

**The Changing Dynamic of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and Changes in
Japanese Security Policy**

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Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of

Master of Arts
In
Political Science

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May 13, 2009
Defense: Blacksburg, VA

Keywords: Japan | United States | Ballistic Missile Defense | Joint Security Declaration |
Rear-Area Support | Security Policy

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ABSTRACT

Beginning in the 1990s, the United States and Japan began redefining their bilateral security alliance. This redefinition also prompted Japan to change its security policies. To what extent and in what ways have changes in the U.S.-Japan security alliance contributed to these changes? I argue that these changes are the result of negotiations of the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century*, signed on April 17, 1996, and the occurrence of an exogenous event. I also argue that the negotiated changes only progress to a certain point, at which time an exogenous event acts as a catalyst to continue change. I examine two cases of policy change associated with exogenous events (the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis). Finally, I summarize my results that Japan was able to change its security policies through negotiations and through a series of systematic steps that follow a consistent trajectory of change; but exogenous events have continued the change that started as a result of the negotiations and the systematic steps.

Acknowledgements

This thesis has been the most stressful and exhilarating scholarly experience of my life. The experience has made me dig down to the very depths of my limits and push past all limitations. I was fortunate enough to have an extremely brilliant and hardworking committee. Dr. Milly, I thank you for your extremely hard work and dedication to this topic. Your guidance over the past eight months has been nothing short of astonishing. Dr. Hult and Dr. Walcott, I thank both of you for agreeing to be part of my committee, especially because I proposed this project to both of you so late in the process. All of the guidance and wisdom of my committee members, whether in the classroom or elsewhere, has contributed not only to the success of this project, but also my growth as a person. Finally, I would like to thank my parents. Had it not been for the constant encouragement and the “pep talk”, I would not have finished. Thank you for all the support and encouragement from so far away. This one is for you.

Table of Contents

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgements	iii
Table of Contents	iv
List of Tables	v
List of Abbreviations	vi
Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Overview	1
Research Question	1
Justification	2
Method	3
Chapter 2: The Political Context of Japanese Security Policy Change	8
Redefining the United States-Japan Security Alliance	8
The Japanese ‘Peace Constitution and Shifting Security Politics of the 1990s	12
The Changing Political Scene	21
Implications of Change in Japanese Domestic Political and Security Policies	24
Chapter 3: Japan’s Self-Defense Force Deployment Policy Changes	26
Policy Changes prior to the Afghanistan Invasion, 1995-2001	27
Policy Changes after the Afghanistan Invasion, 2001-2005	31
Comparative Analysis of Self-Defense Force Deployment Policy Changes	40
Chapter 4: Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense System Policy Changes	44
Policy Changes prior to the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, 1995-2002	46
Policy Changes after the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, 2003-2005	56
Comparative Analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense Policy Changes	60
Chapter 5: Conclusion	66
Works Cited	74

List of Tables

Chapter 3

Table 3.1: *Outline of Major Events/Crises, Participants, and Results prior to MSDF
Deployment to Indian Ocean*..... 28

Table 3.2: *Outline of Major Events/Crisis, Participants and Results after MSDF
Deployment to Indian Ocean*..... 34

Chapter 4

Table 4.1: *Outline of Major Events/Crises, Participants and Results prior to 2003
North Korea Missile Crisis* 48

Table 4.2: *Outline of Major Events/Crises, Participants, and Results after 2003
North Korea Missile Crisis* 58

List of Abbreviations

ATSML	Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law
AWS	Aegis War-Fighting System
BJOCC	Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDO	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
BMDR	Office of Ballistic Missile Defense
CLB	Cabinet Legislation Bureau
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FY	Fiscal Year
GOJ	Government of Japan
IRL	Iraqi Reconstruction Law
JDA	Japanese Defense Agency
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Force
MTDP	Mid-Term Defense Plan
NMD	National Missile Defense
NTW	National Theater Wide
NTWD	National Theater Wide Defense
PAC	Patriot Advanced Capability
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
R&D	Research and Development
ROK	Republic of Korea
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SDF	Self-Defense Force
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SMDS	Sea-Based Mid-course System
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
TMD WG	Theater Missile Defense Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

Introduction

Overview

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has made numerous changes in its defense policies. To what extent and in what ways have changes in the U.S.-Japan security relationship contributed to these changes? In this thesis, I will address how Japan has changed its security policies by examining changes as a result of negotiations with the U.S. versus the intervention of an exogenous event. I will argue that the negotiated systematic, or consistent, changes only produced change to a certain point, but that exogenous events produce further changes. I examine two cases of policy change and compare the role played by the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century*, signed on April 17, 1996, with the role played by two exogenous events (U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis). I find that although the *Joint Declaration* provided a framework for potential change, exogenous events brought about more significant changes beyond those begun through the negotiations associated with the *Joint Declaration*.

Research Question

Since the 1990s, the United States and Japan have been negotiating changes in their security alliance. The main outcome of these negotiations was the signing of the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century*. The *Joint Declaration* and subsequent outside (exogenous) events have contributed to changes in

Japan's security policies. In this thesis I will answer the following question: Are the changes in Japan's security policies due to the negotiations regarding the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century* and the subsequent incremental changes; or are they due to these outside events?

I will argue that the changes in Japan's security policies regarding their rear-area support efforts in Afghanistan and the desire for a ballistic missile defense system are the product of a combination of the negotiations, subsequent systematic policy changes, and outside events. The *Joint Declaration* provides a road map of change in anticipation of an unknown security-related event. Some features of the *Joint Declaration* allow for the implementation of general changes, but exogenous events have served as triggers for Japan to move beyond minimal general guidelines to develop new concrete policies. Exogenous events, such as the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan, have acted as catalysts that facilitated the continuation of changes beyond those produced by the ongoing negotiations.

Justification

Analysis of the question yields an in-depth examination of the transformation in Japan's security policies and the changing nature of the U.S.-Japan bilateral security alliance. Because the alliance was created during the Cold War it is based on Cold War politics. There has been a concerted effort by the Japanese and U.S. to redefine the alliance in terms of post-Cold War politics, especially since the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Part of the redefinition of the alliance has involved

changes in Japan's security policies. The redefinition of the alliance and the changes in Japan's security politics could potentially allow Japan to play a larger role internationally and in the East Asia region.

This study will also showcase how the shift from Cold War politics to Post-Cold War politics influenced Japanese security policies. The U.S.-Japan security alliance was first formed in 1951 as a response to the Cold War. Japan provided the U.S. with a base of operations for the Asia-Pacific region, and the U.S. provided defense for Japan. Over time, the U.S. and Japan signed a number of agreements outlining the security alliance and each government's cooperation with the other. However, all of these documents grew out of a Cold War context. The *Joint Declaration* provides a framework of security policy change, for both countries, in the post-Cold War 21st Century. To fully understand how the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance has impacted the changes in Japan's security policies, it is important to understand and examine the contexts in which the change occurs as well as how potential exogenous events can have an impact on policies.

Method

To answer the question of the dynamics responsible for changes in Japan's security policies, I will use two case studies of policy change. I will pair each case with a provision of the *Joint Declaration* and examine the changes that Japan made prior to the exogenous event and in response to the event. The two cases that I will examine are the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and the subsequent response by Japan to provide rear-area support to the U.S.-led coalition; I will also examine the 2003 North

Korea Missile Crisis and Japan's decision to procure a ballistic missile defense system from the U.S.

My research in this thesis will be analytical and qualitative in nature. I will be using the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century* and the ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Japan to identify systematic changes that followed a consistent path of change occurred in anticipation of an unknown exogenous event. The *Joint Declaration* acts as a set of guidelines that provide a road map for change. The changes resulting directly from the guidelines provided change to a certain extent. Because the guidelines led to only limited changes, exogenous events have been important as catalysts for continued change.

The *Joint Declaration* is the main primary document that I will analyze. In that document, I will be looking at two points of interest: Section 5(c) and Section 5(e). Section 5(c) highlights the signing of a separate document, which was signed on April 15, 1996: the *Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America*. The *Agreement* goes into great detail as to how much, when, and what the U.S. and Japan can provide in the means of assistance to each other. Section 5(e) mentions that the U.S. and Japan recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems are crucial to their common security. Section 5(e) also mentions that the U.S. and Japan will continue the study of a ballistic missile defense

system and proliferation of WMDs. For this thesis, my focus is the portion of Section 5(e) pertaining to the study of a ballistic missile defense system.

Sections 5(c) and 5(e), along with the *Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America* and documents pertaining to the Special Consultative Committees will showcase how the *Joint Declaration* prepares for unknown events and allows for negotiated and implemented security policy change prior to a security event.

I will pair the above two provisions with two cases studies of policy change. These cases studies will examine one exogenous event and the policy changes made prior to and after it. Section 5(c) will be paired with the role of Japan's non-combat rear-area support, especially the refueling, re-supply, and logistical efforts for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Section 5(e) will be paired with the study of a ballistic missile defense system for Japan and the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis. I will then use information gathered from secondary sources about the exogenous events and other secondary interpretations of the changes produced by the *Joint Declaration*.

To compare the security policy changes due to each provision of the *Joint Declaration* with those in the respective case study, I examine policy changes both prior to and after the exogenous event. I first examine the extent of change that resulted from the negotiations of the *Joint Declaration* and the guidelines the *Joint Declaration* lays out. Then I analyze the changes that occurred in response to each exogenous event. I

analyze how these events contributed to further implementation of policies, actions, etc., based on the *Joint Declaration*, the *Agreement*, and the Special Consultative Committee documents beyond previous policy change.

I have decided to examine the changes in Japan's security changes during the period from 1995-2005, because it is during this time period that most of the changes pertaining to the cases occurred. Starting with 1995 is important because that is when discussions and talks pertaining to the *Joint Declaration* began. Most of the changes pertaining to the cases occurred prior to 2005, so by limiting the study to 2005 I will be able to examine all significant changes. I have limited the length of study to a ten-year period, ending in 2005, to have a clearly defined term of study, even though change may continue to happen.

I use both primary and secondary sources to examine and study the cases. I analyze a number of government documents from the United States and Japan, as well as press statements from Japan. I also utilize a number of editorials from on-line Japanese newspapers, as well as polling data from Japanese newspapers. The documents, newspaper editorials, and poll data provide both technical and supplemental information. I also use various books and journal articles by scholars that specialize in Japanese politics, American politics, security politics, and other related topics. The books and articles provide various interpretations of the cases and security policy changes. I use these interpretations and the information provided by the primary sources to formulate my argument and the details of the cases.

This thesis will proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I will introduce the political contexts for changes in Japan's security policies, as addressed in the two case studies. In Chapter 3, I will examine how the invasion of Afghanistan affected Japan's decision to provide rear-area support for the U.S.-led coalition forces. I will show the systematic changes that occurred prior to the invasion and why Japan decided to send the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean. Chapter 4 will be an assessment of Japan's systematic changes pertaining to the development of a ballistic missile defense system prior to the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis and the major policy shift involved in Japan's response to the crisis. Chapter 5 will summarize my findings and suggest potential implications of the policy changes, and I will also suggest further areas of research and study.

Chapter 2

The Political Context of Japanese Security Policy Change

Political changes in Japan have paralleled changes made in Japan's security policies. While Japan was undergoing changes domestically it was also changing its security policies. Later in this thesis, I will show that the changes in Japan's security policies over a ten year period (1995-2005) have been both systematic and consistent path of change, as well as in response to an exogenous event. These changes came about in a broader context of political changes with a bearing on defense policy. In this chapter I will examine three specific political aspects that will provide a broad context for security policy change. I will look at the change in the U.S.-Japan alliance, debate and interpretation of Japan's "Peace Constitution," and government reforms in Japan. The examination of these three aspects of Japanese security policy will provide a clearer understanding of the steps taken by Japan in the two case studies.

Redefining the United States-Japan Security Alliance

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Japanese and American government representatives began holding meetings to address the current state of the Japan-U.S. security alliance. The alliance between the U.S. and Japan had been established during the Cold War and was a product of cold war politics. However, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union created a situation in which cold war politics would no longer be feasible. In order to address this change in international and security politics, the United States and Japan embarked on redefining the security alliance to address the post-Cold

War world. These negotiations were primarily in response to the first Persian Gulf Crisis, in which Japan participated in a matter now commonly known as “checkbook diplomacy.” Because of Japanese domestic politics, Japan was unable to participate in an active manner, meaning Japan was not allowed to provide any kind of support that could be interpreted as going against its constitution. Therefore, Japan was forced to participate passively by providing financial support. The United States wanted Japan to participate in a manner befitting their security alliance. However, the outdated terms of their alliance and the constraints of the Japanese Constitution nullified any attempts by Japan to participate.

