Adelie: Continuous Address Space Layout Re-randomization for Linux Drivers
| dc.contributor.author | Nikolaev, Ruslan | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Nadeem, Hassan | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Stone, Cathlyn | en |
| dc.contributor.author | Ravindran, Binoy | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-10-20T18:40:09Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2022-10-20T18:40:09Z | en |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-02-28 | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2022-10-20T13:42:34Z | en |
| dc.description.abstract | While address space layout randomization (ASLR) has been extensively studied for user-space programs, the corresponding OS kernel’s KASLR support remains very limited, making the kernel vulnerable to just-in-time (JIT) return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks. Furthermore, commodity OSs such as Linux restrict their KASLR range to 32 bits due to architectural constraints (e.g., x86-64 only supports 32-bit immediate operands for most instructions), which makes them vulnerable to even unsophisticated brute-force ROP attacks due to low entropy. Most in-kernel pointers remain static, exacerbating the problem when pointers are leaked. Adelie, our kernel defense mechanism, overcomes KASLR limitations, increases KASLR entropy, and makes successful ROP attacks on the Linux kernel much harder to achieve. First, Adelie enables the position-independent code (PIC) model so that the kernel and its modules can be placed anywhere in the 64-bit virtual address space, at any distance apart from each other. Second, Adelie implements stack re-randomization and address encryption on modules. Finally, Adelie enables efficient continuous KASLR for modules by using the PIC model to make it (almost) impossible to inject ROP gadgets through these modules regardless of gadget’s origin. Since device drivers (typically compiled as modules) are often developed by third parties and are typically less tested than core OS parts, they are also often more vulnerable. By fully re-randomizing device drivers, the last two contributions together prevent most JIT ROP attacks since vulnerable modules are very likely to be a starting point of an attack. Furthermore, some OS instances in virtualized environments are specifically designated to run device drivers, where drivers are the primary target of JIT ROP attacks. Using a GCC plugin that we developed, we automatically modify different kinds of kernel modules. Since the prior art tackles only user-space programs, we solve many challenges unique to the kernel code. Our evaluation shows high efficiency of Adelie’s approach: the overhead of the PIC model is completely negligible and re-randomization cost remains reasonable for typical use cases. | en |
| dc.description.version | Published version | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1145/3503222.3507779 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10919/112242 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | ACM | en |
| dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
| dc.rights.holder | The author(s) | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
| dc.title | Adelie: Continuous Address Space Layout Re-randomization for Linux Drivers | en |
| dc.type | Article - Refereed | en |
| dc.type.dcmitype | Text | en |