Virginia Tech National Security Institute
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Browsing Virginia Tech National Security Institute by Department "Computer Science"
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- Development and Analysis of a Spiral Theory-based Cybersecurity CurriculumBack, Godmar V.; Basu, Debarati; Naciri, William; Lohani, Vinod K.; Plassmann, Paul E.; Barnette, Dwight; Ribbens, Calvin J.; Gantt, Kira; McPherson, David (2017-01-09)Enhance cybersecurity learning experiences of students at Virginia Tech’s large engineering program
- Intrusion Detection System for Applications using Linux ContainersAbed, Amr S.; Clancy, Thomas Charles III; Levy, David S. (Springer, 2015-12-09)Linux containers are gaining increasing traction in both individual and industrial use, and as these containers get integrated into mission-critical systems, real-time detection of malicious cyber attacks becomes a critical operational requirement. This paper introduces a real-time host-based intrusion detection system that can be used to passively detect malfeasance against applications within Linux containers running in a standalone or in a cloud multi-tenancy environment. The demonstrated intrusion detection system uses bags of system calls monitored from the host kernel for learning the behavior of an application running within a Linux container and determining anomalous container behavior. Performance of the approach using a database application was measured and results are discussed.
- Towards Optimal Secure Distributed Storage Systems with Exact RepairTandon, Ravi; Amuru, SaiDhiraj; Clancy, Thomas Charles III; Buehrer, R. Michael (IEEE, 2016-06)Distributed storage systems in the presence of a wiretapper are considered. A distributed storage system (DSS) is parameterized by three parameters (𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑), in which a file stored across n distributed nodes, can be recovered from any 𝑘 out of 𝑛 nodes. This is called as the reconstruction property of a DSS. If a node fails, any 𝑑 out of (𝑛-1) nodes help in the repair of the failed node so that the regeneration property of the DSS is preserved. For such a (𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑)-DSS, two types of wiretapping scenarios are investigated: (a) Type-I (node) adversary which can wiretap the data stored on any 𝑙< 𝑘 nodes; and a more severe (b) Type-II (repair data) adversary which can wiretap the contents of the repair data that is used to repair a set of l failed nodes over time. The focus of this work is on the practically relevant setting of exact repair regeneration in which the repair process must replace a failed node by its exact replica. We make new progress on several non-trivial instances of this problem which prior to this work have been open. The main contribution of this paper is the optimal characterization of the secure storage-vs-exact-repair-bandwidth tradeoff region of a (𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑)-DSS, with 𝑛 ≤ 4 and any 𝑙 < 𝑘 in the presence of both Type-I and Type-II adversaries. While the problem remains open for a general (𝑛, 𝑘, 𝑑)-DSS with 𝑛 > 4, we present extensions of these results to a (𝑛, 𝑛-1, 𝑛-1)-DSS, in presence of a Type-II adversary that can observe the repair data of any 𝑙 = (𝑛-2) nodes. The key technical contribution of this work is in developing novel information theoretic converse proofs for the Type-II adversarial scenario. From our results, we show that in the presence of Type-II attacks, the only efficient point in the storage-vs-exact-repair-bandwidth tradeoff is the MBR (minimum bandwidth regenerating) point. This is in sharp contrast to the case of a Type-I attack in which the storage-vs-exactrepair-bandwidth tradeoff allows a spectrum of operating points beyond the MBR point.