Browsing by Author "Trogdon, Kelly Griffith"
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- Acquaintance and the Formation of Negative Phenomenal BeliefGalvani, Eve Antoinette (Virginia Tech, 2016-06-27)This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases.
- Adaptive Preference TradeoffsJenson, Audra Christine (Virginia Tech, 2018-05-31)Consider the following scenario: A mother chooses to marry off her 10 year-old daughter, not because she doesn’t know the harmful effects of child marriage, nor because she thinks that it is good that her daughter marries when she is 10 years old. Rather, she is unable to feed her daughter and realizes that her daughter’s survival depends upon her marrying a financially stable man. This is an apparent example of what human development practitioners and political philosophers call an adaptive preference (AP): a preference, formed under oppressive circumstances, that seems to perpetuate the agent’s own oppression. Prevailing opinion is that forced tradeoffs—especially following Serene Khader’s taxonomy—, like the case presented above, are a type of AP: one in which a person makes a decision because of a limited option set. In this paper I argue that no paradigm cases of forced tradeoffs should not be classified as APs. Instead, I offer a revised definition of adaptive preferences where I argue that adaptive preferences are psychological traits that cause the agent with adaptive preferences to make irrational or uninformed decisions that perpetuate their own oppression. I defend this new definition by exploring the implications of changing the definition. In particular, forced tradeoffs involve different kinds of interventions from other kinds of adaptive preferences and including forced tradeoffs risks committing testimonial injustice against those who have limited option sets.
- Are Grounding and Naturalness Related?Li, Dexin (Virginia Tech, 2024-06-14)Grounding and Naturalness have been two important concepts in the Metaphysician's toolbox. They are both used to cash out the notion of fundamentality; that is, proponents of both concepts propose certain criteria for counting a property/fact as more fundamental than another. In this paper, I will explore whether there is any plausible systematic connection between the criteria the two concepts offer for fundamentality and argue that there is none. In the end, I suggest that we should stick to one consistent use of naturalness first and then explore further which concept offer a better notion of fundamentality.
- Beliefs in an Opaque BrainAbugattas Escalante, Juan Andres (Virginia Tech, 2016-06-30)Peter Carruther's Interpretive Sensory-Access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge is an interesting account of the opaqueness of our own minds that draws upon a wide range of theories from cognitive science and philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that the theory's assumptions support the conclusion that the available perceptual evidence massively underdetermines all of an agent's second-order beliefs about her own beliefs. Such a result is far more negative than the ISA's well-known pessimism regarding self-knowledge. Furthermore, I also argue that, from the same assumptions, it is possible to build an argument to the effect that cognitive scientists trying to determine an agents' true behavior-causing attitude face similar underdetermination problems. Toward the end of the paper, I suggest that the theory's problems arise from a conflation of two different ways in which terms denoting propositional attitudes, such as 'belief', are used in its formulation. Distinguishing between the two usages of these terms, in turn, leads to a further distinction between two different senses in which we can talk about the 'opaqueness' of our own minds.
- Deceiving Appearances: Problems for the Evidential Insensitivity Approach to Phenomenal DogmatismWhitlock, Matthew Alexander (Virginia Tech, 2018-07-05)Foundationalism about justification has historically enjoyed widespread acceptance among philosophers despite equally widespread disagreement about how foundational justification is possible. It is widely agreed that all knowledge must by justified by a foundation that does not stand in need of justification, but philosophers disagree on what could provide that foundation. Internalists, who look for justification in factors internal to rational agents, tend to agree that foundational justification is provided by seemings, or the way things seem to one to be. This view has most commonly gone by the name 'Phenomenal Dogmatism' although variations of it have been defended. Phenomenal dogmatism has been criticized for being too permissive with regard to the states it counts as able to confer foundational justification. In this paper I will consider one attempt, offered by Berit Brogaard, to revise phenomenal dogmatism in response to these criticisms. I will argue that Brogaard's revised view has significant problems of its own. Specifically, it does not account for problems arising from the possibility of cognitively penetrated perceptions.
