Ferraro, Paul J.2016-04-192016-04-192008Ecological Economics 65(4): 810-8210921-8009http://hdl.handle.net/10919/67535Metadata only recordThis article addresses the informational rents that are created in payments for environmental services (PES) contracts by asymmetric information between landowners and conservation buyers. Three options for reducing informational rents are described and compared: 1)gathering information on compliance costs, 2)screening contracts, and 3)procurement auctions.text/plainen-USIn CopyrightEnvironmental servicesPayments for environmental servicesConservation strategyPESAsymmetric informationContractsScreeningAuctionsInformational rentsOpportunity costsAsymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental servicesAbstractCopyright 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029