In response to this, the United States and Japan began negotiating a revised security alliance. On April 17, 1996, Japan and the United States signed the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century (Joint Declaration)*. While the *Joint Declaration* is vague and does not specify actions that will be taken in a given context, it does “list in general terms common security goals...” that the U.S. and Japan both agreed to.¹ The *Joint Declaration* was a vague document because precedents were based on cold war politics, and cold war politics no longer applied to the security environment. A revamped Japan-U.S. alliance would be formulated in a post-Cold War framework. This framework called for a more active role from Japan in regional security,

¹ Mochizuki, Mike M. *Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations*. Mike M. Mochizuki. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. Pg. 36.

because U.S. commitments in other parts of the world could potentially impact the United States' ability to ensure security and stability in East Asia.²

The *Joint Declaration* and negotiations within the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meetings have resulted in numerous agreements between the U.S. and Japan, as well as the passage of security legislation in Japan. The SCC meetings consist of representatives from both countries.³ These meetings, according to Nick Bisley “have been extremely effective at reinforcing the political relationship, building a consensus on the security environment and appropriate responses and maintaining the diplomatic and bureaucratic momentum that is needed in the management and transformation of such a complex and politically sensitive relationship.”⁴ While the SCC meetings had been held periodically since the 1970s, it was not until the mid 1990s that the SCC meetings began to play a much more important role. Furthermore, it is since 2002 that the SCC meetings have become an integral part of the political, security, and operational aspects of the Japan-U.S. alliance.⁵

Before the signing of the *Joint Declaration*, the U.S.-Japan security alliance was one that was based on cold war politics. The earlier alliance was one in which Japan would provide the United States with a base of operations should a war in East Asia

² A growing and more powerful China has prompted the U.S. to try to enhance Japan's role in East Asia. It is believed by members in the U.S. and Japanese governments that a stronger Japan could counterbalance the growing power and influence of China in East Asia. *Ibid.*, Pg. 126.

³ The Security Consultative Committee meetings are also known as the “2+2” meetings because the meetings are conducted by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State from Japan, as well as some bureaucrats from each nation. Bisley, Nick. "Securing the 'Anchor of Regional Stability'?: The Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security." *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol. 30, no. 1 (2008): [73-98]. Pg. 76

⁴ *Ibid.*, Pg. 78.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Pg. 76.

break out, and the United States would protect Japan from any threat. However, even though Japan was part of the alliance, its participation was mainly passive. As Bisley points out “The US-Japan security relationship had begun as a function of America's Cold War strategy, itself a global endeavour, but in that guise Japan was an entirely passive player.”⁶ The signing of the *Joint Declaration* signifies a more mutual and cooperative alliance. Instead of Japan merely providing certain goods and services to the U.S. for protection, as a result of the *Joint Declaration* Japan has become more active in providing for its own security as well as branching out into the global community. Japan has engaged in assistance to other countries as a part of UN-mandated humanitarian missions.⁷ Japan would also provide assistance in missions led by the U.S. that were not UN-mandated.

The *Joint Declaration*, the SCC meetings, and Japanese security legislation have strengthened and improved the security alliance with the United States. All of the legislation passed by the Japanese was shaped by the general guidelines of the *Joint Declaration* and recommendations from the SCC meetings. Even though there are still stipulations in the Japanese Constitution that prevent Japan from engaging in some activities regarding its military capabilities and responsibilities, Japan has been able to address those stipulations by passing context-specific legislation. Although Japan has been able to address some Constitutional stipulations, the larger debate about

⁶ Ibid., Pg. 77.

⁷ Japan had actually been participating in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations since 1992. However, legislation passed by Japan after the signing of the *Joint Declaration* would make it easier for Japan to assist the United States and other countries in humanitarian and rear-area support missions.

Constitutional revision of Article 9 and interpreting what collective security and collective self-defense mean has not been addressed entirely.

The Japanese “Peace Constitution” and Shifting Security Politics in the 1990s

A second key political context for change in Japanese security policy has been constitutional debates. Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese Constitution is one legacy of the Allied occupation of Japan and Douglas MacArthur’s leadership. Article 9 bans the use of offensive military action as well as calls into question the right to collective security and collective self-defense.⁸ Interpretation of Article 9 allows Japan to use force in self-defense only. While Japan does have some military capabilities to defend itself, the presence of United States forces acts as a deterrent to any potential attacks against Japan. With the redefinition of the bilateral security alliance between the United States and Japan occurring as a result of the signing of the *Joint Declaration*, the idea of reinterpreting or revising Article 9 has become a more public debate.

The recent discussion of revising or reinterpreting Article 9 is a result of the redefined alliance with the United States in a post-Cold War context. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the security policies of the United States changed.⁹ The United States made efforts to ensure stability in the former Soviet Republics and their surrounding

⁸ Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” “Japanese Constitution.” <http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html> (accessed April 13, 2009).

⁹ According to Mike Mochizuki, “The breakup of the Soviet Union reopened the debate on security policy and raised fundamental questions about whether the cold war orthodoxy was still appropriate or adequate.” Mochizuki, *Toward a True Alliance*, pg. 56.

regions. While the United States was up to this daunting task, it would need a more reliable security alliance with Japan to help provide and promote regional stability in East Asia. By having Japan help with regional stability in East Asia, the United States would be able to focus on the security and stability of the former Soviet republics. Cold war politics was influential in the US-Japan alliance; but the experience of World War II has contributed to the strong support of the Japanese public for the “Peace Constitution” and Article 9 more specifically. The redefinition of the alliance would also stimulate discussion over the meaning of Article 9 in Japan.

To play a more active role in the region, Japan would have to debate whether or not Article 9 should be revised or reinterpreted. One potential reason for revision and reinterpretation of Article 9 is that in order to effectively carry out its security alliance obligations, Japan may need to engage in combat that is not in the immediate defense of Japan. Article 9 prohibits Japan from preemptively engaging in military actions against a perceived threat. Japan is only allowed to take military action if it is under attack and is not allowed to engage in military action outside of Japanese territory or territorial waters. Article 9 also negates Japan's right to collective self-defense, which is the ability to protect an ally. This hampers Japan's ability to fully participate in the security alliance with the United States.

There are both pros and cons regarding the subject of reinterpretation of Article 9. There is much ambiguity in Article 9 that creates debate over the constitutionality of the SDF, collective security, and collective self-defense. This ambiguity leads to interpretations of what exactly Article 9 specifies. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB)

has been the government agency charged with the “official” interpretation of Article 9. In 1954, the CLB interpreted Article 9 as allowing for purely defensive troops to defend Japan from immediate and unprovoked attacks.¹⁰ This interpretation would later be expanded to distinguish between the use of military force during peacekeeping missions and the sovereign use of military power.¹¹ This most recent interpretation by the CLB recognizes the “war potential” of Japan only at the “minimum necessary level” of defense.¹²

The CLB also creates a distinction between “collective self-defense” and “collective security.” Collective self-defense, which has been interpreted as unconstitutional by the CLB, is the use of force to defend an ally that is under attack.¹³ Collective security is interpreted as the cooperation with allied nations and international organizations to enhance the security of non-allied nations.¹⁴ This interpretation does not specify the capabilities of the SDF, other than what is specified in regard to Article 9. While there is an “official” definition of collective security and collective self-defense, there are differences in interpretations, especially in regard to the use, deployment, and capabilities of the SDF when providing assistance.

Reform politician and current president of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Ichirō Ozawa, is one of the members of the Diet that favors reinterpretation of Article 9

¹⁰ Kliman, Daniel J. *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik*. Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 2006. Pg. 27.

¹¹ Kliman, Pg. 176.

¹² Samuels, Richard J. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 2007. Pg. 46-47.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Pg. 48.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Pg. 48.

to allow for both collective security and collective self-defense.¹⁵ Ozawa argues that the reinterpretation of Article 9 allows Japan to participate in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations (PKO), which falls under the concept of collective security.¹⁶ Reinterpretation of Article 9 could also create an environment conducive to reinterpreting collective self-defense. Members of the Japanese government advocate debate of the collective self-defense issue because a review and possible reinterpretation of collective self-defense may reinvigorate the security alliance with the United States.¹⁷ Some of the people that advocate debate over a possible reinterpretation of Article 9 may not have the same reasons as Ozawa.

However, the desire to debate Article 9 and collective security is consistent with the systematic change in Japan's security policy changes, and public opinion also reflects these shifts. In 1997, a poll of 2,251 Japanese citizens, conducted by The Asahi Shimbun, reported that 69% of respondents believed that Article 9 should not be revised.¹⁸ Ten years later, a similar poll to the one conducted in 1997, reported that 49% of respondents in an April 2007, Asahi Shimbun poll believed that Article 9 should not be revised.¹⁹ That fewer citizens believe that Article 9 should not be revised is an encouraging sign to the stability of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Because the Japanese citizens seem to be

¹⁵ Ozawa announced his resignation as DPJ president on May 11, 2009.

¹⁶ Mochizuki, *Toward a True Alliance*, Pg. 58.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Pg. 59.

¹⁸ The Asahi Shimbun, "Constitution of Japan 1997: Japanese Opinion at its 50th Anniversary." April 26, 1997. <http://www.kanzaki.com/jpoll/1997/constitution-1997.html#P20>. (accessed April 23, 2009). A similar poll conducted by The Asahi Shimbun on May 2, 2001 reported that 74 percent of respondents believed that Article 9 should not be revised. The Asahi Shimbun, "Most Support Article 9 while Divided on Amendment." May 2, 2001. <http://www.kanzaki.com/jpoll/2001/#20010502>. (accessed April 23, 2009).

¹⁹ The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, "Asahi Shimbun April 2007 Opinion Polls." May 2, 2007. <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-12.htm>. (accessed April 23, 2009).

more receptive to revision of Article 9, revision is more of a possibility and such revision would likely allow Japan to play a more active role in the alliance.

As well, one-third of Diet members in 1996 thought that Japan should revise or reinterpret the constitution to allow for a more cooperative alliance, in terms of the military, with the U.S.²⁰ In 2004, 78 percent of legislators in the Diet advocated revision of the Constitution.²¹ Support for revision of paragraphs one and two of Article 9 stood at 23 percent and 57 percent respectively, but this was not enough to garner the two-thirds of the legislators needed to revise it.²² Even though there has been significant support for revision, revision has not yet occurred. The inability or unwillingness on the part of the Japanese to use offensive force or to enforce collective self-defense has been one of the major reasons for its security alliance with the United States. If revision were to happen it might allow for greater cooperation between the U.S. and Japan under collective self-defense.

Whether, and to what extent, Japanese participation in collective security efforts is permissible under Article 9 continues to be strongly debated. According to an interpretation provided by Takao Sebata, collective security allows for the “minimum self-defense” an individual or country can provide for itself. It is also interpreted as the ability to provide assistance to an ally, such as the United States.²³ This interpretation of collective security causes a problem when Article 9 is applied to it. Article 9 explicitly denies the right to actively engage in combat or force unless force or combat has been

²⁰ Mochizuki, *Toward a True Alliance*, Pg. 33.

²¹ Kliman, Pg. 46.

²² *Ibid.*, Pg. 46.

²³ Sebata, Takao. "Japan's Dilemma and a Problem of the Right to Collective Self-Defense Under the 1997 Guidelines." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* Vol. XIX, no. 3 (Fall 2007): [145-166]. Pg. 146.

directed at Japan. Therefore, in accordance with Article 9, Japan would not be able to fulfill its security alliance obligations and assist the U.S. in combat operations outside of Japan. Sebata's interpretation is applied to collective security; however, his interpretation of Japan's ability to provide assistance under the terms of collective security also seems to describe actions prohibited under collective self-defense. This is an example of the differences in interpretations of collective security and collective self-defense and the confusion that they may cause.

However, while some citizens and government officials are arguing that reinterpreting Article 9 and the right to collective security and collective self-defense has benefits, many are worried that a reinterpretation that allows for such measures may in fact lead to a re-militarization of Japan.²⁴ Along with many domestic nay-sayers, regional countries, such as China, argue that a more militarily capable Japan could potentially lead to tensions.²⁵ The concerns from East Asian countries stem from historical animosity towards Japan and the belief that a Japan with the authority to engage in collective security could intervene in situations that Japan would perceive as a threat to its security and regional stability, such as a crisis between China and Taiwan. With the multitude of arguments for and against revision of Article 9, it is not surprising to see that there have not been any decisions made regarding revision.

Even though there has not been any decision regarding a revision of Article 9 or collective security and collective self-defense, a series of events have led to a more active Japan in the international arena, the first being the first Persian Gulf Crisis. During the

²⁴ Mochizuki, *Toward a True Alliance*, Pg. 58.

²⁵ Christensen, Thomas J. "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia." *International Security* Vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): [49-80]. Pg. 62.

first Persian Gulf Crisis (1990-1991), Japan did not send any troops and only engaged in what has been called “checkbook diplomacy.” At the time of the first Gulf War, Japan believed that its financial contributions were a significant contribution; but the United States took the stand that the Japanese did too little, too late.²⁶ Despite contributing \$13 billion, Japan's lack of physical contribution drew criticism from not only the United States, but the international community as well.²⁷ The ensuing criticism and the continual debate over Article 9 eventually led Japan to believe that in order to be an important player in the international community and a more reliable ally to the United States, it would need change its security policy.

One of the first steps in becoming more involved in the global community was the passage of the “International Peace Cooperation Law” (PKO Law) in June 1992.²⁸ The passage of the PKO Law allowed Japan to participate in UN-mandated humanitarian missions. Japanese troops were to assist in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts away from potential combat zones. Japan was also able to provide financial assistance for the operation.²⁹ According to the PKO Law, Japanese troops were permitted to carry small arms only as a means of self defense and to signal that they were not going to act in an aggressive manner, unless attacked.³⁰ This law allowed the Self-Defense Force (SDF) to be sent overseas, outside Japanese territory. However, even though they were

²⁶ Mastunduno, Michael. *Reinventing the Alliance: U.S.-Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change*. G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pg. 32.

²⁷ Kawano, Katsutoshi. "Japan's Military Role." *Naval War College Review* Vol. 51, no. 4 (1998): [9-22]. Pg. 10.

²⁸ Ito, Go. "Leadership in Bandwagon: A Historical Sketch of Japan's Security Policy." *Policy and Society* Vol. 23, no. 1 (2004): [21-37]. Pg. 29.