- The Epistemic and Ontic Conceptions of Scientific ExplanationTaylor, Kaetlin Diane (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-09)While Wesley Salmon attributes the debate on scientific explanation between Carl Hempel and Peter Railton (or between the epistemic and ontic conceptions of scientific explanation, more generally) as one over which conception of explanation is correct, I claim that Hempel and Railton were responding to two different questions altogether. Hempel was addressing a question akin to 'what is scientific explanation?', while Railton was focused on a question more similar to 'what is scientific explanation?' In this paper I discuss the different questions Hempel and Railton were addressing, and how distinguishing these two questions can aid in the discussion of the requirements and adequacy of models of scientific explanation. While these two questions are clearly inter-related, I claim that we should not judge the adequacy of an answer to one of these questions on the basis of the adequacy of an answer to the other.
- Essence, Revelation, and PhysicalismSmith, Justyn Glynn (Virginia Tech, 2021-06-03)Revelation is (roughly) the thesis that the natures of phenomenal properties are revealed through experience. In this paper, I respond to Antonin Broi's charge that if both Revelation and the quality space view of phenomenal properties are true, then counterintuitive results that speak against the truth of Revelation obtain. I present a qualified theory of Revelation that not only prevents his arguments from succeeding but has independent plausibility as a solution to worries about the alleged epiphenomenalism of phenomenal properties.
- Geometric Possibility, Ideological Parsimony, and Monistic SubstantivalismDavis, Cruz Austin (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-29)Monistic substantivalists believe that material objects and regions of space-time are not two distinct kinds of fundamental of entities. For the monist, objects either are identical with regions or are somehow derivative from them. Dualistic substantivalists view regions and objects as distinct kinds of fundamental entities. One virtue monists claim over dualists is that their view is more ideologically parsimonious than dualism because monists can do without a primitive notion of location. In this paper I provide an argument that undercuts some of the theoretical edge that monists claim over dualists. The assumption that the monist can provide a reduction of location unique to her position rests on a false assumption about the possible structures spacetime can have. If it is metaphysically possible for two distinct regions to coincide with respect to all their significant spatiotemporal properties and relations (call these 'coincident regions'), then analyses of location unique to monism will turn out to be inadequate.
- How Morality Seems: A Cognitive Phenomenal Case for Moral RealismLennon, James Preston (Virginia Tech, 2016-07-19)Philosophers of mind have recently debated over whether or not there exists a unique cognitive phenomenology – a “what it’s like”-ness to our conscious cognitive mental states. Most of these debates have centered on the ontological question of whether or not cognitive phenomenology exists. I suggest that assuming cognitive phenomenology does exist, it would have important consequences for other areas of philosophy. In particular, it would have important consequences for moral epistemology – how we come to know the moral truths we seem to know. I argue that adopting cognitive phenomenology and the epistemic principle of phenomenal conservatism can do “double duty” for the moral realist: they provide the moral realist with prima facie grounds for belief in the objectivity of morality, while epistemically vindicating the specific contents of their beliefs.
- Intrinsicality without NaturalnessWitmer, D. Gene; Butchard, William; Trogdon, Kelly Griffith (2005-03)Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of' notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property."
- Is Superman a Sense or a Superhero?Garro Rivero, Rodrigo Rafael (Virginia Tech, 2023-06-05)This paper discusses the puzzle introduced by Jennifer Saul, which involves swapping coreferential proper names in simple sentences such as (1) Benito dresses as Clark Kent, and (1*) Benito dresses as Superman. While the traditional Frege's puzzle suggests that such substitutions do not change the truth value of a sentence, Saul's puzzle suggests otherwise. My paper explains Saul's proposed solution based on conversational implicatures and argues against it. Then I introduce a different solution called the Shifty-Fregean solution, which states that proper names in some contexts refer to their senses rather than the reference. The paper argues that this solution is better than Saul's and outlines a new approach to Saul's puzzle. The paper is divided into three sections. First, I will provide an overview of Saul's puzzle and Frege's puzzle. Second, I will discuss Saul's solution and its rejection. Finally, I will develop the Shifty-Fregean solution.
