with respect to the conduct of focus groups.

### *Focus Groups*

Insights obtained from focus groups were used to develop and/or refine potential attribute items that describe or characterize unity of effort in the interagency national security process. Additionally, the focus groups provided valuable insights into the research design of this research study and proved invaluable in identifying future areas for additional research.

Focus group interviews were conducted to obtain qualitative, in-depth data specifically addressing attributes of unity of effort in the interagency national security policy process (Merriam & Simpson, 1995). Moore (1994), in her research on the effects of lateral and vertical homogeneity in focus groups, noted the value of the multi-dimensional nature of focus groups. Given the fact that an array of multidisciplinary agencies come together in the interagency to solve complex problems, it was evident that the multidisciplinary approach offered by focus groups would be a useful endeavor. Additionally, the focus group approach allowed for the participation of a number of participants with interests and expertise in the interagency national security policy process and allowed for a purposive sampling directed to a very specific topic (Patton, 1990). Additionally, it was felt that assembling a group of subjects with similar interests and levels of expertise would provide for a more interactive and broad-ranging session. As Merriam and Simpson point out, “The concept of focus group interviewing is based on the therapeutic assumption that people will respond more freely in the security of a homogeneous group concentrating on a single problem or phenomenon” (p. 151).

One additional advantage of conducting focus group interviews for the specific purposes of this study is that they allow for the aggregation of personal constructs into common group constructs by building on individuals’ constructs to ensure the continuity and grounding of data (Cassell & Symon, 1998).

There are several potential limitations associated with the conduct of focus groups. One such limitation is that, as a qualitative research methodology, the results are not generalizable to larger populations (Moore, 1994). Additionally, Moore cautions that interaction between the respondents and the researcher can result in undesirable effects, e.g., respondents’ responses

being not truly independent (therein restricting generalizability of results) and results possibly being biased by a dominant or opinionated member (or, conversely, a “reserved” member reluctant to speak).

Other potential limitations of the focus group interview include the researcher’s skill in conducting such interventions. Merriam and Simpson (1995), for example, note the importance of the researcher’s facility with the complexity and sensitivity of the data to be obtained and the researcher’s ability to be sensitive to group dynamics. Additionally, Stewart and Shamdasni (1990) caution that the moderator may unknowingly provide “clues” with respect to the types of answers and responses that are desired.

These potential limitations were not deemed to be problems in this undertaking due to the researcher’s comprehensive understanding and involvement with the subject under investigation and the fact that the researcher had conducted several focus groups previously, albeit in the areas of education, curriculum development, and evaluation.

Based on the guidance developed by Morgan (1998), I planned to conduct two focus groups of ten subjects each. Potential participants were to be drawn from the ranks of the National Defense University’s faculty, research, and professional staffs. Two major criteria were determined to select focus group participants. The first criterion was previous direct (“real world”) involvement with interagency national security operations. Accordingly, biographical data on all potential participants was screened to ensure that potential subjects had high-level operational experience in interagency national security operations. The second criterion was research experience and teaching expertise in interagency national security processes.

The final group of potential participants was invited to participate based primarily on the review of biographical data and my personal knowledge and evaluation of the potential subjects’ interagency and national security policy expertise and experience in the National Capitol Region or in field assignments involving interagency national security operations, to include operational experience at the National Security Council level.

Two focus groups were convened to solicit participants’ perceptions of what attributes characterize unity of effort with respect to interagency national security policy formulation and execution. A total of 35 personnel were invited to attend one of the two scheduled working groups. Invitees included faculty members from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces the National War College, and the School of National Security Executive Education (SNSEE), researchers from the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), and war gamers from the National Strategic Gaming Center (NSGC), all located at National Defense University’s Fort McNair campus.

Contact was initially made through email followed by a formal letter of invitation. As the planned sessions approached, telephonic confirmation was effected to ensure adequate participation in the planned sessions. The first focus group interview was conducted on 26 May 2004 in a conference room provided by the National Strategic Gaming Center at National

Defense University. This facility had the advantage of providing videotaping support. Five individuals participated in the initial session. The second session was conducted on 28 May 2004 in the same location. Seven individuals participated.

It should be noted that the number of individuals who volunteered to participate fell short of my expectations (20). I attribute this circumstance to the time frame in which the focus groups were conducted: It was the end of the academic year at the National Defense University and faculty were heavily committed to end of year exercises and “wrap-up” activities such as administering oral examinations, evaluating written assignments, and preparing student academic performance reports.

Both interview sessions opened with an overview of the basic research objective and an opportunity for subjects to ask questions regarding the research. Interestingly, there was a great deal of interest in my research design and, as a result of discussions along these lines, I was able to more effectively articulate the scope of this research. More specifically, my research design, viewed in a temporal sense or as a “timeline,” was somewhat vague. As a consequence of focus group discussions, I was able to determine that the principal timeframe or “piece” of the interagency national security process continuum that constitutes my research interest extends from the formal identification of a need to develop policy or take action up to the time actual execution of the policy or action takes place. To use a historical analogy (that was indeed offered by one of the participants), if this study was to be focused on the Normandy invasion in 1944, the “piece” of process that is under scrutiny would extend from that point in the time when the decision to invade was made up to the time the actual invasion commenced.

Continuing the analogy, there would be no direct interest in the degree to which the invasion of Normandy was actually successful. Returning to this research endeavor, then, there is no direct interest in the degree to which interagency policies or operations of interest are or were judged to be successful. That being acknowledged, I must note that the question of appropriate measures of effectiveness or performance for the interagency national security policy process (e.g. outcomes or “end-states”) absorbed a significant amount of interest and energy in both focus groups. Although this is not a direct area of interest for my research, this particular area of inquiry is a *target-rich environment* and clearly an area that warrants further research and analysis.

Since both sessions were planned over normal lunch hours to take advantage of breaks in the university’s academic schedule, sandwiches, snacks, and soft drinks were provided at both sessions.

Following the general discussions addressing research design and levels of interest, I posed two major questions. These questions were developed utilizing the guidelines suggested by Krueger (1998). The first overarching question focused on identification of the discrete attributes of organizational unity of effort. The question was further broken down into three constituent elements:

1. What constitutes unity of effort in a collaborative or “joint” endeavor? This question focuses on the identification of the fundamental attributes or components of the construct of unity of effort?
2. Which attributes or components of unity of effort are perceived to be of greatest importance or criticality in achieving unified action (e.g. mission accomplishment) in a joint or collaborative endeavor?
3. What additional attributes would you recommend be included in the research study?

Following the introduction and discussion of this initial set of questions, I posed the second major question: What additional contextual variables warrant inclusion in this research effort?

As previously noted, I have deliberately chosen not to address this dimension of the interagency national security process in detail as part of this research. However, given the opportunity to engage panels of recognized experts in the national security policy process, I perceived the potential value to be realized in identifying and developing an initial set of contextual variables that warrant rigorous future research in their own right.

The focus group interviews were videotaped to assure that important information was not missed. Participants were notified in advance that the session would be videotaped and there were no objections. Moreover, during the actual sessions, there did not appear to be any resistance, reluctance, or lack of authentic response on the part of the participants to responding (Merriam and Simpson, 1995). Following each session, I reviewed the videotapes and prepared field notes of the sessions and transcribed verbatim responses that were deemed to be of especial significance in this study.

As previously suggested, both focus groups noted the critical importance of distinguishing between the utility of the interagency national security policy process as a means of providing an effective, if not efficient, means for involved agencies to both compete and contribute to national policy development and execution as opposed to the desired outcome of achieving optimal organizational unity of effort in the interagency process. This finding, in my view, is a reflection of the real-world bureaucratic processes and dynamics articulated by Graham Allison (1971) in his landmark work addressing the Bureaucratic Politics Model of governmental policy development and decision making.

More importantly for the purposes of my research, as a result of focus group engagement, the following additional attributes were identified for inclusion in the principal research questionnaire: (a) Legal dimensions (framework), (b) clear definition of policy objectives, (c) congruence of objectives with the organizational goals of the respective interagency participants, (d) the senior leadership’s view of the importance or criticality of the mission (i.e. “lip service” or meaningful commitment), (e) source(s) of authority for the interagency endeavor and, (f) incentives, rewards, and recognition. These attributes were incorporated into the final

questionnaire that was administered in support of this research. Additionally, information addressing contextual or environmental variables was obtained to support potential post-dissertation research into the broader interagency national security policy environment.

### *Pilot Survey*

An initial questionnaire was constructed and administered to a non-random convenience sample soliciting the opinions of 300 individuals selected from the respective student bodies matriculating at the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces during academic year 2003-2004 (August 2003 through June 2004). This population was selected largely because the unique mix of military and executive agency students mirrors the national security interagency arena and the majority of students have been involved in the national security interagency process at various points in their careers. Additionally, the sample was deemed to possess high fidelity to the population that would be the target of the principal research instrument (Kerlinger, 1986; Merriam & Simpson, 1995).

Using conventions recommended by Sheatsley (1985), I designed a pilot questionnaire to be administered during a pilot survey. The data obtained from the pilot survey would be subjected to an initial principal component analysis. The primary purpose of the pilot survey and initial PCA was to determine if the questionnaire would provide statistically significant data and sufficient variance to allow for a meaningful factor analysis (FA) as the principal or main research effort. A secondary objective was to address the likelihood of reducing the number of attributes to be assessed in the major research effort (survey). A third major objective was to identify additional attributes or characteristics (variables) to be added to the follow-on questionnaire to be administered as the principal research instrument. Additional areas of interest included survey format, understanding of the questions and elimination of ambiguities (Kerlinger, 1986), additional questions that may be required, and response scale modifications.

Based on variable-to-subject ratios suggested by Kline (1994) and Bryant and Yarnold (1995), I determined that it would be desirable to obtain at least 225 samples for the pilot survey to support the preliminary principal component analysis.<sup>2</sup> A total of 400 questionnaires were printed and distributed to the selected sample populations. All sample packets and instruments were coded for anonymity so that survey respondents could not be identified directly or indirectly with the information provided. Demographics that were available were noted to assist in adding to potential generalizability to other populations.

A total of 137 questionnaires were completed and returned. This equated to a thirty-four percent return rate. The principal component analysis procedures outlined below for the principal research effort were followed. For the sake of brevity, I will not review those procedures in detail at this time.

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<sup>2</sup> Kline uses the term variable-to-subject ration while Bryant and Yarnold refer to the same construct as subjects-to-variables (STV ratio). Regardless, both constructs address the requirement for a sufficient number of subjects to achieve reliability in the analysis to be performed.



### *Theoretical Unity of Effort Factor Model*

Prior to administration of the pilot survey, I identified an initial set of factors based on a rational analysis of the attributes (variables) generated by the literature review and the findings obtained by preliminary interviews (Oreg, 2003). The derived factors were: (a) *Authority and Leadership*, (b) *Organizational Constructs and Processes*, (c) *Shared End State*, (d) *Resources*, (e) *Organizational Culture*, and (f) *Interpersonal Dynamics*.

As previously noted, there is currently no meaningful body of theoretical knowledge addressing organizational unity of effort. My purpose in doing this was to generate an initial theoretical construct against which I could accomplish preliminary analysis of the results generated by the PCA to assess the consistency of internal factor structures. Had other theoretical models of unity of effort been available, they would have (ostensibly) provided sufficient constructs and scales to facilitate a more robust analysis of the factor structure derived from my research. However, in the absence of such models, this rationally-derived model was deemed sufficient to support the analysis of pilot survey data and to provide at least an initial assessment of the PCA-derived factor structure for unity of effort.

Based on the results of the PCA conducted on pilot survey data (see below), I derived a second theoretical measurement model to support the analysis to be performed on the data derived from the principal survey. This second model consisted of four factors: (a) *Leadership and Decision-Making*, (b) *Interpersonal Dynamics*, (c) *Organizational Performance*, and (d) *Organizational Context*.

### *Implications of Results of Pilot Survey*

Descriptive statistics were derived for the pilot survey data and a principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted. The PCA technique was selected for this application (as well as for the principal research analysis to be described later) based on the findings of Nunnally and Burstein (1994) who recommend that a PCA be conducted for analysis involving more than 20 variables. The rotation method was a VARIMAX technique with Kaiser normalization (Green & Salkind, 2003; Morgan & Griego, 1998). As a result of the analysis, items were deleted that did not load significantly on a single factor or that loaded highly on more than one factor (Oreg, 2003). Additionally, the initial factor analysis suggested that four principal components might be extracted from the data. Accordingly, to provide some measure of validity across the derived factors, I also “forced” the data by conducting three and four factor analyses on the sample data. Based on the analysis of the rotated component matrix and the scree plot, the four-factor construct made the most sense from a rational perspective. In addition, reliability analysis was conducted for the four derived factors and was found to be satisfactory.

As previously noted, based on the above analytic efforts and insights obtained from the focus group interviews, a second theoretical model for unity of effort was derived. The four extracted factors were identified as (a) *Leadership and Decision-Making*, (b) *Interpersonal Dynamics*, (c) *Organizational Performance*, and (d) *Organizational Context*. Table 3-1 displays the four rationally-derived factors and their constituent components (variables).

Table 3-1

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 Unity of Effort Theoretical Factor Model
 

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Factor	Attributes
<i>Leadership &amp; Decision Making Structure</i>	Unified Leadership Unity of Command Directive Authority Lines of Authority Command & Control Frameworks Centralized Leadership Interagency Doctrine Common Planning Systems Integrated Strategy Organizational Options Interagency Training & Education Cross Assignments Common Terminology Integrated Budget
<i>Interpersonal Dynamics</i>	Confidence Trust Rapport Patience Camaraderie Coordination Intel/Information Sharing Clearly Defined Mission
<i>Organizational Performance</i>	Risk Management Security Requirements Transition Procedures Delegation of Authority Performance Measures Strategic Vision
<i>Organizational Context</i>	Agency Interests Agency Values Roles & Responsibilities Knowledge of Other Agencies' Capabilities Common Goals and Missions Liaison Adequate Funding

Based on the results of the PC analysis on the pilot survey data and the insights derived from the conduct of the focus group interviews, the array of attributes to be tested in the main research effort was refined and revised. Items that were determined to be similar in nature were eliminated or consolidated into a single item. Additionally, I discarded those items that focused essentially on *contextual* or *environmental* variables. I based my decision on the following rationale. For the purposes of this particular research effort, my primary interest is in identifying those factors and attributes of organizational unity of effort that permit for some degree of manipulation, management, and/or control by the individuals participating in the interagency national security policy process. As such, I viewed the contextual and environmental variables as essentially independent variables that were, for the most part “givens” and not variables that were easily subject to control by the players in the process. This is not to deny the critical impact they have on the interagency national security policy process. Rather, as outlined in Chapter Five, I have concluded that this initial set of variables offer the possibility for more intensive research in the future.

### *Principal Research*

#### *General*

The principal quantitative research effort consisted of a questionnaire administered to 792 military and civilian students, faculty, and professional staff at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Additionally, questionnaires were administered to 308 students, faculty, and professional staff previously assigned to National defense University. Data obtained from this survey was subjected to principal component analysis (PCA) to identify major factors contributing to defining the construct of unity of effort in interagency national security policy formulation and implementation.

#### *Selection of Samples*

In the initial stages of design development process for this research effort, I had intended to utilize only the respective student bodies matriculating at the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces during academic year 2004-2005 (August 2004 through June 2005). Subsequently, based on the results of the pilot survey, the desired survey sample size for the principal research effort was significantly expanded to include the faculties of the Industrial College, the National War College, the School for National Security Executive Education (SNSEE) and the Information Resource Management College (IRMC); the professional staffs of the Institute for National Security Studies and the Center for Technology and National Security Policy; and the National Defense University. Additionally, in order to obtain sufficient response to support the planned analysis, the ICAF Classes of 1998 and 2003 and former ICAF faculty were administered the instrument via email.