²⁹ Midford, Paul. "Japan's Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea." *Asian Survey* Vol. 43, no. 2 (2003): [329-351]. Pg. 340.

³⁰ Inoguchi, Takashi and Paul Bacon. "Japan's Emerging Role as a 'Global Ordinary Power'." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* Vol. 6, no. 1 (2006): [1-21]. Pg. 12

participating, their participation was contingent upon adhering to the Japanese law. Through this legislation Japan contributed to nearly a dozen SDF PKO deployments from 1992-2008.

The success of the PKO Law coupled with a desire to become more active in the Japan-U.S. security alliance prompted Japan to pass a new law in August 1999. The “Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations Surrounding Japan” is basically a revised and updated version of the PKO Law geared specifically towards the U.S.-Japan security alliance. It allows for the deployment of the SDF in U.S. operations not mandated by the UN. The assistance that Japan would be allowed to provide the U.S. was the same as stipulated in the PKO Law. One issue, that is always brought up when dealing with the passage of legislation regarding the use of the SDF, is the constitutionality of the legislation. The constitutionality of the legislation greatly impacts the capabilities of the SDF and the interpretation of collective security.

There are those within Japanese society and in the Diet who argue that the PKO Law is illegal and goes against Article 9. However, others argue that the PKO Law is constitutional and that it is a matter of interpretation of Article 9 that allows for the usage of the PKO Law. There is not a consensus on what should or should not be done in regard to debates or revisions of Article 9 and collective security. Mike M. Mochizuki argues that the *Joint Declaration* will inevitably bring about a debate over reinterpreting Article 9, collective self-defense, and/or collective security.³¹ Following that argument, any piece of legislation that is based on Article 9, collective self-defense, and/or collective security would subject to reinterpretation and assessment of its constitutionality. It would not be

³¹ Mochizuki, *Toward a True Alliance*, Pg. 145.

until after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that Japan would pass legislation in regard to further SDF deployment.

Although the SDF was still not allowed to use force, the deployment of the SDF marked the change from a passive Japan that only contributed financially, to a less-passive Japan that was able to contribute physically as well. The passage of the PKO Law was significant because it marked a shift in Japanese security policy away from the pacifism that had dominated since the end of World War II. Many Japanese politicians, and even some Japanese citizens, felt that this shift in security policy would cause Japan to revert back to its past militaristic tendencies. However, Japan has been able to avoid those tendencies by passing legislation for each potential peacekeeping operation, stipulating what the SDF can and cannot do.³² Japan's participation in UN-sanctioned PKOs and their eventual support of the U.S. in Afghanistan was a way to show the U.S. that Japan had changed, and that Japan was willing to makeup for their lack of participation in the Gulf War. Even though Japan's efforts in various PKOs were only in a support role,³³ away from any combat zones, the country's participation is significant because of its lack of participation in the past. Japan's participation represents a change in its security policy.

³² Examples of legislation pertaining to specific PKO are the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (October 2001) which allowed for participation in Afghanistan, and the Iraqi Reconstruction Law (July 2003) which allowed for the SDF to assist U.S. forces in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Hughes, Christopher W. "Not Quite the 'Great Britain of the Far East': Japan's Security, the US-Japan Alliance and the 'War on Terror' in East Asia." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* Vol. 20, no. 2 (2007): [325-338]. Pg. 325.

³³ Support role in this context is meant to signify their participation in PKOs by providing clothing, temporary lodging, medical attention and other humanitarian needs and considerations, including financial contributions.

The Changing Political Scene

Japanese domestic politics indirectly played a role in the creation and passage of security based legislation. Internal problems within political parties, mainly the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and restrictions created by the “Peace Constitution” have made security policy change difficult. The internal party problems were a result of faction-based party politics. This faction-based party politics created a system with a weak leader. The domestic political reforms and subsequent policy changes that occurred in the domestic political scene created a strong executive leader position and weakened the role of factions. This section provides a synopsis of the changing political scene in Japan.

For most of the period since the founding of the LDP in 1955, the LDP has been the governing party in Japan. Its continued power in the Diet relied on a number of factions within the LDP, which provided the party with enough support in the Diet to pass legislation. However, these factions within the LDP were so powerful that the prime ministerial position was relatively weak. Most of the factions within the LDP had ties to specific ministries, which led to a high level of faction-based independence in the ministries, and a high level of fragmentation in the government.³⁴ Because of the fragmentation, the Prime Minister often had a limited role in the decision making process.³⁵

³⁴ Mishima, Ko. "Grading Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's Revolution: How Far has the LDP's Policymaking Changed?" *Asian Survey* Vol. 47, no. 5 (September-October 2007): [727-748]. Pg. 728. Mishima uses the term decentralization in his article; however, decentralization has different connotations that can be applied to this particular context. In order to avoid any confusion about the particular connotation being used I have replaced the term decentralization with the term fragmentation. This term better captures the divided nature of the government and the intra-party friction.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Pg. 728.

Amidst a fragmented government and myriad scandals in the 1990s, pressures grew for reform of Japan's electoral system.³⁶ The structure of the Japanese electoral system was one that favored the larger, more powerful parties. In this system, voters were only allowed to cast one ballot for up to six representatives in an electoral district.³⁷ The larger parties, such as the Liberal Democratic Party, were able to take advantage of this electoral system. As a result of the electoral system and because the party was so large and there were so many potential candidates, the only way to get elected was to have the political and financial backing of a faction within the LDP. This caused intra-party friction because the LDP was the only party that was large enough to have multiple candidates within the same district.³⁸ The intra-party friction eventually led to number of defections from the LDP. In 1993, the defectors led the way in a vote of no-confidence of the government. The vote of no-confidence created a power vacuum. The LDP defectors formed a number of small parties. To fill the vacuum, the splinter parties formed a coalition government with the LDP's main opposition, the Social Democratic Party of Japan.³⁹ This new coalition government was able to successfully pass an electoral reform bill in 1994 that would change the voting system.⁴⁰ The electoral reform bill created an electoral system that is a hybrid between what Japan previously had and a “Westminster” system.

³⁶ Christensen, Raymond V. "Electoral Reform in Japan: How It was Enacted and Changes It May Bring." *Asian survey* Vol. 34, no. 7 (July 1994): [589-605]. Pg. 597.

³⁷ Krauss, Ellis S. and Robert Pekkanen. "Explaining Party Adaptation to Electoral Reform: The Discreet Charm of the LDP?" *Journal of Japanese Studies* Vol. 30, no. 1 (2004): [1-34]. Pg. 4.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Pg. 4-5.

³⁹ Christensen, *Electoral Reform in Japan*, Pg. 589.

⁴⁰ Krauss and Pekkanen, Pg. 6.

The electoral reform also was expected to move Japan to a two-party system.⁴¹ Although the electoral reform was expected to lead Japan closer to a two-party system, much like what is seen in the United States and the United Kingdom, the result so far has been a series of coalition and minority governments; in recent years, the LDP has led coalition governments with the cooperation of one or more smaller parties. The problem has been that because of factions in the LDP and multiple parties in government, the LDP-led governments lacked strong leadership.⁴²

Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister from 2001-2006, was the individual within the LDP that was able to most effectively enact reforms to strengthen the role of prime minister. He passed legislation that significantly strengthened the role of the office of prime minister in order to overcome the control of the various LDP factions. Most of the laws were passed during the Junichiro Koizumi administration. “The Central Ministries and Agencies Reform Basic Law” emphasized that the prime minister has executive authority and is the head of the cabinet.⁴³ Also, the “Law to Amend the Cabinet Law” officially recognized the prime minister's ability to initiate policies.⁴⁴ Along with specifically stating the authority of the prime minister, there was an expansion of power and role for the Office of the Cabinet (Kantei) and for offices that directly assist the prime minister.⁴⁵ In an effort to secure the power of the prime minister and to minimize the power of factions, Koizumi gave ministerial positions to individuals based on merit,

⁴¹ Mishima, Pg. 735.

⁴² The current LDP-led coalition government consists of three parties: the LDP, New Kômeitô, and the New Conservative Party. The coalition government began forming in 1998 under Prime Minister Obuchi Keizô.

⁴³ Mulgan, Aurelia George. *Japan's Failed Revolution: Koizumi and the Politics of Economic Reform*. Australia: Asia Pacific Press, 2002. Pg. 178.

⁴⁴ Ibid., Pg. 178.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Pg. 178-179.

not faction-based loyalties and seniority.⁴⁶ These domestic political reforms and laws passed by Koizumi, coupled with the assertiveness, popularity, and charisma of Koizumi, helped create the potential for a strong executive. However, as was the case before Koizumi, subsequent prime ministers have been weak. They have not been able to utilize the reforms and new legislation in a manner comparable to Koizumi. It was during Koizumi's administration that the two cases of policy change examined here took place, and his strong leadership probably contributed to Japan's ability to respond to external events.

Implications of Change in Japanese Domestic Political and Security Policies

Japan's ability to reexamine and change its domestic politics has allowed for change in Japan's security politics. The change from a Cold War world to a post-Cold War world created an opportunity for Japan and the United States to reassess and redefine their alliance. Debate over the "Peace Constitution," collective self-defense, and collective security has brought the importance of the SDF to the forefront of Japanese security politics and the role the SDF could potentially play in the alliance with the U.S. Finally, Japan's domestic political reforms have allowed for a strong executive to take control of a fragmented and unstable domestic political scene. Koizumi's administration was able to create a stable domestic political scene, thus allowing for change in Japan's security policies.

The changes in Japan's domestic and security policies have led to a redefinition of Japanese security politics. Through the policy changes, Japan has made significant steps

⁴⁶ Ibid., Pg. 184-185.

in changing its overall security agenda. The two case studies will provide further support that the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, in terms of the bilateral security alliance, has changed. These changes will be emphasized through the examination of Japan's participation in the U.S.-led coalition invasion of Afghanistan through rear-area support and Japan's decision to procure a ballistic missile defense system from the United States following the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis. Although the steps taken by Japan have produced change, the cases also illustrate that the intervention of an exogenous event was important for pushing Japan to new levels of change. Even so, both of the events studied happened to coincide with the Koizumi administration, and Koizumi's strong leadership cannot be discounted at the time of the events.

Chapter 3

Japan's Self-Defense Force Deployment Policy Changes

Japan's involvement in peacekeeping operations (PKO) was a response to the international criticism Japan received after its lack of participation during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991. The response by Japan to pass the “1992 International Peace Cooperation Law” signaled the beginning of change in Japan's security policy. The passing of this law has led to a “gradual strengthening of the SDF.”⁴⁷ This gradual strengthening would become more apparent when Japan engaged in PKO efforts, as well as in its response to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Having roughly ten years experience in PKO participation, Japan was able to respond to the events in Afghanistan in a manner that adhered to both Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the bilateral security alliance with the United States.

This chapter examines the changes in Japan's security policy regarding the deployment of the SDF prior to and after the invasion of Afghanistan. In section one I will show that prior to the invasion Japan engaged in a series of systematic changes, including the passage of several pieces of legislation that would change the procedures and circumstances in which Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops could be deployed. In section two I will show that the invasion of Afghanistan was an exogenous event that acted as a catalyst for change. Acting as a catalyst, the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan propelled the continuation of change in Japan's security and SDF deployment policies that had begun prior to the invasion of Afghanistan. Japan's reaction to the invasion was

⁴⁷ Inoguchi and Bacon, Pg. 15.

to deploy the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean as rear-area support for the U.S.-led coalition forces. This continuation of change is a direct response by Japan to the exogenous event, the invasion of Afghanistan. In the final section I will compare and analyze the changes made by Japan prior to and after the invasion of Afghanistan. By comparing and analyzing these changes, I will show that even though Japan had been making incremental changes in its security policies, the invasion of Afghanistan acted as a catalyst that allowed for change to continue.

Policy Changes Prior to the Afghanistan Invasion, 1995-2001

The passage of the PKO Law in 1992 was just the first step in Japan redefining its role in both the U.S.-Japan alliance and in the international community. The passage of the PKO Law, while symbolizing to the U.S. that Japan was willing to participate in the global community, was not focused on the U.S.-Japan alliance. The PKO Law allowed Japan to participate in UN-mandated PKO and humanitarian operations. Although the PKO Law is not geared towards the security alliance with the U.S., it signified that Japan was changing its security policies in regard to the use of the SDF or any other Japanese troops outside of Japan.

Table 3.1
Outline of Major Events/Crises, Participants, and Results Prior to MSDF
deployment to Indian Ocean

Event/Crisis	Participant(s)	Event/Crisis Date	Result(s)
Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Law Signed	Japan	June 1992	The PKO law allowed for Japan to engage in UN mandated PKOs.
UN-Mandated PKOs	Japan	1992-Present	Japan begins participating in UN-mandated PKOs. Japan provides humanitarian assistance.
1996 <i>Agreement</i> Signing	Japan, United States	04/15/96	The <i>Agreement</i> stipulated the reciprocal provisions of supplies and other support.
1996 <i>Joint Declaration</i> Signing	Japan, United States	04/17/96	Japan and U.S. announce changes to their bilateral alliance, evolving from a Cold War alliance to a post-Cold War alliance.
1997 Re-negotiation of Defense Cooperation Guidelines	Japan, United States	1997	Re-negotiation of the Defense Guidelines allows for Japan to provide assistance to U.S. in operations outside of Japan's territory.
Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations Surrounding Japan	Japan	August 1999	Japan signs law allowing the deployment of SDF troops in providing assistance to U.S. in non-UN-mandated operations in their “surrounding area”
9/11 Attacks	United States (NYC, Washington, D.C.)	09/11/01	Terrorists attack World Trade Center in NYC and Pentagon in D.C.
Afghanistan Invasion	United States, Coalition Forces	September 2001-Present	U.S.-led coalition invades Afghanistan to rout out Taliban forces and al-Qaeda terrorist organization.