- Kant on the Progression of RepresentationWilson, William (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-03)Recently, the key point of contention in Kant scholarship has revolved around a question concerning whether, for Kant, intuitions can play their role of presenting objects to the mind without the discursive activity of the intellect. According to 'conceptualist' interpretations, intuitions depend for their generation on the activity of the understanding. According to 'nonconceptualist' interpretations, at least some intuitions do not depend for their generation on the activity of the understanding. I argue that although the conceptualism/nonconceptualism debate has brought greater clarity to a number of issues within Kant's critical philosophy, the debate partially rests on a conflation of two importantly distinct representational states, namely 'intuition' [Anschaaung] and 'perception' [Wahrnehmung]. I argue that once this distinction is noted, many of the passages that would appear to threaten a nonconceptualist interpretation lose their force. In addition, I argue that if we understand the conceptualist claim in terms of the kind of structure a particular representational state possesses, then we have good reason to reject the idea that, for Kant, sensory experience is fundamentally conceptual in character.
- A Language-Game Justification for Narrative in Historical ExplanationHall, Brayton Bruno (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-21)The problem of historical explanation consists in how historical facts are put together. No mere collection of facts constitutes an explanation: there must be some underlying explanation for why those facts occurred in the way they did. Many competing theories of historical explanation have thus been offered, from the highly technical D-N or covering law model, to narrative-based explanations. This paper exposes the flaws in the covering law model proposed by Carl Hempel, and offers a justification for narrative-based explanations by appealing to the notion of language games as used by Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as the narrative and paradigm models of Arthur Danto and Thomas Kuhn for explaining historical events.
- Normativity and Experimental PhilosophyAbelson, Shannon Sylvie (Virginia Tech, 2015-05-19)The normative conception of philosophical methodology take as a starting point the teleological prioritization of practical knowledge over theoretical knowledge I examine what a normative philosopher might make of the emergent practice of experimental philosophy. Generally speaking, experimental philosophers set as their methodology the suspension of a priori reflection in favor of empirical experimentation in order to examine the cognitive factors that influence concept application and behavior. I begin by examining the normative view of philosophy. This view is rooted in a pursuit of practical knowledge, which is an inherently normative endeavor. I then consider how a normative philosopher might approach the role of X-phi. I examine two prominent X-phi projects in order to establish some criteria for meeting that normative philosophical expectation. I conclude that some X-phi projects may not meet the normative expectation because of a pervasive neglect of practical knowledge, while others do manage to incorporate a practical element and fall within the bounds of the normative conception.
- On the Intelligibility of Grounding AutonomyHolstein, Jacob Scott (Virginia Tech, 2019-06-25)Metaphysical grounding has received a great deal of attention in the metaphysics literature within the last decade, offering what many see as an attractive theoretical alternative to other attempts to analyze the nature of fundamentality, e.g., dependence, supervenience, identity, conceptual analysis, etc. Still, a number of commentators note a bevy of issues facing the notion of grounding, leading some to believe it cannot perform the relevant work it has been tasked to do. One such issue is the purity dilemma, posed by Ted Sider, which follows from a plausible constraint placed on our theorizing about fundamentality, viz., that the fundamental bedrock of the world contains nothing but purely fundamental phenomena. It is argued that purity creates a problem for metaphysical grounding in that it makes it increasingly difficult to see what might ground the facts about what grounds what. In this paper, I explicate the purity dilemma, and an attempt made by Shamik Dasgupta to sidestep the challenge, and provide a secure grounding foundation for such facts. I then proceed to defend Dasgupta's view from objections made by Sider, and conclude that, at the very least, the crucial notion (autonomy) on which the former's view rests is intelligible, if it is not tenable.