As previously noted in my discussion of the sample population used for the pilot survey (and guided by the criteria suggested by Kerlinger (1986) and Merriam & Simpson (1995) these sample populations were selected primarily because of the unique mix of military and executive agency students, faculty, and professional staff mirrors the national security interagency arena

and the majority of these populations have been involved in the national security interagency process at various points in their careers. Additionally, I elected to proceed with the mixed populations and added groups to add variance to the representative total sample.

### *Total samples*

As previously noted in the conduct of the pilot survey, the sample size requirements for the principal questionnaire were determined based on recommended factor analysis conventions with respect to variables-to-subjects ratios and minimum sample sizes (Kline, 1994; Bryant & Yarnold, 1995). Kline notes that early research on factor analysis recommended SVR's as high as 10:1 but that more recent advances in psychological testing suggest that SRV's can be as low as 2:1 and still produce consistent and stable results if the underlying factor structure is robust. Comrey and Lee (1992) cited in Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) note that 200 samples are considered "fair, 300 as "good," 500 as "very good" and 1000 as "excellent," while Tabachnick and Fidell conclude that 300 sample cases is "comfortable" (p. 588). As previously noted, to support my analysis, I determined to seek at least 215 cases for the pilot survey analysis and 215 for the main PCA. However, following pilot questionnaire analysis and evaluation, I made the decision to conduct two separate PCA's as elements of the principal research effort and raised the minimum number of desired cases 430. In this respect, in expanding the sample population, consistent with conventions delineated in Kline (1994) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) I elected to "pool" samples to achieve wider variance and to obtain a larger sample population.

As noted previously, all sample packets and instruments were coded for anonymity so that questionnaire respondents could not be identified directly or indirectly with the information provided. Demographics that were available were noted to assist in adding to potential generalizability to other populations.

### *Actual samples*

A sample of 448 males and females was obtained and 1 anonymous sample was received. That said, it was recognized that some consideration had to be given to the diversity of groups within the aggregated sample in generalizing the obtained factor structures (Hardy, 1994), in this instance, gender differences, agency affiliation, education levels, years of U.S. Government service and months of interagency experience. The general demographic profile of the total sample represents professional military officers, career U.S. Government Civil Service and Foreign Service professionals, researchers, and professional educators. The majority of the sample can also be characterized as students as they are in attendance at National Defense University for a 10-month period. Tables B-1 and B-2 depict the ages, military/civilian rank, education level, agency affiliation, years of Government service and months of interagency experience of the sample.

## *Procedures*

### *Research instrument.*

The principal survey instrument was developed based on a comprehensive literature review in the field, the analysis of the extant survey addressing interagency education and training sponsored by the National Defense University in June, 2001 input derived from individual and focus groups interviews and the results of the pilot survey. Prior to developing my own instrument, I established to my satisfaction that no such questionnaire exists for this specific type of study. As a result, I elected to develop a separate questionnaire utilizing the information derived from the above developmental sources (Appendix C).

Part One of the questionnaire, "OPINION," consisted of 43 items that ask respondents to rate the degree to which candidate organizational and leadership attributes of unity of effort were perceived as being components or elements of unity of effort. A six anchor Likert scale response was employed to measure responses to each item.

Part Two of the instrument, "EVALUATION," consisted of 43 items that asked respondents to rate *importance* of selected attributes in achieving organizational unity of effort in the national security policy process. A seven-anchor Likert scale was employed to measure response to each item. In addition, the last section of Part Two provides an opportunity for respondents to write in any additional comments.

Part Three of the survey, "Demographic Data," consisted of nine items designed to profile participating survey respondents according to age, agency affiliation, number of years at the respective agency, and functional orientation within the interagency national security community.

One potential limitation to this research was a lower-than-anticipated response rate to the questionnaire resulting in an under-representation in many of the agencies involved in the national security interagency policy process. This limited the degree to which I was able to conduct analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine if there were significant differences in factor structures by the various agencies that participate in the interagency national security policy process. Another possible limitation identified during research design was a potential tendency toward rater bias to avoid the extremes. Post survey analysis of frequencies and distributions led me to conclude that this was not a problem.

### *Instrument administration.*

I personally conducted all the administration of the instruments. Prior to the actual administration of the questionnaire, a research protocol was developed and submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Virginia Tech for review and approval. Approval was obtained on May 12, 2004. In addition, official authorization to survey agency personnel was requested from the General Counsel and Vice President of Academic Affairs of the National Defense University as well as from the respective commandants, deans, and/or directors of the individual colleges, institutes, and centers at National Defense University from which the sample

data would be obtained. Approval was received at various dates, all prior to administration of the survey within the university.

In addition to institutional approval to conduct the survey, I also requested permission to collect the data from the individual target respondents. To this end, an “implied consent” form and appropriate instructions for completing the form were provided with the implied consent form being executed prior to completing the questionnaire.

In accordance with initial research design approach, the survey questionnaires were to be distributed by e-mail within the university. Each questionnaire, consisting of six pages, was to be returned to the researcher through e-mail. However, because there is a separate survey system for each college (APPNET for ICAF, Lotus Notes for NWC), there was a concern that there could be problems in adapting the survey to one or the other systems. However, after careful consideration of the available distribution systems, the mechanics of adapting the questionnaire to each college’s system and the decision to extend the survey to a broader NDU and graduate population sample compelled me to abandon the “on-line” solution and pursue a more reliable course of action by distributing the surveys through the respective student, faculty, and professional staff mailrooms within the university and, for graduated classes and former faculty members identified for inclusion in the survey, through e-mail.

#### *Data Collection Procedures*

The questionnaire instruments to be administered at National Defense University were reproduced and placed in envelopes along with a cover letter explaining the purpose of the survey, an implied consent form, and a return, self-addressed stamped envelope. The cover letter explained the purpose of the study, provided information on how to complete the survey, promised anonymity, requested cooperation in the completion and return of the survey, and offered to send an executive summary of the results to those individuals who so requested. The cover letter also requested that the survey be completed and returned by a specified date.

#### *Data Management and Analysis*

All analyses were supported using EXCEL 2000 (Microsoft) for data input and management. 448 protocols each with between 61 and 94 entries were coded and entered into data sets in spreadsheet formats.<sup>3</sup> Names were not recorded, however, agency affiliation and other interagency and Federal service data were collected and recorded. Data sets were exported to SPSS 10.1 for principal component and factor analysis. SPSS was selected for the factor analysis with respect to accuracy, flexibility, depth of analysis, diverse rotation and extraction options, ease of use, and availability of technical support.

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<sup>3</sup> A review of the data sets revealed that one respondent failed to complete 33 entries. The majority of “missing” data entries consisted of one missing response.

### *Data Analysis*

The returned, usable questionnaires were analyzed, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The multiple-choice items in Parts I and II of the questionnaire were coded numerically and then transcribed for analysis. Responses to the open-ended questions were transcribed verbatim, categorized and coded for analysis.

Prior to commencing the actual analysis, I selected 100 questionnaires at random and visually compared the entries on the questionnaire to the actual scores entered on the EXCEL spreadsheet. No transcription errors were noted.

The quantitative items were initially analyzed using descriptive statistics including central tendency and frequency distributions. This effort focused on assuring that the data possessed sufficient range and variance enabling the planned factor analysis. Additionally, this initial analysis sought to identify any anomalies in the data due to transcription miscues. Three such errors (one in Part I and two in Part II) were identified based on the frequency distribution and range data. These errors were occasioned by my decision to enter non-integer scores entered by respondents (e.g. "6.5" or "8" on a seven anchor scale). These scores were adjusted to integer values after a careful analysis of the respective respondent's characteristic response behavior prior to beginning the main factor analytic effort.

It must be clearly stated at this point that I elected to conduct the main analysis on only Part II of the questionnaire data. In my original research design, I had two principal aims. The first was to gain a level of confidence that the variables I had identified as integral to organizational unity of effort were indeed correct. With this view in mind, Part I of the questionnaire ("opinion") was developed and administered expressively for this purpose. Said differently, I was interested in determining the extent to which respondents "agreed" with me that the identified variables or components were indeed seen as more or less important elements of organizational unity of effort.

With this objective foremost in my mind, Part II of the questionnaire was focused on capturing respondents' evaluations of the *importance* of the candidate components in contributing to organizational unity of effort. Thus, I selected Part II data as the main data source for the principal analytic effort, primarily because it solicited respondents' *evaluation* of organizational unity of effort.

From an overall strategic perspective, I elected to undertake principal component analysis (PCA) as the principal analytic approach for my research. For this particular research effort, PCA--one of the analytic methodologies within the broader family of factor analyses (FA)--has the potential to accomplish a number of desired functions relevant to this research effort. Kline (1994) notes that FA has the potential to reveal previous unknown constructs, clearly a major objective of this research. In so doing, FA provides the means to simplify a matrix of correlations in order to explain a phenomenon in terms of a small number of underlying factors (Kline). In essence, as Kline points out, the derived factors represent a condensed statement of relationships

between a given set of variables. More importantly, factor analysis has the potential to assist in operationally defining the construct of interest (in this case, organizational unity of effort) as evidenced by the correlation of discrete variables with associated factors (Kline).

My research design called for randomly separating the survey responses into two sets. Both sets of responses were then subjected to principal component analysis as the analytic technique and the results of both analyses rationally compared to determine if there were any significant differences in outcomes. Subsequently, after reviewing the data obtained from the questionnaires, I considered subjecting the second data set to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In this approach, I intended to use one half of the randomized sample to first develop a measurement model of the factors that were derived from the variables thought to characterize organizational unity of effort. I would then subject the second half of the randomized sample to develop a hypothesized model of organizational unity of effort that could then be fitted to the test model through confirmatory factor analysis. However, upon reflection, given that this research is literally a first attempt to characterize the construct of organizational unity of effort, I was content to conduct a second PCA for the purpose of validating the factor structure obtained from the initial PCA and defer the CFA for a future research endeavor.

Application of FA is not without its potential problems. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), for example, caution that there are no criterion variables (such the correlation between observed and predicted DV scores in regression analysis) against which one might test a solution derived from PCA or FA. Additionally, Tabachnick and Fidell note that, following the extraction procedure, there are an infinite number of rotations that can be performed, all of which account for the same amount of variance in the source data but with slightly different factor definitions. Thus, it remains to me as the researcher assessment the interpretability and utility of the derived factor models.

I elected to conduct a principal components analysis (PCA) as the main analytical effort due to its ability to identify inter-correlations of all the individual items under consideration as well as its value in identifying which items should be grouped into sets or “factors.” PCA has the value of maximizing the variance extracted by orthogonal factors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). More specifically, PCA addresses the total variance (shared, specific, and error variance) that are included within the extracted components. Version 10.1 of the *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (SPSS) (Norman Nie and Associates) was used to conduct the PCA.

It must be noted that there does not exist unanimous consensus in the factor analysis community with respect to PCA as a legitimate means of exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Fabrigar, MacCallum, Wegener and Strahan (1999) argue that PCA is not a true form of EFA and that there are clear conceptual distinctions between EFA and PCA and that EFA should be employed when the researcher’s purpose is to identify latent constructs underlying measured variable. That said, Fabrigar et al. also noted that with a sufficiently large sample, the sample can be randomly split in two with an EFA being conducted on one half of the data to derive the data necessary to specify a CFA model that can then be fit to the other half of the data. Based on the samples sizes obtained for this study, I am confident that the PCA that was conducted to establish a measurement model would be sufficient to allow for the conduct of a follow-on CFA.



In terms of the derived factor structures, using the parameters established by Kline (1994), I elected to consider a “high” loading as evidencing a value of  $> .60$  and medium-high loading as equaling or exceeding  $.3$ . Unless otherwise indicated, variables with loading values  $< .30$  would be eliminated from the analysis. Kline cautions that “meanings” derived from the analysis have to be deduced from the factor correlations or “loadings” and recommends that some form of external criteria be applied to facilitate the deductive process. To this end, I have relied on the results from the literature review, the focus groups and interviews, and, most importantly, the data derived from the pilot survey to provide a set of criteria for this purpose, albeit, largely rational in nature.

Finally, upon identification of factors, inferential statistics comparing means for sample demographic categories were conducted. For this study, I elected to analyze and compare the results for military personnel and civilians assigned to military departments; for civilian personnel assigned to the major executive department (e.g. Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, etc.) that historically comprise “The Interagency;” and military and civilian personnel working within academia. This last demographic category consisted of individuals involved in research and/or teaching and individuals occupying professional staff positions at the National Defense University or one of the university’s component colleges.

This analysis consisted of a One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) (Morgan & Griego, 1998) of factor scores provided by the demographic groups (above) to determine if there is any significant difference in factor structures across the three groups. This analysis also tested for homogeneity of variance utilizing the Levene Statistic. As required, post-hoc analysis employing Tukey’s Multiple Comparison test (Morgan & Griego) was conducted to explore statistically significant differences in variance.

#### Other Limitations

Initially, security concerns were also seen as posing a limitation to the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of this research. Based on the literature search of the field, security and classification requirements within individual agencies appeared to be major impediments to achieving unity of effort in national security interagency policy endeavors. Given this circumstance, I felt it might be possible that respondents and/or interviewees might have a reluctance to complete the questionnaire and/or be interviewed. Moreover, these same concerns about security and potential classification issues might limit the amount of information respondents/interviewees might be willing to divulge. As events turned out, these potential limitations were not experienced and respondents and interviewees evidence no reluctance to participate in the research and share their perceptions and insights.

## CHAPTER IV

### Analysis

This chapter examines the results of the data analyses. Principal component analyses (PCA) are presented with respect to the data obtained from a questionnaire survey along with a comparative analysis of the two PCA's conducted as part of this research effort. Additionally, demographic analyses with respect to consistency of the derived factor structures is presented.

#### *Preliminary Research and Analysis*

Prior to the conduct of the primary quantitative analysis, I also undertook other preliminary research efforts. These included a review of previous studies, a review of the literature in the field, the conduct of both individual and focus group interviews, and the administration of a pilot survey. The results of these preliminary research activities have previously been discussed and will not be repeated in this chapter unless selected findings are deemed relevant to the results presented in this chapter.

#### *Analysis of the Measurement Model*

The analysis performed in this study followed deliberate convention. For the initial phase, descriptive statistics were obtained and demographic frequency distribution analyses were conducted. After a random separation of the research cases ( $n = 448$ ) into two sample sets, I subjected the first half of the randomized sample data (*measurement model*,  $n = 220$ ) to a principal components analysis (PCA). As previously noted, I had determined that an acceptable variable-to-subject ratio (VSR) was 1:5, indicating a minimally acceptable sample size of 215 cases. I elected to conduct a PCA based on the research of Nunnally and Bernstein (1994), who recommend this extraction technique for factor analytic procedures involving in excess of twenty variables.

An orthogonal rotation was chosen largely because the dimensions of the items (attributes) selected for analysis were assumed to be independent of one another. Based on an analysis of the Scree Plot (Figure 4-1) and the rotated component matrix, the quantitative analysis suggested that four, five or six factors might underlie the construct of organizational unity of effort.

Based on this initially derived solution, I conducted four, five, and six-factor analyses. Interpreting the results of these analyses, and aided by the strength of the generated marker variables (loadings  $> .70$ ) for each of the derived factors, I determined that the four-factor model possessed the most conceptual coherence and validity. Marker variables are usually a small number of items in each scale that, because of their relatively high loadings, are considered to be the most valid representations of the factor for the purpose of identifying or interpreting that factor (Kerlinger, 1986). The four factor measurement model and the observed factor loadings are depicted at Table 4-2. Assisted in great measure by the marker variables, I developed and applied factor labels for each of the four extracted factors.