Source: Author.

In contrast, the first major step that symbolized a willingness to participate on a greater scale with the U.S. was the passage of the *Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America* several years later. The passage of this agreement, on April 15, 1996, outlined the capabilities of how the U.S. and Japan would participate in this agreement.⁴⁸ According to the *Agreement*:

The purpose of this Agreement is to establish basic terms and conditions for the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services...necessary for bilateral exercises and training, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, humanitarian international relief operations, operations in response to situations surrounding Japan, operations which are necessary for repelling armed attack against Japan in armed attack or situations in which armed attack is anticipated, or operations as specified in Article VI [contributions to international peace and security, large scale natural disasters].⁴⁹

This provision in the *Agreement* was an encouraging step toward ensuring the continued cooperation of the U.S. and Japan. However, this article does not stipulate the provision of support in a combat situation outside of Japan's territory.⁵⁰ While the United States was encouraged by the signing of the *Agreement* and Japan's contributions in UN-sanctioned PKO, it was not until 1997 that more significant change would occur. In 1997, the United States and Japan announced the signing of a new set of guidelines pertaining

⁴⁸ The "Agreement" was a result of Special Consultative Committee (SCC) meetings and was announced in the April 17, 1996 *Joint Declaration* signing.

⁴⁹ Ikeda, Yukio and Walter Mondale. "Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America". April 15, 1996. Pg. 6 (Article I, Section 2 and Article VI, Section 2).

⁵⁰ Included in Japan's territory was its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) which had been extended to 1,000 nautical miles off of Japan's coast. Dittmer, Lowell. "Assessing American Asia Policy." *Asian Survey* Vol. XLVII, no. 4 (July-August 2007): [521-535]. Pg. 529.

to defense cooperation between the two countries.⁵¹ These new guidelines stipulated that “Japanese forces could provide 'rear area support' to U.S. forces fighting outside of Japan or Japanese territorial waters.”⁵² It is at this time that the idea of collective security, for Japan, became an issue. Japan, if ever involved in this type of situation, would have to decide if the actions it was taking would violate Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Even though Japan would eventually have to deal with the issue of collective security, the signing of the *Agreement*, according to Go Ito, signified that the bilateral cooperation (between the U.S. and Japan) would lead to greater security and stability in the international security environment.⁵³

While the signing of the *Agreement* and the renegotiated Guidelines represented a shift in Japan's security policy towards participation in international operations, the signing and passing of the “Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” in August 1999 represented a much more significant change. The August 1999 Law was a new commitment that went far beyond the PKO Law signed in 1992. This law allowed SDF troops to assist U.S. forces to “address 'regional contingencies' that involved the use of force outside of U.N. mandates.”⁵⁴ This law, according to Richard J. Samuels, was a response to the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis.⁵⁵ The Taiwan Straits Crisis posed potentially serious concerns about the state of relations with

⁵¹ Berger, Thomas U. "Germany, Japan and the War on Terror." *Society* Vol. 39, no. 5 (July-August 2002): [22-28]. Pg. 26.

⁵² Ibid. Pg. 26. The renegotiated language of the 1997 Guidelines, although stating that action could be taken outside of Japan or its territorial waters, was referring to the “surrounding area” of Japan. The renegotiated Guidelines did not specify action being taken in places outside of the “surrounding area” of Japan. Dittmer, Pg. 529.

⁵³ Ito, Pg. 31.

⁵⁴ Arase, David. "Japan, the Active State?: Security Policy After 9/11." *Asian Survey* Vol. XLVII, no. 4 (July-August 2007): [560-583]. Pg. 568.

⁵⁵ Samuels, Pg. 94. The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis occurred when China fired a test missile over Taiwan.

China. China believed that a stronger and more militarized Japan posed a threat to China.⁵⁶ Japan realized that a strengthening of the U.S.-Japan relationship could hamper the Japan-China relationship.⁵⁷ It is also possible that the United States would believe that a stronger U.S.-Japan relationship could hamper relations between the U.S. and China. These are important points because any legislation or actions by either Japan or the United States that could be seen as strengthening Japan or the U.S.-Japan alliance could be seen as a threat to China. A threatened China could possibly lead to an unstable East Asia region.

The signings of the multiple pieces of legislation in the mid to late 1990s provide a clear picture of Japan's systematic and consistent approach to changing its security policy. After various negotiations with the United States and within the Diet, Japan passed three significant pieces of legislation from 1995-1999 that would help Japan evolve from “checkbook diplomacy” to playing an active role in humanitarian missions. Japan was also able to pass legislation that would allow them to deploy SDF troops, or at least assist U.S. troops, in the event of a regional operation. It would not be until the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent actions by the U.S. that Japan would change its security policy to fit the bilateral alliance.

Policy Changes after the Afghanistan Invasion, 2001-2005

After the United States responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by putting together a multinational coalition to invade Afghanistan, Japan passed an anti-terrorism bill that

⁵⁶ Christensen. *China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia*. Pg. 62.

⁵⁷ Drifte, Reinhard. "US Impact on Japanese-Chinese Security Relations." *Security Dialogue* Vol. 31, no. 4 (December 2000): [449-462]. Pg. 455.

would facilitate its participation in the U.S.-led invasion. The “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law” (ATSML) was an effort by three parties (Liberal Democratic Party, New Kômeitô, and the Conservative Party) in the coalition government to provide non-combat rear support for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.⁵⁸ This law was part of Japan's response to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and it represented further change in Japan's security policy that began before the invasion. The changes that the law represents parallel the changes represented by the PKO Law. Japan took the basic structure and framework of the PKO Law and applied it to a more specific context of the Afghanistan invasion and in accordance with the security alliance with the United States.

After the outline of the bill had been created, Prime Minister Koizumi pushed it through the necessary subcommittees, as well as the Diet.⁵⁹ Even though Koizumi and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had a coalition majority in the Diet, the Defense subcommittee, one of the three subcommittees charged with reviewing the legislation, had one concern that would have to be addressed before any SDF troops could be deployed. The Defense subcommittee believed that the Diet needed to play a greater role in the legislation; therefore it stated that the Diet should approve any and all deployment of SDF troops before any were dispatched.⁶⁰ The bill, once introduced to the Diet, was

⁵⁸ In order to centralize and make decision making easier, Prime Minister Koizumi created an emergency response office in the Kantei (the Office of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet) within 24 hours of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Kliman, Pg. 82. The three coalition parties involved were the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Kômeitô, and the Conservative Party. The three parties agreed to an outline of the bill on September 25, 2001. Shinoda, Pg. 94.

⁵⁹ There were three subcommittees in which the legislation fell under their jurisdiction: the Cabinet, Defense, and Foreign Affairs subcommittees. Ibid. Pg. 95.

⁶⁰ The Defense subcommittee ultimately passed a resolution requiring that the Diet approve all deployment of SDF troops. Ibid. Pg. 95.

quickly approved on October 29, 2001.⁶¹ The ATSMML allowed for Japan to participate in a rear support role not only for the U.S. forces, but for other coalition forces as well. On November 9, 2001, Japan dispatched the MSDF to the Indian Ocean to refuel and re-supply the various forces operating in Afghanistan.⁶²

One of the most fascinating aspects of this bill is the speed with which Koizumi and his administration were able to get the bill passed. In just over one month (from September 25-October 29), the government was able to draft, debate, and pass legislation that would allow it to deploy forces and assist in the military efforts in and around Afghanistan. It took Japan four years, from 1995 to 1999, to be able to authorize the deployment of SDF forces in areas around Japan.⁶³ Although Prime Minister Koizumi was able to get this unprecedented legislation passed in such a rapid manner, he did run into opposition.

⁶¹ A press statement by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on October 29, 2001, announced the passing of the legislation, and the fact that the legislation was introduced on October 5, 2001. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by the Diet of Japan." October 29, 2001.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/speech/pm1029.html>. (accessed April 10, 2009).

⁶² Japan also deployed another contingent of the MSDF on November 26, 2001, and began its refueling efforts on December 2, 2001. Kliman, Pg. 85. Along with the United States, Japan refueled and re-supplied ships from Great Britain, Canada, New Zealand, as well as other European countries. Mochizuki, Mike M. "Between Alliance and Autonomy." *Strategic Asia* 2004-2005, [103-137]. Pg. 107.

⁶³ Arase, Pg. 571.

Table 3.2
Outline of Major Events/Crises, Participants, and Results After MSDF Deployment to Indian Ocean

Event/Crisis	Participant(s)	Event/Crisis Date	Result(s)
Creation of the Emergency Response Office	PM Koizumi, Kantei	September 11-12, 2001	Prime Minister Koizumi creates an office in the Kantei to centralize decision-making in emergency situations.
Drafting and Passing of Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML)	Japan, PM Koizumi, the Diet	September 25-October 29, 2001	The ATSML is passed, thus allowing the MSDF to deploy to the Indian Ocean in a non-combat rear-support role for coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Deployment of Refueling and Re-supply Flotilla of MSDF	Japan, MSDF	11/09/01	MSDF is deployed to Indian Ocean in a non-combat rear support role.
Deployment <i>Kongō</i> -class Aegis Destroyers	Japan, MSDF	December, 2001	Aegis destroyers deployed to patrol Indian Ocean and provide intelligence for U.S. forces.
Iraqi Reconstruction Law (IRL) [also known as the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance]	Japan, the Diet	07/26/03	IRL is passed in conjunction with adherences to UNSC Resolution 1483 allowing SDF deployment to Samawah, Iraq.
Renewal of ATSML	Japan, the Diet	October 2003 October 2005 October 2006	Renewal of ATSML allows for MSDF to continue non-combat rear support efforts in Afghanistan.
SDF Deployment to Samawah, Iraq	Japan, SDF	January 2004	600 SDF troops deployed to Samawah, Iraq for humanitarian and non-combat rear support efforts.
Diet Re-approves MSDF Mission in Indian Ocean	Japan, the Diet, MSDF	January 2008	The Diet re-approves MSDF mission in Indian Ocean after ATMSL was not renewed. Diet sends MSDF back to Indian Ocean.

Source: Author.

Along with sending escort destroyers with the refueling flotilla to the Indian Ocean, Koizumi wanted to send along Aegis destroyers. He had promised the United States that Japan would send its *Kongō*-class Aegis destroyers; however, there were concerns within the GOJ about such a deployment and ultimately no destroyers were dispatched.⁶⁴ One of the major obstacles to the dispatch of the Aegis destroyers was the fact that the Aegis war-fighting system (AWS) between the American and Japanese ships had the capacity to be linked together. Christopher W. Hughes points out that the deployment of the *Kongō*-class ships “would highlight problems with the exercise of collective self-defense and would risk that Japanese forces might become directly involved in combat operations.”⁶⁵ However, after much internal pressure from various Japanese government agencies and only after hostilities had calmed down in Afghanistan did the Aegis destroyers dispatch to the Indian Ocean.⁶⁶

One of the stipulations of the ATSMML that made the deployment of the Aegis destroyers, and any SDF forces in general, such a hot topic was that all forces deployed by Japan were to be out of the combat zone. Numerous Japanese officials in the Diet and citizens were still reluctant to put Japanese soldiers in danger.⁶⁷ As a compromise, the ATSMML expressly prohibits the SDF from engaging in combat forces are being attacked

⁶⁴ Heginbotham, Eric and Richard J. Samuels. "Japan's Dual Hedge." *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 81, no. 5 (2002): [110-121]. Pg. 116.

⁶⁵ Hughes, Christopher W. "Japan's Security Policy, the US-Japan Alliance, and the 'War on Terror': Incrementalism Confirmed or Radical Leap?" *Australian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 58, no. 4 (2004): [427-445]. Pg. 437.

⁶⁶ Most of the internal pressure came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), and the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF). *Ibid.* Pg. 437. The duty of the Aegis destroyers was to patrol the Indian Ocean and monitor sea traffic. Inoguchi and Bacon, Pg. 13.

⁶⁷ Rapp, William E. "Past its Prime?: The Future of the US-Japan Alliance." *Parameters* Vol. 34, no. 2 (Summer 2004): [104-120]. Pg. 113.

and only in the presence of a senior officer.⁶⁸ Therefore only after ensuring that the Aegis destroyers as well as other SDF soldiers would not be in a combat zone and that they would not be used in conjunction with U.S. ships in the region, the Diet approved the deployment of the Aegis destroyers in December 2001.⁶⁹ The ATSMML also stipulates that the SDF may not transport or provide ammunition and weapons.⁷⁰ In addition to prohibiting the transportation of weapons and ammunition, the Diet would have to sign off on any dispatch of SDF personnel.⁷¹

One other stipulation that accompanied the ATSMML was that, because ships and forces were to be deployed close to a combat zone, there would be a time limit on deployment. Any continued deployment or further deployments would require the ATSMML to be renewed. The original ATSMML was a two-year law that was passed in October 2001 and would have to be renewed every two years, beginning in October 2003.⁷² The ATSMML was “renewed” up until November 2007, when it was not renewed by the Diet.⁷³

Despite these “renewals,” there were some questions regarding why Japan was still participating. According to an editorial in The Japan Times On-line on October 11,

⁶⁸ "Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law." October 2001. http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html. (accessed April 10, 2009). Section 10, sub-sections (1) & (2). The “Peace Keeping and Other Operations Law” also stipulated that the SDF could not be deployed in a combat role. Inoguchi and Bacon, Pg. 13.

