VTechWorks Repository :: Browsing by Author "FitzPatrick, William J."

Browsing by Author "FitzPatrick, William J."

Now showing 1 - 18 of 18

An Analysis of the Factor Structure of the Multidimensional Ethics Scale and a Perceived Moral Intensity Scale, and the Effect of Moral Intensity on Ethical Judgment
McMahon, Joan Marie (Virginia Tech, 2002-05-06)
Two studies analyzed the factor structure of the 8-item Multidimensional Ethics Scale (MES) (Reidenbach and Robin, 1988, 1990), a 30-item MES (the 30 items used to develop the 8-item measure), and a Perceived Moral Intensity Scale. Factor analyses supported a 3-factor structure for the 8-item MES, marginally supported a 5-factor structure (but more strongly suggested a 1-factor structure) for the 30-item MES, and supported a 3-factor structure for the Perceived Moral Intensity Scale. These scales were then used in a third study that examined the effect of manipulated and perceived moral intensity (Jones, 1991) on participants' ethical judgment of actions taken in 18 scenarios of an arguably ethical nature. A within-subject design found that manipulated moral intensity had a significant effect on ethical judgment, but perceived moral intensity did not. When ethical judgment (as measured by the three factors of the 8-item MES) was regressed on age, gender, major, perceived moral intensity factors, and interactions between age, gender, major and perceived moral intensity factors, the variance accounted for (R2) was significant for each of the three ethical judgment factors in both high and low intensity conditions using a between-subjects design, but was only significant for one of the ethical judgment factors (Moral Equity), and this only for low intensity scenarios, using a within-subject design. One explanation for the difference in effect appears to be that the means for the three perceived moral intensity factors were significantly different for the low versus high intensity condition using the between-subjects design, but the means of two of the three factors were not significantly different using the within-subject design. Three explanations for this were suggested: perceived moral intensity may not have reached a necessary threshold due to explicit referents for comparison; cognitive demand may have been greater when two versions of a single scenario were being evaluated; and, the online administration of the study may have introduced greater error variance than the in-person paper-pencil administration. Ethical judgment was found to be a more robust predictor of intention than perceived moral intensity using a within-subject design. Suggestions were made for future research.
The Argument from Species Overlap
Ehnert, Jesse (Virginia Tech, 2002-07-15)
The "argument from species overlap" (abbreviated ASO) claims that some human and nonhuman animals possess similar sets of morally relevant characteristics, and are therefore similarly morally significant. The argument stands as a general challenge to moral theories, because many theories hold that all humans possess greater moral significance than all nonhuman animals. In this thesis I discuss responses to the ASO, primarily those of Peter Carruthers, Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar, and Peter Singer. Carruthers denies the conclusion of the ASO, while the other three do not. I argue that the ASO is a sound argument, and that Carruthers's attempts to counter it via his contractualist theory are unsuccessful. I next discuss the rights-based theories of Regan and Pluhar, which agree with the conclusion of the ASO but which, I believe, encounter significant theoretical difficulties. Finally, I address the ASO from a utilitarian perspective, first from Singer's utilitarian formulation and then from a "welfare-utilitarian" formulation. I answer a number of critical objections to welfare utilitarianism, and argue that the theory is most successful in facing the challenge of the ASO.
Between Hull and a Hard Core: Varying Patterns in the Evolution of the Darwinian Research Tradition
Lowe, Mark (Virginia Tech, 2007-05-08)
Focusing on Darwinism, David Hull argues that the protean character of conceptual systems is explained by their nature as historical entities which evolve. If they evolve as biological species do, Hull argues, then they cannot have an "essence" — a set of tenets that all and only instances of the conceptual system has throughout all time. There are no tenets a scientific research program must retain to count as an instance of a particular program. I advance two considerations against this view. First, research programs require a critical cohesiveness among their tenets to inspire and guide research. Second, it is the function of such programs to guide the search for answers to families of questions in a particular domain in a particular spirit. These factors dictate that conceptual systems must retain certain key tenets. This re-emergence of a sort of essentialism does not bar the evolution of conceptual systems, provided we recognize that there are patterns of evolution other than the one Hull considers (anagenesis). It also implies that conceptual systems simply evolve differently than species do. I defend this position by illustrating two episodes of conceptual evolution: the dispute between William Bateson and the British biometricians over discontinuous evolution, and the formation of Neo-Lamarckism in 19th century America.