Figure 4-1

*Scree Plot for Principal Component Analysis*

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


Table 4-1  
*Unity of Effort Factor Loadings for the Measurement Model Principal Component Analysis*

Item	Factor (F) Loadings			
	F1	F2	F3	F4
Camaraderie	.752			
Build Rapport	.711			
Respect for Other Agencies	.709			
Knowledge of Other Agency Roles, Capabilities, Limitations	.668			
Confidence in Other Agency Competence	.646		.301	
Understand Unique Culture of Other Agencies	.636			
Trust Between Agencies	.631			
Understand Unique Values of Other Agencies	.589	.341		
Cohesion	.584			
Understand Unique Interests of Other Agencies	.562			
Patience	.545			
Cross Organization/Exchange Assignments	.511	.470**		
Liaison Between Agencies	.494	.401		
Duration of Previous Organizational Relationships	.485	.349		
Clear Risk Management Policies and Procedures	.481			
Congruence of Interagency Mission & Agency Goals	.455		.388	
Common Terminology	.443	.393**		
Interagency Training and Education	.432	.424**		
Share Intelligence/Information	.426			
Performance Incentives and Rewards	.405	.322		
Coordination	.450			
Clearly Defined Command and Control Frameworks		.719	.306	
Clear Lines of Authority		.694		
Unambiguous Directive Authority		.679		
Integrated/Comprehensive Planning System		.643	.317	
Interagency Doctrine		.633		
Centralized Leadership		.604		
Unity of Command		.566		
Organizational Concept	.454	.559		
Source of Organizational Authority		.543		.408
Measures of Agency Effectiveness (Performance)	.330	.479		
Security Classification and Clearances Requirements		.473		.354
Delegation of Authority	.305	.428		
Understand the Legal Framework		.385		.366**
Clearly Defined Strategy			.789	
Integrated Strategy		.323	.730	
Clear Policy Goals and Objectives			.728	
Clearly Articulated Purpose/ Mission of the Interagency Organization			.718	
Strategic Vision			.716	
Clear Operational Roles and Responsibilities		.364	.612	
Adequate Funding				.818
Realistic Budget				.807
Senior Leader View of Mission Importance			.336**	.365**

\*\* = Item considered to possess significant cross-loading (value as indicated) Values < .30 not reported

As indicated in Table 4-3, the four factors explain nearly 48% of the variance. When five factors were extracted, almost 52% of the variance was explained. However, the added factor was both statistically and theoretically very similar to the first factor in the four-factor model described above.

#### *Factor Structure of the Measurement Model*

The first factor contained twenty-one items that pertained to organizational context and the interpersonal dynamics that facilitated interaction within the organizational environment. This factor included both organizational attributes that are important in creating and defining an organizational entity as well as the types of interpersonal behavior that can contribute to the creation of a true interagency culture.

The second factor consisted of thirteen items that reflected the organizational leadership and decision making dimension and the organizational infrastructure. The focus here appears to be on where the requisite authorities (including delegation of authority), and centers of leadership lie and the organizational infrastructure or frameworks for unified command and control that facilitates the exercise of those authorities. To a lesser degree, the organizational constructs, systems, and processes that facilitate the execution of the organizational mission and measure its effectiveness are inherent in this factor.

The third factor comprised six items that address the strategic orientation of an organization and reflect the importance or value of achieving a shared end state in accomplishing the organizational mission. These items can be viewed as involving the creation and acceptance of an organizational vision and clearly articulated subordinate strategies that provide a clear focus for the organization's personnel to accept and support in the course of subsequent planning and execution activities.

The fourth factor included three items that orient on the resource foundation and environment of the organization. Within this factor, *resources* clearly "follows the money" while *senior leaderships* peaks more directly to the resourcing orientation or environment of the organization. This bifurcation in the factor structure will be discussed in greater detail below.

#### *Reliability Analysis*

Internal consistency reliability of the extracted factors was tested utilizing Cronbach's alpha technique (Morgan & Griego, 1998). Alphas for the *Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics* factor, the *Leadership and Decision Making Structure and Organizational Infrastructure* factor, and the *Strategic Orientation* factor were all acceptable (.91, .89, and .87, respectively). The alpha for the *Resources* factor was marginally acceptable (.73).

Table 4-2

*Total Variance Explained*

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Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	12.653	29.425	29.425	12.653	29.425	29.425
2	3.627	8.434	37.859	3.627	8.434	37.859
3	2.553	5.937	43.796	2.553	5.937	43.796
4	1.864	4.336	48.132	1.864	4.336	48.132

### *Analysis of Item Cross-Loads*

#### *Factor One.*

Three items evidenced cross-loading in Factor One. *cross organization/exchange assignments* (.51) cross-loaded with Factor Two (.47); *common terminology* (.44) similarly cross-loaded with Factor Two (.39); and *interagency training and education* (.43) also cross-loaded with Factor Two (.42).

Turning first to cross organization and exchange personnel assignments, this human resource management practice would clearly serve to enhance individual interaction within an interagency organization as cross-assigned individuals gained knowledge of and confidence in the other participating agencies through interaction with those agencies' personnel. By the same token, a cross-assigned individual will fulfill the same function for his/her agency in his/her interactions with others. Additionally, matrix personnel assignments allow individuals temporarily assigned to another agency to become more familiar with the organizational dimensions of that agency (i.e. culture, capabilities, limitations, values, etc.) and, in becoming more knowledgeable of other agencies, promote the attainment of unity of effort within an interagency endeavor. Viewed in this light, the loading of this item in Factor One "makes sense."

With respect to the loading of this item in Factor Two, respondents may have interpreted this item more as an element of policy and/or an organizational process that would be defined within the context of an organization's functional infrastructure while still accomplishing the essential interaction objective of cross assignments as outlined above.

This contention is supported in the literature as well as in observations offered in focus group sessions. More significantly, written comments provided by respondents to the main questionnaire provide support to this interpretation. For example, in considering the moderately high loading on Factor One, one respondent noted, "While I believe that cross organization and exchange assignments are beneficial, I firmly believe it is more important to have a strong grasp of your service or agency's role and missions.... I feel that the types of individual with a firm grounding in their own service will add more than someone with a weaker service background but more interagency or inter service experience."

In the next instance, *common terminology* loads, albeit at a moderately low level, on both Factors One and Two. With respect to Factor One, the item reflects a relationship between a common, mutually accepted lexicon or set of terms unique to the interagency and enhanced interpersonal dynamics. To the degree that a common terminology facilitates a shared end state and enhanced understanding and communication, it can be argued that the organizational culture of an interagency entity is solidified and validated and that interpersonal dynamics are enhanced. In considering the loading of this item in Factor Two, I can discern two possible dimensions to this loading. In the first case, respondents may have viewed a common terminology within the organization as serving to enhance unity of command and the overall effectiveness of the organizational command and control framework. By extension, this would reinforce the degree to which the exercise of authority is also facilitated by a common lexicon of terms. Turning to the second dimension, a formal requirement to develop, implement, and operate through a

common terminology may have been viewed by respondents as an element of organizational policy that is embedded within the organizational infrastructure and a process through which leadership and decision making is enhanced. As one example, one respondent noted the relationship between planning and organization (both attributes also embraced by Factor Two) and common terminology, noting that, “common terminology is invaluable, and common tools sets for planning and organizing is helpful . . . .”

Turning to the cross-loading of *interagency training and education*, in Factors One and Two, the same basic arguments as outlined for *common terminology* obtain. On the one hand, depending on the actual nature of the training and education conducted within the organization, respondents may have seen training and education as serving to assist in the definition and crystallization of organizational culture (context) as well as facilitating the effectiveness of interpersonal dynamics. Clearly, education and training in the core competencies of the specific agencies, the dynamics of organizational behavior and performance, and the development and utilization of interpersonal skills and abilities would be consistent with a factor embracing both organizational context and interpersonal dynamics. One respondent opined that, “Training, practice and exposure can address many of the interpersonal and cultural issues...” while a second respondent suggested that “Education and training are the key components of changing culture and behavior of the interagency process to become more collegial and effective.” In the second dimension, respondents may have once again viewed interagency training and education as an institutional process that enhanced the execution of leadership functions and decision making. In this regard, one respondent commented on the inherent and generally acknowledged relationship between education and doctrine, as well as the cordiality of training to organization and structure (also items within Factor Two) noting, “Structure, education, doctrine, organization can help [achieve unity of effort].”

#### *Factor Two.*

In Factor Two, *understanding the legal framework* (.39) cross-loaded with Factor Four (.37). Viewed in this light, this variable does not, at first blush, seem to be rationally associated with Factor Four, a factor strongly defined by its marker variables, both in excess of .80. As a rationally-derived variable, the legal dimension was originally viewed with respect to two perspectives. The first involves the legal antecedents or sources that either authorized or created the interagency effort of interest (e.g. Congressional statute, presidential executive order establishing the respective interagency endeavor, etc.).

The second dimension of the legal attribute involves the legal constraints on the interagency organization’s scope, jurisdiction, or operations. In this respect, one respondent intimated a somewhat darker side of the operational-legal relationship between legal considerations and policy, noting that, “Policy sometimes rolls legal.” By way of summary, however, both instances would be consistent with *understand the legal framework* loading on Factor Two.

However, depending upon individual respondent interpretation of the question, it is wholly possible that respondents interpreted an organization’s legal framework from a third perspective. This “legal” aspect of the factor of interest represents a “narrower” interpretation of



the legal dimension by respondents and addresses the extent to which the fiscal constraints or requirements established by law that attend any interagency effort impact the degree to which resources (e.g. budget and funding) are prioritized and obligated. Interestingly, the respondent who noted the relationship between policy and legal framework also touched upon this dimension by noting that legal issues involve the process of affording one agency operational authority or control over the assets of another agency. Viewed from this interpretation then, the attribute of “Legal Frameworks” loading on Factor Four is quite plausible.

*Factors Three and Four.*

Significantly, there were no instances on cross-loading of Factor Three items on any of the other factors.

Factor Four evidenced one instance of cross loading with *senior leader view of mission importance* (.37) cross-loading with Factor Three (.34). As originally conceived, the original focus of the senior leadership variable was the degree to which senior leadership’s discernible commitment to and support of the interagency effort was judged to be important in facilitating the attainment of interagency unity of effort. This relationship was directly noted by one questionnaire respondent who observed that, “Commitment of the senior leadership to the success of interagency efforts is crucial. This commitment must be held by leadership of all the involved agencies.” Similarly, a second respondent noted, “Senior leadership must articulate a vision and constantly communicate vision” and a third respondent concluded, “Building relationships is important, but most important is clear vision, senior leadership support (including resources) and buy-in at all levels and across all agencies. Taken collectively, these observations are wholly consistent with a factor focusing on an organization’s strategic orientation, including *Strategic Orientation* (Factor Three).

With respect to the item’s loading in Factor Four, however, respondent interpretation or characterization of the *senior leadership* variable might center on the degree to which senior leadership’s view of the importance or criticality of the respective interagency effort also serve to create the context or environment within which resource (budgeting and funding) decisions are made. Said differently, to the degree that the senior leaders of an interagency endeavor view the importance or criticality of that effort is the degree to which they directly or indirectly influence budget and funding actions, largely through formal prioritization of interagency program elements and the degree to which they are willing to “fall on their sword” in interagency budget and funding battles. Interestingly, one respondent (as cited above) captured the essence of this relationship by commenting on both the visionary dimension of this item and senior leadership’s role in “resource” decisions, while a second respondent commented that, “Senior leadership, *budget* [italics added], and cultural acceptance are key.” Viewed in these contexts, I would opine that the original intent of the attribute remains essentially valid; however, the manner in which it is manifested is not what I originally postulated. Perhaps, more importantly, if one accepts the premise that the actual funding stream of a program is the real measure of that program’s perceived value or criticality in the larger scheme of things, then this result makes implicit sense.

### *Soundness of the Conceptual Structure*

In evaluating the factor structure from a conceptual perspective, as might be expected, a small number of the “variables” associated with each variable could raise questions as to validity of the relationship between the variable and the factor. Accordingly, a more detailed discussion and evaluation of these apparent anomalies is in order before proceeding further.

#### *Factor One.*

In the case of Factor One, *Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics*, the apparent “outliers” are *clear risk management policies and procedures* and *interagency training and education*. Upon initial inspection, these two items would seem to conceptually nest more effectively in Factor Two. In the case of *clear risk management policies and procedures*, if viewed as a process or operating system, then it would seem to more properly align with Factor Two, that is, as an element of the leadership and decision making structure. However, the inclusion of this item in Factor One could well reflect the degree of risk that individuals are willing to take as a function of how comfortable they are with the various organizational cultures and values of the agencies assembled for the execution of an interagency mission and the level of trust and confidence that they possess in the competencies and abilities of personnel from other agencies. Of note, there were no comments provided by respondents addressing the question of risk management.

With respect to *interagency education and training* I believe my assessment of this item’s cross-loading also adequately address a possible incongruence of this item with Factor One. *Performance incentives and rewards* might also be viewed as being at odds with Factor One. In terms of loading, the item does not load very strongly (.41). At one level of inquiry, an incentives and rewards policy would seem to fit more appropriately in Factor Two as a policy consideration that is ultimately implemented as an element of the organizational infrastructure supporting internal operations. Indeed, one respondent noted that incentives and rewards “Should be intrinsic to government policy-making: The incentives and rewards are policies that protect our national security.”

On the other hand, the manner in which incentives and rewards are administered within an organization (and, therefore, the degree to which achievements and contributions are institutionally valued and recognized) might have been interpreted by respondents as more properly reflecting the cultural parameters of an organization. Perhaps more importantly, to this end, organizational attitudes and values towards individual contributions and consequent incentives and rewards can directly impact interpersonal dynamics such as trust, confidence, camaraderie, rapport, respect, and cohesion within an organization.

Additionally, I recognize that some observers might question *sharing of information and intelligence* as somewhat incongruous to Factor One. Again, on initial observation, this would appear to be more properly a process or systemic function that nests more comfortably in one of the other factors, Factor 2 being the most plausible “fit.” To this end, one respondent offered the

view that, “Coordination, info sharing and clearly defined lines of comm. [communication] and C2 frameworks are all the more critical to interagency activities.”

Notwithstanding the above observation, an alternative analysis and evaluation might well suggest that the degree to which one is willing to freely share information in an interagency environment reflects the comfort levels of individuals with accommodating the cultural expectations of other agencies as well as the trust and confidence individuals have with co-workers from other agencies engaged in a common interagency endeavor. Additionally, in considering information sharing as a function of security classification and security clearances and its congruence to Factor One, a second respondent opined that “To the degree that security classification & clearances contribute to trust & confidence among associates for shared info & coordination, it’s a plus. To the degree that it impedes info sharing & coordination it’s a minus.”

#### *Factor Two.*

For Factor Two, beyond the cross-loading realities of *understand the legal framework*, the array of items loading on this factor successfully withstand subjective scrutiny. For Factor Three, the internal consistency of these six items is even tighter, a condition supported by the relatively high loadings of all six items. Indeed, five of the six items satisfy the criteria for qualifying as marker variables. The cross-loading condition of “senior leadership view of mission importance” has already been addressed above.

#### *Analysis of the Validation Model*

A principal component analysis was conducted on the data generated by the second set of randomized survey cases to investigate the degree to which the derived factor structure from the measurement model retained internal structure consistency. I labeled this construct the *validation model* to simplify identification of the two structures and facilitate comprehension. This PCA consisted solely of a four-factor analysis and the procedures followed mirrored those from the initial PCA. The results of the validation model PCA are shown at Table 4-2. Cross loadings greater than .30 are displayed for each factor.

