Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services

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dc.contributor.authorFerraro, Paul J.en
dc.contributor.departmentSustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (SANREM) Knowledgebaseen
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-19T19:20:17Zen
dc.date.available2016-04-19T19:20:17Zen
dc.date.issued2005en
dc.description.abstractIn contractual relationships involving payments for environmental services, conservation buyers know less than landowners know about the costs of contractual compliance. Such asymmetric information reduces the effectiveness of payment schemes and increases the expense to implement them. To reduce these negative effects, conservation agents can take three approaches: (1) acquire information on observable landowner attributes that are correlated with compliance costs; (2) offer landowners a menu of screening contracts; and (3) allocate contracts through procurement auctions. Although current theory and empirical work provides practitioners with some insights into the relative merits of each approach, more theoretical work and experimentation in the field is necessary before definitive conclusions can be drawn.en
dc.description.notesPES-1 (Payments for Environmental Services Associate Award)en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier2723en
dc.identifier.citationPresented at the ZEF-CIFOR workshop: Payments for Environmental Services (PES): Methods and Design in Developing and Developed Countries, Titisee, Germany, 15-18 June 2005en
dc.identifier.other2723_Ferraro2005_Assymetric_Info_Contract_Des.pdfen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/67108en
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.relation.urihttp://www.cifor.cgiar.org/pes/_ref/news_events/events/germany/papers.htmen
dc.relation.urihttp://epp.gsu.edu/pferraro/docs/Ferraro_PES_Eco_Econ%20Revision_Resubmit.pdfen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectPayments for environmental servicesen
dc.subjectEnvironmental impactsen
dc.subjectLand use managementen
dc.subjectEnvironmental servicesen
dc.subjectMarketsen
dc.subjectEconomic impactsen
dc.subjectAdministrationen
dc.subjectPESen
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationen
dc.subjectEnvironmental servicesen
dc.subjectContractsen
dc.subjectScreeningen
dc.subjectAuctionsen
dc.subjectConservation Reserve Program (CRP)en
dc.subjectPrograma de pagos de servicios ambientales (psa)en
dc.subjectInformational rentsen
dc.subjectOpportunity costsen
dc.subjectFarm/Enterprise Scale Governanceen
dc.titleAsymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental servicesen
dc.typePresentationen
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten

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