Trade impact of maximum residue limits in fresh fruits and vegetables

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dc.contributor.authorHejazi, Minaen
dc.contributor.authorGrant, Jason H.en
dc.contributor.authorPeterson, Everett B.en
dc.date.accessioned2022-09-06T12:51:16Zen
dc.date.available2022-09-06T12:51:16Zen
dc.date.issued2022-01en
dc.description.abstractInterfering maximum residue limits (MRLs) for pesticides with agricultural trade is becoming important for food and trade policies in the early 21st century. Differing levels for pesticide residues among countries have the potential to disrupt trade significantly. We employ a non-linear and disaggregated stringency index to quantify the degree of regulatory heterogeneity levels for pesticides between trading nations for fruits and vegetables in 2013 and 2014 and investigate the trade-restricting nature of this measure using the structural gravity framework. Our findings indicate that stricter importer MRLs reduce bilateral trade to the tune of 8.8%. Looking closer at MRLs with US partners, the effect of stricter MRLs is quite elastic concerning its impact on the US -EU trade. In particular, the estimates imply that a more stringent MRL's policy decreases the US export of fruits and vegetables to the EU members by a striking 13.8%. At the disaggregated level of MRL indices over different classes of chemicals, the results indicate that there is a significant gap in regulations regarding MRLs among several major US foreign markets for fruits and vegetables, particularly in the EU and the Trans-Pacific trading partners.en
dc.description.notesThis paper has benefited from seminar participants at the 2016 Agricultural and Applied Economics Association (AAEA) , the 2015 Southern Agricultural Economics Association, as well as participants and presenters in the 2019 International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) session organized by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) titled "Current Developments in Trade-Related SPS Issues: Questions Policymakers are Asking and Ways to Answer Them." Hejazi, Grant, and Peterson are grateful for financial support from the Office of the Chief Economist (OCE), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) under cooperative agreement 58-0111-17-012. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of OCE or US Department of Agriculture.en
dc.description.sponsorshipOffice of the Chief Economist (OCE), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) [58-0111-17-012]en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2021.102203en
dc.identifier.eissn1873-5657en
dc.identifier.issn0306-9192en
dc.identifier.other102203en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/111713en
dc.identifier.volume106en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevieren
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
dc.subjectFruits and vegetables tradeen
dc.subjectBilateral tradeen
dc.subjectNon-tariff measuresen
dc.subjectMaximum residue limitsen
dc.subjectIntensive and extensive margins of tradeen
dc.titleTrade impact of maximum residue limits in fresh fruits and vegetablesen
dc.title.serialFood Policyen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten

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