Ismail, MohannadJelesnianski, ChristopherJang, YeongjinMin, ChangwooXiong, Wenjie2024-05-022024-05-022024-04-27https://hdl.handle.net/10919/118734Control-flow hijacking and data-oriented attacks are becoming more sophisticated. These attacks, especially dataoriented attacks, can result in critical security threats, such as leaking an SSL key. Data-oriented attacks are hard to defend against with acceptable performance due to the sheer amount of data pointers present. The root cause of such attacks is using pointers in unintended ways; fundamentally, these attacks rely on abusing pointers to violate the original scope they were used in or the original types that they were declared as. This paper proposes Scope Type Integrity (STI), a new defense policy that enforces all pointers (both code and data pointers) to conform to the original programmer’s intent, as well as Runtime Scope Type Integrity (RSTI) mechanisms to enforce STI at runtime leveraging ARM Pointer Authentication. STI gathers information about the scope, type, and permissions of pointers. This information is then leveraged by RSTI to ensure pointers are legitimately utilized at runtime. We implemented three defense mechanisms of RSTI, with varying levels of security and performance tradeoffs to showcase the versatility of RSTI. We employ these three variants on a variety of benchmarks and real-world applications for a full security and performance evaluation of these mechanisms. Our results show that they have overheads of 5.29%, 2.97%, and 11.12%, respectively.application/pdfenCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 InternationalArticle - Refereed2024-05-01The author(s)https://doi.org/10.1145/3620666.3651342