dc.contributor.author Valinejad, Jaber en dc.contributor.author Barforoushi, Taghi en dc.contributor.author Marzband, Mousa en dc.contributor.author Pouresmaeil, Edris en dc.contributor.author Godina, Radu en dc.contributor.author Catalão, João P. S. en dc.date.accessioned 2018-10-24T12:34:46Z en dc.date.available 2018-10-24T12:34:46Z en dc.date.issued 2018-10-18 en dc.identifier.citation Valinejad, J.; Barforoshi, T.; Marzband, M.; Pouresmaeil, E.; Godina, R.; P. S. Catalão, J. Investment Incentives in Competitive Electricity Markets. Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, 1978. en dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10919/85472 en dc.description.abstract This paper presents the analysis of a novel framework of study and the impact of different market design criterion for the generation expansion planning (GEP) in competitive electricity market incentives, under variable uncertainties in a single year horizon. As investment incentives conventionally consist of firm contracts and capacity payments, in this study, the electricity generation investment problem is considered from a strategic generation company (GENCO) $′$ s perspective, modelled as a bi-level optimization method. The first-level includes decision steps related to investment incentives to maximize the total profit in the planning horizon. The second-level includes optimization steps focusing on maximizing social welfare when the electricity market is regulated for the current horizon. In addition, variable uncertainties, on offering and investment, are modelled using set of different scenarios. The bi-level optimization problem is then converted to a single-level problem and then represented as a mixed integer linear program (MILP) after linearization. The efficiency of the proposed framework is assessed on the MAZANDARAN regional electric company (MREC) transmission network, integral to IRAN interconnected power system for both elastic and inelastic demands. Simulations show the significance of optimizing the firm contract and the capacity payment that encourages the generation investment for peak technology and improves long-term stability of electricity markets. en dc.format.mimetype application/pdf en dc.language.iso en en dc.publisher MDPI en dc.rights Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International en dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ en dc.subject capacity payment en dc.subject firm contract en dc.subject generation expansion planning en dc.subject mathematical program with equilibrium constraints en dc.subject strategic GENCO en dc.subject uncertainty en dc.subject investment incentives en dc.title Investment Incentives in Competitive Electricity Markets en dc.type Article - Refereed en dc.date.updated 2018-10-24T08:16:05Z en dc.description.version Published version en dc.contributor.department Electrical and Computer Engineering en dc.title.serial Applied Sciences en dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.3390/app8101978 en dc.type.dcmitype Text en
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