VTechWorks Repository :: Browsing by Author "Moehler, Michael"

Browsing by Author "Moehler, Michael"

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Adaptive Preference Tradeoffs
Jenson, Audra Christine (Virginia Tech, 2018-05-31)
Consider the following scenario: A mother chooses to marry off her 10 year-old daughter, not because she doesn’t know the harmful effects of child marriage, nor because she thinks that it is good that her daughter marries when she is 10 years old. Rather, she is unable to feed her daughter and realizes that her daughter’s survival depends upon her marrying a financially stable man. This is an apparent example of what human development practitioners and political philosophers call an adaptive preference (AP): a preference, formed under oppressive circumstances, that seems to perpetuate the agent’s own oppression. Prevailing opinion is that forced tradeoffs—especially following Serene Khader’s taxonomy—, like the case presented above, are a type of AP: one in which a person makes a decision because of a limited option set. In this paper I argue that no paradigm cases of forced tradeoffs should not be classified as APs. Instead, I offer a revised definition of adaptive preferences where I argue that adaptive preferences are psychological traits that cause the agent with adaptive preferences to make irrational or uninformed decisions that perpetuate their own oppression. I defend this new definition by exploring the implications of changing the definition. In particular, forced tradeoffs involve different kinds of interventions from other kinds of adaptive preferences and including forced tradeoffs risks committing testimonial injustice against those who have limited option sets.
Civility: Its Distinctness and Significance
Love, Christopher William (Virginia Tech, 2017-10-26)
Civility has many critics. Some challenge its distinctness as a virtue, others its moral significance. In this essay, I attempt to meet both challenges by offering an account of civility that stands distinct from other concepts and holds great value, both intrinsically and instrumentally. I claim that we show civility toward others when we dispute their ideas in ways that respect those persons' intrinsic worth. My account pays particular attention to the connections between civility, clarity and reconciliation--connections that make civility vital for modern pluralistic societies. I then consider a recent alternative to this conception of civility advanced by Calhoun (2000), arguing that it secures distinctness at the cost of moral significance.
The Democratic Kaleidoscope in the United States: Vanquishing Structural Racism in the U.S. Federal Government
Ryan, Mary Kathleen (Virginia Tech, 2019-04-04)
This dissertation is broadly concerned with the relationship between democracy and race in the United States federal government. To analyze this problem, I rely on archival research from the 1967-8 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (commonly known as the Kerner Commission, after chairperson Governor Otto Kerner) to examine how the discussion and management of hundreds of so-called "race riots" in the summer of 1967 both challenges civil disobedience and embodies structural racism. Employing a content analysis of the final 425-page Kerner Commission government report, I assess the categorization, labeling, and language used to describe and document the hundreds of "race riots" and related state violence through acts of police misconduct that engulfed the country in the summer of 1967. I rely heavily on the report and background research itself, as well as major books related to race riots and presidential commissions, such as Anthony Platt's 1971 The Politics of Riot Commissions and Steven Gillon's 2018 Separate and Unequal. I incorporate theories of exit and the entitlement to rights advanced in literature by scholars like Jennet Kirkpatrick, James C. Scott, and Hannah Arendt. This dissertation is concerned with the relationship between morality and civic participation in democratic politics. I analyze Christopher Kutz's book Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age to delve into the ramifications of democracy and US citizenship being considered a kind of "collective project" and further contemplate what obligations and implications exist for citizens in US democracy against racial injustice. Since the Kerner Commission coincided with the rise of "law and order" politics in the nation's political vernacular, it represents a unique opportunity to witness an ideological shift toward a Garrison state and neoliberal ethos, both of which undermine the country's espoused democratic values, resting on the grammar of equality and justice for all. The Kerner Commission can provide valuable lessons in studies of political domination that remain pertinent to overcoming oppression and injustice today.