#### *Factor Structure of the Validation Model*

The first factor contained seventeen items that pertained to organizational context and the interpersonal dynamics that facilitated interaction within the organizational environment. As a result of the PCA, one new item was added to the array (*organizational concept*) while five items (*congruence of interagency mission and agency goals, clear risk management policies and procedures, share intelligence/information, performance incentives and rewards, and coordination*) migrated from Factor One to either Factor Three or Four.

The second factor consisted of eleven items with *clear operational roles and responsibilities* being added (from Factor Three of the Measurement Model) and *integrated/comprehensive planning systems* and *measures of agency effectiveness (performance)* migrating to Factor Four (and *organizational concept*) migrating to Factor One as previously noted).

Table 4-3

*Unity of Effort Factor Loadings for the Validation Model Principal Component Analysis*

Item	Factor (F) Loadings			
	F1	F2	F3	F4
Respect for Other Agencies	.742			
Understand Unique Culture of Other Agencies	.705			
Build Rapport	.705			
Trust Between Agencies	.689			
Camaraderie	.676			
Understand Unique Values of Other Agencies	.645			.323
Confidence in Other Agency Competence	.646			
Cohesion	.631			
Patience	.621			
Understand Unique Interests of Other Agencies	.603			
Duration of Previous Organizational Relationships	.561		.313	
Knowledge of Other Agency Roles, Capabilities, Limitations	.557		.327	
Interagency Training and Education	.532			
Cross Organization/Exchange Assignments	.464			
Organizational Concept	.411	.402**	.302	.330
Liaison Between Agencies	.411		.382**	
Common Terminology	.405		.372**	
Clear Lines of Authority		.770		
Unambiguous Directive Authority		.745		
Centralized Leadership		.738		
Clearly Defined Command and Control Frameworks		.714	.341	
Clear Operational Roles and Responsibilities		.685	.387	
Source of Organizational Authority		.607		.342
Unity of Command		.564		
Delegation of Authority		.533		
Interagency Doctrine		.477	.330	.404**
Understand the Legal Framework		.449		.355
Security Classification and Clearances Requirements	.323**	.365		
Clearly Defined Strategy			.722	
Integrated Strategy			.711	
Clear Policy Goals and Objectives		.363	.635	
Clearly Articulated Purpose/ Mission of the Interagency Organization			.605	
Strategic Vision			.577	
Senior Leader View of Mission Importance			.473	
Coordination	.366**	.330	.462	
Share Intelligence/Information	.356		.454	
Congruence of Interagency Mission & Agency Goals			.371	.352**
Adequate Funding				.757
Realistic Budget				.755
Measures of Agency Effectiveness (Performance)	.303	.368		.597
Clear Risk Management Policies and Procedures				.562
Performance Incentives and Rewards	.340			.561
Integrated/Comprehensive Planning System		.452**	.434**	.478

\*\* = Item considered to possess significant cross-loading (value as indicated) Values < .30 not reported

The third factor now comprised nine items. As noted previously, *congruence of interagency mission and agency goals* and *share intelligence/information* migrated into this factor from Factor One. *senior leader view of mission importance* migrated in from Factor Four of the Measurement Model.

The fourth factor included six items, losing none to migration, but adding three items from Factors One and Three as previously noted above.

### *Reliability Analysis*

Internal consistency reliability of the extracted factors was tested utilizing Cronbach's alpha technique (Morgan & Griego, 1998). Alphas for the *Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics* factor, the *Leadership and Decision Making Structure and Organizational Infrastructure* factor, the *Strategic Orientation* factor, and the *Resources* factor were all acceptable (.92, .89, .85, and .84 respectively).

### *Analysis of Item Cross-Loads*

#### *Factor One.*

Three items evidenced cross-loading in Factor One. *Organizational concept* (.41) cross-loaded with Factor Two(.40); *liaison between agencies* (.41) cross-loaded with Factor 3 (.38); and *common terminology* (.41) similarly cross-loaded with Factor Three (.37). Based on the relatively low values observed, none of these cross-loadings were interpreted as being highly significant. Nonetheless, a brief analysis of possible dynamics at play is instructive.

The cross-loading of *organizational concept* on Factor Two is most likely due to respondents interpreting this factor as playing a role in defining the organizational context of an interagency structure as well framing the leadership and decisionmaking structure of the organization.

The cross-loading of *liaison between agencies* and *common terminology* with Factor Three is most likely occasioned by respondent's perception that both of these items would serve to help frame and define an organization's strategic orientation. In this cases, liaison activities would function to foster a shared view of the mission and the strategy to accomplish it while a common lexicon within an interagency organization would facilitate both clear communication and enhanced understanding and acceptance of agency policies and procedures implemented to facilitate organizational operations.

#### *Factor Two.*

Three items in Factor Two evidenced relatively low cross-loadings. *Interagency doctrine* (.48) cross-loaded with Factor Four (.40), *understand the legal framework* (.45) also cross-loaded with Factor Four, and *security classification and security requirements* (.37) cross-loaded with Factor One (.32).

To better understand the potential implications of these results, it is important to note that Factor Four of the Validation Model expanded from three items to six. More significantly, however, the three migrations into Factor Four served to characterize Factor Four as reflecting organizational infrastructure as well as resources. Indeed, this structural configuration is much more consistent with my findings derived from the review of the literature as reflected in the first and second theoretical models. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the respondents to the Validation Model interpreted interagency doctrine and legal frameworks as elements of organizational infrastructure. In both cases, to the degree doctrinal policies and procedures and formal legal constraints define an organization's functional infrastructure and influence the manner in which organizational business is conducted, it would be quite reasonable to expect these items to evidence a relationship, albeit relatively modest, with this factor.

In analyzing the relationship of security considerations the institutional approach taken with respect to how security requirements are functionally addressed argues weakly for inclusion of this item within Factor One. While it might be argued that security levels and operational procedures for handling classified or sensitive materials reflects the organizational context and, to a degree, the dynamics of interpersonal relationships, I do not assign much credence to this correlation and would argue that the security function more properly aligns with organizational infrastructure in both the measurement and validation models.

*Factor Three.*

Three items in Factor Three also evidenced relatively low levels of cross-loading. *Coordination* (.46) and *share intelligence/information* (.45) cross-loaded with Factor One (.37 and .36 respectively) while *congruence of interagency mission and agency goals* (.37) cross-loaded with Factor Four (.35).

In the case of organizational coordination within an organization, respondents might well have viewed these functions as falling within the purview of organizational context and/or interpersonal dynamics. However, my research suggests that the coordination function is more consistent with Factor Three in terms of effecting coordination to build organizational consensus and a shared perception of organizational aims.

Similarly, it might reasonably be argued that the sharing of intelligence and information reflects the interagency organizational context or the effectiveness of interpersonal dynamics in interagency operations. Once again, however, my research indicates that sharing of both intelligence and operational information across the organization more properly facilitates the development and acceptance of an organization's strategic purpose and orientation.

With respect to the cross-loading of *congruence of interagency missions and agency goals*, the preponderance of results gained by analysis strongly suggests that this item clearly aligns with Factor Three. The only possible explanation I can offer for this item loading on Factor Four (based on my research to date) is that the degree of congruence between interagency and individual agency missions and goals drives the actual resource levels (personnel, facilities,

and funding) allocated to the organization and, to a lesser extent, the development and implementation of organizational systems to measure and reward performance that is perceived as contributing to the attainment of organizational goals and objectives.

*Factor Four.*

One item in Factor Four--*integrated/comprehensive planning system* (.48)--cross-loaded with Factors Two (.45) and Three (.43). As suggested in the review of the literature and interviews, planning systems are an enabler; they facilitate planning and operational execution to achieve organizational goals and objectives. When viewed from this perspective, it is reasonable to conclude that respondents might perceive the planning function as facilitating the execution of leadership and decision making functions and/or contributing towards the development, articulation, and acceptance of an organization's strategic orientation. However, my research argues strongly that the proper relationship of the planning function in achieving unity of effort resides in the incorporation or integrated, organization-wide planning systems into an organization's functional infrastructure.

*Soundness of the Conceptual Structure*

In analyzing the conceptual structure of the Validation Model and especially the migrations of selected factors into the model, I concluded that the Validation Model evidenced even stronger conceptual consistency than the Measurement Model. Moreover, unlike the Measurement Model, I did not find any items that appeared to be conceptually incongruent with the factor within which they emerged as a result of the analysis. I will discuss this finding in greater detail in Chapter Five.

*Demographic Analysis*

Following the factor analyses, I undertook to conduct an analysis of questionnaire data to determine if there was any significant difference between selected agency populations with respect to the perceived importance of the individual or variables items in achieving organizational unity of effort. Finally, upon identification of factors, inferential statistics comparing means for sample demographic categories were conducted.

For this study, I elected to analyze and compare the results for military personnel and civilians assigned to military departments; for civilian personnel assigned to the major executive department (e.g. Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security, etc.) that historically comprise "The Interagency;" and military and civilian personnel working within academia. This last demographic category consisted of individuals involved in research and/or teaching and individuals occupying professional staff positions at the National Defense University or one of the university's component colleges.

The One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) of factor scores provided by the demographic groups (above) established that there no significant differences in the factors across the three groups for Factors 1, 3, and 4, with significance scores of .98, .11, and .27 respectively ( $p = .05$ ).

However, the analysis of variance for Factor Two (*Leadership/Decision Making and Organizational Infrastructure*) displayed some interesting results. The Levene Statistic to check the assumption of equal variances for all three groups was not significant (.14), however, the ANOVA table (Table 4-4) indicates that there is a significant difference in the variances of the three groups ( $F(2,387)=4.17, p=.01$ ). Post hoc analysis employing Tukey's Multiple Comparison test establishes that there is a significant difference between the military sample and the interagency with respect to *Leadership and Decision Making and Organizational Infrastructure*. The Tukey analysis revealed that the mean value for the military group was .11 while the mean value for the interagency group was -.20. The difference in the mean scores (.31) between the two groups was significant at  $p=.05$ .

### *Summary*

This chapter detailed the analysis of the comparative principal components and one-way analysis of variance analyses. With the insights gained from interviews and focus groups and a review of the literature, a theoretical factor structure for organizational unity of effort was developed as a baseline. Comparative principal components analyses were then conducted resulting in a revised factor structure for organizational unity of effort. Additionally one-way analysis of variance analysis was conducted to investigate whether the factor structure from the initial sample differed significant across three selected population subgroups.

The derived factor structure evidenced satisfactory internal consistency reliability scores and an acceptable internal factor framework, although there were some cross-loadings and migrations of items to different factors from sample to sample. Nonetheless, the two derived factor models for organizational unity of effort demonstrated a clear and relatively consistent structure across both samples populations.

In the following chapter, the four research questions of this study will be addressed within the limitations of this research.



Table 4-4

*Analysis of Variance for Total Sample Population Factor Scores,*

Source	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups				
Organizational Context & Interpersonal Dynamics	2	.02	.16	.98
Leadership & Decision Making Structure	2	3.72	4.17	<b>.02**</b>
Strategic Orientation	2	2.21	2.19	.15
Organizational Infrastructure & Resources	2	1.33	1.31	.27
Within Groups				
Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics	387	1.02		
Leadership & Decision Making Structure	387	.89		
Strategic Orientation	387	1.01		
Organizational Infrastructure And Resources	387	1.01		

\* p = .05

\*\*p = .01

## CHAPTER V

## Conclusions and Recommendations

*Introduction*

Organizational unity of effort -- the attainment of effective unified action -- is critical to the successful development of national security policy and the planning and execution of national security operations within the interagency context. On the other hand, achieving unified action within the U.S. national security organizational framework has historically proven to be extremely difficult and, indeed, perfection is impossible. Still, as this research has demonstrated, there is strong consensus that unity of effort and harmonization of the many diverse offices, agencies, and departments with responsibilities in national security is critical to assure strong national security. Organizational unity of effort is a valuable organizational virtue to be actively pursued and realized. However, unlike the situation in the larger realm of organizational behavior, my research has established that there is no comprehensive body of theoretical knowledge addressing organizational unity of effort or unified action as an operational construct that can serve as a means of facilitating unity of effort as an organizational outcome, especially within the interagency national security arena. Thus, the initial impulse for the conduct of this research effort.

*Research Questions*

This research seeks to explore and define the coordinating processes and functioning of the interagency national security policy making community by examining the construct of unity of effort as an enduring organizational virtue to be embraced in the accomplishment of the national security mission. In pursuit of this overarching objective, four research questions were addressed in this study. Delineated below, these research questions deal with the measurement and theoretical dimensions of organizational unity of effort.

1. What constitutes unity of effort in a collaborative or “joint” endeavor? This question focuses on the identification of the fundamental attributes or components of the construct of unity of effort.
2. Which attributes or components of unity of effort are perceived to be of greatest importance or criticality in achieving unity of effort (e.g. effective unified action) in a joint, interagency or multinational collaborative endeavor?
3. To what degree do the perceptions of unity of effort change as a function of agency affiliation?
4. What external conditions or contextual variables have the greatest retarding or inhibiting impact on the achievement of unity of effort (and unified action) in a collaborative or joint undertaking?

*Informing the Research Questions*

The following data elements informed the research questions as indicated. The initial interviews, literature search and focus group interviews primarily served to inform Research Questions one, two, and four. The principal objectives in this endeavor was to (a) identify and develop attributes and components that would serve to characterize the construct of unity of effort in the interagency national security policy process, (b) refine the operational definition of unity of effort, and (c) provide insights into a broader conceptual model of organizational unity of effort.

The questionnaire instrument and the two principal component analyses (PCAs) of questionnaire data informed research questions one, two, and three. The data concerning attributes or components of unity of effort obtained through the questionnaire instrument and subjected to principal component analyses serve to both identify the individual attributes or components of unity of effort and derived factor structures that established the relative importance of the individual attributes/components of unity of effort. Additionally, the analysis of the demographic data along with the attribute data addressed the degree to which perceptions of the need and/or importance of unity of effort varies as a function of organizational affiliation. Taken in the aggregate, this data serves to answer the broader question (research question one) of what constitutes unity of effort in a “joint” or collaborative national security policy endeavor.

As previously discussed, as a contingent strategy, in the event the principal questionnaire and subsequent analyses did not provide sufficient variance and statistical significance to make definitive conclusions, senior level agents in the interagency national security policy community were to be convened and a Multi-Attribute Utility analysis was to be conducted using a “rational” framework of attributes and dimensions developed from interviews, the literature review, and focus group interviews. This analysis, if executed, would serve to directly inform research questions one, two, and three. This “contingent” analysis utilizing the MAUT approach would have been based on the factor structure derived from the initial PCA and would have involved the subjective assignment of location measures to discrete “variables” or items and the assignment of weights to the major “factors” of unity of effort. Taken together, these measures would serve to determine “utility” values for each of the major factors to numerically establish their relative importance on an empirical basis and to confirm the findings of the original analysis of survey data. In the end, this contingent analytic strategy was not pursued.

Research question four -- the identification and development of situational or contextual variables that adversely impact the attainment of unity of effort -- was primarily informed by the literature review, comments provided in the questionnaire data, and the conduct of focus groups consisting of high-level agents in the interagency national security policy arena. Candidate variables were developed based on inferences rationally derived from these three research approaches. Originally, it was planned to present this data to a senior agent work group to empirically determine which variables or factors are (subjectively) determined to have the greatest negative impact on the attainment of unity of effort. As previously, noted, I elected to

nor pursue the high-level agent work group. However, the inferences obtained from the literature review, questionnaires, and focus groups are reported in this chapter along with appropriate recommendations for further research.

