Intrusion Detection Against MMS-Based Measurement Attacks at Digital Substations

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorZhu, Ruoxien
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Chen-Chingen
dc.contributor.authorHong, Junhoen
dc.contributor.authorWang, Jiankangen
dc.contributor.departmentElectrical and Computer Engineeringen
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-10T18:36:15Zen
dc.date.available2021-06-10T18:36:15Zen
dc.date.issued2021-01-05en
dc.description.abstractInformation and Communications Technology (ICT) supports the development of novel control and communication functions for monitoring, operation, and control of power systems. However, the high-level deployment of ICT also increases the risk of cyber intrusions for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Attackers can gain access to the protected infrastructures of the grid and launch attacks to manipulate measurements at the substations. The fabricated measurements can mislead the operators in the control center to take undesirable actions. The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) proposed in this paper is deployed in IEC 61850 based substations. The proposed IDS identifies falsified measurements in Manufacturing Messaging Specification (MMS) messages. By cross-checking the consistency of electric circuit relationships at the substation level in a distributed manner, the falsified measurements can be detected and discarded before the malicious packets are sent out of the substations through DNP3 communication. A cyber-physical system testbed is used to validate the performance of the proposed IDS. Using the IEEE 39-bus test system, simulation results demonstrate high accuracy of the proposed substation-based intrusion detection system.en
dc.description.notesThis work was supported by the National Science Foundation at Virginia Tech, a Collaborative Project with The Ohio State University, under Grant ECCS-1824577.en
dc.description.sponsorshipNational Science Foundation at Virginia Tech; Ohio State UniversityOhio State University [ECCS-1824577]en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3047341en
dc.identifier.issn2169-3536en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/103756en
dc.identifier.volume9en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
dc.subjectCyber security of substationen
dc.subjectmeasurement-based attacken
dc.subjectMMSen
dc.subjectIEC 61850en
dc.subjectintrusion detectionen
dc.subjectSCADAen
dc.titleIntrusion Detection Against MMS-Based Measurement Attacks at Digital Substationsen
dc.title.serialIEEE Accessen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
dc.type.dcmitypeStillImageen

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
09306781.pdf
Size:
5.59 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Published version
Download

Collections

Scholarly Works, Electrical and Computer Engineering