Contractarianism and Moderate Morality
Baltzly, Vaughn Bryan (Virginia Tech, 2001-06-25)
In his book The Limits of Morality, Shelly Kagan claims that contractarian approaches to ethics are incompatible with our common, everyday, "moderate" morality. In this thesis I defend a version of contractarianism that I believe leads to both deontological constraints and options; i.e., to a genuinely moderate morality. On my account, the parties to the agreement are conceived of as being motivated not only to promote self-interest, but also to formulate a code of ethics that gives proper respect to their moral status as persons. If such a picture of the bargainers' motivations is defensible, as I believe it is, then the 'moderate' may in fact have recourse to contractarianism in her defense of everyday morality, for - as my thesis argues - bargainers that are thus motivated will arrive at a moderate morality.
Designer Genes: An analysis of a theoretical framework for policy proposals in relation to genetic engineering as a reproductive technology
Crain, Stacie M. (Virginia Tech, 2003-05-16)
With the new capabilities of genetic engineering and such biotechnologies, come added considerations for policy makers. If gene therapy (or even embryo selection) becomes common practice, we must look not only to creating policies that protect the interests of individuals in the legal and social realms, but consideration must also be given to the equality of opportunity in the genetic sense. This additional level brings with it much significance; one can argue that financial disparity is at least theoretically surmountable but it is difficult to account for intentional genetic alterations that would forever give certain individuals a physical advantage over non-enhanced persons. It is with these new boundaries that genetic policy must find itself creating legislation; it is also with these new boundaries that policy will find its greatest hurdles. Given the ever-expanding field of biotechnology and gene therapy, one can hardly expect policy written today to be up-to-date ten, or even two years from now. Instead of focusing, therefore, on specific recommendations, I will center my discussion on a broad framework that outlines the arguments that should be considered when dealing with genetic engineering and public policy. After creating a theoretical structure centered on historical experiences and the philosophical writings of John Rawls, we will delve deeper into the actual possibilities created by genetic engineering and embryo selection. I will further analyze the differences between positive and negative genetic interventions and discuss the consequences of these differences as they should (or should not) affect policy. This particular distinction and the implications of these differences on policy will serve as the bulk of my discussion.
Ethical pluralism without complementarity
FitzPatrick, William J. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)
Grinnell, Bishop, and McCullough (2002) have proposed extending Bohr's notion of complementarity from the realm of quantum physics to that of bioethics, arguing that many ethical disputes cannot in principle be resolved. On this view, we should give up the aim of reaching all-things-considered moral verdicts on a variety of disputed questions, settling instead for a holism of irreducibly complementary perspectives. I discuss a number of difficulties with this proposal, and argue that the desire for inclusiveness that motivates it is properly captured through a different approach to ethical pluralism already familiar in moral philosophy, which does allow for resolution.
Experience and Pictorial Representation: Wollheim's Seeing-in and Merleau-Ponty's Perceptual Phenomenology
Gardner, Jason (Virginia Tech, 2005-05-13)
Contemporary aesthetics includes a project directed at understanding the nature of pictorial representation. Three types of theories enjoy recent favor. One explains pictorial representation by way of resemblance or experienced resemblance between the picture and what it represents. A second employs interpretation: the spectator looks at a picture and interprets conventionally determined symbols found therein to mean what it represents. The third describes pictorial representation as a matter of experience. On this approach, when the spectator looks at a picture she has a visual experience of the thing represented. Key components of representation include the representation bearing artifact and the human activity that produces it. An adequate account of pictorial representation must neglect neither. Theories focusing on resemblance fail to account for the human role in representation so that a picture may represent only what it can resemble. Theories making interpretation of conventional symbols the key fail to account for the role visible properties play in grounding representation. Wollheim's experience based theory, however, unifies the visible properties of the artifact and the intentions of the artist in a single experience, called seeing-in, whereby a spectator sees in a picture what an artist intends to represent. Wollheim fails to specify just how visible properties of the artifact ground seeing-in. His account of seeing-in raises other curiosities as well. These issues can be dealt with if we apply phenomenological concepts developed by Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception to our experience of pictures as a method of enriching Wollheim's account of seeing-in.
