Policy Trap and Optimal Subsidization Policy under Limited Supply of Vaccines

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dc.contributorVirginia Techen
dc.contributor.authorYi, Mingen
dc.contributor.authorMarathe, Achlaen
dc.date.accessed2014-05-14en
dc.date.accessioned2014-06-17T20:12:09Zen
dc.date.available2014-06-17T20:12:09Zen
dc.date.issued2013-07-01en
dc.description.abstractWe adopt a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model on a Barabási and Albert (BA) network to investigate the effects of different vaccine subsidization policies. The goal is to control the prevalence of the disease given a limited supply and voluntary uptake of vaccines. The results show a uniform subsidization policy is always harmful and increases the prevalence of the disease, because the lower degree individuals’ demand for vaccine crowds out the higher degree individuals’ demand. In the absence of an effective uniform policy, we explore a targeted subsidization policy which relies on a proxy variable instead of individuals’ connectivity. Findings show a poor proxy-based targeted program can still increase the disease prevalence and become a policy trap. The results are robust to general scale-free networks.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported by Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Grant HDTRA1-11-1-0016 (http://www.dtra.mil/), DTRA CNIMS Contract HDTRA1-11-D-0016-0001 (http://www.dtra.mil/), National Institutes of Health (NIH) Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study (MIDAS) Grant 2U01GM070694-09 (http://www.nigms.nih.gov/Research/FeaturedPrograms/MIDAS/), NIH MIDAS Grant 3U01FM070694-09S1 (http://www.nigms.nih.gov/Research/ FeaturedPrograms/MIDAS/), National Science Foundation (NSF) ICES Grant CCF-1216000 (http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id = 503549), and NSF NetSE Grant CNS-1011769 (http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id = 503325). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.en
dc.identifier.citationYi M, Marathe A (2013) Policy Trap and Optimal Subsidization Policy under Limited Supply of Vaccines. PLoS ONE 8(7): e67249. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067249en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0067249en
dc.identifier.issn1932-6203en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/49004en
dc.identifier.urlhttp://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0067249en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherPublic Library of Scienceen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectImmunityen
dc.subjectInfectious disease controlen
dc.subjectPopulation groupingsen
dc.subjectScale-free networksen
dc.subjectSocial networksen
dc.subjectSocial policyen
dc.subjectVaccination and immunizationen
dc.titlePolicy Trap and Optimal Subsidization Policy under Limited Supply of Vaccinesen
dc.title.serialPLoS ONEen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden

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Destination Area: Global Systems Science (GSS)