Epistemic Overload as Epistemic Injustice
Bernal, Amiel (Virginia Tech, 2018-07-11)
Epistemic injustices are the distinctly epistemic harms and wrongs which undermine or depreciate our capacities knowers. This dissertation develops a theory of epistemic injustice and justice which accounts for excesses in epistemic goods as a source of epistemic injustice. This is a theory of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. The dissertation can be divided into three parts: 1) motivational, 2) theoretical, 3) applications and implications. First, Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the study of epistemic injustice and epistemic overload. Chapter 1 identifies a gap in the literature on epistemic injustice concerning excesses in epistemic goods as sources of epistemic injustice while canvassing the major themes and debates of the field. Chapter 2 levels an objection to ‘proper’ epistemology, thereby providing an indirect defense of the study of epistemic injustice. Second, theoretical development occurs in are Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6. Chapter 3 initiates the argument for epistemic overload, while Chapter 4 extends the case for epistemic overload, identifying several epistemic injustices arising from excesses of understanding, credibility, and truth. Chapter 5 explains the oversights of prior theorists by developing a more descriptively adequate account of social epistemics that explains the many sites of epistemic injustice. Chapter 6 develops a two-stage contractualist theory of epistemic in/justice to explain the bad-making features of epistemic injustices and generates the duty of epistemic charity. The third part of the dissertation applies the findings of earlier chapters to contemporary practical and theoretical problems. Chapter 7 employs the contractualist reasoning of Chapter 6 to address and ameliorate problems from excesses in the uptake and circulation of hermeneutical resources and true-beliefs. Chapter 8 considers the mutual dependence relations between political phenomena and epistemic in/justice, showing that accounts of political justice depend upon or presuppose epistemic justice. Finally, Chapter 9 applies epistemic overload to the use of big data technologies in the context of predive policing algorithms. An abductive argument concludes that the introduction of the “Strategic Subjects List” as part of a Chicago policing initiative in 2013 introduced understandings which likely contributed to gun-violence in Chicago and which constitutes an epistemic overload. In sum, the dissertation shows the theoretical and practical significance of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice.
The Ethics of (Dis)connection: Understanding 'Care' Through Phenomena of Despair
Respess, Shaun (Virginia Tech, 2021-11-12)
This dissertation examines the outbreak of depression in the United States through an ethical lens of care and disconnection. Discussions in bioethics and collaborating fields largely speak of mental health as a series of phenomena attributable to individuals, subsequently using terms like 'disease' and 'disorder' to denote abnormality in those persons affected by distress. Alternatively, I respond to the ongoing "crisis of care" through a critique of neoliberalism and biomedicalization. I argue that widespread despair is the result of a collective way of life wherein persons are detached from fundamental physical and psychosocial needs by nature of fallacious cultural commitments and techniques. I implement constructivism to empirically ground a new application of care ethics to be considered by normative ethicists. In addition to merging several established traditions such as feminist philosophy and the capabilities approach, I also contribute a comprehensive model for understanding basic needs and the distribution of caring responsibilities/roles. Further, the project enhances the field of applied bioethics by featuring a practically-specific relational approach that is built from the experiences of those embedded in daily decision-making. The dissertation critiques the theoretical soundness of psychiatric and psychological classifications and the practical efficacy of prominent solutions such as antidepressant medications and various psychotherapies. I further assert that these depictions of mental health misrepresent the experiences of those affected by depression, and thus share their stories of derealization, isolation, frustration, resentment, and hopelessness through a lens of disconnection. These feelings apply to caregivers as well: the commodification of care alongside of the constraints attached to "professionalism" are used to inhibit their autonomy, exploit their labor, and detach them from relationships with charges and other carers. This leads to issues such as moral distress, burnout, and vicarious traumatization, all of which foster despair. Finally, I respond to these collective concerns with a new framework consisting of an expanded account of fundamental needs and an analysis of "care-abilities": the capabilities one has to meet their needs and to fulfill the needs of others who depend on them. I then supplement this account with a detailed distribution of skills and responsibilities attached to the particular caring roles that one might occupy. This ethical framework is intended to be advisory and malleable to contextual practice rather than prescriptive.
Examining "The Adam Smith Problem": Individuals, Society, and Value
Crowder, Rachel E. (Virginia Tech, 2012-04-26)
In this paper I offer an analysis of the Adam Smith Problem. This Problem arises from perceived inconsistencies between Smith's economic work, The Wealth of Nations, and his moral theory, the Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that far from being inconsistent with Smith's economic theory, his moral theory serves as a necessary foundation. I suggest that, because he takes humans to be moral by nature, Smith defends social capitalism which requires moral economic agents rather than homo economicus. I then sketch some specific implications for the moral limits of Smithian social systems.
