CEO Power and Lead Independent Directors

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2026-05-29

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Virginia Tech

Abstract

Although prior research documents a positive association between CEO duality and the presence of a lead independent director (LID), I show that this finding may be incomplete. Conditional on duality, concentrated CEO power, measured using a multidimensional index of pay slice, ownership, and tenure, is negatively associated with LID presence and with LID presence on key monitoring committees. These findings are consistent with managerial power theory: CEOs leverage their power to resist independent board leadership, and this resistance is consequential. LIDs who serve on the nomination committee are meaningfully associated with increased sensitivity of CEO forced turnover to poor performance, and financially expert LIDs are associated with strong oversight outcomes more broadly. I further show that once an LID is appointed, CEO power is associated with a lower likelihood of LID discontinuance, suggesting that the role becomes entrenched over time. Collectively, my findings reveal that CEO power influences not only LID presence but also the conditions under which the role is effective. These results have direct implications for investors and practitioners seeking to strengthen independent board leadership.

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lead independent director; CEO power; board oversight; CEO turnover; CEO performance evaluation; pay sensitivity

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