The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster

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dc.contributor.authorGibbs, Danielen
dc.date.accessioned2024-01-29T19:30:01Zen
dc.date.available2024-01-29T19:30:01Zen
dc.date.issued2023-10-03en
dc.description.abstractFilibusters and efforts to defeat them shape the public reputation of U.S. senators and their parties. I develop a formal model to study how senators’ concerns about their own and the opposing party’s reputation influence their behavior in the Senate. In the model, a majority and opposition party bargain over policy. Each party earns a reputation with a core primary constituency which observes legislative bargaining and forms beliefs about its party’s policy priorities. Filibusters and attempts to defeat them are costly and can therefore credibly signal that a party values a particular issue. I identify conditions under which parties use these costly procedural moves to preserve or enhance their reputation when the costs of obstruction deter purely policy-motivated parties from filibustering or attempting to defeat a filibuster. Alternatively, under certain conditions parties strategically choose not to pursue policy victories that they otherwise would either to protect their own reputation with a constituency that values other issues more highly or to deny the opposing party the opportunity to signal. I examine the model’s empirical implications for the relative frequency of filibusters, cloture votes, and tabling motions and identify conditions under which the Senate is endogenously supermajoritarian.en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
dc.format.extentPages 469-511en
dc.format.extent43 page(s)en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020109en
dc.identifier.eissn1554-0634en
dc.identifier.issn1554-0634en
dc.identifier.issue4en
dc.identifier.orcidGibbs, Daniel [0000-0003-3104-0294]en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10919/117722en
dc.identifier.volume18en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherNow Publishersen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectFilibusteren
dc.subjectobstructionen
dc.subjectreputationen
dc.subjectUS Senateen
dc.subjectlegislative bargainingen
dc.titleThe Reputation Politics of the Filibusteren
dc.title.serialQuarterly Journal of Political Scienceen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
dc.type.otherArticleen
dcterms.dateAccepted2022-09-12en
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Techen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/All T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciencesen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciences/Political Scienceen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciences/CLAHS T&R Facultyen

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