### *Research Design*

#### *Interviews and Literature Review*

In the course of this research, I conducted both individual and focus group interviews, accomplished an expansive review of the literature, and quantitatively analyzed data derived from questionnaire responses of a relatively homogenous population. The individual and focus group interviews were conducted with individuals possessing extensive interagency national security policy experience and focused on identifying potential attributes that would serve to specifically characterize the construct of unity of effort within the national security policy arena. Based on an initial construct of attributes or components of unity of effort derived from these preliminary steps, I planned and executed an expansive review of the literature to broaden the inquiry into these individual attributes and clarify their individual dimensions.

As previously noted in Chapter Two, the review of the literature established that unity of effort, per se, is rarely, if ever, addressed from a theoretical perspective. There were very few direct references to organizational unity of effort in the organizational behavior literature, while a small number of writings in the areas of multinational business enterprises, community endeavor, and teams discussed organizational unity of effort as an organizational virtue. On the other hand, I found that many of the broader research issues that I associated with characterizing unity of effort in a general sense also existed with respect to characterizing the effectiveness of teams. My research suggests that, while a great deal of study has been devoted to team training and performance, little or no research has been accomplished with respect to the actual components of teamwork and, more particularly, in the measures of those components. In summary, because of the structural fidelity of teams to interagency national security organizational entities and what I perceived as the potential commonality of attributes of teamwork to unity of effort, I was able to draw more heavily on the research in this domain.

I next narrowed the focus of the literature review down to the national security arena. Generally, I found that unity of effort was more frequently cited as a desired organizational goal or outcome. Understandably, the majority of literature in this area consisted of government reports, reports of independent “think tanks” specializing in national security, and Congressional testimony. To a lesser degree, I also researched media commentary on the effectiveness of interagency operations as a means to glean further insight into the construct of unity of effort.

Finally, I focused my research on joint military endeavor. From the outset, I expected this specific area of inquiry to be the one domain of organizational endeavor that clearly embraced and valued the principle of unity of effort as both a desired organizational virtue and operational outcome. In the end, this research focus indeed offered the richest insight into the construct of unity of effort with respect to its component attributes. In this respect, the most valuable source was the joint visionary and doctrinal literature developed to guide the planning, resourcing, and

conduct of joint, interagency, and multinational (alliance/coalition) operations. To a lesser degree, Congressional testimony of senior military leaders and insights offered by informed observers of the interagency national security process provided supplemental research sources.

Based on these outcomes, I made the decision to focus on the latter three areas of endeavor for the majority of research efforts with the research effort becoming increasingly intensified as I moved from the study of teams and teamwork into the narrower realm of military endeavor.

### *Analytic Methodology*

With respect to actual analytic methodology, the analysis performed in this study followed deliberate convention. For the initial phase, descriptive statistics were obtained and frequency distribution analyses were conducted. Using the data manipulation capability provided by SPSS, I then randomly split the research cases ( $n = 448$ ) into two halves. I then performed a principal components analysis (PCA) utilizing the first sample ( $n = 220$ ) utilizing a VARIMAX rotation to estimate the number of potential factors and to assess the factorability of the correlation matrices.

Following these preliminary steps, I then conducted four, five, and six factor PCA's again utilizing measurement model sample data ( $n = 220$ ) to determine which extracted factor structure made the most conceptual sense. Internal consistency estimates (Cronbach's alphas) were conducted for the derived factor structures. Based on the results of the internal consistency analyses, rational analysis, and the factor structures previously suggested by the review of the literature and interviews, I selected the four-factor structure as the model for additional analysis and evaluation. I then conducted a second PCA on sample 2 data ( $n = 228$ ) and compared the results against those obtained from the initial PCA.

The conclusions and recommendations for each of these questions will now be discussed. As a matter of convenience, because questions one and two were principally informed by the same analytic method, the results for these two questions will be discussed together. Where results unique to one question or the other are reported, the question to which the result applies will be addressed separately.

*Research Question One - What constitutes unity of effort in a collaborative or "joint" endeavor?*

*Research Question Two - Which attributes or components of unity of effort are perceived to be of greatest importance or criticality in achieving unity of effort in a joint, interagency or multinational collaborative endeavor?*

The generalized four-factor unity of effort model derived from the principal component analyses of questionnaire data served to identify the major factors in the unity of effort model as derived by the item correlation coefficients in both PCA's. The derived models evidenced strong reliability and a sound internal factor structure and, from a rational perspective, exhibited the strongest conceptual consistency.

In analyzing the data obtained from the two PCA's, while the basic factor structure remained stable between the *measurement model* analysis and the *validation model* analysis, the actual factor structure of the *validation model* demonstrated stronger conceptual structure than that exhibited by the initial *measurement model*. As a result of this finding and the factor identities suggested by the marker variables in each factoral set, I revised the general unity of effort model to reflect the following factors: (a) *Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics*; (b) *Leadership and Decision Making Structure*; (c) *Strategic Orientation*; and (d) *Organizational Infrastructure and Resources*. An initial conceptualization of a general unity of effort model reflecting this revised factor construct is detailed at Figure 5-1.<sup>1</sup>

### *Relative Importance of Derived Factors*

Turning first to the larger question of the relative importance of the factors and subordinate components in enhancing unity of effort, the results of the two principal components analyses clearly suggest that the most important factor in achieving organizational unity of effort is the *strategic orientation* of the organization. This factor evidenced consistently high item loadings, especially in the *measurement model* where five of the six items loading on the factor exhibited loadings between .72 and .79.

Conceptually, this finding suggests that organizational unity of effort is facilitated and enhanced by the development and articulation of a clearly stated organizational vision and sense of purpose, supported by coherent organizational goals and objectives, and guided by clearly articulated and integrated strategies to accomplish the organizational mission. In short, this factor argues for the value of developing, articulating, and nurturing a shared end state and common purpose within an interagency organization.

The next most important factor suggested by the research is *leadership and decision making structure*. This factor experienced relatively high loadings in the *validation model* (i.e. four of the items loaded between .71 and .77). Moreover, this factor evidenced only one case of significant cross-loading (*understand the legal framework*) and experienced only two migrations of items between factors as described below.

Conceptually, this finding suggests that organizational unity of effort is facilitated and enhanced by the development and implementation of a clearly delineated and enforced leadership and decision making structure that unambiguously lays out the functional command and control framework and the various (operational, administrative) lines of authority within an interagency organization.


The research also indicates that *Organizational context* and the *interpersonal dynamics* within the organizational context occupies the third position of relative importance in the general

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<sup>1</sup> This model is builds on a construct suggested by Desai (2005) wherein *integrated operations doctrine* is seen as one element integral to the creation of a *strong interagency culture*. Desai's work was crucial in helping me conceptualize a model based on my research, especially with providing the twin foci of doctrine and strong interagency culture as integrating mediums for the factor structure derived from my research.

Figure 5-1

*Conceptualization of Organizational Unity of Effort*



unity of effort model derived from this research. While there were three cases of significant cross-loading (see below) and several migrations of items to other factors, two of the three cross-loadings were relatively weak and all of the migratory items were relatively low in loading on Factor One. More significantly, the higher loading items remained stable within the three samples, with sixteen items loading consistently in Factor One of all three factor structures.

Finally, the analysis also strongly suggests that and the *organizational infrastructure* and *resource* base is, in a relative sense, the least important of the factors that frame organizational unity of effort in the interagency. More interesting, however, is the change in the items comprising this factor when one moves from the initial PCA and examines the results of the PCA's conducted on the second set of sample data and the total sample. In all three analyses, the funding and budget attributes remain consistent and evidence strong loadings (.76 to .82). However, in the latter two analyses, three items migrate to this factor (*measures of effectiveness*, *clear risk management policies and procedures*, and *performance incentives and rewards*). Additionally, *integrated, comprehensive planning system* loads on this factor based on the second set of sample data while *understand the legal framework* loads on this factor in the total sample analysis. Conceptually, the loading of these items in Factor Four are seen as quite reasonable.

As a consequence of the above observations, I believe that the factor structure (see Figure 5-1) for organizational unity of effort derived from a comparative analysis of the measurement and *validation models* sample data is the most conceptually sound.

#### *Reliability of the Unity of Effort Models.*

Internal consistency reliability of the extracted factors was tested utilizing Cronbach's alpha technique (Morgan & Griego, 1998). Generally speaking, reliability coefficients greater than .70 (Kline, 1994) are considered a satisfactory measure of a model's reliability.

Alphas for the *Organizational Context and Interpersonal Dynamics* factor, the *Leadership and Decision-Making Structure and Organizational Infrastructure* factor, the *Strategic Orientation* factors in the *measurement model* were all acceptable (.91, .89, and .87 respectively) The alphas for the *Resources* factor was marginally acceptable (.73). Alphas for the factors scales in the *validation model* were all acceptable (.92, .89, .85, and .84 respectively). Taken together, both models derived from the PCA's evidenced strong internal consistency.

#### *Internal Structure of the Unity of Effort Models*

##### *Introduction.*

Based on the comparative results of the analyses of the measurement sample and the validation sample, the four-factor unity of effort model delineated at Figure 5-1 evidenced a strong and reliable factor structure.

As a preliminary analytic step, the factor structure derived from the initial PC analysis of the main questionnaire data was compared to the second theoretical unity of effort model (Figure



3-1) derived from the analysis of pilot questionnaire data. Before proceeding, it should be noted that the factor structure derived from the main analytic effort differs from that derived from the pilot analysis. While both models contain four factors, the factor structure derived from the main analysis is markedly different from the theoretical model initially proposed. I attribute these changes in factor structure to the following causes.

First, in preparing the questionnaire for the main analytic effort, two items (unified leadership and transition procedures) were discarded and ten items (respect, culture, cohesion, duration of previous relationships, purpose, congruence, senior leadership, incentives and rewards, and legal framework) were added. Utilizing a revised set of items most likely influenced responses obtained in the questionnaire and the four factors derived from the main analytic effort were different than those derived from the pilot analysis. As a result, a pair-wise comparison of Cronbach's alphas cannot be conducted with any degree of confidence. However, it is worth noting that the alphas for the four factors derived from the main analytic effort are generally higher than those observed from the pilot analysis.

Based on the above, I elected to conduct at least a rational analysis of the two derived factor structures to determine if there were any observed consistency with respect to how the items loaded on the factors. For Factor One, *Organizational Context and Interpersonal Systems*, eleven of fifteen items (with eight loading .53-.75) that loaded on the organizational context or interpersonal dynamics factors in the second theoretical model loaded on this factor in the structure derived from the main analytic effort. In the case of Factor Two, *Leadership and Decision Making Structure and Organizational Infrastructure*, eight of the fourteen items (with five loading .60-.80) that loaded on the leadership and decision making factor in the second theoretical model loaded on this factor in the structure derived from the main analytic effort. The remaining factor (performance) in the second theoretical model was not replicated in the model derived from the main analysis. Instead, two "new" factors were derived from the main analytic effort: *Strategic Orientation* and *Resources*. The remaining items from the second theoretical model loaded on one or the other of the two newly derived factors. A rational analysis of item association with the two new factors made sense conceptually.

#### *Principal Components Analyses.*

I next conducted a PCA of the data derived from the second sample population. The analytic outcomes of the unity of effort factor structures clearly suggest no significant difference between the two sample populations and the total sample population. As discussed in Chapter 4, the factor analytic structures for all three subgroups were fundamentally similar. Three items from Factor 1 in the first sample (*coordination, congruence of interagency mission and organizational goals, and sharing of intelligence and information*) migrated to Factor 3 (*Strategic Orientation*) derived from the second sample while *clear risk management policies and procedures* and *performance incentives and rewards* from Factor 1 in the initial sample migrated to Factor 4 (*Resources*) in the second sample. Additionally, *integrated, comprehensive planning system* and *measures of effectiveness* migrated from Factor 2 to Factor 4 and *organizational concept* migrated from Factor 2 to Factor 1. One item (*clear operational roles and*

*responsibilities*) migrated from Factor 3 in the initial sample to Factor 2 in the follow-on sample and one item (*senior leadership view of mission importance*) migrated from Factor 4 in the first sample to Factor 3 in the second sample.

When the results of the first and second samples were compared with the total sample population, both *sharing of information and /intelligence* and *coordination* returned to Factor 1 and *planning systems* and *organizational concept* reemerged as components of Factor 2. The only major migration from the Sample 2 to the total sample was Understanding Legal Framework which migrated from Factor 2 to Factor 4.

As a second analytic measure, I conducted internal consistency reliability testing of the factor structure for Sample 2. Cronbach's alphas for the four factors were .92, .89, .85, and .84, respectively. For the second sample, Factor 4 clearly took on a construct that reflected both resources and what I would term organizational performance processes. This characterization was evident in Factor 4 of the total sample as well, with *understanding legal framework* emerging as a factor variable in place of *integrated, comprehensive planning system* which migrated back to Factor 2 for the total sample.

*Research Question Three - To what degree do the perceptions of unity of effort change as a function of agency affiliation?*

### *Introduction*

As previously noted, I elected to divide the total sample population into three primary groups: military, interagency, and academia. I based this decision on the wide range of responses I had within the three sub-groups. As an example, with the military subgroup, while I received a total of ninety-one responses from Army personnel, eighty-six responses from Navy personnel, and seventy-six responses from Air Force personnel, within the interagency domain, I received far fewer responses per individual agency. Therefore, I elected to break the sample population down into three generic groups in order to examine the principal differences, if any, between military personnel, civilian personnel likely to participate in the interagency process, and academics more inclined to research and study the specifics of interagency operations.

### *Analysis of Variance*

Utilizing a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) methodology, I concluded that there were no significant differences between the three demographic subgroups with the exception of Factor Two. I had expected that there might be significantly different perceptions of unity of effort between the three subgroups based on their organizational affinity. More specifically, I expected to find that the military would more inclined to and comfortable with a more firmly defined and rigid organizational structure and attendant institutional processes. On the other hand, I anticipated that the interagency subgroup would evidence a signal preference for a more compliant, flexible organizational structure and less emphasis on rigid organizational processes and procedures.

Post hoc analysis employing Tukey's Multiple Comparison test established that there is a significant difference between the military and the interagency subgroups with respect to Factor Two, *Leadership and Decision Making Structure*. The Tukey analysis revealed that the mean value for the military group was .11 while the mean value for the interagency group was -.20. The difference in the mean scores (.31) between the two groups was significant at  $p=.05$ .

*Research Question Four - What external conditions or contextual variables have the greatest retarding or inhibiting impact on the achievement of unity of effort (and unified action) in a collaborative or joint undertaking?*

### *Introduction*

As previously indicated in my discussion of questionnaire construction, I made a deliberate decision to cull out questions that solicited respondents' opinions and evaluation of what I have characterized as environmental or contextual variables. Indeed, beyond the literature review and the focus group interviews, I have deliberately not pursued intensive research into this particular area of interest much beyond the literature review and the focus group interviews.

Although I originally postulated this question as an original objective of my research, it gradually became clear that this was an area of inquiry that far exceeded the primary aim of my research, that being to characterize the construct of organizational unity of effort. Nonetheless, based on my research, it is clear that the impact or influence of external factors upon the attainment of organizational unity of effort cannot, in the long run, be denied nor ignored. Although I have selfishly elected to not pursue this line of inquiry as a primary research endeavor, I strongly aver that it demands a concerted research effort in its own right. Indeed, because of the criticality of these influences upon the interagency national security policy process, I have elected to provide some recommendations for future research that may serve to illuminate potential pathways for further research into this particular area of interest. These recommendations for future research are derived from my review of the literature (see Chapter 2) pilot survey findings, and individual and focus group interviews.

