VTechWorks Repository :: Browsing by Author "Klagge, James C."

Browsing by Author "Klagge, James C."

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Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal Belief
Galvani, Eve Antoinette (Virginia Tech, 2016-06-27)
This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases.
Adjust Both: Adjusting Credibility Excesses for Epistemic Justice
Whittaker, Lindsay Melissa (Virginia Tech, 2018-06-04)
Epistemologists and those involved in feminist philosophy have expanded philosophical analyses of epistemic injustices and its subparts over the last decade. In doing so, such authors have thoroughly discussed the role of credibility deficits and the harms they cause for those receiving the deficits. In this literature, however, credibility excesses have not received as much attention owing to their tendency to be socially advantageous for those receiving them. In this paper, I show that epistemic justice relies in part on taking these excesses into account. More specifically, I illustrate how adjusting only credibility deficits leads to a two-fold problem. On the one hand, it leads to an epistemic harm insofar as not taking the excesses into account can cause us to draw the wrong conclusion from furnished testimonies. If one persons testimonial excess is still greater than another's corrected deficit in a certain way, then the person with the excess will be favored over the other person even once the deficit is corrected. On the other hand, it can also lead to a moral harm that wrongs the person who received the eventually corrected deficit in their capacity as a knower. It does so in instances when it undermines the person's self-trust. As such, if we are willing to adjust credibility deficits up in the project of epistemic justice we also have to be willing to adjust credibility excesses down in at least some cases.
The Argument from Species Overlap
Ehnert, Jesse (Virginia Tech, 2002-07-15)
The "argument from species overlap" (abbreviated ASO) claims that some human and nonhuman animals possess similar sets of morally relevant characteristics, and are therefore similarly morally significant. The argument stands as a general challenge to moral theories, because many theories hold that all humans possess greater moral significance than all nonhuman animals. In this thesis I discuss responses to the ASO, primarily those of Peter Carruthers, Tom Regan, Evelyn Pluhar, and Peter Singer. Carruthers denies the conclusion of the ASO, while the other three do not. I argue that the ASO is a sound argument, and that Carruthers's attempts to counter it via his contractualist theory are unsuccessful. I next discuss the rights-based theories of Regan and Pluhar, which agree with the conclusion of the ASO but which, I believe, encounter significant theoretical difficulties. Finally, I address the ASO from a utilitarian perspective, first from Singer's utilitarian formulation and then from a "welfare-utilitarian" formulation. I answer a number of critical objections to welfare utilitarianism, and argue that the theory is most successful in facing the challenge of the ASO.
Beliefs in an Opaque Brain
Abugattas Escalante, Juan Andres (Virginia Tech, 2016-06-30)
Peter Carruther's Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge is an interesting account of the opaqueness of our own minds that draws upon a wide range of theories from cognitive science and philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that the theory's assumptions support the conclusion that the available perceptual evidence massively underdetermines all of an agent's second-order beliefs about her own beliefs. Such a result is far more negative than the ISA's well-known pessimism regarding self-knowledge. Furthermore, I also argue that, from the same assumptions, it is possible to build an argument to the effect that cognitive scientists trying to determine an agents' true behavior-causing attitude face similar underdetermination problems. Toward the end of the paper, I suggest that the theory's problems arise from a conflation of two different ways in which terms denoting propositional attitudes, such as 'belief', are used in its formulation. Distinguishing between the two usages of these terms, in turn, leads to a further distinction between two different senses in which we can talk about the 'opaqueness' of our own minds.
Civility: Its Distinctness and Significance
Love, Christopher William (Virginia Tech, 2017-10-26)
Civility has many critics. Some challenge its distinctness as a virtue, others its moral significance. In this essay, I attempt to meet both challenges by offering an account of civility that stands distinct from other concepts and holds great value, both intrinsically and instrumentally. I claim that we show civility toward others when we dispute their ideas in ways that respect those persons' intrinsic worth. My account pays particular attention to the connections between civility, clarity and reconciliation--connections that make civility vital for modern pluralistic societies. I then consider a recent alternative to this conception of civility advanced by Calhoun (2000), arguing that it secures distinctness at the cost of moral significance.
A Davidsonian Response to the Dead Metaphor Problem
Wilson, Richard James (Virginia Tech, 2008-04-28)
In his article, "What Metaphors Mean," Donald Davidson presented his own unique theory of metaphor. While this theory has proved to be influential, there seems to be one problem which a Davidsonian theory cannot account for: the dead metaphor problem. Due to certain aspects of Davidson's theory of metaphor, critics argue that it is impossible for Davidson to explain how dead metaphors form. In this thesis, I will show why Davidson's account should be chosen over other prominent theories of metaphor, and how a Davidsonian might be able to bypass the dead metaphor problem.