The Gig is Up: The Disjunction of Gig Economy Labor and the American Welfare State
Work, Nicholas Christopher (Virginia Tech, 2019-06-28)
The gig economy has rapidly become something of a phenomenon in the digital economy today. New firms are quickly being added to this digital market ecosphere and the business model has garnered the attention of the business and investor communities as a new organizational alternative to standard hierarchies. However this new business model also poses substantial problems for its workers, who as independent contractors are not afforded the benefits or rights of the welfare state that are granted to employees. As the gig economy continues to achieve financial success and holds a more prominent place in our labor force, the precarious state of gig labor is becoming an increasingly political problem. This thesis explores the present state of labor in the gig economy by situating it within the context of welfare state scholarship. I examine how the inner mechanics of the gig economy operate, as well as examine the structures of the American welfare state that create this dualist divide between contractors and employees. I argue that welfare state scholarship demonstrates a path by which gig laborers and gig firms can form cross class alliances that can help develop new welfare state policies to improve gig worker conditions and be supported by gig firms themselves.
Human Capabilities and Collectivist Justice
D'Amato, Claudio (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-05)
The capability approach to justice, made popular by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has been a stalwart of the human development literature for the last 30 years, and its core ideals underwrite the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals. This dissertation offers a new version of the approach, rejecting many of its ideological commitments to liberal-democratic humanism and replacing them with more distinctly collectivist and communitarian ones. It contends that the capability approach, when used as a theoretical framework for global development, need not contain almost any ethical normativity with regard to a definition of justice, and indeed it is much more functional when it endorses a moderate ethical relativism. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, it shows that all existing versions of the capability approach are ideologically committed to a specific kind of liberal humanism, which its proponents consider universalist but that is actually quite provincial. Second, it argues that collectivist critiques from prominent capability theorists in the last decade have been misunderstood and their recommendations unheeded, a fact that this dissertation attempts to rectify. Third, it offers a properly collectivist account of group capabilities and group self-determination, which can do all the normative work that individual capabilities and agency perform in the approach's original versions. Finally, it introduces the notion of public objective capabilities, which justifies a higher deference to collective self-determination at the expense of some individual freedom and equitable participation in democratic polity. The overall goal of this new collectivist version of the approach is not to reject the worth of capability as a metric of global justice, but rather to reinforce it. A collectivist capabilitarianism shows that capability is so well suited to global development work that it can function across diverse political realities, without the ideological constraints of a liberal humanism that is widely accepted in the Global North but whose cross-cultural appeal has been far overstated by its proponents.
Implications of a Universal Healthcare System in the United States: Why Individual Health Is Now of National Concern
Wright, Jessica Ann (Virginia Tech, 2014-07-03)
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law. This paper explores the implications of these new healthcare policies in the United States, given that a universal healthcare system has already being put in place. More specifically, it explores the question "Does the new 'universal healthcare' system bring with it obligations for citizens participating within the system to be more conscientious about their health and lifestyle choices? And if so, on what grounds?". I argue that individuals have strong social and moral obligations within a universal healthcare system to take the minimal provisions required for staying healthy (eating healthy, exercising, getting vaccinations, smoking cessation, and attending routine "check-ups" in order to not burden others with easily avoidable healthcare costs. These new obligations are grounded in the duty of fair play stemming from the fact that health insurance is a cooperative scheme. Furthermore this paper will show that when a universal healthcare scheme is in place, the healthcare resources become a 'common good' which is susceptible to a collective action problem known as 'the tragedy of the commons', and thus also give recommendations for its solution. The solutions that I endorse, although designed to address the free-rider problem recognized David Winkler, shows that Winkler's solution goes too far by indiscriminately punishing every unhealthy individual within a universal healthcare system.
