Browsing by Author "Mansi, Sattar"

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    Investor Attention and Insider Trading
    Mansi, Sattar; Peng, Lin; Qi, Jianping; Shi, Han (2025)
    We identify a new mechanism of opportunistic insider trading linked to attention-driven mispricing. Insiders are more likely to sell their company's stock during periods of heightened retail attention and more inclined to buy when attention diminishes. The results are particularly pronounced for lottery-type stocks and for firms with substantial retail ownership. We demonstrate that our findings—which relate to indicators of mispricing, retail order imbalances, and Robinhood herding episodes—extend to seasoned equity issuances and cannot be solely explained by firm fundamentals. Attention-based insider trading is less likely to result in SEC enforcement actions and persists across different regulatory regimes.
  • Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders
    Becker, William J.; Mansi, Sattar; Nazari, Maryam; Wald, John K. (Wiley, 2023-09-08)
    Research Question/Issue: For firms with institutional dual holders, is proxy voting affected by whether the vote is confidential? Does confidential voting affect firms' cost of debt?. Research Findings/Insights: Consistent with social exchange theory and reciprocity norms, we find that, in the absence of confidential voting, firms with institutional dual holders gain more favorable votes for proposals and, in particular, for management-sponsored compensation proposals. Further, these firms pay a higher cost of borrowing. This reciprocity relation does not exist if the firm has confidential voting in place. Theoretical/Academic Implications: The results are consistent with reciprocity norms creating a psychological obligation to repay valuable favors between firm managers and institutional dual holders when proxy votes are not confidential. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The findings support the popular position that confidential voting is in the best interests of shareholders and rigorous external corporate governance.