### *Leader Personality*

As a minimum, the effect of leader personality on organizational unity of effort argues strongly for intensive research and analysis. At the risk of denigrating or otherwise discounting the potential insights provided by this research with respect to the degree one can identify and "work" specific attributes of organizational unity of effort to a successful culmination, the naked reality of organizational endeavor is compelled to at least acknowledge that the personalities of the key leaders in any organization can materially impact the degree to which the organization or agency of interest can truly achieve unity of effort and accomplish the assigned mission both effectively and efficiently. To be more blunt in describing this dynamic, my research (and the research of others--See Toquan et al., (1997); Toth, 2003; Whittaker et al., (2002)) suggests that an organization can possess all the right internal operating structures, all the requisite resources in personnel and money, the appropriately functional command and control systems, and all the right people in the right positions to accomplish the assigned mission. However, if the "boss" of the enterprise is the dysfunctional cog in the larger system because of incompetence, prejudiced

perspectives, or questionable values, achieving organizational unity of effort across all dimensions and levels of the organization is not assured. This is an area that begs for further research and analysis, as the leadership--either singularly or collectively--is perhaps the most critical element in achieving organizational effectiveness and success.

### *Organizational Culture*

Clearly one other area that begs further research is the influence of organizational culture on organizational unity of effort. Of all the contextual variables that emerged from my research, organizational or bureaucratic culture was clearly the most often cited impediment to organization unity of effort by interviewees and focus group participants.

#### *Sociocentrism.*

As suggested in Chapter 2, sociocentrism as an institutional dynamic emerged as an organizational variable that can contribute to the success or failure of an organization's effectiveness in interagency national security operations. Sociocentrism is somewhat chameleon-like in its manifestation and can take many forms. In a positive sense, it manifests itself as patriotism, devotion, loyalty, esprit d'corps, all factors deemed "positive" in promoting and enhancing organizational unity of effort. Negatively, it can materialize as parochialism and chauvanism involving the narrow pursuit of institutional interests above the common good (Toth, 2003).

As previously noted, Toth (2003) argues that it is basic human nature to assume superiority or rightness of one's own group or organization. Ergo, argues Toth, this phenomenon is pervasive within and among religions, cultures, governments, and the military. Within the joint military area, service centric paradigms emerging from legally established roles and missions, long historical precedents, and even budget and turf battles have long plagued the conduct of joint military operations as inhibitors to unity of effort.

To no one's surprise, sociocentrism frequently manifests itself as competition within the interagency setting. Hawley (2003) maintains that "intense feuding" among agencies in the national security arena has "...fudged or delayed key decisions, resulting in serious gaps and disconnects on the ground" (p. 6). Hawley also notes that rivalries can emerge between regional agencies and offices and functional entities at the point of direct intervention. And between agencies designated as lead agencies and those relegated to a formal supporting role. On a more personal level, competition and cooperation are both central human characteristics, yet competition often mitigates against effective cooperation amongst personnel involved in an interagency endeavor (Joint Publication 1, 2000). Hawley (2003) makes the additional point that "...agency-centric models for interagency management are impeded by discord, turf protection, inefficiency, planning failures, and unforeseen disconnects that can have sever adverse consequences for operational success" (p. 11).

As noted earlier, organizational principles, beliefs, and values are critically important to an organization's effective performance. At the same time, however, they also influence the intensity of sociocentric orientations. Within the joint military arena, Joint Publication 1 (2000)

makes a strong experientially-derived case that that “joint values” influence the conduct of joint warfare (Preface). Joint Publication 1 goes on to note that “War is a human undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules” (p. viii) and concludes that values are the bedrock of combat success. A similar view was advanced by the GAO in testimony on the proposed Department of Homeland Security. The GAO urged that, “The new department” focus on “. . . articulating . . . core values . . . .” (GAO Report 02-886T, 2002, p. 2).

Toth (2003) suggests that, while parochialism can never be eliminated, it can and must be managed in order to achieve unified action. This requires a high degree of tact, tolerance, and objectivity on the part of the leader in charge. Whittaker et al. (2002) recommend working towards a prudent consensus approach to interagency national security issues by strengthening interagency team identity, controlling internal politics among team members, fostering competitive and constructive debate, and forging a consensus approach for action.<sup>2</sup> Hawley (2003), on the other hand recommends a course of action that places the requirements of the policy-maker first and those of the agency second in priority. Hawley notes that “policy makers operate in an intensely political world, involving uncertain public opinion, relentless media scrutiny, and sensitive partner expectations. Thus, maintains Hawley, policy-makers are much more focused on success of the mission.

Hawley (2003) also argues that it is essential to focus on the Washington “interagency” and steer clear of tangential issues. Hawley urges that “The spotlight should be on the critical need for unity-of-effort and avoid diversions involving politicized arguments about how best to run an administration, or comparing how one administration performed against another” (14). Additionally, Hawley urges that interagency players steer clear of agency roles and missions and other contentious “turf” issues. Hawley succinctly sums up the reality of the situation by noting that, “The interagency has a ‘bigger role’” (14). Taken at the flood, the recommendations of both Toth and Hawley, buttressed by the findings of this research, argue strongly for further research into the realm of organizational sociocentrism and its impact - - both positive and negative - on organizational unity of effort.

#### *Bureaucratic Power.*

A second -- and related -- contextual variable that warrants significant research in its own right is the expansive, indeed elusive, domain of bureaucratic power or “clout.” By and large, the types of organizational issues that derived from this variable closely mirror organizational behavior and bureaucratic dynamics identified by Allison Graham in his classic study of bureaucratic politics. While there is a significant body of literature specifically focused on this arena, there still remains a compelling need to examine bureaucratic power dynamics as it specifically impacts the attainment of organizational unity of effort in the interagency.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the interests or competing requirements that individual organizations bring to the interagency national security process can impact the effectiveness of

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<sup>2</sup> This last prescriptive action involves building support with those sharing similar perspectives and introducing supporting material from outside actors not directly involved in the process, but who can affect final acceptance of policy decisions (e.g. congressmen, Capitol Hill and/or department staffers, and non-governmental and international organizations ,etc.) Whittaker et al, (2002).

planning and operations. The literature and individual and group interviews strongly suggest that bureaucratic rivalries detract from the process of consensus-building deemed critical to interagency success in accomplishing the assigned mission. Much of the literature I reviewed in this study uniformly suggests that executive agencies and departments experienced major difficulties in overcoming narrow organizational interests in order to cooperate with military elements in the planning, resourcing, and execution of interagency taskings.

Further, my research strongly suggests that institutions possess a core (institutional) ideology that remains relatively constant over time, even as missions, threats, evolve and change. As such, this core ideology can still be a potential inhibitor in creating interagency organizational entities such as task forces (IATF's) or other ad hoc national security organizations in order to respond to existing or emerging national security crises. That said, it is also recognized that these organizational ideologies are important in building cohesiveness and pride in one's organization and its achievements and accomplishments. To the degree that these positive dimensions of sociocentrism can be enhanced (and the negative dimensions reduced), further research into this area of interest is clearly warranted.

### *Conclusions and Recommendations*

Although the factor analyses supporting this research were relatively rudimentary in scope, the analyses, taken along with the supporting interviews, focus groups, and literature review, strongly suggest a useful model for leaders and managers to consider when charged with the responsibility for crafting an interagency organization.

All three analyses conducted as elements of this research clearly point to the conclusion that the single most important factor in pursuing organizational unity of effort is the establishment of a clear sense of why the interagency organization exists and that this vision must be quickly developed and articulated, along clear, attainable goals and objectives that are developed and promulgated organization-wide. Senior leadership must make a visible commitment to the organization's mission and quickly establish and reinforce the importance of that mission in order that the entire organization has a shared end state upon which to effectively focus organizational efforts.

Second, leaders and managers of interagency organizations must also pay close attention to the leadership and decision making structure of the organization and design and implement organizational systems, processes, and infrastructures that provide for unambiguous command and control (unity of command). To this end, the primal organizational authorities of the organization must be understood and lines and loci of authority must be quickly and clearly established to reduce uncertainty and confusion with respect to "who's in charge." Additionally, appropriate and clear organizational roles and responsibilities must be specified throughout the agency to provide for an efficient and effective work structure and division of labor. Finally, comprehensive interagency doctrine that facilitates unity of effort both within and external to the organization should be developed at the earliest opportunity to provide a useful framework for attacking and solving general problems that can surface.

Third, attention must be directed towards building a strong interagency organizational identity and focusing on effective interpersonal dynamics. In both cases, the discrete attributes of the factor clearly point to the need for organizational efforts focused on enhancing the knowledge and understanding of organizational personnel with respect to organizational cultures, values, and interests of participating agencies and building respect for participating agencies. Additionally, leaders and managers of interagency organizations should undertake measures as early as possible in the life of the organization to build trust and confidence and to engender rapport and camaraderie among members of the interagency team. Concerted efforts should be directed toward training and education in interpersonal skills and abilities and the development and implementation of organizational structures and processes to enhance communications.

Finally, leaders and managers charged with executing an interagency mission must develop and implement tailored and effective organizational policies and procedures that define and enhance the actual conduct of organizational activities. To this end, a budget that reflects the imperatives of the mission must be developed and adequate funding must be assured. Appropriate policies and procedures to identify risk and mitigate its impact must be developed and implemented. Additionally, measures of effectiveness for organizational performance must be developed and implemented and an equitable and visible incentive and reward system must be instituted to recognize and reward top performers in the organization. Further, integrated, enterprise wide planning systems must be designed and implemented to facilitate the resolution of specific problems and challenges

As previously addressed, one of the subtle but consistent “constants” that emerged from this study is the need for cultural awareness and understanding within the broader fabric of the interagency. To remedy this deficiency and enhance unity of effort, in addition to formal education and training interventions, increased efforts to promote cultural awareness, such as military and civilian exchange programs, culture orientation programs, and combined multinational/multilateral exercises is recommended. Indeed, one of the recurring recommendations to emerge from the comments provided by respondents to the principal survey is that more attention and resources be directed towards interagency war gaming exercises and operational practices, and rehearsals as a means to enhance interagency unity of effort.

Finally, turning to analytic considerations, notwithstanding my decision to take the less contentious research approach into organizational unity of effort, it is clear that an intensive and well-formulated confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the derived factorial structures be accomplished at some future point. The data and implications realized as a result of this initial research inquiry into organizational unity of effort within the interagency national security policy community provides the foundation for additional future research into this important organizational virtue. Hopefully, additional research that employs the data and findings of this study will serve in the development of hypothesized factor structures (models) that can be more thoroughly and robustly analyzed to determine their theoretical relevance and utility as analytic models for the test and evaluation of organizational performance.

*Summary*

The organizational unity of effort factor structure suggested by this research, if carefully studied and appropriately tailored to the situation at hand, offers the potential to expedite the creation of interagency organizations and meaningfully enhance organizational performance. While certainly not all-inclusive, the four factors suggested by the research, as well as the subordinate attributes that underlie the larger organizational model, can provide leaders and managers of interagency entities with a running start in getting an interagency operation up and running and serve to assure highly effective and efficient long-term organizational performance and achievement.



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## **APPENDICES**

APPENDIX A  
CORRELATION MATRIX

Table A-1

*Principal Component Analysis - Measurement Model Correlation Matrix*

	UOFCMD	STRATVISION	INTSTRAT	SRLDRS	LEGAL	COMTERM	KNOWL	CLRSTRAT	BUDGET	COORD	CULTURE	POLGOALS	RAPPORT	INFOSHARE	FUNDING	ORGAUTH	PATIENCE	SECURITY	ORGVALUE	DIRAUTH	PURPOSE	PREVRELA	TRUST	ORGCNCP	COHESION	X-ORGASS	ORGINTERST	DOCTRINE	LINEAUTH
UOFCMD	1.000																												
STSRATVISION	.275	1.000																											
INTSTRAT	.332	.629	1.000																										
SRLDRS	.159	.249	.342	1.000																									
LEGAL	.148	.227	.257	.197	1.000																								
COMTERM	.209	.094	.235	.157	.379	1.000																							
KNOWL	.074	.124	.196	.133	.291	.412	1.000																						
CLRSTRAT	.216	.568	.627	.327	.128	.106	.206	1.000																					
BUDGET	.208	.292	.260	.281	.321	.156	.305	.352	1.000																				
COORD	.059	.120	.317	.192	.258	.186	.382	.225	.186	1.000																			
CULTURE	.110	.121	.123	.248	.279	.358	.487	.102	.283	.324	1.000																		
POLGOALS	.146	.432	.486	.303	.131	.194	.160	.624	.192	.311	.196	1.000																	
RAPPORT	-.038	.043	.043	.112	.139	.170	.389	-.015	.121	.346	.423	.110	1.000																
INFOSHARE	.097	.179	.191	.201	.213	.182	.275	.150	.208	.306	.264	.237	.390	1.000															
FUNDING	.193	.142	.181	.289	.332	.159	.193	.260	.847	.180	.283	.154	.191	.201	1.000														
ORGAUTH	.237	.100	.190	.234	.423	.406	.238	.171	.322	.218	.276	.099	.102	.075	.306	1.000													
PATIENCE	-.015	.000	.115	.158	.124	.307	.307	.085	.169	.266	.401	.233	.357	.226	.181	.217	1.000												
SECURITY	.241	.127	.130	.217	.365	.309	.239	.139	.291	.212	.265	.072	.157	.250	.284	.378	.120	1.000											
ORGVALUE	.227	.212	.311	.286	.255	.436	.511	.305	.266	.268	.569	.302	.299	.274	.233	.329	.416	.319	1.000										
DIRAUTH	.428	.086	.282	.246	.293	.233	.206	.207	.281	.305	.196	.237	.016	.167	.292	.493	.143	.384	.335	1.000									
PURPOSE	.171	.449	.496	.257	.151	.158	.229	.557	.147	.287	.142	.601	.145	.271	.070	.181	.194	.131	.344	.269	1.000								
PREVRELA	.162	.039	.087	.131	.229	.210	.312	.055	.063	.224	.323	.128	.221	.077	.112	.183	.256	.264	.328	.233	.132	1.000							
TRUST	.143	.195	.276	.197	.184	.324	.402	.142	.105	.282	.353	.318	.409	.328	.119	.158	.263	.141	.458	.124	.356	.284	1.000						



Table A-1 (continued)