(In)Justice in Nonideal Social Worlds
Cooper, Dominick Robert (Virginia Tech, 2017-06-09)
While there is an abundance of philosophical literature on justice, there is far less literature within political philosophy on the topic of injustice. I think one common assumption these approaches share is that injustice is simply the absence of justice; call this the absence thesis. This assumption becomes more peculiar juxtaposed to social and political struggle for justice, which quite commonly begins with cries of injustice. Injustice is an importantly distinct philosophical notion from justice – it can explain how justice fails to be realized in interesting and sophisticated ways, and, I argue, track our efforts to realize just social worlds, in ways that paradigmatically ideal and nonideal approaches to justice by themselves cannot. In this essay, I focus specifically on the question of how theories of justice can guide action in social worlds with systematic oppression. I ultimately argue that action-guiding theories of justice that evaluate worlds with systematic oppression must represent features of injustice. If a theory fails to represent features of injustice, it will fail to guide action in these worlds. That representation of such features is necessary gives us reason to think, in certain circumstances, that the absence thesis is false.
Integrated Moral Agency and the Practical Phenomenon of Moral Diversity
Moehler, Michael (2021-11-07)
The practical phenomenon of moral diversity is a central feature of many contemporary societies and poses a distinct problem to moral theory building. Because of its goal to settle the moral question fully and exclusively and/or to provide better understanding of moral disagreement, traditional first-order moral theory often does not provide sufficient guidance to address this phenomenon and moral agency in deeply morally diverse societies. In this article, I move beyond traditional first-order moral theorizing and, based on multilevel social contract theory (Moehler 2018, 2020a), develop a practically sound notion of moral agency for morally diverse societies. The interrelational and dynamic notion of integrated moral agency developed in this article demands that agents actively exercise their rational and affective capacities, are receptive to the capacities of others, and are aware of the type of moral interaction in which they engage with others. The notion of integrated moral agency helps agents to reconcile conflicting first-order moral directives and to maximally protect agents’ autonomy in morally diverse societies.
Moral Authority as Moral Skill: An Exemplarist Theory of Practical Justification
Lindsey, Johnathan Matthew (Virginia Tech, 2017-03-02)
How should we understand the question "Why be moral?" Can we answer this question? If so, how? In this paper I develop an exemplarist theory of practical moral justification; that is, a theory of the justification of the prima facie moral things that we do, not the moral beliefs that we have. I take as my starting point that morality is, essentially, a set of practices in which all persons, in virtue of their being persons, participate. I argue that skillful practitioners of these various practices should be understood as moral authorities, and that the appeal to a moral authority for the purpose of one's justifying one's moral doings is necessarily justified for the appealer whenever she is practicing the same practice as the moral authority. This theory holds that moral authorities, so circumscribed, are Authoritative Exemplars, and as the appeal to their authority is necessarily justified they are able to provide a foundation for practical moral justifications, and thus rebutting the objection that all such justifications will run to regress. Among other things this account allows us to interpret the "Why be moral?" question as a question asking for more than can be had posed from a position of misunderstanding the nature of morality and practical moral justification. We cannot answer the "Why be moral?" question any more than we can answer the "Why be human?" question.
Paraphilias and the Medicalization of Criminal Behavior
Keith, Rachel Elizabeth (Virginia Tech, 2019-06-19)
'Paraphilia' is the term used by professionals to indicate that a sexual fetish is severe enough to warrant being called a mental health disorder. Even after the release of the fifth edition of the DSM (DSM-5) paraphilias remain controversial. Although philosophers and scientists alike have argued that some paraphilias are just a way to medicalize sexual behavior that is simply abnormal by society's standards, these arguments typically target paraphilias that do not involve immoral or illegal behaviors. To my knowledge, philosophers have largely ignored the 'criminal paraphilias' (like pedophilia) in their arguments. In this paper, I attempt to fill this gap. I argue that the diagnostic criteria for some paraphilic disorders allows for criminal behavior to serve as a sufficient condition for diagnosis, blurring the line between criminal behavior and psychopathology. I argue that such an equivocation is undesirable in at least three ways: it is contrary to the goals of psychiatry; it allows for the rights of individuals being diagnosed to be routinely violated; and it perpetuates mental illness stigma. These objectionable aspects of including criminal behavior as a diagnostic criterion for criminal paraphilias, coupled with the lack of empirical evidence that shows criminal behavior is a legitimate symptom of paraphilic disorders, provide a strong argument in support of removing the criterion. Once removed, there will effectively be no difference between diagnostic criteria for the noncriminal and criminal paraphilias, and philosophers providing critiques of the former group will be pressed to also address the latter.
