From Margin Calls to Micro-Expressions: Leverage, Liquidity, and Physiological Signatures of Experimental Bubbles

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2026-08-26

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Virginia Tech

Abstract

This dissertation develops new experimental infrastructure to study instability in speculative asset markets, focusing on short squeezes and bubble-crash cycles alongside the behavioral and physiological states that accompany them. The first chapter examines short squeezes: rapid and extreme price increases caused when speculative traders who borrowed an asset are forced into the market in order to acquire it again. This phenomenon is largely absent from experimental asset-pricing research despite its real-world prominence. By permitting leveraged short positions and enforcing margin requirements, the experimental design generates conditions under which squeezes can poten- tially emerge. We develop a tiered classification of squeeze events that includes voluntarily buying the asset at a loss and being forced to purchase the asset to maintain margin re- quirements; in the most extreme cases, cascading buy-ins drove prices to nearly 50 times fundamental value. We conclude that short-selling restrictions and excess liquidity amplify bubble formation, which creates an environment in which these explosive squeezes are more likely to happen. The second chapter turns to the psychological and physiological underpinnings of bubble formation and collapse in constant fundamental value markets. Using Support Vector Re- gression alongside linear models, we find that conventional financial signals, such as lagged returns and order book imbalances, outperform biometric measures in predicting contempo- raneous market returns. At the individual level, however, electrodermal activity meaningfully predicts de-risking behavior and revealed risk aversion, with high earners exhibiting antici- patory arousal before crashes and low earners showing only reactionary spikes. The third chapter introduces oPAL (open-source Periodic Auction Laboratory), a turnkey, extensible asset market platform built on the oTree architecture. oPAL fills a critical gap left by existing tools' near-exclusive focus on continuous double auctions, offering discrete call markets that isolate strategic bidding from execution-speed noise. Additionally, oPAL addresses practical frictions of online synchronous recruitment through an integrated pre- screening module and administrative portal. Key features enabling the two experiments presented in this dissertation include short selling, margin-based leverage, automated liquidations, flexible fundamental value trajectories, and a motion-artifact-minimizing entry interface for biometric recording. Together, these chapters contribute new open-source infrastructure for experimental finance and new evidence on how leverage, liquidity, and emotional state jointly shape the formation and resolution of price instability in speculative markets.

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asset markets, short squeeze, market bubbles, experimental economics, software

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