Virginia Tech
    • Log in
    View Item 
    •   VTechWorks Home
    • ETDs: Virginia Tech Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    • Doctoral Dissertations
    • View Item
    •   VTechWorks Home
    • ETDs: Virginia Tech Electronic Theses and Dissertations
    • Doctoral Dissertations
    • View Item
    JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

    Social Capital and Conventions: A Social Networks Perspective

    Thumbnail
    View/Open
    cjohnson.pdf (902.4Kb)
    Downloads: 147
    cjohnsonvita.pdf (53.69Kb)
    Downloads: 40
    Date
    2000-04-14
    Author
    Johnson, Cathleen A.
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Abstract
    We introduce a spatial cost topology in the network formation model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory 71 (1996), 44--74. This cost topology might represent geographical, social, or individual differences. It describes variable costs of establishing social network connections. Participants form links based on a cost-benefit analysis. We examine the pairwise stable networks within this spatial environment. Incentives vary enough to show a rich pattern of emerging behavior. We also investigate the subgame perfect implementation of pairwise stable and efficient networks. We construct a multistage extensive form game that describes the formation of links in our spatial environment. Finally, we identify the conditions under which the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these network formation games are stable. We analyze the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game where both the actions of the players and the communication network evolve over time. Cost considerations of social interaction are incorporated by considering a circular model with endogenous neighborhoods, meaning that the locations of the players are fixed but players can create their own communication network.The dynamic process describing medium-run behavior is shown to converge to an absorbing state, which may be characterized by coexistence of conventions. In the long run, when mistake probabilities are small but nonvanishing, coexistence of conventions is no longer sustainable as the risk-dominant convention becomes the unique stochastically stable state. We create and investigate a system that is capable of observing the accumulation of social capital and the effect of social capital accumulation on behavior of individually rational players. In the first model, we develop a restricted system to show that social capital forms and is maintained at a steady state level. The resulting network is the chain. The second model uses a congestion function in conjunction with social capital to show a network emerge that contains links that costlier than those in the chain network.
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10919/27230
    Collections
    • Doctoral Dissertations [15818]

    If you believe that any material in VTechWorks should be removed, please see our policy and procedure for Requesting that Material be Amended or Removed. All takedown requests will be promptly acknowledged and investigated.

    Virginia Tech | University Libraries | Contact Us
     

     

    VTechWorks

    AboutPoliciesHelp

    Browse

    All of VTechWorksCommunities & CollectionsBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis CollectionBy Issue DateAuthorsTitlesSubjects

    My Account

    Log inRegister

    Statistics

    View Usage Statistics

    If you believe that any material in VTechWorks should be removed, please see our policy and procedure for Requesting that Material be Amended or Removed. All takedown requests will be promptly acknowledged and investigated.

    Virginia Tech | University Libraries | Contact Us