Browsing by Author "Patton, Lydia K."
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- Anti-Metaphysical Arguments in the Anticipations of PerceptionPatton, Lydia K. (Editura Academiei Romane/Publishing House of the Romanian Academy, 2022-12-22)In the Anticipations, Kant defends the claim that all sensations must register on a purely subjective scale of response to stimuli, in order for sensation to be a possible source of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that Kant defends this claim in response to “scholasticism” or transcendental realism about sensation. The fact that all sensations are measurable on a subjec- tive scale is the a priori content of the principle of the Anticipations, and, according to Kant, is a necessary condition for building any systematic analysis of sensation. The anti-metaphysical arguments in the “Anticipations of Perception” are key building blocks of Kant’s transcendental idealism.
- Challenges to Effective RealismShifrel, Zachary D. (Virginia Tech, 2019-08-20)That a theory is merely effective has historically counted against it, especially in pro-realism discourse. For example, many realists take the interpretation of a theory to amount to specifying what the world would be like was the theory true (or characterizing the possible worlds picked out by the theory). But effective theories are not true simpliciter. They describe a limited subset of nature and only approximately so, giving the traditional realist little to work with. The effective realist gives up on the traditional realist project, noting that contemporary physical theories tell us nothing, or very little, about what's fundamental. The traditional realist gives us unreliable results for our ontology at fundamental length scales. Effective realism responds by taking effective theories seriously. I have two primary goals in this paper. First, I consider a few responses to arguments provided by Ruetshce (2017). Ruetsche worries that the theory space over which the effective realist quantifies might fail to be comprehensive. I hope to defend the effective realist through the use of first-order scientific evidence and with a response motivated by Fraser (forthcoming). Second, I develop an objection to effective realism similar in kind to one posed by Ruetshce. Rather than a skepticism in the space on which the renormalization group acts, I entertain a more general skepticism with respect to the construction of effective field theories. I then tease out a response grounded in theory space constraints to justify the effective realist's use of effective field theories to guide ontological commitment.
- The Colonial Rift: A Review of Hannah Holleman’s Dust Bowls of Empire: Imperialism, Environmental Politics, and the Injustice of “Green” CapitalismBurkey, Brandon; Patton, Lydia K. (2021-07-14)
- Computation Methods for Parametric Analysis of Gravitational Wave DataPatel, Heta Ajay (Virginia Tech, 2019-09-18)Gravitational waves are detected, analyzed and matched filtered based on an approximation of General Relativity called the Post Newtonian theory. This approximation method is based on the assumption that there is a weak gravity field both inside and around the body. However, scientists cannot justify why Post-Newtonian theory (meant for weak fields) works so well with strong fields of black hole mergers when it really should have failed [C. Will 2011]. Yunes and Pretorius gave another approach called parameterized post-Einsteinian (ppE) theory that uses negligible assumptions and promises to identify any deviation on the parameters through post-processing tests. This thesis project proposes to develop a method for the parametric detection and testing of gravitational waves by computation of ppE for the inspiral phase using ChirpLab. A set of templates will be generated with ppE parameters that can be used for the testing.
- A Critique of Langton on Kantian SubstanceOldham, Heather Renee (Virginia Tech, 2009-05-04)Rae Langton's interpretation of the distinction between things in themselves and phenomena solves many traditional problems at the expense of Kant's discussion of the categories and time, which she thinks are irrelevant to explaining the problem of affection. Langton applies the concept "substance" in a transcendentally real manner to things in themselves, in order to argue that we are ignorant of the latter because they are causally inert intrinsic properties. In doing so, she misdiagnoses the source of Humility, which can be properly understood by the fact that things in themselves are not objects of experience. Langton misapplies the concept of substance to things in themselves, and says that substance of the First Analogy is phaenomenon substantiatum. I argue that substance is a concept which should only be applied to matter in order to unite perceptions in an objective time order.
- Editor’s notePatton, Lydia K. (University of Chicago Press, 2021-09-01)
- Editor’s notePatton, Lydia K. (University of Chicago Press, 2021-09-01)
- The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific ExplanationTaylor, Kaetlin Diane (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-09)While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is scientific explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific explanation?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.
- Essence, Revelation, and PhysicalismSmith, Justyn Glynn (Virginia Tech, 2021-06-03)Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties.
- Examining "The Adam Smith Problem": Individuals, Society, and ValueCrowder, Rachel E. (Virginia Tech, 2012-04-26)In this paper I offer an analysis of the Adam Smith Problem. This Problem arises from perceived inconsistencies between Smith's economic work, The Wealth of Nations, and his moral theory, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that far from being inconsistent with Smith's economic theory, his moral theory serves as a necessary foundation. I suggest that, because he takes humans to be moral by nature, Smith defends social capitalism which requires moral economic agents rather than homo economicus. I then sketch some specific implications for the moral limits of Smithian social systems.
