Browsing by Author "Hersch, Gil"
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- Douglass, Jacobs, and Freedom Found in ResistanceMalley, Colleen Margaret (Virginia Tech, 2022-06-23)The narratives of abolitionist thinkers Frederick Douglass - My Bondage and My Freedom - and Harriet Jacobs - Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl - both include instances of the authors engaging in resistance against their slaveholders that do not free them from slavery. I begin with these narratives of resistance and make the interpretive claim that both Douglass and Jacobs took themselves to be free in their acts of resistance even though they were still in conditions we would not associate with freedom. In doing so, I determine that Douglass takes himself to be free because he is able to regain an internal sense of self-respect. Differently, I argue that Jacobs takes herself to be free because she is able to exert control over her material circumstances by identifying and pursuing her goal of sexual and reproductive autonomy to the best of her ability. This difference in understanding of freedom is surprising since Douglass and Jacobs find themselves in similar situations. I proceed by addressing this surprise and making the claim that the form of freedom Jacobs found in resistance is preferable to the form of freedom found by Douglass. In order to make this claim, I draw on Isaiah Berlin's discussion of freedom in "Two Concepts of Liberty" and find that Douglass achieves a form of freedom that isolates himself from his external desires whereas Jacobs does not. Jacobs' act of resistance is tightly connected to her desires. I demonstrate that connection to desires in resistance is important because it allows an agent to develop a sense of practical agency which allows them to adapt to future circumstances. Jacobs' understanding of freedom is ultimately preferable because it tells us what it is like to find freedom in our immediate circumstances through persistence.
- A Duty to Deceive? Using New and Deceptive Technologies to Enhance the Lives of Dementia PatientsNofal, Jacob Ramsey (Virginia Tech, 2023-04-24)In this paper I propose a new type of therapy for dementia patients called AIIT. AIIT concerns using artificially intelligent programs to mimic the likeness of a dementia patients' spouse or relative in hopes of providing them comfort and an alternative solution to them constantly reliving grief or being lied to in unsatisfactory ways. I establish the moral permissibility of AIIT through the moral parity claim, which is a conditional claim stating that if current dementia care practices are permissible, then AIIT ought to be as well. This means that AIIT is no more morally problematic than current dementia care practices. To make this claim I evaluate and compare AIIT to current practices from three different perspectives/potential harms. I first find AIIT to be less harmful to dementia patients than current practices since AIIT better preserves dementia patients' beliefs, emotions, and desires. I then conclude that AIIT does not pose a unique harm to the impersonated person, since 1) Many theories of wellbeing do not support the possibility of the deceased being harmed and 2) People with dementia are not commonly creating new impressions, and therefore harms committed to the impersonated person are extremely unlikely. Finally, I claim that AIIT would not cause additional harms to society given that current practices already harm relatives in a similar manner, also have the potential to pose problems if used outside of dementia care, and don't differ from AIIT in respect to affecting trust in the medical system. Having established moral parity, I conclude with a push for a stronger claim, the superior option claim, which states that AIIT is morally permissible by arguing for the antecedent of the moral parity claim. I argue for this by denying that we have an obligation to not deceive dementia patients since they have special conditions that do not allow them to apprehend the world accurately.
- The Limits of Popular Control over GovernmentCurtis, Samuel John (Virginia Tech, 2022-05-12)Philip Pettit argues that freedom is best defined as non-domination, where domination is understood as subjection to uncontrolled interference. Pettit further argues that government is legitimate when it succeeds in preventing citizens from dominating each other without dominating them in the process, as this allows citizens to enjoy the protection of government without surrendering their freedom. Since Pettit argues that democratic (popular) control over government prevents government from dominating its citizens, Pettit argues that a legitimate, non-dominating state is possible. In this paper I argue that popular control cannot prevent government domination unless one accepts controversial, substantive value judgments about freedom and equality that Pettit claims his theory avoids.
- Making Change Intelligible: Why The Study of Human Kinds Is Just Science As UsualAli, Mohamed (Virginia Tech, 2023-05-04)This paper challenges the notion that the social sciences require a fundamentally different methodology from the natural sciences due to the interactivity of human kinds. By examining the concept of classificatory looping and its impact on human kinds, the author argues that understanding the causal pathways and utilizing behavioral science can offer reliable generalizations about human kinds. The paper presents examples such as the Buraku of Japan and African Americans to demonstrate how behavioral science can be employed to predict changes in properties of social groups. It posits that the social sciences can operate in a manner similar to the natural sciences by examining generic human tendencies that hold broadly across diverse social contexts. This exploration ultimately supports the unity thesis, emphasizing that social sciences can indeed gain a scientific understanding of human kinds comparable to the knowledge offered by natural sciences.