⁶⁹ Hughes, *Japan's Security Policy*. Pg. 436.

⁷⁰ Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008. Pg. 183.

⁷¹ Midford, Pg. 333.

⁷² Mochizuki, *Between Alliance and Autonomy* Pg. 107. It should be noted that the term “renewal” is inaccurate. According to the original Japanese texts of the “renewal” sessions, there were not any actual renewals of the law. There were only extensions for the deadline for renewal. Therefore the law was never renewed, it was in continuous effect and kept receiving an extension on the deadline to actually renew the law.

⁷³ The refusal to renew the law led the Diet to re-approve the overall mission of the MSDF, thus sending the MSDF back to the Indian Ocean in January 2008. Bisley, Pg. 80.

2003, the Diet failed to address a number of concerns regarding the extinction of the ATSMML. The editorial points out that the rapid manner in which the renewal legislation was passed failed to evaluate the scope of contributions of the MSDF as well as why the MSDF was still participating in the operation.⁷⁴ The same editorial also states that the lack of debate about the ATSMML renewal legislation brings up essential questions about Japan's role in the U.S.-Japan alliance and interpretation of the Constitution.⁷⁵ Another editorial by The Japan Times On-line written on September 30, 2005, states that the revision of the ATSMML (in October 2005) to allow for another one year extension to consider renewal of the ATSMML should be looked at very closely.⁷⁶ The editorial brings up concerns about the actual mission and contributions of the MSDF in the Indian Ocean, both in the Afghanistan and Iraq missions.

According to the September 30, 2005, editorial, the doubts and the continued debate over the use of force and Article 9 and the impossibility of eliminating terrorism “Japan should expand its activities that concentrate on eliminating the social and economic causes of terrorism in cooperation with other nations under the leadership of the United Nations.”⁷⁷ These notions and concerns about the participation differ strongly from earlier support that was illustrated in an editorial written less than two weeks after 9/11. At that time, The Japan Times On-line September 22, 2001, editorial stated that it

⁷⁴ The Japan Times On-Line. "Editorial: Antiterror Debate Deserved Better." October 11, 2003. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20031011a1.html>. (accessed April 19, 2009).

⁷⁵ According to the editorial, major debate would slow down the passage of the legislation thus hindering the alliance with the United States; and, any debate would bring about serious discussion about Article 9 and whether it should be revised. Debate about the potential of revising Article 9, according to the editorial, is something that should take place. Ibid.

⁷⁶ The Japan Times On-Line. "Editorial: Extending the SDF Missions." September 30, 2005. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20050930a1.html>. (accessed April 19, 2009).

⁷⁷ Ibid.

was time for Japan to “show the flag” and clearly establish what Japan can and cannot do in a support role.⁷⁸ It also stated that although debate about the Constitution is necessary, it is more important for Japan to be part of the international community before the Constitutional debate.⁷⁹ It is possible that Constitutional debate could hamper Japanese efforts.⁸⁰

In the period from December 2001 to November 2007, the MSDF supplied 450,000 kiloliters of fuel to the various coalition forces,⁸¹ but although Japan was providing rear support to U.S. and coalition forces, the United States put very little pressure on Japan to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom. As Paul Midford points out, the United States pressure on Japan was much less than it had been during the first Gulf Crisis; in his opinion, Washington saw Japan's support role as being less important, especially in the larger scope of the operation.⁸² In fact, it was actually pressure by the MSDF on American naval officers that made the Americans in turn pressure Japan for assistance in the operation.⁸³

⁷⁸ The Japan Times On-line. "Editorial: Supporting the War on Terrorism." September 22, 2001. <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ed20010922a1.html>. (accessed April 19, 2009).

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ The monetary value of the fuel is roughly \$168 million (US). Totals are as of August 31, 2006. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan Decides to Continue to Dispatch JMSDF Vessels to the Indian Ocean in Order to Support International Efforts to Fight Against Terrorism (Extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law)." October 27, 2006.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/measure0610.html>. (accessed April 10, 2009). The fuel provided by Japan provided about 30% of all the fuel used by the U.S. and other coalition ships. Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Mark E. Manyin, and William H. Cooper. "Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress." *Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress* (October 5, 2006): Pg. 4.

⁸² Midford, Pg. 333, 335.

⁸³ The MSDF pressured the US Navy immediately after 9/11, and again in April 2002. The April 2002 pressure was to get the United States to request advanced air-defense Aegis destroyers and P3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft. The United States agreed, and in turn pressured Japan for these resources. Ibid. Pg. 336.

Japan responded to the criticism over its lack of participation in the first Persian Gulf Crisis by becoming an active participant in the Afghanistan mission. This participation marks a stark contrast in Japan's security policy. Japan's efforts in the Afghanistan mission, albeit away from the combat zone, coupled with Koizumi's extremely high popularity in Japan⁸⁴ and a coalition majority in the Diet helped Japan branch out and be a more visible member of the international community. This visibility and rear support success, along with Koizumi's support of the U.S.' "War on Terror" contributed to Japan's participation in the reconstruction of Iraq after the 2003 invasion by the United States.

In July 2003, Japan passed the Iraqi Reconstruction Law. This law, in conjunction with UN Security Council Resolution 1483, paved the way for Japan to provide reconstruction and humanitarian support in Iraq.⁸⁵ The incorporation of UNSC Resolution 1483 was a way to assure opposition members of the Diet that Japanese personnel would not be put into the combat zone and would be out of danger.⁸⁶ To further ensure that Japanese personnel would be out of danger and not engaging in combat, British and Dutch troops defended the 600 Japanese troops in Samawah, Iraq.⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Koizumi's approval rating was as high as 87% during his tenure as Prime Minister. Shinoda, Pg. 90.

⁸⁵ Mochizuki, *Between Alliance and Autonomy* Pg. 108.

⁸⁶ United Nation Security Council Resolution 1483 outlined the UN efforts to rebuild and provide humanitarian efforts in Iraq. United Nations Security Council, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483." (May 22, 2003): [1-7]. Pg.2 (section 2). <http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/210503.pdf>. (accessed April 24, 2009). With the stipulation that UNSC 1483 was a humanitarian resolution, and with the resolution being directly from the UN, Japan was able to justify the sending of SDF troops to Iraq. Also, Japan was honoring the 1999 Peace and Security Law that allowed the deployment of SDF troops in United States operations that were not mandated by the UN.

⁸⁷ The Japanese troops were deployed to Samawah, Iraq, in January 2004. Samuels, Pg. 98.

Comparative Analysis of Self-Defense Force Deployment Policy Changes

Throughout this chapter I have shown how Japan has incrementally changed its security policy, but that the Japanese response to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan enabled the escalation of change associated with the deployment of the SDF. The systematic changes by Japan have allowed it to go from a country participating in international operations by only contributing financially to participating actively in humanitarian and non-combat rear support efforts. As a result of domestic politics and restrictions on Japanese capabilities (because of Article 9) during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis, Japan was unable to contribute other than financially. Because of this lack of participation and despite the huge financial contribution of \$13 billion (US), Japan was the target of much international criticism.⁸⁸ Japan was able to transform its security policy, with the assistance of the United States and the United Nations, by engaging in PKOs and passing various forms of legislation easing the restrictions on the deployment of the SDF. It would be the eventual deployment and success of Japanese troops in PKOs that would allow the Diet as well as the Japanese public to be more receptive to future legislation and SDF deployments in response to Afghanistan and Iraq.

While Japan had been systematically changing its security policy, that followed a consistent path of change, there were two instances in which an exogenous event played a role in propelling Japan into further change. The first event, one I had not anticipated, was the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. Although legislation was not passed until 1999, the Taiwan Straits Crisis alerted Japan that it needed to protect itself as well as provide regional stability. The ensuing change came about with the signing of the “Law Ensuring

⁸⁸ Mochizuki, *Between Alliance and Autonomy*, Pg. 106.

Peace and Security in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” in August 1999. As a result of this law, Japan was able to deploy SDF troops in U.S.-led operations in Japan's “surrounding area,” essentially meaning the East Asia and South East Asia regions. It is also conceivable that Japan would have reached this point by continuing its systematic approach, but the fact that Japan became worried about a situation and reacted to it created change consistent with the established path of change.

The second incident that caused Japan to react was the U.S.-led coalition invasion of Afghanistan. Japan's uncharacteristically quick and profound response to the 9/11 attacks and the Afghanistan invasion was astonishing. By September 19, 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had announced that he supported the U.S. and its subsequent actions.⁸⁹ Japan responded by drafting and passing the ATSMML in just over one month.⁹⁰ This legislation allowed for the deployment of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean in a non-combat rear-area support role. While David Leheny and Peter J. Katzenstein argue that Japan's efforts were largely symbolic, Japan's contributions cannot be denied.⁹¹ Japan provided nearly one-third of all fuel used by the United States, Great Britain, France, and other coalition members, as well as logistical support, replenishment of water, and hundreds of airlift support missions.⁹²

Japan's change in security policy is an encouraging sign to the U.S. and is an effort to strengthen the bilateral alliance. While the actions taken by Japan, more

⁸⁹ Arase, Pg. 570. PM Koizumi had also stated on September 12 that Japan would support the U.S. and its allies, and on September 15 he announced that Japan would provide any and all assistance it could, with the exception of combat. Kliman, Pg. 77.

⁹⁰ The drafting began on September 25, 2001 and was signed on October 29, 2001.

⁹¹ Katzenstein, Peter J. "Same War-Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism." *International Organization* Vol. 57, no. 4 (Autumn 2003): [731-760]. Pg. 752. Leheny, David. "Tokyo Confronts Terror." *Policy Review* 110 (December-January 2001): [37-47]. Pg. 41.

⁹² Chanlett-Avery et. al, Pg. 4.

specifically the Koizumi administration, are a sign that the “checkbook diplomacy” era is over, as Alan Dupont argues, Japan still has much work to do in order to become a much bigger player in the international security community.⁹³ Japan still will need to come up with a clear definition of collective security as well as decide whether or not to revise Article 9 of the Constitution. What is undeniable, though, is that Japan has been able to redefine its security policy from that of only contributing financially to being an active member of multinational operations. Japan's efforts to systematically change its security policy by passing multiple pieces of legislation prior to the invasion of Afghanistan and its response of providing non-combat rear support for the U.S. and other forces after the invasion show distinct policy change.

While Japan's security policy changes in response to the invasion of Afghanistan show distinct and significant policy change, they are also subtle in regard to the scale of the change. While Japan did respond directly to the invasion, its response was based on an already established line of change. Japan had made systematic changes that followed a consistent path of change. First was the passage of legislation that allowed Japan to participate in UN-mandated PKOs. Second was the re-negotiation of the 1997 Defense Guidelines that allowed the Japan to provide assistance to the U.S. in areas outside of Japan. Third was the passage of the 1999 Peace and Security Law that allowed the deployment of SDF troops in U.S. operations that were not mandated by the UN, outside of the territory and territorial waters of Japan.⁹⁴ Fourth, the passage of the ATSMML in

⁹³ Dupont, Alan. "The Schizophrenic Superpower." *The National Interest* 79 (Spring 2005): [43-51]. Pg. 45.

⁹⁴ The deployment of SDF troops were to be in the “surrounding area” of Japan, thus implying the East Asia and Southeast Asia regions.

2001 allowed the deployment of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean in a rear-area support role for the U.S.-led coalition invasion of Afghanistan. Finally, in 2003, the IRL was passed allowing the deployment of SDF troops, the first such deployment of its kind for the Japanese since World War II, to Iraq.

While this chronology of events shows a systematic and consistent approach of Japan in changing its security policy, the passage of the ATSMML was in response to the Afghanistan invasion. While the response by Japan was consistent with previous developments in security policy, directly after and in response to the invasion, the response shows that the Afghanistan invasion did indeed act as a catalyst to propel further change. It is possible that at some point Japan would have eventually passed similar legislation to the ATSMML; but Japan's response to the Afghanistan invasion and subsequent passage of the ATSMML demonstrates the event was a catalyst for change. However, the changes followed a trajectory that did not starkly deviate from the previous path. In contrast, the change in the Japan's policies regarding a ballistic missile defense system in response to the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, the next case, is much more pronounced.

Chapter 4

Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense System Policy Changes

The apparent buildup of military strength of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has led to a heightened state of alert by the Government of Japan (GOJ), allies of the GOJ, East Asian countries, and the DPRK. While many factors contributed to these heightened states of alert, it was the 14-month period from October 2002 to December 2003 that would create significant changes in the relationship, or lack thereof, between the GOJ and the DPRK, as well as the GOJ and the United States. This 14-month period, known as either the 2003 North Korean Missile Crisis or 2003 North Korean Nuclear Crisis, marked a dramatic shift in Japan's efforts to procure a Ballistic Missile Defense system (BMD).⁹⁵

In August 1998, North Korea got the attention of the GOJ and the world when it launched a *Taepodong-1* missile in the direction of Japan, and it caused even more concern when it launched two more missiles in 2003. The 2003 launches caused alarm to Japan, the United States, China, and South Korea (Republic of Korea [ROK]) because according to Central Intelligence Agency estimates, North Korea had one or two plutonium bombs.⁹⁶ Although North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il had explicitly stated to the Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, that North Korea would be enacting a

⁹⁵ Kliman, Pg. 94. Gilbert Rozman, in his book *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis*, labels the time period from 2002-2007 as a nuclear crisis, not as a missile crisis.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Pg. 6.

missile test moratorium until after 2003,⁹⁷ North Korea launched the missile tests on February 24, 2003, and March 10, 2003. Because North Korea already had the capability to reach almost all of Japan with its Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), the *Nodong-1*, and potentially could attach nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads to the missiles, it was important that Japan and other regional players address the situation with North Korea. The announcement by Pyongyang that they had 8,000 reprocessed nuclear fuel rods and enough plutonium to create six nuclear weapons prompted the Six-Party talks between the United States, Japan, China, North Korea, South Korea and Russia to resume.⁹⁸ However, the Six-Party talks failed to accomplish anything significant, and in this state of heightened tensions, Japan made a dramatic change in its position on BMD.