- Expanding theory testing in general relativity: LIGO and parametrized theoriesPatton, Lydia K. (2020-02)The multiple detections of gravitational waves by LIGO (the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory), operated by Caltech and MIT, have been acclaimed as confirming Einstein's prediction, a century ago, that gravitational waves propagating as ripples in spacetime would be detected. Yunes and Pretorius (2009) investigate whether LIGO's template-based searches encode fundamental assumptions, especially the assumption that the background theory of general relativity is an accurate description of the phenomena detected in the search. They construct the parametrized post-Einsteinian (ppE) framework in response, which broadens those assumptions and allows for wider testing under more flexible assumptions. Their methods are consistent with work on confirmation and testing found in Carnap (1936), Hempel (1969), and Stein (1992, 1994), with the following principles in common: that confirmation is distinct from testing, and that, counterintuitively, revising a theory's formal basis can make it more broadly empirically testable. These views encourage a method according to which theories can be made abstract, to define families of general structures for the purpose of testing. With the development of the ppE framework and related approaches, multi-messenger astronomy is a catalyst for deep reasoning about the limits and potential of the theoretical framework of general relativity.
- Experimental Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience: Evidence, Errors, and InferenceAktunc, Mahir Emrah (Virginia Tech, 2011-07-02)This is a work in the epistemology of functional neuroimaging (fNI) and it applies the error-statistical (ES) philosophy to inferential problems in fNI to formulate and address these problems. This gives us a clear, accurate, and more complete understanding of what we can learn from fNI and how we can learn it. I review the works in the epistemology of fNI which I group into two categories; the first category consists of discussions of the theoretical significance of fNI findings and the second category discusses methodological difficulties of fNI. Both types of works have shortcomings; the first category has been too theory-centered in its approach and the second category has implicitly or explicitly adopted the assumption that methodological difficulties of fNI cannot be satisfactorily addressed. In this dissertation, I address these shortcomings and show how and what kind of experimental knowledge fNI can reliably produce which would be theoretically significant. I take fMRI as a representative fNI procedure and discuss the history of its development. Two independent trajectories of research in physics and physiology eventually converge to give rise to fMRI. Thus, fMRI findings are laden in the theories of physics and physiology and I propose how this creates a kind of useful theory-ladenness which allows for the representation of and intervention in the constructs of cognitive neuroscience. Duhemian challenges and problems of underdetermination are often raised to argue that fNI is of little, if any, epistemic value for psychology. I show how the ES notions of severe tests and error probabilities can be applied in epistemological analyses of fMRI. The result is that hemodynamic hypotheses can be severely tested in fMRI experiments and I demonstrate how these hypotheses are theoretically significant and fuel the growth of experimental knowledge in cognitive neuroscience. Throughout this dissertation, I put the emphasis on the experimental knowledge we obtain from fNI and argue that this is the fruitful approach that enables us to see how fNI can contribute to psychology. In doing so, I offer an error-statistical epistemology of fNI, which hopefully will be a significant contribution to the philosophy of psychology.
- (In)Justice in Nonideal Social WorldsCooper, Dominick Robert (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-09)While there is an abundance of philosophical literature on justice, there is far less literature within political philosophy on the topic of injustice. I think one common assumption these approaches share is that injustice is simply the absence of justice; call this the absence thesis. This assumption becomes more peculiar juxtaposed to social and political struggle for justice, which quite commonly begins with cries of injustice. Injustice is an importantly distinct philosophical notion from justice – it can explain how justice fails to be realized in interesting and sophisticated ways, and, I argue, track our efforts to realize just social worlds, in ways that paradigmatically ideal and nonideal approaches to justice by themselves cannot. In this essay, I focus specifically on the question of how theories of justice can guide action in social worlds with systematic oppression. I ultimately argue that action-guiding theories of justice that evaluate worlds with systematic oppression must represent features of injustice. If a theory fails to represent features of injustice, it will fail to guide action in these worlds. That representation of such features is necessary gives us reason to think, in certain circumstances, that the absence thesis is false.
- Kant on the Progression of RepresentationWilson, William (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-03)Recently, the key point of contention in Kant scholarship has revolved around a question concerning whether, for Kant, intuitions can play their role of presenting objects to the mind without the discursive activity of the intellect. According to 'conceptualist' interpretations, intuitions depend for their generation on the activity of the understanding. According to 'nonconceptualist' interpretations, at least some intuitions do not depend for their generation on the activity of the understanding. I argue that although the conceptualism/nonconceptualism debate has brought greater clarity to a number of issues within Kant's critical philosophy, the debate partially rests on a conflation of two importantly distinct representational states, namely 'intuition' [Anschaaung] and 'perception' [Wahrnehmung]. I argue that once this distinction is noted, many of the passages that would appear to threaten a nonconceptualist interpretation lose their force. In addition, I argue that if we understand the conceptualist claim in terms of the kind of structure a particular representational state possesses, then we have good reason to reject the idea that, for Kant, sensory experience is fundamentally conceptual in character.