Utopian Hope vs. Merely-Political Combat: Directionality for the Kingdom of God
Burkette, Jerry W. (Virginia Tech, 2022-02-03)
Utopia, as a concept, has experienced a resurgence within literature of various genres, ranging from scholarly work inside the 'academy' to diverse accounts of utopian and/or dystopian imaginaries within diverse fictional stories. Identifying what utopia picks out conceptually, however, is challenging, not least due to the limitations inherent in the ways we perceive the world could be. In this dissertation, I first defend a 'processual' account of utopia, contrasting this way of thinking about the idea against any fixed or granular description of some candidate, concrete state of affairs. I then look at the primary methodology leveraged by most processual utopian theorists, namely: utopian hope. After considering this affective, performative stance against what I call 'merely-political' combat, I demonstrate how utopian hope, within processual accounts, turns out to be equivalent to religious faith. As such, processual utopian projects require a return to a mystical, transcendent field of play for both their theoretical and methodological constituents. The second half of my project attempts to outline a fledgling, practical methodology for processual utopia, first identifying a very counter-intuitive directional focus on the part of the privileged when pursuing utopian ends. This focus requires the privileged to consider alternate imaginaries for possible futures while additionally requesting assistance from the marginalized to appropriately parse them. I conclude by examining several instances of liminal 'utopias' that have occurred in the wake of tragic events. These are placed in conversation with fictional accounts of utopian effort in order to highlight why utopian performativity must begin from a space of mutual vulnerability.
We who make one another: Liberatory solidarity as relational
Matheis, Christian (Virginia Tech, 2015-03-04)
Which conceptions of solidarity will help subjugated, oppressed groups pose liberatory challenges to the regimes under which they suffer? Activists and scholars concerned with liberation err by constraining solidarity to the parameters outlined in conventional moral and political theory and, therefore, by imagining solidarity as dependent on models of identity and shared interests. Organized movements may aim for expanded access to institutional claims and for cultural representation, and yet liberatory movements also have more specific objectives: to challenge the legitimacy of oppressive political and moral regimes, and to put those regimes in the obediential service of the vulnerable and oppressed. I critique notions of solidarity conceived in political philosophy as shared interests, and as a functions of identity in discourses about anti-racist, feminist, and pro-indigenous movements for social justice and cultural inclusion. Using the works of Enrique Dussel, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Elaine Scarry, I argue that a notion of solidarity developed as a relational concept, primarily as a reference to the laborious activities of relating, can serve as a resource for liberatory projects once we describe the three main ideas as a coherent proposition: liberatory solidarity as relational. The concept refers to when individuals and groups continue to relate, to make one another, for the purposes of liberation despite countervailing exploitative power relations, incentives, and disincentives. Those seeking emancipatory change either labor to relate for the sake of liberation, or preserve the bigger-picture status quo in which disparate and episodic enclave movements rise and fall on the terms set by identity politics and fictive individualistic autonomy.
When may police kill in self-defence? A special moral obligations argument against moral parity
Chang, Kuo Fu Si Hua (Virginia Tech, 2019-09-25)
That police have special moral obligations to protect others is an important moral consideration which is largely absent from discourse about the moral permissibility of police killings of civilians in self-defence. I argue that police officers, at least when acting ex officio, face a special justificatory burden such that the set of conditions under which a police officer may permissibly kill a civilian in self-defence is more tightly constrained than the set of conditions under which a civilian may kill a fellow civilian in self-defence. In other words, police officers' right to kill in self-defence is attenuated by their special moral obligation to protect others. I provide three arguments for this claim. First, police have a special obligation to protect others, even at risk to themselves. Thus, there are some situations in which, compared to a civilian, an officer must tolerate an elevated level of risk of harm to herself before she is justified in resorting to defensive harm. Second, police have a derivative obligation to minimise imposing harm on those whom they have undertaken to protect. It is a greater wrong to harm those to whom one has special moral duties. Thus, compared to the civilian, the police officer must give greater moral weight to the possibility that she is facing an innocent or non-responsible threat. The third argument rests on the view that the right to self-defence derives from the right protect oneself. I show that the special moral obligations of police officers attenuate this right and, derivatively, attenuate their right to self-defence as well.

Browsing by Author "Moehler, Michael"

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