Alexander, Brady Steven2024-05-152024-05-152024-05-14vt_gsexam:40283https://hdl.handle.net/10919/118986Traditionally, power system protection describes detecting, clearing, and locating faults in the power system. Traditional methods for detecting and locating faults may not be sufficient for inverter-based resources (IBR) as the fault response of an IBR differs from the response of a synchronous generator. As the composition of the power grid continues to evolve to integrate more IBRs that employ communication-based control algorithms; the power system is also exposed to cyberattacks. Undetected cyberattacks can disrupt normal system operation causing local outages. Therefore, power system protection must evolve with the changes in the grid to not only detect, locate, and clear faults with IBR generation but also detect and mitigate cyberattacks on IBR controllers. This thesis proposes methods for protecting an IBR-based transmission system from: (i) GPS spoofing cyberattacks on a power sharing controller; (ii) open-circuit faults. The GPS spoofing detection algorithm is a decision tree that enables either the proposed state observer--based mitigation technique or the proposed long short-term memory (LSTM)-based mitigation algorithm. The proposed logic for detecting open-circuit faults addresses each subcategory of open-circuit faults: breaker malfunctions, broken conductors, and series arc faults. PSCAD/EMTDC simulations are performed to test the effectiveness of the proposed methods.ETDenIn CopyrightBroken conductorcyberattackGPS spoofinginverter-based resources (IBR)power sharingprotection.Thesis