This chapter will look at how Japan changed its policy regarding a BMD system. In the first section I will show the process of systematic changes prior to the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis. In the second section I will show how the 2003 Missile Crisis was an exogenous event that acted as a catalyst to propel change in Japan's BMD policy beyond the incremental changes thus far. In the final section I will compare and analyze the changes prior to and after the 2003 Missile Crisis. In this analysis, I will demonstrate that the consistent and systematic change that Japan was engaged in prior to the event

⁹⁷ Pinkston, Daniel A. *The North Korea Ballistic Missile Program*. Strategic Studies Institute, 2008. Pg. 27.

⁹⁸ This announcement coincided with North Korea's ability to attach a smaller nuclear warhead to its *Nodong-1* missile, in June 2003. Kliman, Pg. 97. Also, according to the "2005 National Defense White Paper of South Korea", it is believed that North Korea had 2,500-5,000 tons worth of chemical, toxic, and biological components which may have the potential of being used in an attack against Japan. Kaneda, Hideaki, Kazumasa Kobayashi, Hiroshi Tajima, and Hirofumi Tosaki. "Japan's Missile Defense: Diplomatic and Security Policies in a Changing Strategic Environment." *The Japan Institute of Foreign Affairs* (March 2007): [1-188]. Pg. 38. http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/policy_report/pr200703-jmd.pdf. (accessed March 30, 2009).

only followed changes stipulated by the Joint Declaration. The 2003 Missile Crisis served as a catalyst for a Japanese response beyond what was stipulated in the Joint Declaration.

Policy Changes prior to the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, 1995-2002

Beginning in 1995, the United States and Japan began negotiating a redefinition of their bilateral alliance. The negotiations and cooperation to redefine the bilateral alliance led to the signing of the *Joint Declaration*. Of the many areas that both Japan and the United States looked at, the creation of a BMD system was one of the more controversial and important areas of consideration. Encompassed in this document was a section pertaining to nuclear weapons and a BMD system. Section 5(e) of the *Joint*

Declaration states that:

The two governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implication for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.⁹⁹

This statement within the *Joint Declaration* is ambiguous and vague. Although it states that the U.S. and Japan will continue to cooperate with each other and study a BMD system, that is about all it specifies. Nowhere does the document specify what will be studied by which country, when, or with how much cooperation between the two countries. It leaves many avenues of research open. Besides not addressing avenues of research, the *Joint Declaration* also fails to enact a time line for the research or implementation of a BMD system, should one be feasible.

⁹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century*. April 17, 1996. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>. (accessed October 21, 2008).

However, even though Japan agreed to engage in a bilateral study with the United States regarding a BMD system, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) declined in 1995 to go beyond bilateral study. It was not until the *Taepodong-1* missile flyover in August 1998 that Japan agreed to do joint research with the U.S.¹⁰⁰ The missile launch demonstrated a clear threat that needed to be addressed. Japan and the United States agreed in December 1998 that they would jointly pursue research on the Navy Theater Wide Defense system.¹⁰¹ In August 1999, the United States and Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that outlined “a five-year program of joint research and development on the...ballistic missile defense program...”¹⁰² This is one instance in which Japan had agreed in principle with the United States to conduct research on a BMD system, but an exogenous event acted as a catalyst and led Japan to engage in cooperative research with the U.S. Once that event occurred Japan engaged in research that corresponded to the statement made within the *Joint Declaration* guidelines.

¹⁰⁰ Kliman, Pg. 108.

¹⁰¹ There were four areas of research pertaining to that agreement and defense system: lightweight nose cone, stage-two rocket engine, advanced kinetic warhead, and two-color infrared sensor. Cronin, Richard P. Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division. CRS Report for Congress, *Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects*. March 19, 2002. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9186.pdf>. Pg. 14. (accessed March 20, 2009).

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Pg. 10.

Table 4.1
Outline of Major Events/Crises, Participants, and Results Prior to 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis

Event/Crisis	Participant(s)	Event/Crisis Date	Result(s)
Signing of <i>Joint Declaration</i>	Japan, United States	04/17/96	Both countries pledge to cooperate in BMD studies
Independent Studies	Japan	1995-1999	Japan conducts studies independent of United States. Independent studies do not indicate cooperative research with the United States.
1998 <i>Taepodong-1</i> Missile Launch	North Korea	08/31/98	North Korean <i>Taepodong-1</i> Missile flies over Japanese island of Honshu
Navy Theater Wide (NTW) Agreement Signed	Japan, United States	December, 1998	Japan agrees to participate in cooperative/joint NTW research with United States
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Signed	Japan, United States	August, 1999	MOU outlines a 5-year joint research program on BMD
Japan-North Korea Summit	Japan, North Korea	September 2002	Talks between Japan and North Korea. North Korea announces a missile test moratorium.

Source: Author.

Even though it was not until 1998 that Japan agreed to joint research with the U.S., Japan had already been conducting research studies on its own. A report by the

Japan Defense Agency (JDA)¹⁰³ of August 1995 argued in favor of a BMD system, but it also stated that the current technology utilized in BMD systems had deficiencies.¹⁰⁴ That same report, “On Research Concerning Ballistic Missile Defense,” also prompted the JDA to call for several more studies. “Subsequently, in December 1995, the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for FY 1996-2000 stated that the government of Japan would conduct extensive research on ballistic missile defense and would come to a conclusion by the end of the MTDP.”¹⁰⁵ Along with the JDA studies, Japan also created the Office of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMDR), which would work in conjunction with its U.S. counterpart, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), which would assess the threat of North Korea's *Nodong-1* missiles.¹⁰⁶ The BMDR and BMDO worked together on research and development on two of the four areas pertaining to the NTW system.¹⁰⁷

While the independent BMD studies were underway, and tensions were mounting in response to North Korea's August 1998 launch of a *Taepodong-1* missile, Japanese officials contended with domestic political concerns. Those concerns ranged from a growing North Korea-phobia to questions regarding Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and what constitutes collective self-defense.¹⁰⁸ Other concerns included

¹⁰³ The JDA became the Ministry of Defense in January 2007. Samuels, Pg. 52.

¹⁰⁴ Swaine, Michael D., Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakumi. *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001. Pg. 30.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. Pg. 31.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. Pg. 32.

¹⁰⁷ Japan and the United States jointly researched and developed the infrared sensors (labeled as seeker in diagram) and the kinetic warheads. Japan independently researched and developed the nose cone and the two stage rockets. Ministry of Defense of Japan. “Japan's BMD.” February 2009 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/bmd/bmd2009.pdf. Pg. 19. (accessed April 1, 2009). The BMDO and BMDR created cooperative groups to work on specific projects within the greater R&D program.

¹⁰⁸ The North Korea-phobia stemmed from historical tensions between the two countries, as well as the fact that it was widely believed in Japan that the DPRK had kidnapped Japanese citizens (which would eventually be revealed September 2002). Also, Japanese citizens, as well as the Diet, were torn between

“[T]he 1998 firing of a *Taepodong-I* missile [which] came amidst heightened media coverage of alleged kidnapping[s] and concern[s] about U.S.-China relations bypassing Japan.”¹⁰⁹ Finally, the content of policy among the points of controversy was Japan's research and development of sensors and satellite based information gathering.

Some of the public and members of the Japanese Diet argued that the research, development, and eventual deployment of such technology would constitute a direct military use of space, which was illegal in Japan.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the Diet was being pressured by industry, most likely vying for contracts for the sensors and satellites.¹¹¹ However, through re-interpretation of the law, and with a re-designated purpose of the satellites, Japan was able to proceed with researching, developing and deploying space based satellites that could detect missile launches and their trajectory. The Diet was also able to go ahead with the satellites by giving the public enough time to get used to the idea. The satellites were termed as “information gathering” satellites, which eliminated the notion that they were used purely for military matters. This decision

the definition of collective self-defense and whether or not a BMD system would go against the premise “minimum self-defense” outlined in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Sebata, Takeo. "Japan's Dilemma and a Problem of the Right to Collective Self-Defense Under the 1997 Guidelines." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, vol. XIX, no. 3 (Fall 2007): [145-155] Pg. 146. One final issue that Japan was concerned about was the China factor. In 1995-96, China was involved in the Taiwan Straits crisis, which Japan feared may spill over into the Sea of Japan. China was also concerned that the R&D on a BMD system, by Japan, was in response to the Taiwan Straits Crisis, and that Japan may use the BMD in protection of Taiwan. Christensen, Thomas J. "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia." *International Security* vol. 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): [49-80] Pg.64.

¹⁰⁹ Rozman, Gilbert. *Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Pg. 148.

¹¹⁰ Oros, Pg. 143.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, Pg. 145-146.

to deploy the satellites was reached on December 25, 1998, four months after the *Taepodong-1* launch.¹¹²

One of the more important aspects of research that the United States and Japan had to address was the kind of BMD system that should be researched, developed, and possibly deployed. The Sea-Based Mid-course System [SMDS] (which was originally the Navy Theater Wide Defense [NTWD] system) was chosen based on the fact that the Aegis destroyers, in Japan's naval fleet, were already compatible with the systems needed to launch from the sea.¹¹³ Additionally, the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2), and eventually PAC-3, missile systems used for ground based defense could be stationed on both U.S. and Japanese bases in Japan.

One aspect of the R&D on the BMD system that both the United States and Japan met independently of one another was the procurement of funds. The procurement of funds allowed the U.S. and Japan to continue joint R&D on the Sea-Based Mid-course System, the missile sensors, and the kinetic warhead. Japan also needed to have funds to be able to do independent research on the missile nose cone and two-stage rocket. The United States worked independently on radar systems, including the X-Band radar system. During the beginning phases of the studies, Japan was suffering from tight budget restrictions, while the United States' economy was booming. Despite this fact, after the 1998 *Taepodong-1* launch, Japan contributed \$300 million (U.S.) over a six year

¹¹² Ibid. Pg. 139.

¹¹³ Swaine et. al, Pg. 33. The recommendation of the Navy Theater Wide (NTW) portion of the BMD system was proposed by the JDA after reports were provided to the JDA from the Theater Missile Defense Working Group (TMD WG), in 1997.

period toward a U.S.-led Theater Missile Defense system (TMD).¹¹⁴ During the next five years the U.S. contributed \$2.3 billion just for NTWD development.¹¹⁵ Although the U.S. contributed far more than Japan did, Japan kept contributing more money as the situation with North Korea became tenser and the feasibility of a BMD system became more apparent.

Although Japanese financial contributions to joint research with the U.S. were minimal at the very beginning of joint research, Japanese expenditures quickly grew. During the fiscal years (FY) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, Japanese expenditures grew from 0.96 billion yen (1999), 2.05 billion yen (2000), and 3.70 billion yen (2001) respectively.¹¹⁶ According to a 2002 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, “the Japanese Diet has appropriated about 6.9 billion yen [\$53.1 million]...for design and trial manufacturing activities...the Defense Department has requested \$31.9 million for the same program element”.¹¹⁷ Despite the growing financial contributions and the advances made in BMD technology, estimates from various Japanese studies and organizations claimed that Japan would need to spend a total of \$10 billion to \$50 billion for the BMD system, along with \$30 billion just for R&D.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ The difference between a TMD system and a BMD system is that a TMD system would encompass shooting down missiles headed to the U.S. However, because of Article 9, Japan is not allowed to do that. Therefore a BMD system was developed as it is more of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, purely for the defensive purposes of Japan.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. Pg. 21, 23.

¹¹⁶ Umemoto Tetsuya, *Reinventing the Alliance*, Pg. 187. Using the beginning of the Japanese FY (April 1) the currency conversion into the US dollar is such: \$8,044,917 (1999); \$20,043,019 (2000); \$29,306,931 (2001).

¹¹⁷ Cronin, Pg. 13. The money appropriated by Japan was for FY 2002, while the money appropriated by the U.S. was for FY 2003.

¹¹⁸ The monetary figures are thought to have equaled or exceeded Japan's entire defense budgets, as of FY2001. Swaine et. al, Pg. 67. According to a report put out by the Center for Defense Intelligence on October 10, 2003, the operating and maintenance costs of a BMD could exceed 1 trillion yen. Kotani,

Also, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) put out joint statements from the two governments. These statements continued to stress the importance of not only a BMD system, but also the non-proliferation of WMDs. The December 16, 2002, SCC statement claims:

Based on the shared recognition of the growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, the two sides emphasized the need for a comprehensive strategy to address such proliferation, including both defense systems and diplomatic initiatives. The Japanese side reaffirmed that a ballistic missile defense system is an important consideration in Japan's defense policy, which is exclusively defense-oriented. The Japanese side noted that a ballistic missile defense system would be an inherently defensive capability...The Ministers acknowledged the need to continue current U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.¹¹⁹

The SCC statement emphasized the importance of continued research and development as well as the continued cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. This statement was made amidst the beginning stage of the 2003 North Korean Missile Crisis.