- A new well-being atomismHersch, Gil; Weltman, Daniel (Wiley, 2022-06)Many philosophers reject the view that well-being over a lifetime is simply an aggregation of well-being at every moment of one's life, and thus they reject theories of well-being like hedonism and concurrentist desire satisfactionism. They raise concerns that such a view misses the importance of the relationships between moments in a person's life or the role narratives play in a person's well-being. In this article, we develop an atomist meta-theory of well-being, according to which the prudential value of a life depends solely on the prudential value of each moment of that life. This is a general account of momentary well-being that can capture different features of well-being that standard atomistic accounts fail to capture, thus allowing for the possibility of an atomism that is compatible with a variety of well-being theories. Contrary to many criticisms leveled against momentary well-being, this well-being atomism captures all of the important features of well-being.
- The Puzzle of Victim-AngerDempsey, Thomas Zebulon (Virginia Tech, 2022-06-23)In this paper I raise a puzzle that I call 'the puzzle of victim-anger' that is parallel to Bernard William's puzzle of agent-regret. Suppose a truck driver is driving down the street when a child happens to walk in front of them. Through no fault of their own, the driver hits and kills the child. It is well understood that the driver will, and probably should, have some sort of guilt-like response, called agent-regret. However, it would also be unsurprising to find out that the child's parents were angry at the driver for killing their child, and this observation has been largely overlooked in the literature on agent-regret. This anger is totally intelligible—we might even feel deeply alienated by a parent who didn't feel it in the wake of their child's avoidable death. Nevertheless, it's hard to see how this anger could be rationally defensible: aren't the parents just lashing out at an innocent party? In this paper, I show how the traditional philosophical account of anger fails to yield a satisfactory solution to this puzzle. As a result, I reject the traditional account and offer my own positive account of anger in its place. According to my positive account, anger functions to shift the conversational dynamic in order to call attention to the target's obligations to repair the harm they caused.
- Self-respect and The Obligation to Resist OppressionDixon, Kordell (Virginia Tech, 2022-06-17)In this paper, I will argue against the position of Carol Hay, who asserts that the oppressed have an obligation against oppression and that the bare minimum of this obligation is to resist internally. I will demonstrate that resisting internally leaves space for the oppressed to affirm the oppressors' false beliefs. Affirming the oppressor's false belief causes the oppressed person to disrespect themself. In order to understand why we must first understand what things contribute to our self-respect. Our ability to respect ourselves depends on many factors, but I will focus on two specifically. The first is our internal/self-image; this is how we see ourselves. The second is our external image; this is how we think people see us. One way we can disrespect ourselves is by causing conflict between these two elements, which undermines our self-respect. Hay's account is grounded on the oppressed person respecting themself. Therefore, if an oppressed person can disrespect themself while meeting the bare requirements of the duty to resist oppression, then we need to reconsider the bare minimum of the obligation to resist oppression.
- Structural Injustice and the Responsibilities of the Oppressed: The Case of DenialismStocks, Dane (Virginia Tech, 2022-05-10)Leading accounts of responsibility for structural injustice endorse the idea that all members of an unjust social structure—including those who are oppressed—bear a forward-looking responsibility to help combat structural injustice. Importantly, this idea assumes that all oppressed agents are capable of consciously combating structural injustice. But there exist oppressed agents, which I term 'denialists', who deny the existence of the wrongs that they and other members of their social group(s) experience in virtue of being subject to structural injustice. Initially, it seems doubtful that a denialist can consciously combat structural injustice—what could they possibly do to consciously combat wrongs whose existence they reject? This may lead one to think that a denialist cannot be held responsible for helping combat structural injustice, so that the aforementioned accounts must be revised. In this paper, I show that such revision is not needed. Despite initial appearances, a denialist can be held responsible for helping combat structural injustice. To establish this claim, I first argue that two criteria—feasibleness and plausible effectiveness—jointly generate pro tanto responsibilities to help fix structural injustice for oppressed agents. Then, I argue that these criteria entail that a denialist has a pro tanto responsibility to listen to others' claims of wrongdoing.