Browsing by Author "Vilares, Iris"
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Results Per Page
Sort Options
- A model of risk and mental state shifts during social interactionHula, Andreas; Vilares, Iris; Lohrenz, Terry; Dayan, Peter; Montague, P. Read (PLOS, 2018-02-15)Cooperation and competition between human players in repeated microeconomic games offer a window onto social phenomena such as the establishment, breakdown and repair of trust. However, although a suitable starting point for the quantitative analysis of such games exists, namely the Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (I-POMDP), computational considerations and structural limitations have limited its application, and left unmodelled critical features of behavior in a canonical trust task. Here, we provide the first analysis of two central phenomena: a form of social risk-aversion exhibited by the player who is in control of the interaction in the game; and irritation or anger, potentially exhibited by both players. Irritation arises when partners apparently defect, and it potentially causes a precipitate breakdown in cooperation. Failing to model one's partner's propensity for it leads to substantial economic inefficiency. We illustrate these behaviours using evidence drawn from the play of large cohorts of healthy volunteers and patients. We show that for both cohorts, a particular subtype of player is largely responsible for the breakdown of trust, a finding which sheds new light on borderline personality disorder.
- Predicting the knowledge–recklessness distinction in the human brainVilares, Iris; Wesley, Michael J.; Ahn, Woo-Young; Hoffman, Morris; Jones, Owen D.; Morse, Stephen J.; Yaffe, Gideon; Lohrenz, Terry; Montague, P. Read; Bonnie, Richard J. (NAS, 2017-02-09)Criminal convictions require proof that a prohibited act was performed in a statutorily specified mental state. Different legal consequences, including greater punishments, are mandated for those who act in a state of knowledge, compared with a state of recklessness. Existing research, however, suggests people have trouble classifying defendants as knowing, rather than reckless, even when instructed on the relevant legal criteria. We used a machine-learning technique on brain imaging data to predict, with high accuracy, which mental state our participants were in. This predictive ability depended on both the magnitude of the risks and the amount of information about those risks possessed by the participants. Our results provide neural evidence of a detectable difference in the mental state of knowledge in contrast to recklessness and suggest, as a proof of principle, the possibility of inferring from brain data in which legally relevant category a person belongs. Some potential legal implications of this result are discussed.