POSTER: Privacy Guarantees of BLE Contact Tracing for COVID-19 and Beyond: A Case Study on COVIDWISE
| dc.contributor.author | Ahmed, Salman | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Xiao, Ya | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Chung, Taejoong | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Fung, Carol | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Yung, Moti | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Yao, Danfeng | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-19T16:56:22Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2022-10-19T16:56:22Z | en |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-05-30 | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2022-10-19T15:08:13Z | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Google and Apple jointly introduced a digital contact tracing technology and an API called “exposure notification,” to help health organizations and governments with contact tracing. The technology and its interplay with security and privacy constraints require investigation. In this study, we examine and analyze the security, privacy, and reliability of the technology with actual and typical scenarios (and expected typical adversary in mind), and quite realistic use cases. We do it in the context of Virginia’s COVIDWISE app. This experimental analysis validates the properties of the system under the above conditions, a result that seems crucial for the peace of mind of the exposure notification technology adopting authorities, and may also help with the system’s transparency and overall user trust. | en |
| dc.description.version | Published version | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1145/3488932.3527279 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10919/112216 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | ACM | en |
| dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
| dc.rights.holder | The author(s) | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
| dc.title | POSTER: Privacy Guarantees of BLE Contact Tracing for COVID-19 and Beyond: A Case Study on COVIDWISE | en |
| dc.type | Article - Refereed | en |
| dc.type.dcmitype | Text | en |