Even though the signing of the April 1996 *Joint Declaration* had stipulated cooperative research and potential development of a BMD system, Japan did not actively begin to do this until 1999. Japan was more content to go about doing its own studies on the feasibility and technological requirements for a BMD system. It was not until the August 1998 launch of a *Taepodong-1* missile by North Korea that Japan finally engaged in cooperative research with the U.S. In 1999, Japan formally decided “to participate in a U.S.-led TMD program...”¹²⁰ Because of the potential threat from North Korea and

Rui. Center for Defense Information. “Japan's Recent Step-up in Missile Defense.” October 10, 2003. <http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1725>. (Accessed April 1, 2009). The approximate budget needed to operate and maintain a BMD system is roughly “0.34 percent of Japan's GDP, and 40 percent of Japan's annual defense budget...” Swaine et. al, Pg. 31-32.

¹¹⁹ U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. *Joint Statement: U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee*. December 16, 2002. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0212.html>. (accessed October 29, 2008).

¹²⁰ Swaine et. al, Pg. 23.

Japan's pure defense-minded security policy, it was important for the country to engage in cooperative research with the U.S.¹²¹

Although joint research was finally happening, it was happening slowly. Kliman states that “[I]n 2000, the Japanese government insisted that fielding a BMD system would require separate decisions at both the development and deployment stages.”¹²² It was at this time that the U.S. and Japan “agreed to cooperate in studying four areas—heat shields, kinetic warheads, heat-seeking guidance systems and rocket engines.”¹²³ However, even though Japan had agreed to do joint, cooperative research with the U.S., Japan did so by cooperating in three distinct phases: research, development, and procurement/deployment.¹²⁴

Japan's decision to separate the research into three distinct phases was a stark contrast to the United States. The U.S. did not distinguish between the phases of research and that of development. Because of this, the U.S. was more likely to move more quickly from R&D to deployment because there were only two phases instead of three. The inclusion of a third and separate phase in the R&D, by Japan, has created an extra time consuming step that may have had an effect on Japan's rate of R&D and eventual commitment to the deployment of a BMD. Japan separated the phases into researching

¹²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Defense Technology.” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/arrange.html>. (accessed April 1, 2009).

¹²² Kliman, Pg. 36.

¹²³ Green, Michael Jonathan and Akihisa Nagashima. “Key Areas to Watch in Japan-U.S. Security Relations.” *Japan Quarterly* 46, no. 1, 1999:

¹²⁴ This created a slight wrinkle in the cooperative nature in the agreement due to the fact that while Japan had more flexibility in conducting research in their three phases, the United States did not have three phases. The U.S. did not distinguish between research and development as two separate phases. In the U.S. system, research and development are in one phase together. Jimbo, Ken. “A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination.” *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 9, no. 2 (summer 2002): [56-62]. Pg. 57.

the feasibility and technological requirements for a BMD system, developing the technology for it, and deploying the technology. The U.S. researched and developed at the same time, rather than doing the two phases separately like the Japanese. This may have been a reason why Japan was slower to research and develop BMD related technologies, as compared to the U.S.

By looking at how Japan's policies and attitudes changed in relation to a BMD as I have, I have shown a distinct and consistent pattern of change. Japan went from showing only a mild interest in a BMD system and minimal cooperation on R&D with the U.S. to showing a strong interest in a BMD system and a much more cooperative attitude regarding joint R&D with the U.S. However, Japan's interest in a BMD system and cooperative R&D with the U.S. grew as North Korea began to become more of a threat to Japan. There were still issues, however, that prevented the Japan from adopting a BMD system.

Even though the United States was providing most of the financial support, and even though Japan had found a way to address most its domestic concerns (China, domestic politics, Article 9, etc.), the Japanese were unwilling or simply unable to commit to procuring a BMD system. As of mid-2002, Japan was requiring a 100 percent rate of success when intercepting ballistic missiles before it would implement and deploy a BMD system.¹²⁵ However, I have also shown that when pressured by an exogenous event (in this case the 1998 *Taepodong-1* launch) Japan will respond and change its

¹²⁵ Kliman, Pg. 102.

policies. In the next section I will take this concept of an exogenous event acting as a catalyst for change and apply it to the missile crisis of 2003.

Policy Changes after the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, 2003-2005

For decades Japan has retained a clause imposed by the United States in its Constitution that bans the use of offensive force by Japan. Article 9 and the continued protective umbrella of its relationship with the U.S. have given Japan a sense of stability and security. However, the posturing and missile launches by North Korea in 1998 and 2003 showed that Japan is not as safe and secure as previously thought. These missile launches, especially the 2003 launches, provided an opportunity for Japan to begin to redefine its security approach.

Prior to the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, Japan and the United States had been jointly studying technological requirements, financial contributions, and feasibility of a BMD system to protect Japan. Although this was a controversial topic given the structure of domestic politics in Japan, the GOJ, along with the Bush administration, felt that a BMD system was an extremely important piece of foreign policy, especially amidst the “Growing risks of missile proliferation and development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction...”¹²⁶ This type of thinking was even more clear and pronounced immediately before, during, and following the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis.

¹²⁶ Campbell, Kurt M. and Yuki Tatsumi. "In the Aftermath of the Storm: US Foreign Policy in the wake of 9/11 and its Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region." *Asia-Pacific Review*, vol. 9, no. 2 (2002): 31-44. Pg. 34.

During the beginning stages of the crisis, Japan and North Korea had been trying to come to a diplomatic arrangement. In September of 2002, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and their advisors engaged in a summit in Pyongyang, North Korea. During the summit, North Korea announced that it had kidnapped Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983. This admission by Kim Jong-Il left Japanese citizens furious.¹²⁷ This admission came just before the Missile Crisis began. In December of 2002, North Korea also announced that it would resume all functions at its nuclear facilities.¹²⁸ With Japan already afraid of potential missile attacks from North Korea, the announcement of a resumption of all nuclear activities accentuated that concern. Because North Korea's missiles were capable of carrying nuclear warheads and its 200 road-mobile *Nodongs* had the capability of striking Tokyo, Japan was understandably worried about a potential missile attack from North Korea.¹²⁹

Japan continued its diplomatic efforts and its ongoing research and study with the U.S. North Korea's missile launches on February 24, 2003, and March 10, 2003, were a signal to Japan that it needed to change its stance. Instead of only continuing research and study on a BMD system, Japan purchased a BMD system from the United States. "On December 19, 2003, Japan's chief cabinet secretary announced that Japan would deploy both of these types of missile defense beginning in 2004: PAC-2 (and, when available,

¹²⁷ Kliman, Pg. 99.

¹²⁸ Ibid., Pg. 97.

¹²⁹ Pinkston, Pg. vii, 48.

PAC-3) ground-based interceptor missiles and Aegis-based upper-tier interceptor missiles.”¹³⁰ This marked a stark contrast to previous Japanese policy.

Table 4.2
Outline of Major Events/Crises, Participants, and Results After 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis

Event/Crisis	Participant(s)	Event/Crisis Date	Result(s)
Joint Studies	Japan, United States	2003-2005	Japan and United States engage in joint cooperative studies in the research and development of various components of a BMD system
First North Korean Missile Launch	North Korea	02/24/03	North Korea launches missile into Sea of Japan
Second North Korean Missile Launch	North Korea	03/10/03	North Korea launches missile into Sea of Japan
Japan Buys Off-the-Shelf Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System	Japan	12/19/03	Japan buys BMD system from United States in response to North Korean missile launches
Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) Created	Japan, United States	10/29/05	BJOCC is a joint U.S./Japanese organization designed to do cooperative research as well as information gathering and sharing

Source: Author.

The launching of the missiles in 2003 prompted a significant change in Japanese policy that could most likely only happen through, or because of, this kind of event. If North Korea had not launched the missiles, it is possible that despite all of the already brewing hostilities regarding its resuming nuclear activities and its admission of kidnapping Japanese citizens, Japan may have been content to continue researching a BMD system. Only when Japan was ready and satisfied with the results would it then

¹³⁰ Oros, Pg. 153.

deploy a BMD system. However, North Korea essentially forced Japan's hand, causing it to change its policy and act in a more assertive, less passive manner.

Furthermore, just because Japan possesses a BMD system does not mean that it is ceasing its research on BMD systems. Japan's decision to procure a BMD system from the United States in no way negates its agreement in the 1996 *Joint Declaration* to continue to study BMD systems and the non-proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems. In fact, the February 19, 2005 SCC statement stresses the fact that continued joint research and non-proliferation efforts between the U.S. and Japan are key to ensuring the stability of the Asia-Pacific Region.¹³¹ The October 29, 2005 SCC statement reinforces the February 19, 2005 statement by asserting that:

...BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities. To support these BMD systems, they emphasized the critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing...¹³²

Also, the bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) was created in response to direction from the SCC.¹³³ These statements by the SCC show a continued support by both the U.S. and Japan to continue to improve the security of Japan, and that of the Asia-Pacific region.

¹³¹ U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. *Joint Statement*. February 19, 2005. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>. (accessed October 29, 2008).

¹³² U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. *U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future*. October 29, 2005. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>. (accessed October 29, 2008).

¹³³ U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. *Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation*. May 1, 2007. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html>. (accessed October 29, 2008). The BJOCC is a joint organization between the United States and Japan and works together to pass along information and joint policy coordination. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/bmd/bmd2009.pdf. Pg. 26.

As Japan continues to show support and cooperation with the U.S. on the subject of a BMD system, it is clear that although the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis acted as a catalyst that propelled further change, Japan continues to adhere to the guidelines set forth in the 1996 *Joint Declaration*. The next section will address further changes in Japan's security and their relationship with the U.S. by comparing what occurred prior to the missile crisis and what happened after it.

Comparative Analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense Policy Changes

As I have shown throughout the previous two sections, Japan underwent a series of changes concerning a BMD system that can be partially attributed to the guidelines set forth by the 1996 *Joint Declaration*. As I previously stated, the guidelines were just that, a set of guidelines. They in no way, shape, or form dictated policy or set any time lines for study, implementation, or deployment. The guidelines merely stated that both Japan and the U.S. would cooperate with each other in the study of a BMD system for Japan. The guidelines also stated that the U.S. and Japan would cooperate in non-proliferation efforts related to WMDs, ballistic missiles, and their delivery systems. One of the original reasons for a BMD system in Japan was to ensure regional stability and perhaps, as many scholars speculate, to counter the growing military strength of China. Although this was and still remains a popular sentiment amongst scholars, it was the growing tensions and eventual missile launches by North Korea that prompted Japan to procure a BMD system from the United States.

The efforts to pursue a BMD system cooperatively were spearheaded by U.S. policy. As Andrew Oros states, “Missile defense is not a policy option considered by Japan independently of U.S. policy planning. It is a direct response by Japan to U.S. initiative, U.S. planning, and U.S. pressure.”¹³⁴ While this certainly appears to be the case, the *Taepodong-1* launch of 1998 and the missile launches in 2003 suggest otherwise. The 1998 and 2003 launches provided Japan with opportunities to engage in BMD policy not directly related to any U.S.-led initiative, such as the BMD program that was agreed upon immediately after the 1998 launch. In response to the missile launches, Japan decided to pursue research on space-based satellite technologies, as well as the procurement of the BMD system in 2003. The decision to pursue the satellite technologies and the BMD system is a direct response to the missile launches, thus supporting the idea that an exogenous event propels the continuation of change.

The missile launches in 1998 and 2003 thrust Japan into a more assertive and active role with the U.S. It was during this time period, 1999-2003, that Japan worked cooperatively with the U.S. Despite domestic politics and regional concerns, Japan and the United States worked together on researching, financing, and developing a BMD system, as well as using diplomatic avenues to ease tensions. However, during this time period the extent and types of change that occurred were negligible at best.

Because Japan adhered to a literal and strict interpretation of the 1996 *Joint Declaration* guidelines and utilizing them as simply such, Japan was unable to go past the study phase. This inability to get away from only doing research and studies showcased

¹³⁴ Oros, Pg. 148.

that Japan was unable to redefine its role in the bilateral alliance with the U.S. and its (Japan's) own security policy. There was the possibility that Japan may have been able to develop and deploy a feasible BMD system sometime in the 2010s, but it would not have been before 2010.¹³⁵ Japan was firmly committed to the stipulation in the *Joint Declaration* of only studying a BMD system. When Japan changed its security policy by moving from internal studies by the JDA to cooperative studies with the United States, it was an exogenous event of the August 1998 *Taepodong-1* launch that moved Japan beyond solo studies. The 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, another exogenous event, has had a huge impact on Japanese security policy and its relationship with the United States because it forced Japan to respond to it. The Japanese choice to depart from its earlier stand and buy an off-the-shelf BMD system from the U.S. indicates that Japan was able to redefine its security policy.

Because the *Joint Declaration* only stipulated the study, Japan was in no hurry to deploy a BMD, even though U.S. policy and money were guiding BMD study. While the “Taepodong Incident provided an opportunity for the government [Japan] to justify and implement long-brewing plans for the domestic development of surveillance satellites,” it was the 2003 missile launches that convinced Japan to change even more than what had been previously considered for the long standing country of peace.¹³⁶ Even though the 1998 launch was a factor in propelling Japan into change, the 2003 launch provided more change in a more assertive and immediate manner. The 1998 launch motivated Japan to

¹³⁵ Umemoto Tetsuya, *Reinventing the Alliance*, Pg. 187-188.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, Pg. 145.

jointly study with the U.S., while the 2003 launch prompted Japan to purchase an off-the-shelf BMD system from the United States.

