A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Feedback in Ideation Contests

dc.contributor.authorJiang, Juncaien
dc.contributor.authorWang, Yuen
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-13T05:49:30Zen
dc.date.available2020-01-13T05:49:30Zen
dc.date.issued2019-11-11en
dc.date.updated2020-01-13T05:49:26Zen
dc.description.abstractIdeation contests are commonly used across public and private sectors to generate new ideas for solving problems, creating designs, and improving products or processes. In such a contest, a firm or an organization (the seeker) outsources an ideation task online to a distributed population of independent agents (solvers) in the form of an open call. Solvers compete to exert efforts and the one with the best solution wins a bounty. In evaluating solutions, the seeker typically has subjective taste that is unobservable to solvers. In practice, the seeker often provides solvers with feedback, which discloses useful information about her private taste. In this study, we develop a game-theoretic model of feedback in unblind ideation contests, where solvers’ solutions and the seeker's feedback are publicly visible by all. We show that feedback plays an informative role in mitigating the information asymmetry between the seeker and solvers, thereby inducing solvers to exert more efforts in the contest. We also show that some key contest and solver characteristics (CSC, including contest reward, contest duration, solver expertise, and solver population) have a direct effect on solver effort. Interestingly, by endogenizing the seeker's feedback decision, we find that the optimal feedback volume increases with contest reward, contest duration, solver expertise, but decreases with solver population. Thus, CSC elements also have an indirect effect on solvers’ effort level, with feedback volume mediating this effect. Employing a dataset from Zhubajie.com, a leading online ideation platform in China, we find empirical evidence that is consistent with these theoretical predictions.en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
dc.format.extent20 page(s)en
dc.identifierpoms.13127 (Article number)en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13127en
dc.identifier.eissn1937-5956en
dc.identifier.issn1059-1478en
dc.identifier.orcidJiang, Juncai [0000-0002-4936-3326]en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/96406en
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.publisherWileyen
dc.relation.urihttp://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000495588600001&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=930d57c9ac61a043676db62af60056c1en
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectEngineering, Manufacturingen
dc.subjectOperations Research & Management Scienceen
dc.subjectEngineeringen
dc.subjectideation contesten
dc.subjectfeedbacken
dc.subjectinformation asymmetryen
dc.subjectcrowdsourcingen
dc.subjectcontest and solver characteristicsen
dc.subjectINNOVATION CONTESTSen
dc.subjectSALES CONTESTSen
dc.subjectGENERATIONen
dc.subjectINCENTIVESen
dc.subjectCREATIVITYen
dc.subjectBEHAVIORen
dc.subjectIDEASen
dc.subjectWORKen
dc.subject1503 Business and Managementen
dc.subject0102 Applied Mathematicsen
dc.subjectOperations Researchen
dc.titleA Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of Feedback in Ideation Contestsen
dc.title.serialProduction and Operations Managementen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.otherArticleen
dc.type.otherEarly Accessen
dc.type.otherJournalen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Pamplin College of Businessen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/All T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Pamplin College of Business/Marketingen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Pamplin College of Business/PCOB T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Techen

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