Scholarly Works, Philosophy
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Browsing Scholarly Works, Philosophy by Author "FitzPatrick, William J."
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- Ethical pluralism without complementarityFitzPatrick, William J. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)Grinnell, Bishop, and McCullough (2002) have proposed extending Bohr's notion of complementarity from the realm of quantum physics to that of bioethics, arguing that many ethical disputes cannot in principle be resolved. On this view, we should give up the aim of reaching all-things-considered moral verdicts on a variety of disputed questions, settling instead for a holism of irreducibly complementary perspectives. I discuss a number of difficulties with this proposal, and argue that the desire for inclusiveness that motivates it is properly captured through a different approach to ethical pluralism already familiar in moral philosophy, which does allow for resolution.
- Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical ChallengeFitzPatrick, William J. (University of Chicago Press, 2008-07)Philosophical doubts about moral responsibility have typically been rooted in worries about free agency in the face of causal determinism, culminating in familiar metaphysical arguments against the very possibility of moral responsibility.1 Recently, however, a skeptical argument has emerged that is simultaneously less ambitious and potentially more challenging to many of our common beliefs and practices concerning responsibility. It is less ambitious because the aim is to show not that agents cannot in principle be responsible for what they do but only that the ascription of responsibility or blame for bad actions is never warranted in any particular case.2 Since this more modest argument does not rely on the truth of determinism, however, the worries it raises for attributions of moral responsibility are likewise not mitigated by familiar compatibilist strategies for rescuing moral responsibility from the threat of determinism. The problems remain whatever one concludes about the underlying metaphysical issues.
- The practical turn in ethical theory: Korsgaard's constructivism, realism, and the nature of normativityFitzPatrick, William J. (University of Chicago Press, 2005-07)My aim is to assess the merits of Korsgaard's rejection of realism as well as the prospects for her practical approach to normativity, and I shall both raise problems for her constructivism and develop a realist response to her central challenge. To make clear what is at stake, I will begin by elucidating the "normative question" that motivates her negative and positive projects alike and by describing the realist and constructivist positions in this debate. Then, in Section II, I will lay out her central critique of realism and go on, in Section III, to explain her current strategy for avoiding the problems she raises for realists. As described more fully at the end of Section III, I will then examine Korsgaard's distinctive approach to normativity by looking at how her practical_problem_solving conception of normativity applies specifically to the principle at the heart of Kantian ethics-the formula of humanity, which she believes must be derived in a purely constructivist fashion in order to be binding. Giving careful attention to such derivations in light of her general account of normativity (Secs. IV-VI) is the best way both to clarify what is really at issue in the debate over normativity and to see concretely how her constructivist approach to deriving normative principles is supposed to deliver what is required by her practical_problem_solving account of binding normative force.