The growing nuclear crisis, the admission by Pyongyang about kidnapping Japanese citizens, and then the eventual launching of missiles into the Sea of Japan in 2003 led a passive Japan to become assertive in their decision making. Japan's decision making was not only assertive in regard to the procurement of a BMD system from the U.S. in December of 2003, but also in its decision making without American influence. The decision to buy and implement a BMD system from the U.S. was not something that the Bush administration had urged. Kliman states that "The prospect of Pyongyang's developing an operational nuclear arsenal motivated the GOJ to discard its original time line for BMD in favor of an off-the-shelf purchase from the United States,"¹³⁷ and "U.S. Policy played a minimal role in the Japanese government's decision to purchase missile defense."¹³⁸

The above quotations support the notion of Japan making the decision with little to no U.S. influence because they show that North Korea's nuclear arsenal was a great enough concern to warrant the purchase of a BMD system, rather than abide by the time line. They also show that the Bush administration played a minimal role, which may be attributed to the fact that the U.S. was occupied elsewhere in the world; because of this, Japan was able to become more independent of U.S. policy. It was the actions by North Korea that caused Japan to become more assertive.

¹³⁷ Kliman, Pg. 93.

¹³⁸ Ibid., Pg. 107.

The 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis allowed Japan to distance itself in a way from American foreign policy, while at the same time relying on American security through purchasing the BMD system and on the continued U.S. nuclear deterrent and presence of U.S. troops in Japan. By being able to do this, Japan was becoming more independent from the U.S. and strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance at the same time. This change in Japanese security policy is a direct result of the 2003 missile crisis acting as a catalyst, prompting the GOJ to respond to it. In this case, the GOJ's response went beyond previous changes that had included research on BMD systems and diplomatic efforts in the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and their delivery systems with the United States.

The viewpoints of Kliman emphasize my point that an exogenous event caused Japan to respond to the event and change its BMD security policy. Kliman argues that the North Korean threat was a much greater influence, as compared to the U.S., on Japan's policy decisions on a BMD system.¹³⁹ Also, Kliman argues that "The North Korean threat, an exogenous variable, decisively influenced Japan's consideration of missile defense."¹⁴⁰ Kliman's assessment supports my hypothesis that an exogenous event contributes to continued change within a general established trajectory. Finally, Hagström and Söderberg argue that "the renewed threat of North Korean nuclear weapons

¹³⁹ The portion before October 2002, which Kliman discusses, primarily addresses the summit talks between Pyongyang and Tokyo regarding the DPRK's growing threat to Japan, as well as Kim Jong-Il's admission of North Korea taking Japanese citizens hostage. Ibid., Pg. 107

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., Pg. 111.

development has been a major catalyst in bringing Japan's basic defence policies up to speed and motivating the Japanese government...»¹⁴¹

What is it exactly that has taken place during 1995-2005, in terms of Japan's security policy regarding a BMD system, and what changes have taken place? From 1995-2003, Japan was content to do as the *Joint Declaration* guidelines outlined, which was to study a BMD system. From 1995-1999, Japan only did internal studies. It was not until 1999, after the *Taepodong-1* launch in August 1998, that Japan decided to jointly study a BMD system with the U.S. Then, in the ending months of 2002 and all of 2003, Japan changed from doing only studies to purchasing a BMD system from the United States, in response to the missile launches by North Korea, in February and March 2003. From 2003-2005, Japan continued to cooperatively study with the United States, as well as taking a more assertive role in foreign policy regarding North Korea. Japan's security policy changes created a situation in which Japan began to become more independent of U.S. policy direction and strengthened the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The changes that Japan went through are directly related to the guidelines set forth in the 1996 *Joint Declaration*, as well as being a response to the 2003 North Korean Missile Crisis.

¹⁴¹ Hagström, Linus, and Marie Söderberg, eds. *North Korea Policy: Japan and the Great Powers*. London; New York, Routledge, 2006. Pg. 87.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

Beginning in 1995, the United States and Japan redefined their security relationship. One of the underlying factors for this redefinition of the security alliance was the fact that the alliance was a product of the Cold War and the political ideology of the time. The redefinition of the alliance also prompted Japan to change its security policies from 1995 to 2005. Throughout this thesis I have examined why Japan has gone through the security policy changes that they did and what factors influenced change. I answered the following question: Are the changes in Japan's security policies due to the negotiations regarding the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century* and the subsequent incremental changes; or are they because of these outside events?

In order to answer the above question, I analyzed the negotiated and systematic changes of the *Joint Declaration* and changes evidently due to the intervention of two exogenous events (the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis). I argued that although change in Japan's security policies could occur systematically and consistently follow a path of change, as a result of the *Joint Declaration*, it was actually due to a combination of the negotiated and systematic changes, coupled with the change implemented in response to the exogenous events. I utilized two case studies and two provisions in the *Joint Declaration* to argue this point. I paired each provision with its corresponding case and analyzed the change that happened prior to and after the advent of the exogenous event. However, before I was able to

answer the question regarding Japan's security policy changes I needed to understand the Japanese political context and how that context impacted the changes in Japan's security policies.

Understanding the political context in Japan allowed for a more in-depth analysis and understanding of the security policy changes. During the security policy changes, Japan and the United States were redefining their alliance. Japan was also reexamining its role in the international community and how the “Peace Constitution” would impact Japan's security policies. Finally, Japan was undergoing a series of domestic political reforms that would assist in stabilizing the government and creating a strong prime minister position. Although Japan produced reforms to facilitate a strong prime minister, only Junichiro Koizumi has been able to take advantage of the reforms. All of these aspects of the Japanese political context directly or indirectly impacted Japan's security policies.

Once I established a clear context for my thesis, I was able to examine the two cases. The first case that I studied was the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. In this case study I examined the systematic changes in Japan's policies regarding the deployment of the Self-Defense Force and the deployment of the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area support for coalition forces following the invasion of Afghanistan. I examined multiple pieces of legislation that laid the groundwork for the deployment of the SDF. One of the main pieces of legislation that contributed to this was the PKO Law of 1992. Although this law is outside of the time frame I had originally set, it was important to explain because it set a precedent for deploying Japanese forces in

non-combat support roles. The PKO Law stated that Japanese forces could only assist in providing humanitarian assistance in UN-mandated operations.

Although the changes brought about by the PKO Law had no direct impact on Japan's decision to send troops to Afghanistan, it set a precedent for future deployment of Japanese forces. This precedent and success of Japanese involvement in humanitarian missions assisted the Japanese decision to re-negotiate the 1997 Defense Guidelines with the U.S. These re-negotiations culminated with Japan being able to provide assistance to the U.S. outside of Japan. Furthermore, this renegotiation, along with an unanticipated exogenous event, also led to the 1999 signing of the “Law Ensuring Peace and Security in Situations Surrounding Japan,” which permitted Japan to deploy the SDF and provide assistance in U.S.-led operations that were not mandated by the UN. The unexpected event was the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis alerted Japan to the fact that it would have to take a more active role in East Asia to ensure security and stability. The passage of the 1999 Law was Japan's response to the 1996 crisis, thus showcasing the impact an exogenous event can have on policy change. All of these changes in Japanese security policy were prior to the invasion of Afghanistan.

After the invasion of Afghanistan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s administration rapidly drafted and submitted legislation that enabled the deployment of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area support for the U.S.-led coalition. As Japan was unable to engage in combat unless it was directly attacked, it provided fuel, supplies, and logistical support to the coalition. The response by Japan to send the MSDF was directly related to the invasion of Afghanistan. It appears that the decision to send the

MSDF followed a consistent path of change; however there is no telling when Japan would have been able to make such a decision without the invasion of Afghanistan or even if Japan would have been able to. The impact of the invasion and the subsequent response by Japan marked a significant change in Japan's security policies regarding the deployment of the SDF and involvement in military operations. Further evidence of the impact of an event and the policy changes can be seen in Japan's participation in a non-combat role in Iraq.

The second case study provides even more support for my argument. The second case study dealt with Japan's desire to procure a ballistic missile defense system and the policy changes that assisted in that. Japan's desire to procure a BMD system is related to a continued threat from North Korean missile attacks. Beginning in 1995, the United States and Japan began researching the feasibility of a BMD system. At the time the research began, the U.S. and Japan were performing the research studies independently of each other even though the *Joint Declaration* stated that the two countries would perform joint cooperative studies. It was not until after the 1998 North Korea *Taeopodong-1* missile launch that Japan finally agreed to engage in joint research with the U.S. In this instance, the 1998 missile launch acted as an unforeseen exogenous event that convinced Japan to change its security policies regarding a BMD system.

After the 1998 missile launch and the pledge to participate in joint research with the U.S., the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1999 that outlined a 5-year plan to engage in BMD research. From 2000 to 2003, Japan and the United States conducted joint research on the feasibility of a BMD system and technologies

related to such a system. Although Japan was engaged in joint research, it had not committed to procuring a BMD system. In February and March 2003 North Korea launched two missiles tests. These tests, known as the 2003 North Korea Missile Crisis, created a heightened sense of alert in East Asia generally and in Japan more specifically. In response to these tests, Japan decided to buy an off-the-shelf BMD system from the United States.

This decision to bypass research and development of a BMD system and simply buy a BMD system marks an extremely stark shift in Japanese security policy. It is probable that at some time Japan would have procured a BMD system, however there is no telling when that would have been done. Like the previous case study, the change in response to the event is consistent with change that had already occurred. What is not consistent, however, is the time frame in which it happened. Japan had been changing its policies slowly, but in an instant it significantly sped up its policy change and changed quite profoundly.

The changes in security policy illustrated in the two cases show how much change can occur systematically as a result of the *Joint Declaration* negotiations. The two cases also show how an exogenous event can act as a catalyst and continue and possibly accelerate the change that had been ongoing prior to the exogenous event. Change that occurred prior to the exogenous event only progressed to a certain point. Because external events act as a catalyst for change, the response by Japan furthered the change that began prior to the event. This continuation of change created more significant change, than those prior to the exogenous event.

Now that I have gone over my results, I will outline possible areas of further research as well as possible implications of the changes. After going through these changes, what is next for Japan, and what are potential implications of these security policy changes? One thing that is most apparent is that Japan has become a more trusted and reliable ally to the United States. Japan's willingness and ability to transform and change some aspects of their security policy has shown the U.S. that Japan wants to and is able to, for the most part, fulfill its obligations under the *Joint Declaration*. Japan's desire and ability to become more involved in the international community creates a sense of a strengthening and more assertive Japan. This produces a situation in which Japan wants to become more involved in the security alliance with the U.S., but it also generates a situation in which Japan may be able to become more independent from the U.S. If this situation occurs, Japan will have to clearly define how they want to be more involved and more independent.

This stronger and more assertive Japan may have regional implications. One country that may be concerned with a more influential Japan is China. Japan's reaction to the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis alerted China to the possibility that Japan may become involved in a future crisis involving Taiwan, China, and the United States. It is not a certainty that Japan would become involved if a situation were to arise; however, the possibility is there. China is also worried that a more militarily capable and more involved Japan may try to counterbalance China's growing influence and strength in East Asia. The above scenario may in fact be a result of changing U.S. security policies in the post-Cold War world. As the United States focuses a major portion of its security agenda

on the Middle East, the U.S. may require forces stationed in East Asia to address its commitments in the Middle East or Afghanistan. A removal or adjustment of U.S. forces in East Asia would require a stronger Japan to fill that absence of military power in East Asia.

Although potential regional scenarios could influence both Japan's role in East Asia and further security policy changes, the debates over Article 9, collective self-defense, and collective security are more critical. As a result of the security policy changes, Japan has begun to more seriously discuss revisions of Article 9, collective self-defense, and collective security. If these revisions were to occur, they could have significant impact on Japan's interactions with not only the U.S, but East Asia in general and China more specifically. New interpretations and definitions of collective security, collective self-defense, and a revision of Article 9 could occur; however, for revisions or reinterpretations to occur, Japan would need its domestic political scene to be conducive to debate and change. If the revisions or reinterpretations do occur, my study suggests it may be as a result of an exogenous event.

During the writing of this thesis I ran into a number of limitations. One main limitation is the limited explanation of Japanese domestic politics. Even though I provide a domestic political context there is much more information about the Japanese domestic politics that may have an impact on explaining the security policy changes. Also, a specific time period is a limitation. Although I stipulated that 1995-2005 was the period I was studying, there have been more changes in Japanese security policy that could have helped support my argument. One last limitation is the language barrier. There were a

number of documents that could have proven useful, however because I do not speak or read Japanese, I was unable analyze certain texts and information. These limitations do not take away from the research that I conducted, however they could have helped in expanding my argument.

It is important to take into account that Japan's security policy changes have created a more involved Japan in the alliance with the United States and globally. The policy changes by Japan have shown that it is willing to continue to change. Japan's efforts in redefining its security alliance with the United States began the process of change. This change started systematically and as a result of the negotiations pertaining to the *Joint Declaration*, followed a consistent path of change, and continued because of exogenous events. If Japan continues this method of change, it is possible that it could redefine many more security policies. Future changes in Japan's security policies could create a nation-state that is much different from the one that we presently know. If these changes continue, will Japan revert to the Japan of the World War II era, or will it become an influential and engaged member of the international community? Neither may happen, but what I do know is that Japan has begun a journey that will have the world watching.

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