Hoek, Daniel2022-01-182022-01-182022-03-310022-362Xhttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/107743Choices confront us with questions. How we act depends on our answers to those questions. So the way our beliefs guide our choices is not just a function of their informational content, but also depends systematically on the questions those beliefs address. This paper gives a precise account of the interplay between choices, questions and beliefs, and harnesses this account to obtain a principled approach to the problem of deduction. The result is a novel theory of belief-guided action that explains and predicts the decisions of agents who, like ourselves, fail to be logically omniscient: that is, of agents whose beliefs may not be deductively closed, or even consistent.application/pdfen2203 PhilosophyPhilosophyQuestions in ActionArticle2022-01-16Journal of PhilosophyHoek, Daniel [0000-0002-5331-2409]