*Principal Component Analysis - Measurement Model Correlation Matrix*

ORGCONCPT	.291	.224	.350	.283	.311	.375	.466	.303	.304	.311	.459	.281	.147	.216	.231	.354	.344	.309	.543	.424	.316	.356	.305	1.000					
COHESION	.191	.205	.257	.118	.213	.254	.344	.174	.098	.267	.296	.292	.468	.405	.136	.060	.179	.150	.311	.173	.367	.253	.463	.384	1.000				
X-ORGASS	.225	.106	.229	.131	.263	.339	.431	.151	.151	.226	.340	.180	.217	.207	.161	.205	.216	.260	.364	.249	.200	.408	.247	.457	.350	1.000			
ORGINTERST	.104	.194	.175	.259	.342	.350	.434	.241	.255	.222	.461	.228	.214	.209	.188	.135	.331	.252	.529	.236	.272	.368	.261	.483	.304	.429	1.000		
DOCTRINE	.303	.351	.488	.166	.387	.336	.408	.375	.281	.236	.265	.361	.081	.260	.186	.353	.140	.304	.464	.382	.296	.310	.234	.562	.322	.515	.413	1.000	
LINEAUTH	.515	.240	.405	.266	.271	.299	.186	.302	.257	.280	.218	.325	-.043	.166	.254	.459	.148	.290	.428	.630	.333	.212	.240	.457	.262	.246	.307	.456	1.000
MOPS	.200	.255	.366	.222	.245	.351	.293	.210	.206	.226	.284	.198	.150	.159	.189	.341	.119	.214	.382	.252	.261	.200	.216	.391	.286	.326	.361	.470	.362
REWARDS	.103	.186	.259	.194	.231	.281	.292	.093	.256	.103	.273	.097	.122	.137	.248	.198	.196	.261	.346	.117	.150	.245	.203	.356	.254	.428	.420	.366	.178
CONGRUEN	.231	.343	.375	.281	.255	.320	.301	.333	.236	.228	.285	.301	.226	.226	.228	.101	.234	.177	.458	.168	.365	.279	.361	.394	.349	.338	.426	.378	.297
LIAISON	.098	.043	.263	.217	.250	.339	.402	.244	.164	.393	.288	.270	.302	.272	.245	.241	.305	.187	.369	.352	.238	.366	.313	.448	.264	.487	.323	.396	.327
CAMARAD	.158	.095	.099	.117	.109	.338	.434	-.009	.106	.248	.453	.139	.581	.270	.117	.119	.351	.151	.393	.167	.183	.391	.407	.348	.512	.419	.382	.199	.150
TNGEDUC	.261	.331	.375	.279	.344	.302	.423	.246	.254	.336	.320	.313	.235	.290	.238	.291	.213	.237	.400	.252	.282	.353	.364	.429	.229	.522	.266	.509	.299
CONFIDENC	.154	.195	.275	.273	.237	.281	.414	.211	.241	.331	.338	.309	.493	.439	.285	.181	.334	.111	.424	.216	.338	.288	.588	.283	.458	.221	.296	.193	.236
RISKMG	.129	.225	.233	.140	.372	.305	.299	.134	.256	.236	.325	.116	.280	.230	.245	.321	.250	.274	.380	.290	.112	.252	.316	.359	.288	.289	.289	.340	.208
RESPECT	.008	.214	.270	.261	.245	.279	.530	.203	.240	.274	.436	.247	.472	.288	.211	.153	.364	.116	.419	.171	.320	.275	.529	.349	.418	.258	.437	.234	.105
ROLERESP	.302	.426	.478	.235	.164	.227	.174	.508	.246	.215	.173	.441	.012	.172	.239	.174	.066	.234	.336	.394	.497	.069	.250	.381	.233	.200	.187	.357	.474
C2FRMWRKS	.491	.272	.434	.232	.276	.291	.200	.268	.188	.325	.144	.271	.033	.312	.190	.357	.077	.366	.316	.628	.284	.181	.169	.461	.266	.254	.164	.468	.646
PLANSYS	.323	.347	.470	.178	.302	.265	.220	.371	.264	.310	.189	.284	.023	.171	.225	.319	.005	.245	.287	.368	.288	.275	.125	.489	.220	.324	.282	.589	.408
DELAUTH	.303	.211	.287	.298	.240	.231	.269	.245	.324	.284	.327	.253	.157	.320	.281	.274	.280	.297	.372	.410	.276	.265	.222	.441	.232	.308	.289	.387	.437
CENTLDRSH	.433	.192	.219	.239	.235	.164	.110	.137	.196	.223	.133	.210	-.002	.150	.235	.336	.085	.338	.175	.511	.220	.178	.121	.283	.140	.208	.094	.278	.463





Table A-2

*Principal Component Analysis, Validation Model Correlation Matrix*

	UOFCMD	STRATVISION	INTSTRAT	SRLDRS	LEGAL	COMTERM	KNOWL	CLRSTRAT	BUDGET	COORD	CULTURE	POLGOALS	RAPPORT	INFOSHARE	FUNDING	ORGAUTH	PATIENCE	SECURITY	ORGVALUE	DIRAUTH	PURPOSE	PREVRELA	TRUST	ORGCONCPT	COHESION	X-ORGASS	ORGINTERST	DOCTRINE	LINEAUTH
UOFCMD	1.000																												
STRATVISION	.312	1.000																											
INTSTRAT	.390	.546	1.000																										
SRLDRS	.288	.315	.438	1.000																									
LEGAL	.270	.285	.357	.445	1.000																								
COMTERM	.267	.342	.415	.354	.442	1.000																							
KNOWL	.181	.293	.287	.310	.281	.525	1.000																						
CLRSTRAT	.261	.392	.615	.422	.298	.310	.328	1.000																					
BUDGET	.269	.134	.354	.350	.451	.203	.196	.271	1.000																				
COORD	.358	.295	.397	.400	.380	.302	.455	.394	.333	1.000																			
CULTURE	.157	.243	.231	.256	.288	.386	.546	.198	.273	.382	1.000																		
POLGOALS	.328	.361	.459	.423	.383	.347	.296	.638	.299	.465	.232	1.000																	
RAPPORT	.179	.207	.191	.237	.252	.298	.381	.183	.217	.400	.519	.250	1.000																
INFOSHARE	.240	.298	.333	.308	.309	.289	.315	.346	.185	.456	.274	.365	.324	1.000															
FUNDING	.252	.151	.278	.313	.361	.218	.196	.231	.816	.272	.254	.247	.156	.238	1.000														
ORGAUTH	.358	.183	.218	.357	.450	.311	.323	.302	.418	.380	.367	.357	.270	.328	.400	1.000													
PATIENCE	.005	.120	.102	.142	.234	.275	.236	.077	.088	.237	.385	.155	.428	.172	.101	.163	1.000												
SECURITY	.212	.222	.207	.236	.321	.268	.237	.244	.255	.276	.248	.278	.295	.277	.247	.413	.233	1.000											
ORGVALUE	.252	.362	.280	.311	.299	.375	.384	.281	.332	.371	.629	.350	.439	.367	.335	.406	.340	.395	1.000										
DIRAUTH	.448	.267	.323	.392	.402	.326	.225	.319	.297	.365	.229	.403	.184	.306	.241	.643	.122	.452	.409	1.000									
PURPOSE	.271	.339	.343	.339	.203	.244	.237	.456	.144	.359	.160	.577	.307	.309	.148	.236	.170	.209	.333	.324	1.000								
PREVRELA	.095	.028	-.007	.081	.224	.154	.259	.018	.075	.165	.424	.045	.286	.138	.056	.233	.224	.231	.350	.246	-.018	1.000							
TRUST	.230	.311	.308	.211	.244	.296	.367	.216	.205	.414	.410	.241	.506	.292	.187	.212	.424	.265	.500	.151	.224	.281	1.000						
ORGCONCPT	.302	.339	.405	.406	.429	.384	.442	.389	.412	.426	.458	.414	.310	.370	.330	.494	.211	.427	.478	.422	.319	.252	.378	1.000					
COHESION	.367	.362	.457	.318	.354	.413	.409	.369	.285	.432	.436	.365	.496	.390	.279	.351	.402	.370	.521	.373	.312	.264	.614	.551	1.000				
X-ORGASS	.095	.233	.246	.234	.143	.244	.356	.326	.164	.242	.344	.173	.298	.379	.171	.255	.182	.231	.355	.135	.175	.376	.248	.407	.310	1.000			

Table A-2 (continued)

*Principal Component Analysis, Validation Model Correlation Matrix*

ORGINTERST	.057	.179	.197	.264	.408	.352	.436	.184	.244	.293	.608	.279	.316	.274	.198	.349	.316	.242	.503	.295	.110	.451	.356	.526	.452	.329	1.000	.	
DOCTRINE	.257	.312	.439	.427	.496	.329	.278	.439	.337	.351	.273	.405	.164	.342	.275	.449	.069	.445	.307	.453	.286	.224	.198	.526	.338	.340	.371	1.000	.
LINEAUTH	.422	.211	.406	.394	.462	.249	.225	.335	.324	.428	.311	.394	.149	.263	.279	.558	.066	.367	.287	.597	.287	.134	.153	.410	.343	.112	.366	.591	1.000
MOPS	.289	.341	.334	.266	.370	.340	.254	.313	.377	.356	.387	.320	.243	.308	.376	.438	.157	.418	.480	.473	.196	.256	.261	.447	.454	.244	.401	.492	.400
REWARDS	.184	.207	.213	.157	.260	.217	.136	.181	.329	.189	.346	.203	.272	.125	.280	.295	.150	.230	.380	.235	.107	.353	.269	.325	.387	.249	.326	.328	.177
CONGRUEN	.187	.281	.391	.338	.395	.237	.161	.339	.258	.336	.203	.450	.113	.300	.211	.300	.137	.201	.385	.376	.341	.125	.190	.367	.315	.122	.278	.456	.302
LIAISON	.217	.243	.325	.253	.352	.367	.382	.295	.292	.490	.286	.302	.350	.457	.274	.320	.260	.224	.383	.274	.200	.134	.324	.401	.424	.432	.286	.370	.279
CAMARAD	.244	.248	.223	.236	.281	.294	.303	.166	.212	.293	.411	.167	.622	.322	.181	.241	.308	.332	.454	.222	.253	.324	.457	.330	.544	.421	.318	.220	.151
TNGEDUC	.193	.284	.309	.321	.298	.337	.450	.298	.212	.308	.415	.263	.346	.409	.229	.300	.222	.303	.474	.270	.202	.340	.371	.405	.403	.542	.367	.463	.204
CONFIDENC	.297	.316	.299	.227	.349	.406	.353	.260	.252	.394	.409	.332	.421	.352	.282	.318	.420	.322	.538	.318	.324	.283	.587	.398	.597	.261	.439	.294	.299
RISKMGMT	.307	.285	.364	.271	.389	.287	.143	.335	.403	.325	.277	.370	.196	.310	.406	.374	.212	.431	.455	.343	.259	.193	.322	.399	.412	.288	.268	.390	.331
RESPECT	.203	.205	.217	.283	.312	.366	.462	.249	.259	.377	.579	.345	.495	.352	.303	.348	.460	.345	.626	.304	.207	.385	.567	.428	.574	.309	.536	.263	.215
ROLERESP	.470	.314	.446	.387	.423	.365	.236	.433	.277	.449	.205	.550	.198	.294	.267	.446	.074	.357	.283	.558	.369	.128	.240	.484	.443	.178	.328	.499	.611
C2FRMWRKS	.531	.330	.428	.457	.483	.381	.254	.411	.335	.443	.258	.481	.235	.317	.281	.499	.031	.390	.349	.554	.312	.169	.234	.527	.377	.258	.269	.554	.628
PLANSYS	.389	.419	.514	.376	.455	.395	.356	.467	.443	.452	.345	.458	.214	.408	.449	.486	.047	.387	.408	.515	.353	.160	.214	.530	.403	.361	.337	.578	.501
DELAUTH	.353	.216	.256	.262	.369	.261	.251	.213	.291	.319	.233	.321	.184	.287	.285	.377	.133	.256	.245	.393	.290	.239	.228	.384	.386	.171	.232	.310	.389
CENTLDRSH	.478	.260	.296	.333	.366	.189	.138	.289	.211	.297	.160	.336	.091	.191	.141	.403	.000	.135	.164	.496	.243	.124	.096	.344	.305	.115	.189	.342	.533





APPENDIX B  
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION  
DEMOGRAPHICS



Table B-1

## Demographics

## Frequency Distribution for AGE

From ( $\geq$ )	To ( $\leq$ )	Count	Percent
24	28	6	1.4
29	33	1	0.2
34	38	18	3.9
39	43	117	26.2
44	48	142	31.7
49	53	80	17.8
54	58	49	11.0
59	63	19	4.2
64	68	10	2.1
69	74	2	0.4
Missing		4	0.9
Total		448	100.0

## Frequency Distribution for GENDER

	Count	Percent
Female	87	19.4
Male	360	80.4
Missing	1	0.2
Total	448	100.0

## Frequency Distribution for EDUCATION

	Count	Percent
Undergraduate	50	11.2
Graduate	321	71.7
Post Graduate	76	17.0
Missing	1	0.2
Total	448	100.0

Table B-1 (cont)

## Frequency Distribution for RANK/GRADE

	Count	Percent
Lieutenant Colonel/Commander	135	30.1
Colonel/Captain	124	27.8
GS-9/10	1	0.2
GS-11	4	0.9
GS-13	3	0.7
GS/GM-14	31	6.9
GS-GM-15	114	25.4
SES/FS/General Officer	30	6.7
Civilian Contractor	2	0.4
Missing	4	0.9
Total	448	100.0

## Frequency Distribution for AGENCY

	Count	Percent
U.S. Army	91	20.3
U.S. Navy	86	19.2
U.S. Air Force	76	17.0
U.S. Marine Corps	28	6.3
U.S. Coast Guard	7	1.6
National Defense University (University Staff)	75	16.7
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)	12	2.7
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)	2	0.4
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)	3	0.7
National Security Agency (NSA)	4	0.9
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)	7	1.6
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)	3	0.7
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)	6	1.3
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)	2	0.4
Missile Defense Agency (MDA)	3	0.7
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)	3	0.7
Department of State (DoS)	14	3.1
Agency for International Development (AID)	4	0.9
Department of Transportation (DoT)	1	0.2
Department of Energy (DoE)	1	0.2
Department of Justice (DoJ)	1	0.2
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	5	1.1
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)	1	0.2
Bureau of Customs	1	0.2
Other Agencies	11	2.5
Missing	1	0.2
Total	448	100.0

Table B-2Descriptive Statistics for Demographics

## Descriptive Statistics for AGE

Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
24	72	47.20	7.200

## Descriptive Statistics for YEARS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE

Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
0	50	22.84	7.498

## Descriptive Statistics for YEARS OF SERVICE WITH PRESENT AGENCY

Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
0	48	18.15	8.646

## Descriptive Statistics for MONTHS OF INTERAGENCY EXPERIENCE

Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
0	300	42.95	56.79 <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The extreme standard deviation is due to the fact that 52 respondents reported no formal interagency experience.

APPENDIX C

MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT

## ABOUT THIS QUESTIONNAIRE

This survey is being administered to personnel from different government agencies. The survey asks questions about your experiences and perceptions regarding your dealing with other government agencies. We are interested in learning from your past experiences on how interagency national security policy development and implementation is currently working within the federal government.

### **Why Me?**

You have been selected to be part of a sample of individuals who represent your federal agency. The only information used to sample individuals for this survey was to group them by agency, location and availability. We are very interested in learning about your experiences and would appreciate it your cooperation in completing this survey.

### **Why should I bother? Do surveys change anything?**

Statistics from surveys provide valuable information to the policy makers and planners. While no decisions about you alone will be made based on this survey, survey results can influence policy discussions and may result in changes that affect you and other service members like you. You may not see the changes directly since policy statements do not list sources of information considered for adoption. And, policy changes often impact the future with the affected personnel unaware of a survey completed few months or even years earlier. **Your response counts.** If you don't respond, your views and the views of other members like you will not be considered in personnel policy reviews and changes.

### **Will my survey responses be kept private?**

**Yes.** Under no circumstances will any information about identifiable individuals be released. Identifiable information is only being used by persons engaged in conducting the survey and building the survey databases. Your responses will be combined with information from many other members to report the views and experiences of groups of members. Comments may be reported verbatim but never with identifiable information.

### **May I obtain copies of the completed research report?**

**Yes.** At the conclusion of the research effort, an summary executive summary will be prepared and distributed to those respondents who request it. If you desire a copy of the executive summary please indicate below and provide your email address.

I request a copy of the Executive Summary

E-Mail address \_\_\_\_\_

I do not wish to receive a copy of the Executive Summary

Please complete this survey at your earliest convenience, but not later than November 20, 2004.

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION  
PLEASE BEGIN COMPLETING THE SURVEY**

**Part I. OPINION**

This section of the survey presents a series of statements concerning situations involving collaborative efforts among different types of agencies. Consider each item carefully and determine the degree to the statement reflects your experience or opinion. Remember that ALL ANSWERS ARE CONFIDENTIAL.