- Philosophical Zombies Don't Share Our Epistemic SituationWright, John Curtis (Virginia Tech, 2018-06-04)Chalmers (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies do share our epistemic situation. In the following paper I aim to show that philosophical-zombies do not share our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness. I will begin with some background material regarding the general dialectic I am addressing in section (I) before outlining the debate between Chalmers (2007) and Carruthers and Veillet (2007) in more detail and its relevance for mind-body considerations in section (II). Next, in section (III) I will suggest a worry related to Carruthers and Veillet’s position: that phenomenal concepts fail to refer in zombie worlds in the first place. Finally, in section (IV) I will argue that even if a zombie’s phenomenal concepts successfully refer, there is still good reason to think that zombies will fail to share our epistemic situation. I will defend this claim by explaining three asymmetries between me and my zombie twin’s corresponding epistemic situations.
- Problems for Introspection as a Basis for Reasoning about the SelfBak, Dillon William (Virginia Tech, 2018-08-29)Through introspection we may gain insight into phenomenology and thereby learn about our own mental lives. One aspect of our phenomenology that we might wish to introspect is our experience of selfhood. In particular, Galen Strawson views phenomenology as particularly useful for reasoning about the self. He expresses this in what he calls the Equivalence Thesis, which states that there are selves if and only if there is something that has properties attributed to the self in every instance of self-experience, where self-experience refers to a phenomenological experience of selfhood. In order to arrive at a phenomenological characterization, any set of properties that characterizes the self via the Equivalence Thesis, one must examine the phenomenology of self-experience through introspection. The Equivalence Thesis can run into difficulties in at least two ways with respect to its reliance on introspection. If introspection is unreliable then the Equivalence Thesis fails as we cannot accurately examine our phenomenology. While some of the consequences of such unreliability will be explored this will not be the main focus. Instead I call into question whether or not introspection provides the information that Strawson says it does. The Equivalence Thesis depends on the ability of introspection to provide us with information about so called mental elements, which give structure to our overall phenomenology. However, this is implausible. When we introspect we can learn directly about the kind of experience we are having, but it will not allow us to form an acceptable phenomenological characterization.
- Protein Classification and Natural KindsTolbert, Alexander (Virginia Tech, 2019-07-08)This project surveys biochemical practice and sets the record straight regarding which parts of protein classification are pluralist. Assuming an approach that attempts to draw metaphysical conclusions by analyzing how multifaceted practices of science work, I tie the results of my survey of protein classification practices to the debate over natural kinds. I address which classificatory practice is likely to pick out a natural kind. I defend the thesis that dynamics is a fundamental description of proteins as kinds. This view is widely held in biochemistry but is absent from philosophical literature on biochemical kinds.
- The Substance of Ontological DisputesLamb, Richard Campbell (Virginia Tech, 2016-07-06)There is a large philosophical literature focused on what sorts of things can be said to exist. This field is called ontology. Ontological disputes have sometimes been accused of being merely verbal disputes: that they are concerned only with language and not with facts. Some think that if this accusation is correct, philosophers should give up doing ontology. However, whether the accusation is correct and whether it is so serious depends on what is meant by verbal dispute. Eli Hirsch in particular has argued that ontological disputes are merely verbal in one specific sense. In this paper, I first argue that his accusation fails to show that ontological disputes are not substantive. Even if we admit that ontological disputes are verbal in Hirsch's sense, they may still be substantive in a variety of other senses. Second, I argue that even though ontological disputes are substantive, the reason for this will not support stronger claims about the nature and role of ontological disputes.
- Testimony Without BeliefMischler, Steven J. (Virginia Tech, 2014-06-24)In my thesis I ask the epistemological question: If a speaker testifies to some proposition p to some hearer, and the hearer learns that p, must that speaker believe that p? Those who maintain the traditional view in the epistemology of testimony claim that testimony is primarily a way in which speakers transmit beliefs to hearers. If this is the case, then in order to transmit the belief that p, the speaker must be in possession of a belief that p. Other epistemologists reject this view altogether and argue that when speakers stand in the right sort of epistemic relation to the statements they issue they properly testify. My project carves out a position between these two views. I argue that speakers need not believe p, but speakers must be in some appropriate epistemic state with respect to p in order to properly testify to p. On my view, understanding is among the epistemic states that can place a speaker in the right sort of epistemic relation to p. Thus, if p is a consequence of a speaker's understanding of a subject, the speaker is licensed to testify that p.