Deceiving Appearances: Problems for the Evidential Insensitivity Approach to Phenomenal Dogmatism
Whitlock, Matthew Alexander (Virginia Tech, 2018-07-05)
Foundationalism about justification has historically enjoyed widespread acceptance among philosophers despite equally widespread disagreement about how foundational justification is possible. It is widely agreed that all knowledge must by justified by a foundation that does not stand in need of justification, but philosophers disagree on what could provide that foundation. Internalists, who look for justification in factors internal to rational agents, tend to agree that foundational justification is provided by seemings, or the way things seem to one to be. This view has most commonly gone by the name 'Phenomenal Dogmatism' although variations of it have been defended. Phenomenal dogmatism has been criticized for being too permissive with regard to the states it counts as able to confer foundational justification. In this paper I will consider one attempt, offered by Berit Brogaard, to revise phenomenal dogmatism in response to these criticisms. I will argue that Brogaard's revised view has significant problems of its own. Specifically, it does not account for problems arising from the possibility of cognitively penetrated perceptions.
Dialogical Writing in Philosophy and Literature. A Study on Plato's Crito and Gorgias and Peacock's Nightmare Abbey
Gabor, Octavian (Virginia Tech, 2002-04-17)
Both Thomas Love Peacock and Plato use dialogue for their works while they differ in what they envisage and what they achieve, i.e. same form, different objectives. Thus, having Peacock and Plato writing dialogues in different frames - one literary and one philosophical - raises an important question: can literary writers be more provocative of thought in the audience than writers of philosophical dialogues? If so, what then are the features of dialogical writing, whether literary or philosophical, or common features that pertain to both these fields, that cause it to be respectful or nurturing to the minds that encounter it? This question will underlie the whole paper. It actually comes from the fact that in dialogue, whether deployed in philosophical or literary texts, we do not see the author's opinion clearly expressed. In dialogue, and this is often true for Plato, the author's dogma loses itself under the various dogmas that the characters have; the author hides himself behind his personages. The readers do not encounter only one mind that has claims of revealing a truth - the philosophical approach - or that lays out a story - the literary one. In dialogue, the reader finds an ongoing discussion and becomes part of it. Through the analysis of two of Plato's dialogues, the Crito and the Gorgias, and Peacock's satirical novel, Nightmare Abbey, I intend to show that, used in philosophy or literature, dialogue seems to be the perfect tool to communicate the idea that once expressed becomes its negative: the only thing that we know is that we do not know anything.
Empirical Meaning and Incomplete Personhood
Maas, Steven M. (Virginia Tech, 1998-06-08)
Both intensional and extensional explanations of linguistic meaning involve notions -- linguistic roles and referential relations, respectively -- which are not perspicuous and seem to evade satisfactory explanations themselves. Following Sellars, I make a move away from semantic explanation of the designation relation and of linguistic roles toward an explanation which relates to the use of linguistic and perceptual signs (i.e., pragmatics). In doing so, concerns are raised that seem to be more closely associated with epistemology and phenomenology than with the philosophy of language or logic. In particular, experience is taken to be intentional, i.e., to have a propositional content which is irreducible to the causal order. Along with intentionality, certain essentially autobiographical conditions of experience are neglected in typical conceptions of the problem of meaning. They are reintroduced here. Further, I take as a presupposition the pragmatist notion that each of our conceptual schemes emerges from a community of persons, rather than from individuals. What follows from the preceding starting points is a picture of incomplete personhood in which persons are seen as being inclined both toward experiential wholes which have conceptual content and toward establishing and unifying beliefs which resolve doubts. Because of the conditions of experience constitutive of, and peculiar to, personhood and the necessity of the community for individual inquiry, the notion of incomplete personhood has a central position in my pragmatist conception of the problem of meaning. By emphasizing the pragmatistic conditions of experience and the active role of persons in finding objects and in continually reaching toward a final complete picture, the problems related to objectivity are found to be peripheral to a conception of meaning which captures the practice(s) of persons' living object-directed lives. The result is a new way of conceiving of the problem of meaning.
Engendered: An Artistic Treatise Against Gender
Shepard, Kathryn Ann (Virginia Tech, 2016-07-06)
As humans, we are enslaved by language. The kind of knowledge we hold is both created and limited by language. Gender is a category socially constructed in language that helps to determine our expression. Today, however, we are living in a world where the meaning of the words 'man' and 'woman' in our language are far more blurred than they used to be. Gender and sex are no longer considered binary structures by many and this presents interesting philosophical discussions. In fact one might even say there are 1,000's of tiny sexes (or genders) . So with the topic of gender (and sex) becoming a gray area what would a world completely devoid of gender terms look like? Are we constraining individuals by placing them within such a category as gender or are we taking something significant from them if we were to remove this label? Would we provide empowerment to oppressed genders by removing such labels or simply put them at further risk of domination by the oppressors? In this thesis I would like to argue that the removal of gender terms would create more accurate self-identity by allowing for a broader spectrum of diversity and, as a result, further equity. Due to the strong bond between language and culture, my theory is that by slowly tweaking our language over time, while intermediately allowing for the resulting cultural changes, until gender terms are removed from our everyday lives we could develop a culture that has no ability to discriminate between what we currently consider different genders.
