Is short-term debt a substitute for or complementary to good governance?

dc.contributor.authorAnginer, Denizen
dc.contributor.authorDemirguc-Kunt, Aslien
dc.contributor.authorSimsir, Serif Azizen
dc.contributor.authorTepe, Meteen
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-18T13:51:25Zen
dc.date.available2022-07-18T13:51:25Zen
dc.date.issued2022-03en
dc.description.abstractShort-term debt can reduce potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders by exposing managers to more frequent monitoring by the credit market. Using an international dataset, we examine whether internal monitoring can substitute for external monitoring through the use of short-term debt. We find that the relationship between debt maturity and governance depends on the institutional environment in a given country. In common-law countries and in countries with stronger investor protection rights, governance and short-term debt act as substitutes. The extent of creditor rights, state-level governance quality, cultural characteristics, and economic development levels of countries also play a role in explaining the relationship between governance and debt maturity. Copyright (C)& nbsp;2021, Borsa Istanbul Anonim Sirketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.& nbsp;en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2021.05.004en
dc.identifier.eissn2214-8469en
dc.identifier.issn2214-8450en
dc.identifier.issue2en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/111273en
dc.identifier.volume22en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
dc.subjectAgency issueen
dc.subjectBoard independenceen
dc.subjectInvestor protectionen
dc.subjectLegal originen
dc.subjectShort-term debten
dc.titleIs short-term debt a substitute for or complementary to good governance?en
dc.title.serialBorsa Istanbul Reviewen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten

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