Browsing by Author "Groat, Stephen"

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    Implementing an IPv6 Moving Target Defense on a Live Network
    Dunlop, Matthew; Groat, Stephen; Marchany, Randolph C.; Tront, Joseph G. (Cyber-Physical Systems Virtual Organization, 2012)
    The goal of our research is to protect sensitive communications, which are commonly used by government agencies, from eavesdroppers or social engineers. In prior work, we investigated the privacy implications of stateless and stateful address autoconguration in the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). Autocongured addresses, the default addressing system in IPv6, provide a third party a means to track and monitor targeted users globally using simple tools such as ping and traceroute. Dynamic Host Conguration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) addresses contain a static DHCP Unique Identier (DUID) that can be used to track and tie a stateless address to a host identity. Our research focuses on preventing the issue of IPv6 address tracking as well as creating a "moving target defense." The Moving Target IPv6 Defense (MT6D) dynamically hides network and transport layer addresses of packets in IPv6 to achieve anonymity and protect against certain classes of network attacks. Packets are encrypted to prevent trac correlation, which provides signicantly improved anonymity. MT6D has numerous applications ranging from hosts desiring to keep their locations private to hosts conducting sensitive communications. This paper explores the results of implementing a proof of concept MT6D prototype on a live IPv6 network.
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    Security and Privacy produced by nHCP Unique Identifiers
    Tront, Joseph G.; Groat, Stephen; Dunlop, Matthew; Marchany, Randolph C. (IEEE, 2011-10)
    As protection against the current privacy weaknesses of StateLess Address AutoConfiguration (SLAAC) in the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), network administrators may choose to deploy the new Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6). Similar to the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) for the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), DHCPv6 uses a clientserver model to manage addresses in networks, providing statefol address assignment. While DHCPv6 can be configured to assign randomly distributed addresses to clients, the DHCP Unique Identifier (DUID) was designed to identify uniquely identify clients to servers and remains static to clients as they move between different subnets and networks. Since the DUID is globally unique and exposed in the clear, attackers can geotemporally track clients by sniffing DHCPv6 messages on the local network or by using unauthenticated protocol-valid queries that request systems' DUIDs or leased addresses. DUIDs can also be formed with systemspecific iriformation, forther compromising the privacy and security of the host. To combat the threat of the static DUID, a dynamic DUID was implemented and analyzed for its effect on privacy and security as well as its computational overhead. The privacy implications of DHCPv6 must be addressed before large-scale IPv6 deployment.