Strengthening MT6D Defenses with LXC-Based Honeypot Capabilities

Basam, Dileep; Ransbottom, J. Scot; Marchany, Randolph C.; Tront, Joseph G.

Strengthening MT6D Defenses with LXC-Based Honeypot Capabilities

dc.contributor.author	Basam, Dileep	en
dc.contributor.author	Ransbottom, J. Scot	en
dc.contributor.author	Marchany, Randolph C.	en
dc.contributor.author	Tront, Joseph G.	en
dc.contributor.department	Computer Science	en
dc.date.accessioned	2017-09-18T09:38:25Z	en
dc.date.available	2017-09-18T09:38:25Z	en
dc.date.issued	2016-04-20	en
dc.date.updated	2017-09-18T09:38:25Z	en
dc.description.abstract	Moving Target IPv6 Defense (MT6D) imparts radio-frequency hopping behavior to IPv6 networks by having participating nodes periodically hop onto new addresses while giving up old addresses. Our previous research efforts implemented a solution to identify and acquire these old addresses that are being discarded by MT6D hosts on a local network besides being able to monitor and visualize the incoming traffic on these addresses. This was essentially equivalent to forming a darknet out of the discarded MT6D addresses, but the solution presented in the previous research effort did not include database integration for it to scale and be extended. This paper presents a solution with a new architecture that not only extends the previous solution in terms of automation and database integration but also demonstrates the ability to deploy a honeypot on a virtual LXC (Linux Container) on-demand based on any interesting traffic pattern observed on a discarded address. The proposed architecture also allows an MT6D host to query the solution database for network activity on its relinquished addresses as a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) object. This allows an MT6D host to identify suspicious activity on its discarded addresses and strengthen the MT6D scheme parameters accordingly. We have built a proof-of-concept for the proposed solution and analyzed the solution’s feasibility and scalability.	en
dc.description.version	Published version	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	en
dc.identifier.citation	Dileep Basam, J. Scot Ransbottom, Randy Marchany, and Joseph G. Tront, “Strengthening MT6D Defenses with LXC-Based Honeypot Capabilities,” Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering, vol. 2016, Article ID 5212314, 13 pages, 2016. doi:10.1155/2016/5212314	en
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/5212314	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78943	en
dc.language.iso	en	en
dc.publisher	Hindawi	en
dc.rights	Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International	en
dc.rights.holder	Copyright © 2016 Dileep Basam et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.	en
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	en
dc.title	Strengthening MT6D Defenses with LXC-Based Honeypot Capabilities	en
dc.title.serial	Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering	en
dc.type	Article - Refereed	en
dc.type.dcmitype	Text	en