Essays on Decision Making under Risk, Betrayal, and Manipulation

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2026-06-12

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Virginia Tech

Abstract

This doctoral thesis consists of three chapters that study decision-making under risk, betrayal, and information manipulation. Chapter 2 investigates how preferences for income redistribution respond to differences in expected income and income volatility. Using a theoretical framework and a controlled experiment, the chapter shows that individuals with lower expected incomes choose higher redistribution, while those with higher expected incomes prefer lower redistribution. Exposure to greater income volatility increases support for redistribution, consistent with a self-insurance motive, whereas social preferences play a more limited role in shaping behavior under risk. Chapter 3 examines how betrayal aversion influences voting behavior. Using a vignette experiment, we show that voters are less likely to support otherwise preferred candidates when there is a possibility of betrayal. The results further indicate no significant differences across types of betrayal, implying that participants respond similarly regardless of the nature of the betrayal. Chapter 4 studies a model of information design in the presence of a strategic manipulator. An information designer selects a signal structure, while an intermediary can manipulate message probabilities, and receivers are naive to such manipulation. The analysis characterizes equilibrium information structures under varying degrees of alignment between the designer and the manipulator. A benevolent designer provides fully informative signals, whereas a compromised designer optimally reduces informativeness, with the extent of distortion depending on manipulation costs and degree of compromise.

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Keywords

Preferences, Redistribution, Income Volatility, Betrayal Aversion, Voting Behavior, Information Design, Information Distortion

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