Geometric Possibility, Ideological Parsimony, and Monistic Substantivalism
Davis, Cruz Austin (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-29)
Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. For the monist, objects either are identical with regions or are somehow derivative from them. Dualistic substantivalists view regions and objects as distinct kinds of fundamental entities. One virtue monists claim over dualists is that their view is more ideologically parsimonious than dualism because monists can do without a primitive notion of location. In this paper I provide an argument that undercuts some of the theoretical edge that monists claim over dualists. The assumption that the monist can provide a reduction of location unique to her position rests on a false assumption about the possible structures spacetime can have. If it is metaphysically possible for two distinct regions to coincide with respect to all their significant spatiotemporal properties and relations (call these 'coincident regions'), then analyses of location unique to monism will turn out to be inadequate.
Holistic Theories of Content and Instability
Ferguson, Ryan Matthew (Virginia Tech, 2014-06-02)
In this paper, I will defend two methodological theses, one negative and one positive, about how to develop a holistic theory of content for mental representations that avoids a problem peculiar to holistic theories, viz., the problem of content instability. The relevant debate between holists and anti-holists has focused on whether this problem provides an in principle barrier to developing a plausible holistic theory. On this front, the holists have won; defenders of holistic theories have convincingly argued that the anti-holists do not have a cogent argument from the problem of content instability to the impossibility of developing a plausible holistic theory. However, beyond this, little has been said about how to develop a holistic theory that avoids the problematic consequences of content instability; all that has been established is that it appears to be, in principle, possible to do so. This paper should contribute to making progress in this area. The two theses I will defend are about how to generate useful constraints on holistic theories so that they avoid content instability. The negative thesis of this paper is that the strategy of generating constraints suggested by the holists' response to anti-holist arguments, viz., appealing to properties of theories' determination functions, is a non-starter. The positive thesis of this paper is that the best way to develop useful stability constraints is to appeal to the explanatory role(s) that representations play in cognitive science theories.
How Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral Realism
Lennon, James Preston (Virginia Tech, 2016-07-19)
Philosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest that assuming cognitive phenomenology does exist, it would have important consequences for other areas of philosophy. In particular, it would have important consequences for moral epistemology – how we come to know the moral truths we seem to know. I argue that adopting cognitive phenomenology and the epistemic principle of phenomenal conservatism can do “double duty” for the moral realist: they provide the moral realist with prima facie grounds for belief in the objectivity of morality, while epistemically vindicating the specific contents of their beliefs.
Kantianism and Its Commitment to Non Naturalism
Frazier, Joseph (Virginia Tech, 2016-06-27)
Kantian ethics has a strong following amongst the philosophical community when it comes to morality and ethics. Many Kantians, including Christine Korsgaard, subscribe to the view that Kantianism is opposed to Non-Naturalism. This view, while understandable, is incorrect. In fact, the Kantian approach to ethics has a strong commitment to Non-Naturalism in its metaphysical construction. The purpose of this paper is to prove this dependence by showing the inferences and concepts of Kantianism that one cannot accept without accepting Non-Naturalistic principles. To demonstrate this connection between Kantianism and Non-Naturalism, I will give a summary of Kantianism through the interpretation given by Velleman (2005). Then I will present Non-Naturalism as presented by Fitzpatrick (2008) and Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). After explaining these views as clearly as possible, I will explain why Kantianism is committed to Non-Naturalism, address the possible contradiction of Kantianism and Fitzpatrick's idea of 'ethical truths being independent of any perspective,' as well as address the issues raised by Korsgaard (2003) concerning the realist approach to Kantian ethics.
A Language-Game Justification for Narrative in Historical Explanation
Hall, Brayton Bruno (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-21)
The problem of historical explanation consists in how historical facts are put together. No mere collection of facts constitutes an explanation: there must be some underlying explanation for why those facts occurred in the way they did. Many competing theories of historical explanation have thus been offered, from the highly technical D-N or covering law model, to narrative-based explanations. This paper exposes the flaws in the covering law model proposed by Carl Hempel, and offers a justification for narrative-based explanations by appealing to the notion of language games as used by Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as the narrative and paradigm models of Arthur Danto and Thomas Kuhn for explaining historical events.
