An economic analysis of state criminal courts

This dissertation is an analysis of state criminal courts, and employs the economics of property rights to develop a model of these courts. Previous economic analyses have not considered the effects of the property rights structure an decision making in the courts and are thus incomplete. That property rights structures affect decision making has been established in a large body of literature examining both private and public forms of organization. This study asserts that the court decision makers will make choices reflective of the property rights structures they face.

The implications of the property rights model are tested across state through the estimation of a linear regression equation. The results of these tests largely confirm the predictions of the property rights model. The primary conclusion derivable from the statistical work is that the property rights structure does affect the volume and composition of the output produced by a court.

Additionally, a competing hypothesis is tested over time for several of the states examined previously. This hypothesis is based upon the notion that output is determined by the caseload pressures facing a court. This hypothesis is not, however, consistently supported by the statistical results, thus adding credence to the idea that the property rights structure is a major determinant of court output.