Intrusion Detection and Recovery of a Cyber-Power System

The advent of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in power systems has revolutionized the monitoring, operation, and control mechanisms through advanced control and communication functions. However, this integration significantly elevates the vulnerability of modern power systems to cyber intrusions, posing severe risks to the integrity and reliability of the power grid. This dissertation presents the results of a comprehensive study into the detection of cyber intrusions and restoration of cyber-power systems post-attack with a focus on IEC 61850 based substations and recovery methodologies in the cyber-physical system framework. The first step of this study is to develop a novel Intrusion Detection System (IDS) specifically designed for deployment in automated substations. The proposed IDS effectively identifies falsified measurements within Manufacturing Messaging Specification (MMS) messages by verifying the consistency of electric circuit laws. This distributed approach helps avoid the transfer of contaminated measurements from substations to the control center, ensuring the integrity of SCADA systems. Utilizing a cyber-physical system testbed and the IEEE 39-bus test system, the IDS demonstrates high detection accuracy and validates its efficacy in real-time operational environments. Building upon the intrusion detection methodology, this dissertation advances into cyber system recovery strategies, which are designed to meet the challenges of restoring a power grid as a cyber-physical system following catastrophic cyberattacks. A novel restoration strategy is proposed, emphasizing the self-recovery of a substation automation system (SAS) within the substation through dynamic network reconfiguration and collaborative efforts among Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). This strategy, validated through a cyber-power system testbed incorporating SDN technology and IEC 61850 protocol, highlights the critical role of cyber recovery in maintaining grid resilience. Further, this research extends its methodology to include a cyber-physical system restoration strategy that integrates an optimization-based multi-system restoration approach with cyber-power system simulation for constraint checking. This innovative strategy developed and validated using an Software Defined Networking (SDN) network for the IEEE 39-bus system, demonstrates the capability to efficiently restore the cyber-power system and maximize restoration capability following a large-scale cyberattack. Overall, this dissertation makes original contributions to the field of power system security by developing and validating effective mechanisms for the detection of and recovery from cyber intrusions in the cyber-power system. Here are the main contributions of this dissertation:

1. This work develops a distributed IDS, specifically designed for the substation automation environment, capable of pinpointing the targets of cyberattacks, including sophisticated attacks involving multiple substations. The effectiveness of this IDS in a real-time operational context is validated to demonstrate its efficiency and potential for widespread deployment.
2. A novel recovery strategy is proposed to restore the critical functions of substations following cyberattacks. This strategy emphasizes local recovery procedures that leverage the collaboration of devices within the substation network, circumventing the need for external control during the initial recovery phase. The implementation and validation of this method through a cyber-physical system testbed—specifically, within an IEC 61850 based Substation Automation System (SAS)—underscores its practicality and effectiveness in real-world scenarios.
3. The dissertation results in a new co-restoration strategy that integrates mixed integer linear programming to sequentially optimize the restoration of generators, power components, and communication nodes. This approach ensures optimal restoration decisions within a limited time horizon, enhancing the recovery capabilities of the cyber-power system. The application of an SDN based network simulator facilitates accurate modeling of cyber-power system interactions, including communication constraints and dynamic restoration scenarios. The strategy's adaptability is further improved by real-time assessment of the feasibility of the restoration sequence incorporating power flow and communication network constraints to ensure an effective recovery process.