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dc.contributorVirginia Tech. Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.contributorVirginia Tech. Aerospace and Ocean Engineering Departmenten_US
dc.contributor.authorBhela, Siddharthen_US
dc.contributor.authorTam, Kwa-suren_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T18:27:19Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T18:27:19Z
dc.date.issued2015-06en_US
dc.identifier.citationBhela, S., & Tam, K.-s. (2015, June). A game-theoretic framework to investigate the conditions for cooperation between energy storage operators and wind power producers. Paper presented at the North American Wind Energy Academy 2015 Symposium, Blacksburg, VA.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/54714
dc.description.abstractEnergy storage, has widely been accepted as a means to provide capacity firming service to renewable sources of energy due to its capability to quickly start and shut down and its ability to have flexible ramping rates. Lithium Ion batteries in particular are of interest as their production cost is expected to significantly decrease over the next few years. In addition, Li-Ion batteries have high efficiency, high energy density and high cycling tolerance. These batteries are also used in electric vehicles whose penetration is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. The social benefit of energy storage to provide energy balancing service to renewable producers is evident, especially in the context of a micro-grid where deviations from distributed generation sources can be handled locally. However, co-operation with renewable producers may not be automatically guaranteed and would depend on the amount of revenue generated by balancing such deviations. Storage may derive more benefit from choosing to operate independently. Balancing wind deviations would take capacity away from providing other high value services to the micro-grid community such as arbitrage and regulation service. The decision to enter the market and balance deviations for the wind producer is highly intertwined with the strategy adopted by the wind producer. Interactive problems in which the outcome of a rational agent's action depends on the actions of other rational players are best studied through the setup of a game-theoretic framework. A case-study is presented here using wind and electricity market data for a site in west Texas. Historical data is used to calculate expected pay-offs for the month of January. The columns in the following table are the available strategies for the wind producer and the rows are the available strategies for the energy storage. There are four possible combination of strategies, which are discussed next: The pay-off table provides the net revenues of the wind producer in the upper right corner and the net revenues of the energy storage in the lower left corner of each cell. Note that revenue from Production Tax Credits (PTC) is not included for the wind producer.en_US
dc.format.extent2 pagesen_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherVirginia Techen_US
dc.relation.ispartofNorth American Wind Energy Academy 2015 Symposiumen_US
dc.rightsIn Copyright (InC)en_US
dc.rightsThis Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. Some uses of this Item may be deemed fair and permitted by law even without permission from the rights holder(s). For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights holder(s).en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.titleA game-theoretic framework to investigate the conditions for cooperation between energy storage operators and wind power producersen_US
dc.title.alternativeA Game-theoretic Framework to Investigate Conditions for Cooperation between Wind Power Producers and Energy Storage Operatorsen_US
dc.typePresentationen_US
dc.rights.holderBhela, Siddharthen_US
dc.rights.holderTam, Kwa-suren_US
dc.description.notesSession 0B - Electrical Integrationen_US
dc.description.notesGraduate Student Symposiumen_US
dc.description.notesIncludes paper and PowerPoint slidesen_US
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten_US


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