The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster
| dc.contributor.author | Gibbs, Daniel | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-01-29T19:30:01Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2024-01-29T19:30:01Z | en |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-10-03 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Filibusters and efforts to defeat them shape the public reputation of U.S. senators and their parties. I develop a formal model to study how senators’ concerns about their own and the opposing party’s reputation influence their behavior in the Senate. In the model, a majority and opposition party bargain over policy. Each party earns a reputation with a core primary constituency which observes legislative bargaining and forms beliefs about its party’s policy priorities. Filibusters and attempts to defeat them are costly and can therefore credibly signal that a party values a particular issue. I identify conditions under which parties use these costly procedural moves to preserve or enhance their reputation when the costs of obstruction deter purely policy-motivated parties from filibustering or attempting to defeat a filibuster. Alternatively, under certain conditions parties strategically choose not to pursue policy victories that they otherwise would either to protect their own reputation with a constituency that values other issues more highly or to deny the opposing party the opportunity to signal. I examine the model’s empirical implications for the relative frequency of filibusters, cloture votes, and tabling motions and identify conditions under which the Senate is endogenously supermajoritarian. | en |
| dc.description.version | Published version | en |
| dc.format.extent | Pages 469-511 | en |
| dc.format.extent | 43 page(s) | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00020109 | en |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1554-0634 | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1554-0634 | en |
| dc.identifier.issue | 4 | en |
| dc.identifier.orcid | Gibbs, Daniel [0000-0003-3104-0294] | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10919/117722 | en |
| dc.identifier.volume | 18 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.publisher | Now Publishers | en |
| dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
| dc.subject | Filibuster | en |
| dc.subject | obstruction | en |
| dc.subject | reputation | en |
| dc.subject | US Senate | en |
| dc.subject | legislative bargaining | en |
| dc.title | The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster | en |
| dc.title.serial | Quarterly Journal of Political Science | en |
| dc.type | Article - Refereed | en |
| dc.type.dcmitype | Text | en |
| dc.type.other | Article | en |
| dcterms.dateAccepted | 2022-09-12 | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/All T&R Faculty | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciences | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciences/Political Science | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/Liberal Arts and Human Sciences/CLAHS T&R Faculty | en |
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