Browsing by Author "Hardcastle, Valerie Gray"
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- Emotions and Narrative SelvesHardcastle, Valerie Gray (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003-12)
- Evolutionary Psychology: The Academic DebateSuplizio, Jean (Virginia Tech, 2005-07-28)This dissertation examines the academic debate that surrounds the new field called "Evolutionary Psychology." Evolutionary psychology has emerged as the most popular successor theory to human sociobiology. Its proponents search for evolved psychological mechanisms and emphasize universal features of the human mind. My thesis is that in order to flourish evolutionary psychologists must engage other researchers on equal terms -- something they have not been doing. To show this, I examine the stances of practitioners from three other social science fields whose claims have been shortchanged by evolutionary psychology: Barbara King in biological anthropology, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in empirical linguistics and Annette Karmiloff-Smith in developmental psychology. These researchers are also involved in cognitive science investigations that bear on evolutionary psychology's key claims about the mind and how it works. Evolutionary psychologists make three key claims about the mind. The first (1) is that the mind is massively modular; the second (2) is that this massively modular mind has been shaped by the processes of natural selection over evolutionary time; and the third (3) is that it is adapted to the Pleistocene conditions of our past. Evolutionary psychologists seek to elevate these three claims to the status of meta-theoretical assumptions making them the starting place from which our deliberations about human cognition ought proceed. These claims would constitute the framework for a new paradigm in the ultimate sense. I argue that elevating these claims to such a status is not only premature, but also unwarranted on the available evidence. This result is justified by evidence produced outside evolutionary psychology by those disciplines from which evolutionary psychologists explicitly seek to distance themselves.
- Explanations of the Success of ScienceGannon, Dennis Patrick (Virginia Tech, 1998-06-29)Many bodies of modern scientific theory (such as both Newtonian and relativistic physics) have proven to be remarkably successful at predicting future observable phenomena. Some philosophers have seen this success as calling for deeper explanation: what is it about these theories that makes them so predictively reliable, when, presumably, not just any theory would enjoy such success? This question has often motivated philosophers (such as Richard Boyd) to adopt a realist stance towards scientific theories, wherein the entities and mechanisms postulated by a successful theory are understood as referring to real entities and mechanisms in the world. However, as Nicholas Rescher has argued, a close look at the concepts employed in scientific theorizing reveals that they are not of the right kind for such a realist explanation to work. His arguments show that at the root of the meaning of each key element of our standard scientific framework is a reference to mental functionings. This being so, an explanation such a Boyd's ceases to be viable, as an approximately accurate picture of the external world would presumably be free of reference to mental functioning. I thus attempt to provide a plausible explanation for the success of science bearing in mind that a straightforward correspondence between the world described by our theories and the world itself does not obtain. Such an explanation relies not only on the features of the external world that our theories might approximate, but also on the ability of mental processes to enrich this world, both in theorizing and in experience.
- Hyperadaptation - Another Missing Term in the Science of FormRudnick, David Jr. (Virginia Tech, 1997-04-28)In a 1982 paper, Gould and Vrba argue that a conflation of the two components of adaptation of a feature, historical development of the feature and present utility, has caused evolutionists to overlook a missing term in the science of form, which they call 'exaptation'. In the present project, I show that evolutionary biology still contains a confusion in the use of 'adaptation' due to an inappropriate perception of the interaction between the two components of adaptation. Because of the confusion, evolutionists have missed another term in the science of form. Evolutionary theory, specifically the treatment of adaptation, would profit from the introduction of a term referring to features that have a selective history which causes them to appear overly well adapted to their present function. I suggest we refer to these features as hyperadaptations, since they appear to be hyperbolized adaptations. By introducing hyperadaptation into the conceptual framework of adaptation, we can sharpen our understanding of related concepts (adaptation to function, exaptation, maladaptation, etc.) and remove or reduce some confusion regarding the interplay between analysis of historical pathways and ascriptions of (current) function in the diagnosis of adaptation. Furthermore, the improved framework should allow evolutionists to more adequately explain biological phenomena.
- Meaning, Functions, and the Promise of Indicator SemanticsRichardson, Jason (Virginia Tech, 1996-07-19)In this thesis, I first present Fred Dretske's theory of mental represent- ations, which purports to show how a physical thing could have (non-derived) meaning. In order to illustrate the applicability of the theory to an actual physical system, I discuss the theory in relation to two theories of audio localization (i.e., the capacity to locate the source of sounds in one's environment). Having clarified the theory, I examine two charges laid against it. Lynne Rudder Baker charges the theory with circularity. Her charge is refuted by appealing to the concept of a "standby function." Stephen Stich charges the theory with vagueness. His charge is refuted by appealing to a general analysis of functions. I conclude that a careful use and analysis of the previously unanalyzed term "function" makes possible the refutation of these two charges.
- Objectivity in Feminist Philosophy of ScienceWard, Laura Aline (Virginia Tech, 2004-06-22)Feminist philosophy of science has long been considered a fringe element of philosophy of science as a whole. A careful consideration of the treatment of the key concept of objectivity by such philosophical heavyweights as Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, followed by an analysis of the concept of objectivity with the work of such feminist philosophers of science as Donna Haraway, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Sandra Harding, reveals that feminist philosophers of science are not members of some fringe movement of philosophy of science, but rather are doing philosophical work which is both crucial and connected to the work of other, "mainstream" philosophers of science.
- A risk management process for complex projectsBrown, Robert G. (Virginia Tech, 1995-11-06)A more effective and efficient method to identify, assess, track and document project risks was explored. Using the systems engineering approach, an adaptable, repeatable risk management process was designed for complex projects (typically multi-million dollar electronics I defense contracts with advanced technology, aggressive schedules and multiple contractors I subcontractors). Structured tools and techniques were synthesized to increase the probability of risk identification, to facilitate qualitative and quantitative risk assessment, to graphically portray risk reduction priorities and to provide a vehicle for improved communication and traceability of risk reduction activity across the project team. A description of the process used to survey current risk management methods, to ascertain the critical risk management process requirements and to define a means to prioritize risks for more effective resource allocation is included.
- Situated Cognition, Dynamicism, and Explanation in Cognitive ScienceGreenlee, Christopher Alan (Virginia Tech, 1998-06-19)The majority of cognitive scientists today view the mind as a computer, instantiating some function mapping the inputs it gets from the environment to the gross behaviors of the organism. As a result, the emphasis in most ongoing research programmes is on finding that function, or some part of that function. Moreover, the types of functions considered are limited somewhat by the preconception that the mind must be instantiating a function that can be expressed as a computer program. I argue that research done in the last two decades suggests that we should approach cognition with as much consideration to the environment as to the inner workings of the mind. Our cognition is often shaped by the constraints the environment places on us, not just by the "inputs" we receive from it. I argue also that there is a new approach to cognitive science, viewing the mind not as a computer but as a dynamical system, which captures the shift in perspective while eliminating the requirement that cognitive functions be expressable as computer programs. Unfortunately, some advocates of this dynamical perspective have argued that we should replace all of traditional psychology and neuroscience with their new approach. In response to these advocates, I argue that we cannot develop an adequate dynamical picture of the mind without engaging in precisely those sorts of research and hypothesizing that traditional neuroscience and psychology engage in. In short, I argue that we require certain types of explanations in order to get our dynamical (or computational) theories off the ground, and we cannot get those from other dynamical (or computational) theories.