Inescapable Wrongdoing and the Coherence of Morality: An Examination of Moral Dilemmas
Jackson, Vincent Patrick (Virginia Tech, 2009-05-04)
In this thesis, I propose an argument against the possibility of moral dilemmas, which I construe as situations in which moral wrongdoing is inescapable. The first chapter addresses some terminological matters and attempts to sort out the main issues of contention between proponents and opponents of moral dilemmas. The second chapter lays out my argument, which I dub the "Argument from Action-Guidingness," against proponents of moral dilemmas. Negative moral judgments of the sort "X is wrong" typically carry with them the implication that X ought not to be done. If judgments of wrongness always have this action-guiding force, then moral dilemmas, which say that all courses of action available to the agent are morally wrong, threaten morality with incoherence. To avoid this problem, proponents of dilemmas will be forced to abandon the action-guiding implications of negative moral judgments when dilemmas arise. But this move is not without its own difficulties, which I elucidate. The final chapter identifies flaws in two prominent arguments in favor of dilemmas: the argument from moral distress and the argument from incommensurable values. The latter half of the chapter examines Sayre-McCord's "fairness argument" against dilemmas, and contrasts it with the argument from action-guidingness.
Luck Egalitarianism and Democratic Equality
Klipfel, Kevin Michael (Virginia Tech, 2007-05-11)
Luck egalitarianism is the view that justice requires that we hold people accountable for the choices that they make but not the circumstances that they find themselves in. My aim in this thesis is to reject luck egalitarianism. My argument builds on the recent critique of luck egalitarianism by Elizabeth Anderson. Anderson rejects luck egalitarianism in favor of a view she calls "democratic equality." The aim of democratic equality is to create a community in which citizens relate to one another as equals. This requires, among other things, that we provide citizens with the necessary capabilities and functionings needed in order for them to function as free and equal citizens. In this thesis I argue that Anderson's critique of luck egalitarianism, although successful against the standard luck egalitarian view, does not undermine a weaker version of luck egalitarianism. This position — which I call moderate luck egalitarianism — claims that we ought to apply the choice/circumstance distinction always and only when doing so does not compromise the aims of democratic equality. This is because it is always unfair, according to luck egalitarians, when some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. Since Anderson's view does not correct for this, we need to combine the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism in the name of fairness. I argue, however, that this is not necessary. Not all inequalities that are the result of people's unchosen circumstances are unfair or unjust; inequalities in income and wealth are unfair only to the extent that they inhibit the ability of individuals to function as free and equal citizens. Thus, luck egalitarians have given us no reason to conjoin the aims of democratic equality and luck egalitarianism: democratic equality suffices.
Michael Walzer on the Moral Legitimacy of States and the Morality of Killing in War
Mueller, Nathan (Virginia Tech, 2006-05-10)
This thesis is divided into two chapters. In the first chapter, I analyze Michael Walzer's account of the moral legitimacy of states. In the second chapter, I analyze his account of the morality of killing in war. I begin the first chapter by contrasting Walzer's account of state legitimacy and humanitarian intervention with that of David Luban. Next, I develop a Rawlsian account of state legitimacy and humanitarian intervention and argue that this account is more plausible than both Walzer's and Luban's accounts. The second chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I argue that Walzer's account of the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is misleading because it gives the impression that all and only infantry soldiers are combatants and that all and only civilians are noncombatants. In the second part of the second chapter, I describe an account of the morality of killing in war developed by Jeff McMahan that is based on an analogy with the morality of killing in domestic society and argue that this account is more plausible than Walzer's account of the morality of killing in war. I also suggest a way that McMahan's account could be improved.
Molecular Epigenetics in Evolution and Development
Lewis, James Joseph (Virginia Tech, 2010-06-25)
The dominantly held view in evolutionary theory focuses on gradual or punctuated change, primarily via natural selection, as the mechanism by which novel traits arise and evolution occurs. Noticeably absent from this portrayal of evolution is mention of the conservation of general characteristics, such as homologous morphological features or conserved nucleotide sequences, commonly observed across even distantly related groups at both the molecular and organismal levels. This raises at least the following questions: a) How does the evolution of conserved traits fit into an evolutionary theory that emphasizes change? b) What components of an evolving system provide the capacity for adaptation in spite of this apparent conservation of general traits? And c) How do these components affect the evolution of lineages? Here I suggest that heritable traits such as DNA methylation and histone modifications provide one place to look when addressing these questions. Current quantitative and population genetic models reflect the dominant view of evolution described above, and act as the foundation for both formal and informal descriptions and predictions of evolutionary change. Using results from recent work in molecular epigenetics, I consider the evolutionary implications for these traits, and show how current models of evolution fail to accurately capture this influence. In doing so, I also address some of the philosophical implications for how we conceptualize evolution, and what potential changes might be necessary for a more complete theory.
Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge
FitzPatrick, William J. (University of Chicago Press, 2008-07)
Philosophical doubts about moral responsibility have typically been rooted in worries about free agency in the face of causal determinism, culminating in familiar metaphysical arguments against the very possibility of moral responsibility.1 Recently, however, a skeptical argument has emerged that is simultaneously less ambitious and potentially more challenging to many of our common beliefs and practices concerning responsibility. It is less ambitious because the aim is to show not that agents cannot in principle be responsible for what they do but only that the ascription of responsibility or blame for bad actions is never warranted in any particular case.2 Since this more modest argument does not rely on the truth of determinism, however, the worries it raises for attributions of moral responsibility are likewise not mitigated by familiar compatibilist strategies for rescuing moral responsibility from the threat of determinism. The problems remain whatever one concludes about the underlying metaphysical issues.
The Moral Status of Nonhuman Animals
Farmer, Rhiannon M. (Virginia Tech, 2003-01-31)
Although moral individualism is sufficient for making fair moral decisions, it is itself supported by our implicit moral commitments; Rawls (and consequently Rowlands) uses the original position as a method for making moral decisions that are both fair and consistent without proposing a normative moral code, and DeGrazia adds content to this method by spelling out what interests are and which individuals are capable of having interests - and thus being morally considerable. Rawls does not go far enough in the process of bracketing off undeserved, unearned properties; he fails to see that properties such as rationality and species are undeserved. Using Rowlands' interpretation of Rawls, I argue that the revised intuitive equality argument provides the justification for the social contract argument - that is, for bracketing off the properties that are arbitrary. I use DeGrazia to make the case for sentience as being essential for moral consideration. Sentience is necessary and sufficient for having interests, and having interests is sufficient for being worthy of moral consideration. From this, I conclude that because there are many sentient nonhuman animals, there are many nonhuman animals that are worthy of moral consideration. Being morally considerable is not equivalent to having substantial moral status. Rachels' moral individualism allows us to make moral decisions based upon the properties or characteristics of the individual, and this is particularly useful for pinpointing our treatment of humans and our justification for doing so and then simply extending this line of thought to nonhumans. This method allows us to isolate what is indeed relevant to the situation at hand and to consider if both individuals under consideration share it. In the case of moral status, sentience will play an important role because it is a property shared by humans and at least some nonhuman animals. Using Rawls, Rowlands, DeGrazia and Rachels as support, I conclude that at least some animals have significant moral status.
The Ontology of Persistence
Love, Shanon (Virginia Tech, 2001-06-22)
In 1986, David Lewis offered what he thought would be the decisive objection against endurantism, showing it to be an implausible theory. The problem of temporary intrinsics stated that an object cannot have two complementary intrinsic properties while maintaining identity, as endurantists claim. Perdurantism, then, must be the more plausible theory, according to Lewis. The endurantists responded to this objection by formulating different versions of endurantism designed to avoid the problem. Subsequently, the endurantist tried to undermine the perdurantist position by arguing that a perduring object cannot undergo what is considered to be genuine change. As a result, endurantism is the more plausible theory. However, the perdurantist can show that endurantism seems to fail to provide an account of change as well. In what follows, I argue that the implicit ontological commitments of the endurantists and perdurantists have prevented the problem of temporary intrinsics and change from resolving the endurantist/perdurantist debate. I offer examples of plausible ontologies for the endurantist and perdurantist in order to emphasize this problem. I will argue that, in order to resolve the debate, one must ultimately examine the ontological accounts of each theory.
