Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

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dc.contributor.authorFerraro, Paul J.en
dc.contributor.departmentSustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (SANREM) Knowledgebaseen
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-19T19:31:27Zen
dc.date.available2016-04-19T19:31:27Zen
dc.date.issued2008en
dc.descriptionMetadata only recorden
dc.description.abstractThis article addresses the informational rents that are created in payments for environmental services (PES) contracts by asymmetric information between landowners and conservation buyers. Three options for reducing informational rents are described and compared: 1)gathering information on compliance costs, 2)screening contracts, and 3)procurement auctions.en
dc.description.notesPES-1 (Payments for Environmental Services Associate Award)en
dc.format.mimetypetext/plainen
dc.identifier3427en
dc.identifier.citationEcological Economics 65(4): 810-821en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.07.029en
dc.identifier.issn0921-8009en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/67535en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.en
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectEnvironmental servicesen
dc.subjectPayments for environmental servicesen
dc.subjectConservation strategyen
dc.subjectPESen
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationen
dc.subjectContractsen
dc.subjectScreeningen
dc.subjectAuctionsen
dc.subjectInformational rentsen
dc.subjectOpportunity costsen
dc.titleAsymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental servicesen
dc.typeAbstracten
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten

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