Heeren-Moon, Erika2025-08-072025-08-072025-06-10https://hdl.handle.net/10919/137065This case study analyzes the telecommunications infrastructure, national security, and bureaucratic governance in the United States with a “Rip and Replace” initiative focus. Over concerns with Huawei and ZTE, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 provided funding for the removal of certain technologies from United States networks. Moreover, the initiative demonstrates the ongoing struggles between a public-private partnership, regulatory governance, and geopolitical cybersecurity conflict. Without heeding early warnings, inaction and an inadequate budget left United States networks vulnerable, leading to the Salt Typhoon cyber-espionage campaign in 2024. This case demonstrates the struggles associated with the critical infrastructure policy surrounding the supply chain, risk, and service equity—especially in rural and underserved regions. This case, with the help of timelines and developing FCC actions, allows for confrontation with bureaucratic stagnation, innovation vs. security trade-offs, and the aftermath of broken public-private partnerships. Designed for the Tech for Humanity Pathways Minor, the study provides an in-depth framework for analyzing how infrastructure policy is shaped by global power dynamics, technological change, and domestic governance priorities.10 pagesapplication/pdfenIn Copyright (InC)This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. Some uses of this Item may be deemed fair and permitted by law even without permission from the rights holder(s). For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights holder(s).United StatesTelecommunications PolicyNational Security InfrastructureRip & Replace: Bureaucracy and National Security in Critical InfrastructureReportVirginia Tech