The practical turn in ethical theory: Korsgaard's constructivism, realism, and the nature of normativity
FitzPatrick, William J. (University of Chicago Press, 2005-07)
My aim is to assess the merits of Korsgaard's rejection of realism as well as the prospects for her practical approach to normativity, and I shall both raise problems for her constructivism and develop a realist response to her central challenge. To make clear what is at stake, I will begin by elucidating the "normative question" that motivates her negative and positive projects alike and by describing the realist and constructivist positions in this debate. Then, in Section II, I will lay out her central critique of realism and go on, in Section III, to explain her current strategy for avoiding the problems she raises for realists. As described more fully at the end of Section III, I will then examine Korsgaard's distinctive approach to normativity by looking at how her practical_problem_solving conception of normativity applies specifically to the principle at the heart of Kantian ethics-the formula of humanity, which she believes must be derived in a purely constructivist fashion in order to be binding. Giving careful attention to such derivations in light of her general account of normativity (Secs. IV-VI) is the best way both to clarify what is really at issue in the debate over normativity and to see concretely how her constructivist approach to deriving normative principles is supposed to deliver what is required by her practical_problem_solving account of binding normative force.
The Problem of Evil as the Problem of Pain
Schuler, Matthew Michael (Virginia Tech, 2010-05-06)
The problem of evil arises from the argument that the existence of suffering is incompatible with (or else renders improbable) the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God (and that, since the former surely exists, the latter must not). Philosophers working on the problem, however, rarely make profitable use of the distinction between mental and physical suffering. Accordingly, in this thesis I develop a version of the problem that focuses specifically on the phenomenal experience of physical pain. After providing (in the first chapter) a detailed analysis of (i) both logical and evidential (or probabilistic) formulations of the problem, and (ii) the usefulness of this logical/evidential distinction, I discuss some of the most promising theistic responses to the problem, and conclude that these theistic responses fail. In the second chapter I lay out my argument, and I attempt to show that there is no plausible way for the theist to respond when the problem is formulated in this manner. I conclude the chapter by arguing that my argument demonstrates the incompatibility of theism with both epiphenomenalism and zombies-informed dualism. In the third chapter I begin with a discussion of mental supervenience in order to defend a commonsense modal intuition necessary for the success of my argument. I then proceed to address possible objections, including most notably the effort to cast doubt on the reliability of the inference from conceivability to possibility. Finally, I consider empirical findings that substantiate my argument's most contentious premise.
Rawls, Liberalism, and Leisure
Jones, Clinton W. (Virginia Tech, 2001-05-03)
There is a tension within liberalism between the ideal of equality on the one hand and the respect for freedom (in the form of non-interference) on the other. I shall try to show that in liberalism?s efforts to simultaneously realize its goals of freedom and equality it must ultimately settle for less than the ideal of each. Since Rawls? theory of justice is a liberal one, it suffers from this tension as well. However Rawls? theory has also been accused of forcing some members of society to subsidizing the choices of others. I shall argue that one of the more recent attempts to defend his theory, by Walter Schaller, against such accusations, falls short of its goals. I shall also argue that Rawls? suggestion, in Political Liberalism, that a principle guaranteeing a social minimum ?may easily precede? the principle guaranteeing the basic liberties, should be rejected because it does not provide adequate protection of the basic liberties, especially freedom of the person.
Respecting Citizens, Protecting Capabilities: the Role of the State in a Liberal Society
Sewell, Carolyn Marie (Virginia Tech, 2003-05-07)
The free exercise of religion as a basic human right is considered essential by those who are concerned about protecting and maintaining each person?s capability to live a good life. Unfortunately, in protecting this right the fundamental rights of women are often violated or overlooked. In order to grant religious freedom, liberal states often permit discriminatory and oppressive practices. Martha Nussbaum maintains that a balance must be struck between the protection of individual rights and the protection of religious freedom. She suggests the liberal state should not take a stand on disputed non-political issues concerning the good. The state should adopt political liberalism, thereby refraining from espousing religious or other ?comprehensive? views such as the view that men and women are innate moral equals. By doing so, Nussbaum says the political liberal state shows full respect for its citizens, and protects their ability to lead a good life. This thesis presents the argument that the liberal state need not, and should not, go as far as political liberalism in order to protect and show full respect for its citizens. Although the state should not pressure or force religious groups to change their doctrines to fall in line with liberal principles, the state may assert the truth of some non-political liberal values that are essential to maintaining the liberal political system. Political liberalism ties the hands of the liberal state, leaving it handicapped in its ability to protect individual rights, especially the rights of women and minorities.

Browsing by Author "FitzPatrick, William J."

Results Per Page

Sort Options