Limited Revisionism and Error Theory
Key, Andrew Braxton (Virginia Tech, 2019-06-25)
In Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. Along the way, I show that Joyce has unfairly ignored limited revisionism because of faulty views about what makes a concept or term normative, and that limited revisionism ignores some expected pitfalls, such as overgeneralizing to legitimately error-theoretic discourses.
Meaning, Functions, and the Promise of Indicator Semantics
Richardson, Jason (Virginia Tech, 1996-07-19)
In this thesis, I first present Fred Dretske's theory of mental represent- ations, which purports to show how a physical thing could have (non-derived) meaning. In order to illustrate the applicability of the theory to an actual physical system, I discuss the theory in relation to two theories of audio localization (i.e., the capacity to locate the source of sounds in one's environment). Having clarified the theory, I examine two charges laid against it. Lynne Rudder Baker charges the theory with circularity. Her charge is refuted by appealing to the concept of a "standby function." Stephen Stich charges the theory with vagueness. His charge is refuted by appealing to a general analysis of functions. I conclude that a careful use and analysis of the previously unanalyzed term "function" makes possible the refutation of these two charges.
A modifier-based philosophy of whole number
Martin, James V. (Virginia Tech, 2007-05-10)
This paper offers an alternative philosophy of whole number in which number-words are treated as being of the semantic-type modifier. Other accounts of number in which number-words are treated as names, syncategoremata, determiners, and predicates are considered and rejected based on their failure to provide number-words with the necessary compositional semantics. This leaves only modifiers as plausible candidates to play number-words' role in natural language. After the semantic-type modifier is chosen, a decision between number-words' being adjectival or adverbial modifiers must then be made. I argue that due to a lack of entities to be ascribed adjectival numerical properties we must settle on an adverbial treatment. After developing this treatment, I close with an attempt to explain seemingly singular-term uses of number-words in arithmetical statements like '2 + 2 = 4' in terms of these claims' stating the rules for substituting equivalent modifier-phrases in non-mathematical usages.
Moral Motivation and the Devil
Haderlie, Derek Christian (Virginia Tech, 2014-05-19)
In this paper, I call into question the thesis known as judgment internalism about moral motivation. Broadly construed, this thesis holds that there is a non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. The difficulty for judgment internalism arises because of amoral agents: when an agent both knows the right and yet fails to be motivated to act on this knowledge. Specifically, I cite John Milton's Satan from Paradise Lost. This is a problem because it calls into question the non-contingent relation between moral judgment and moral motivation. I argue that in order for judgment internalism to be viable in reconciling judgment internalism and amoralism, it must provide plausible accounts of both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility. While crude versions of the thesis fail to do this, I provide a revised thesis which I call Narrative Internalism, which assumes a narrative theory of the self. This thesis has the dual strength that it can account for both why one would typically be motivated to Φ upon judging that it is right to Φ and also the conditions that might obtain such that one would fail to be motivated. This account of moral psychology explains both (a) the relationship between judging and motivation, and (b) the conditions for defeasibility by giving an account of plausible defeasibility conditions. I conclude that unless there are more plausible accounts of judgment internalism in the offing, which doesn't seem apparent to me, we should adopt Narrative Internalism.
The Moral Status of Nonhuman Animals
Farmer, Rhiannon M. (Virginia Tech, 2003-01-31)
Although moral individualism is sufficient for making fair moral decisions, it is itself supported by our implicit moral commitments; Rawls (and consequently Rowlands) uses the original position as a method for making moral decisions that are both fair and consistent without proposing a normative moral code, and DeGrazia adds content to this method by spelling out what interests are and which individuals are capable of having interests - and thus being morally considerable. Rawls does not go far enough in the process of bracketing off undeserved, unearned properties; he fails to see that properties such as rationality and species are undeserved. Using Rowlands' interpretation of Rawls, I argue that the revised intuitive equality argument provides the justification for the social contract argument - that is, for bracketing off the properties that are arbitrary. I use DeGrazia to make the case for sentience as being essential for moral consideration. Sentience is necessary and sufficient for having interests, and having interests is sufficient for being worthy of moral consideration. From this, I conclude that because there are many sentient nonhuman animals, there are many nonhuman animals that are worthy of moral consideration. Being morally considerable is not equivalent to having substantial moral status. Rachels' moral individualism allows us to make moral decisions based upon the properties or characteristics of the individual, and this is particularly useful for pinpointing our treatment of humans and our justification for doing so and then simply extending this line of thought to nonhumans. This method allows us to isolate what is indeed relevant to the situation at hand and to consider if both individuals under consideration share it. In the case of moral status, sentience will play an important role because it is a property shared by humans and at least some nonhuman animals. Using Rawls, Rowlands, DeGrazia and Rachels as support, I conclude that at least some animals have significant moral status.

Browsing by Author "Klagge, James C."

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