(Circle One Choice for Each Line)

	<b><u>Strongly Disagree</u></b>							<b><u>Strongly Agree</u></b>
	<b><u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u></b>							
1. It is essential to have unity of command to plan and conduct interagency operations. ....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
2. A strategic vision that fosters acceptance of shared goals affects the effectiveness of interagency cooperation .....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<hr/>								
3. An integrated strategy is necessary to achieve effective interagency cooperation .....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
4. The view that senior leaders in an interagency activity hold of the importance of the organization's mission does not play a role in achieving unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<hr/>								
5. An understanding of the legal framework governing an interagency operation helps to achieve unity of effort...	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
6. It is essential to have common terminology during interagency collaborations.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<hr/>								
7. Knowledge of the roles, capabilities, and limitations of other agencies is not necessary to achieve effective interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
8. A clearly defined strategy is necessary to achieve effective interagency coordination.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<hr/>								
9. A realistic budget is necessary to plan and execute interagency operations.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
10. Coordination between different components of an interagency organization enhances unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
<hr/>								
11. An understanding of the unique cultures of organizations conducting interagency operations promotes unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
12. Well-developed, clearly defined policy goals and objectives increase the likelihood of success in interagency operations.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	

(Circle One Choice for Each Line)

	<b><u>Strongly Disagree</u></b>						<b><u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u></b>					<b><u>Strongly Agree</u></b>
13. Building rapport in an interagency operation does not enhance unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
14. Sharing of intelligence and information between elements of an interagency organization is critical to the successful accomplishment of interagency operations.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
15. Adequate funding is important in achieving unity of effort in interagency operations.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
16. The source of organizational authority (Congressional , mandate, Presidential Executive Order, etc.) for creating and running an interagency organization does not make a difference in attaining unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
17. It is important to possess patience when engaged in interagency endeavors.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
18. Stringent security classification and clearance requirements facilitate the attainment of interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
19. An understanding of the unique organizational values of agencies conducting interagency operations promotes unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
20. Unambiguous directive authority is necessary to achieve effective interagency unity of effort (NOTE: Directive authority is the legal or operational authority to compel cooperation, control resources, or mediate disputes between agencies).....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
21. A clear articulation of the purpose or mission of an interagency organization is critical to achieving unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
22. The duration of previous organizational relationships between agencies combined to conduct interagency operations is essential in achieving unity of effort....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
23. Trust between organizations conducting interagency operations is not required to achieve unity of effort...	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
24. The specific organizational concept ("Czar," Blue Ribbon Panel, Joint Interagency Task Force, etc.) selected for the conduct of an interagency mission plays an important role in assuring unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					

(Circle One Choice for Each Line)

	<b><u>Strongly Disagree</u></b>							<b><u>Strongly Agree</u></b>
	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>2</u></b>	<b><u>3</u></b>	<b><u>4</u></b>	<b><u>5</u></b>	<b><u>6</u></b>	<b><u>7</u></b>	
25. Cohesion among members of an interagency organization helps to assure unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
26. Cross-organizational or “exchange” assignments among personnel who are likely to engage in interagency operations are vital to achieving interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
27. An understanding of the unique organizational interests of agencies designated to conduct interagency operations serves to enhance unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
28. Doctrine specifically developed for interagency operations is not necessary to achieve unity of effort...	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
29. Clearly delineated lines of authority (e.g. “Chain of Command”) influence the effectiveness of interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
30. Measures of effectiveness for organizational performance do not contribute to interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
31. Performance incentives and rewards contribute to the attainment of interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
32. Congruence between interagency mission objectives and the internal goals of participating agencies does not contribute to interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
33. Liaison between agencies positively influences the attainment of interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
34. Interagency camaraderie is necessary to achieve interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
35. Interagency training and education is not necessary to achieve interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
36. Confidence in the competencies of agencies conducting interagency operations facilitates unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	



(Circle One Choice for Each Line)

	<b><u>Strongly Disagree</u></b>		<b><u>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</u></b>				<b><u>Strongly Agree</u></b>
37. Clearly delineated risk management policies and procedures are critical for achieving effective interagency collaboration.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
38. It is important to have respect for agencies participating in interagency endeavors in order to achieve interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<hr/>							
39. Clearly defined operational roles and responsibilities contribute to interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
40. Clearly delineated command and control (C2) frameworks are important in achieving interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<hr/>							
41. An integrated, comprehensive planning system is essential in order to achieve interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
42. Delegation of authority does not contribute to interagency unity of effort.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<hr/>							
43. Centralized leadership is important in achieving effective interagency unity of effort. (NOTE: "Centralized leadership" refers to the vesting of a single, high-level Federal agency focal point for policy and coordination).....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

**PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO PART II (NEXT PAGE)**

## PART II. EVALUATION

Below is a list of attributes or characteristics that may influence interagency collaboration among different agencies. Consider each characteristic carefully and determine its **importance** for influencing situations involving interagency collaborations. Remember **ALL OF YOUR ANSWERS ARE CONFIDENTIAL**

Circle the option that reflects how important the attribute/characteristic may be based on your judgment and experience

CHARACTERISTIC	No Importance	Little Importance	Some Importance	Good Bit of Importance	A Lot of Importance	Extreme Importance
1. UNITY OF COMMAND	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. STRATEGIC VISION	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. INTEGRATED STRATEGY	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. SENIOR LEADER VIEW (of mission importance)	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. LEGAL FRAMEWORK	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. COMMON TERMINOLOGY	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER AGENCY ROLES, LIMITS, ETC.	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. CLEARLY DEFINED STRATEGY	1	2	3	4	5	6
9. REALISTIC BUDGET	1	2	3	4	5	6
10. COORDINATION	1	2	3	4	5	6
11. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE	1	2	3	4	5	6
12. CLEAR POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. RAPPORT	1	2	3	4	5	6
14. INTELL/INFO SHARING	1	2	3	4	5	6
15. ADEQUATE FUNDING	1	2	3	4	5	6
16. SOURCE OF ORG. AUTHORITY	1	2	3	4	5	6
17. PATIENCE	1	2	3	4	5	6
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CLEARANCES	1	2	3	4	5	6
19. ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES	1	2	3	4	5	6
20. DIRECTIVE AUTHORITY	1	2	3	4	5	6
21. CLEAR PURPOSE/MISSION	1	2	3	4	5	6
22. DURATION OF PREVIOUS ORG RELATIONSHIPS	1	2	3	4	5	6
23. TRUST	1	2	3	4	5	6
24. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT	1	2	3	4	5	6
25. COHESION	1	2	3	4	5	6
26. CROSS ORGANIZATION/ EXCHANGE ASSIGNMENTS	1	2	3	4	5	6
27. ORGANIZATIONAL INTERESTS	1	2	3	4	5	6
28. INTERAGENCY DOCTRINE	1	2	3	4	5	6
29. LINES OF AUTHORITY	1	2	3	4	5	6
30. PERFORMANCE MEASURES	1	2	3	4	5	6
31. INCENTIVES & REWARDS	1	2	3	4	5	6
32. CONGRUENCE OF MISSION & ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS & OBJECTIVES	1	2	3	4	5	6
33. LIAISON	1	2	3	4	5	6



**PART III BACKGROUND**

This section presents descriptive questions about you. Read each item and **place an X** on the option that describes you.

1. Are you:     Male             Female

2. What is your current age? \_\_\_\_\_

3. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? **Mark only one**

- High school Diploma/GED
- Some College/Technical Degree
- Associate Degree (AA)
- Bachelor Degree (BA/BS)
- Master's Degree (MA/MS)
- Advanced Degree (PhD/JD/MD)

4. What is your current rank/grade: \_\_\_\_\_

5. How many years have you worked for the federal government? \_\_\_\_\_

6. What Department/Bureau/Agency are you currently working for?

- |   |  |                               |
|---|--|-------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> USA            | <input type="checkbox"/> USAF          | <input type="checkbox"/> USN  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> USMC           | <input type="checkbox"/> USCG          | <input type="checkbox"/> NDU  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> OSD            | <input type="checkbox"/> DLA           | <input type="checkbox"/> DIA  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> NSA            | <input type="checkbox"/> NGA           | <input type="checkbox"/> DTRA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DNA            | <input type="checkbox"/> DCMA          | <input type="checkbox"/> DCAA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DARPA          | <input type="checkbox"/> DISA          | <input type="checkbox"/> DSCA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> MDA            |  |                               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> NSC            | <input type="checkbox"/> CIA           | <input type="checkbox"/> OMB  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DOS            | <input type="checkbox"/> AID           | <input type="checkbox"/> DOT  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> DOC            | <input type="checkbox"/> DOE           | <input type="checkbox"/> DOJ  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> FBI            | <input type="checkbox"/> Treasury      | <input type="checkbox"/> DOA  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> HHS            | <input type="checkbox"/> DHS           | <input type="checkbox"/> FEMA |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Secret Service | <input type="checkbox"/> Border Patrol | <input type="checkbox"/> INS  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> EPA            | <input type="checkbox"/> Customs       | <input type="checkbox"/> GSA  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____    |  |                               |

7. How many years have you been with this agency? \_\_\_\_\_

8. How many **months** of interagency experience do you possess? \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE: For the purpose of this survey, "interagency" experience includes both experience in a formal interagency environment (e.g. joint task force, interagency working group, NSC, etc.) or experience working within an "ad hoc" environment within an agency (e.g. teams, task forces, red teams, etc.).

APPENDIX D

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

### Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAN	Army After Next
AID	[U.S.] Agency for International Development
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and United States [Treaty]
AOR	Area of Responsibility
C2	Command and Control
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CCO	Complex Contingency Operation
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COCOM	Combatant Command
CoCom	Combatant Commander
CONPLAN	[U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism] Concept of Operations Plan
CP	Command Post
CTNSP	Center for Technology and National Security Policy (NDU)
DC	Deputies Committee [of the NSC]
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
EO	Executive Order [issued by the President of the United States]
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EU	European Union
EUCOM	[U.S.] European Command
ExComm	Executive Committee [of the NSC]
FA	Factor Analysis
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRP	Federal Response Plan
GAO	General Accounting Office
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HLS	Homeland Security
HHS	Health and Human Services [Department of]
IATF	Interagency Task Force
ICAF	Industrial College of the Armed Forces [NDU]
IAWG	Interagency Working Group
ICS	Incident Command System
IGO	International Governmental Organization
IJV	International Joint Venture
INSE	Innovations in National Security Education
INSS	Institute for National Security Studies [NDU]

IO	International Organization
ITEA	Interagency Training, Education & After Action Review [program]
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JFCOM	[U.S.] Joint Forces Command
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTTP	Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
MAUT	Multi-Attribute Utility Technology
MNF	Multinational Forces
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Contingency
NACCHO	National Association of County and City Health Organizations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authorities
NDP	National Defense Panel
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMS	National Military Strategy
NORTHCOM	[U.S.] Northern Command
NRC	National Research Council
NRP	National Response Plan
NSC	National Security Council
NSGC	National Strategic Gaming Center [NDU]
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSS	National Security Strategy
NWC	National War College [NDU]
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
OOTW	Operations Other Than War
OSC	On-Scene Commander [FBI]
	On-Scene Coordinator [EPA]
OSCE	Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PC	Principals Committee [of the NSC]
PC	Principal Components [a form of Factor Analysis]
PCA	Principal Components Analysis
PCCs	Policy Coordinating Committees [of the NSC]
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PDM	Presidential Decision Memorandum
PME	Professional Military Education
POL-MIL	Political-Military [plan]
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review

RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SNSEE	School for National Security Executive Education (NDU)
SOCOM	[U.S.] Special Operations Command
SSC	Senior Service College
SOUTHCOM	[U.S.] Southern Command
STRATCOM	[U.S.] Strategic Command
SVR	Sample to variable ratio
TRADOC	[U.S. Army] Training and Doctrine Command
TRANSCOM	[U.S.] Transportation Command
TSA	Transportation Security Agency
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
USC	United States Code
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S. CREST	United States Center for Research and Education on Strategy and Technology
USG	United States Government
USG CONPLAN	U.S. Government Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
Y2K	Year 2000 Conversion Program



APPENDIX E  
INTERVIEW WORKSHEET

### INTERVIEW WORKSHEET

**1. Basic contact info:**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_  
Agency: \_\_\_\_\_  
Department: \_\_\_\_\_  
Address: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Email: \_\_\_\_\_  
Phone No: \_\_\_\_\_  
FAX No: \_\_\_\_\_  
Grade/Rank: \_\_\_\_\_  
Functional or regional specialty: \_\_\_\_\_  
No. years in government (incl. military service if applicable): \_\_\_\_\_  
No. years at current organization: \_\_\_\_\_  
Other interagency agency experience: \_\_\_\_\_  
Positions held: \_\_\_\_\_

**2. Interagency Experience:**

What experience do you have in planning interagency operations? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

What other government/non-governmental agencies have you worked with in planning and/or executing interagency operations? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Do you currently coordinate your plans with any other agency -- either through formal or informal relationships? Which agencies? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

In your estimation, are there any benefits to this coordination? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

If so, what are some examples? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

If not, are there any reasons for the lack of interagency coordination? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

What is your understanding/definition of interagency unity of effort? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

In your opinion, is interagency unity of effort necessary to meet assigned objectives/missions? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Would unity of effort within the interagency make it easier/or more difficult to meet your objectives, or would it have no impact? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

In your opinion, what organizational, managerial or leadership elements/components/attributes contribute to achieving interagency unity of effort? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Which department/agencies, if any, do you have the best working relationship With? Why (i.e., compatibility of mission, personal friendships, etc.)? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Are you aware of deliberate efforts within your department/agency to promote unity of effort with other departments/agencies? If so, with which departments/ agencies and what did these plans consist of? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

What do you feel is necessary in order to promote interagency unity of effort? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

What, if any, do you consider to be your role in promoting interagency unity of effort? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Have you participated in real-world interagency planning? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

If so, which operations? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

### 3. Training and Education:

Have you ever participated in any type of training intended to promote/enhance interagency unity of effort? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

What is your evaluation of the impact of interagency training and education in promoting interagency unity of effort? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### 4. Creating A Strong Interagency Culture:

What organizational attributes or elements contribute most directly to the development of a strong cultural affiliation within an interagency context? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

What external or environmental factors or influences have the greatest retarding or inhibiting effect on creating a strong interagency culture? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### 5. Creating Organizational Unity of Effort:

What organizational attributes or elements contribute most directly to the attainment of organizational unity of effort within an interagency context? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

What external or environmental factors or influences have the greatest retarding or inhibiting effect on the attainment of organizational unity of effort in an interagency endeavor? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

In your opinion, how does agency identity (culture, values, interests, goals) impact the attainment of organizational unity of effort? \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### 6. Additional comments?

## VITA

Received a Bachelor of Science (*Cum Laude*) in Secondary Education from Northeastern University in 1970 and a Master of Science in Systems Management from Florida Institute of Technology in 1979.

Served as an adjunct professor on the faculties of Embry Riddle University (Hawaii Extension), 1979-1982 and Big Bend Community College (Germany Extension), 1989-90. Also served as a Professor of Military Strategy and Logistics at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, from 1993 to 2000. From 1995 to 2000, held the U.S. Army's tenured professorship at the Industrial College. Served as Chair, Department of Military Strategy and Logistics, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2002-2004. Currently serves as a Professor of Military Science at the Industrial College.

Served thirty years on active duty with the United States Army, retiring in 2000. Major military education includes the U.S. Army Rotary Wing Qualification Course (1973), Transportation Officer's Advanced Course (1977-1978), Air Command and Staff College (1982-1983), U.S. Army Operations Research-Systems Analysis Course (1983), Program Managers Course, Defense Systems Management College (1986), and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (1990-1991).

Holds national certification as a Fire Instructor III and Commonwealth of Virginia certification as an Emergency Vehicle Operators Course instructor and Incident Command instructor and Emergency Medical Technician-Basic. Serves as a fire service instructor for the Commonwealth of Virginia and Prince William County, Virginia.

Awarded the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Civilian Commendation Medal for emergency medical services at the Pentagon, September 11, 2001.