Browsing by Author "Swallow, Brent M."
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- Evaluating contingent and actual contributions to a local public good: Tsetse control in the Yale agro-pastoral zone, Burkina FasoKamuanga, M.; Swallow, Brent M.; Sigué, H.; Bauer, B. (Elsevier Science B.V., 2001)In this case study of the Yale agro-pastoral zone in southern Burkina Faso, the sustainability of tsetse control as a local public good was shown to depend upon farmers' contributions to establish and maintain the traps and targets that attract and kill tsetse flies. Contingent valuation (CV) techniques were used to generate estimates of farmers' willingness to pay for tsetse control in money, labour, or both forms of payment. Of the 261 households that participated in the CV survey, these proportions were 23, 37 and 40 percent, respectively, indicating differentiation among the population and an overall preference for labour contribution. A comparison of predicted versus actual contribution of labour indicated that only 56 percent of households that said they would contribute actually contributed; 3 percent of households that said they would not contribute actually contributed. Major factors affecting contingent contributions of labour in discrete choice models were identified, as well as those to account for in any successful scheme for actual labour contribution. These factors include the age of household head, offtake of cattle, involvement in secondary activities, membership in rural organizations, current expenditure on drug therapy, and cash-on-hand. The results also indicate that full cost-recovery of the investment in targets--about US$8000--could not be achieved in the short run with the proposed contribution of US$0.90-1.00 per month per household. Contingent contributions of money were interpreted as maximum donations to expect of beneficiaries as part of the total cost of providing tsetse control.--abstract from Journal
- Invasion of prosopis juliflora and local livelihoods: Case study from the Lake Baringo area of KenyaMwangi, Esther; Swallow, Brent M. (Nairobi, Kenya: World Agroforestry Centre, 2005)Case study exploring the impact of an invasive species on local households and livelihoods in Lake Baringo in Kenya.
- Property rights, risk, and livestock development in Africa: Issues and a project approachSwallow, Brent M.; McCarthy, N. (IFPRI and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), 2000)In 1996, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Institute for Rural Development at the University of Goettingen began a research project aimed at providing information to improve the efficiency, equity, and environmental sustainability of livestock production and land use in Sub-Saharan Africa. The project focused on semi-arid areas where mobile livestock-production and mixed crop-livestock production are competing land uses. It is estimated that a population of 87 million live in these areas, and these people are among the poorest in the world. Not only are average incomes low, but their livelihoods are also subject to a great deal of risk-environmental, tenurial, social, and political.
- Strategies and tenure in African livestock developmentSwallow, Brent M. (1990)This paper maintains that prediction of the likely consequences of policy instruments requires an understanding of livestock owner strategies and the complex interactions between the instruments, the ecological systems and the social systems. The goal of the paper is to contribute to that understanding. A review of empirical evidence on livestock owner strategies supports the following conclusions: strategies depend on past actions, expectations of the impact of random shocks and perceived risks of alternative actions; the more variable the environment, the more flexible the pastoralist; livestock are used for subsistence and commercial purposes; large-scale commercial livestock owners are emerging. Four tenure regimes (state, private, common, open access) are identified, whilst a new regime, coordination access, is developed for the purposes of this study. The following conclusions are made about rangeland tenure: combinations of conventions, explicit and implicit contracts provide pastoralist security; tenure regimes of water resources regulate arid rangelands; common property innovations can be successful; different types of rangeland tenure may operate at different levels of territorial organization; livestock owners favour projects that tally with their objectives and object to those that regulate herd management; property relations are consistent with flexible and mobile strategies; an ineffective state-property regime is likely to undermine local tenure regimes. Empirical research supports the following two hypotheses: (1) explicit contracts and implicit contracts can be equally appropriate solutions to the coordination problems faced by African pastoralists; and (2) policy instruments will be welcomed by livestock owners only if they are designed to improve livestock herds, coordination with other resource use or security of access and rights to land. (CAB Abstracts)