- Kant's Negative Answer to Molyneux's QuestionCreek, Richard David (Virginia Tech, 2014-06-03)While it has recently been argued that Kant's views about space in the Transcendental Aesthetic do not commit him to an affirmative answer to Molyneux's question, there has been very little attention given to the issue of what a Kantian negative answer would look like. The paper begins by defending the view that the arguments of the Aesthetic alone do not provide a direct answer to Molyneux's question. I will then argue that addressing Molyneux's question on Kant's behalf is much more complicated, requiring us to pay special attention to his views on the relationship between vision and touch, the specific sort of concepts that are relevant, and some issues involving the schemata for these concepts. To this end, I will examine the extent to which different considerations in each of these areas lead to radically different, competing answers to Molyneux's question. When difficulties surrounding both of these possible answers are examined, the modified framework that is left standing will support a negative answer.
- Kantianism and Its Commitment to Non NaturalismFrazier, Joseph (Virginia Tech, 2016-06-27)Kantian ethics has a strong following amongst the philosophical community when it comes to morality and ethics. Many Kantians, including Christine Korsgaard, subscribe to the view that Kantianism is opposed to Non-Naturalism. This view, while understandable, is incorrect. In fact, the Kantian approach to ethics has a strong commitment to Non-Naturalism in its metaphysical construction. The purpose of this paper is to prove this dependence by showing the inferences and concepts of Kantianism that one cannot accept without accepting Non-Naturalistic principles. To demonstrate this connection between Kantianism and Non-Naturalism, I will give a summary of Kantianism through the interpretation given by Velleman (2005). Then I will present Non-Naturalism as presented by Fitzpatrick (2008) and Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). After explaining these views as clearly as possible, I will explain why Kantianism is committed to Non-Naturalism, address the possible contradiction of Kantianism and Fitzpatrick's idea of 'ethical truths being independent of any perspective,' as well as address the issues raised by Korsgaard (2003) concerning the realist approach to Kantian ethics.
- A Language-Game Justification for Narrative in Historical ExplanationHall, Brayton Bruno (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-21)The problem of historical explanation consists in how historical facts are put together. No mere collection of facts constitutes an explanation: there must be some underlying explanation for why those facts occurred in the way they did. Many competing theories of historical explanation have thus been offered, from the highly technical D-N or covering law model, to narrative-based explanations. This paper exposes the flaws in the covering law model proposed by Carl Hempel, and offers a justification for narrative-based explanations by appealing to the notion of language games as used by Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as the narrative and paradigm models of Arthur Danto and Thomas Kuhn for explaining historical events.
- Limited Revisionism and Error TheoryKey, Andrew Braxton (Virginia Tech, 2019-06-25)In Joyce's Myth of Morality, Joyce proposes an error theory about morality. He then argues that, once we accept an error theory, we have three options: we can be abolitionists and jettison moral discourse, be conservationists and maintain our false moral beliefs, or be revolutionary fictionalists and assent to and act in accordance with moral discourse while believing it's false. In this paper, I argue that Joyce has ignored a fourth option—limited revisionism, or slightly changing our moral terms to avoid problematic commitments—and that this option is superior to the three aforementioned possibilities. Along the way, I show that Joyce has unfairly ignored limited revisionism because of faulty views about what makes a concept or term normative, and that limited revisionism ignores some expected pitfalls, such as overgeneralizing to legitimately error-theoretic discourses.
- Must Kuhn Allow Cross-Paradigm Evidence?Patton, Lydia K. (Editura Academiei Romane/Publishing House of the Romanian Academy, 2023-12-01)Does Kuhn’s thesis that successive paradigms are incommensurable necessarily entail denying that the same evidence can be employed under successive paradigms? In this paper, I will argue no. In supporting that conclusion, I will argue for an even stronger point: Kuhn must be committed to the claim that the same evidence can be employed across paradigms, or his account of anomalies makes no sense.
- On Distinguishing the Meaningless from the Meaningful: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach to Ruth Millikan\'s TeleosemanticsSlipetz, Lindley (Virginia Tech, 2013-05-03)What distinguishes a meaningless utterance from a meaningful term? While one might say that, within the context of Ruth Millikan\'s teleosemantics, it is a term\'s having a proper function that distinguishes it from a meaningless utterance, I propose that the distinction can be made with reference to the history of the term. Using evolutionary game theory, I offer a way to clarify the distinction between the meaningless and the meaningful. I reject the possibility of correlating meaning with an evolutionarily stable strategy as this does not seem to be consistent with how communication works or with Millikan\'s theory. Instead, when a term has meaning, the function category of that term corresponds to an evolutionarily stable state composed of both speaker and hearer strategies.