Li, WeitongLin, ZhexiaoAshiq, Md. IshtiaqAben, EmileFontugne, RomainPhokeer, AmreeshChung, Taejoong2023-11-022023-11-022023-10-24http://hdl.handle.net/10919/116619The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a system to add security to the Internet routing. In recent years, the publication of Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects, which bind IP prefixes to their legitimate origin ASN, has been rapidly increasing. However, ROAs are effective only if the routers use them to verify and filter invalid BGP announcements, a process called Route Origin Validation (ROV). There are many proposed approaches to measure the status of ROV in the wild, but they are limited in scalability or accuracy. In this paper, we present RoVista, an ROV measurement framework that leverages IP-ID side channel and in-the-wild RPKI-invalid prefix. With over 20 months of longitudinal measurement, RoVista successfully covers more than 28K ASes where 63.8% of ASes have derived benefits from ROV, although the percentage of fully protected ASes remains relatively low at 12.3%. In order to validate our findings, we have also sought input from network operators. We then evaluate the security impact of current ROV deployment and reveal misconfigurations that will weaken the protection of ROV. Lastly, we compare RoVista with other approaches and conclude with a discussion of our findings and limitations.application/pdfenCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 InternationalArticle - Refereed2023-11-01The author(s)https://doi.org/10.1145/3618257.3624806