dc.contributor.author	Lobingier, Patricia Graybeal	en
dc.contributor.committeechair	Brown, Robert M.	en
dc.contributor.committeemember	Kumar, Raman	en
dc.contributor.committeemember	Haynes, Christine M.	en
dc.contributor.committeemember	Easterwood, Cintia M.	en
dc.contributor.committeemember	Richardson, Frederick M.	en
dc.contributor.department	Business (Accounting)	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-14T20:22:09Z	en
dc.date.adate	1997-03-24	en
dc.date.available	2014-03-14T20:22:09Z	en
dc.date.issued	1997-03-24	en
dc.date.rdate	1997-03-24	en
dc.date.sdate	1998-07-18	en
dc.description.abstract	Public criticism of executive pay has increased significantly in recent years. Shareholders express concern that the level of pay to many executives does not match the level of increase in shareholder wealth. The government has even gotten involved in the issue by changing tax laws related to compensation and taking an interest in how compensation is recorded in financial statements. This study investigates the relationship between adoption of compensation components and improved firm performance. Specifically, performance and restricted stock plan adoptions are analyzed for nine industries. Variable change is analyzed pre and post adoption for adopters; these adopters are then compared to non-adopters and to non-adopting peers. Data were gathered from COMPUSTAT and analyzed using four statistical methods; ttests, analysis of variance, multivariate analysis of variance and analysis of means. The study covers 20 years of adoptions and involves 335 adopting firms. Results of the study indicate that, when solely analyzing adopters, adoptions of performance or restricted stock plans improve firm performance for some industries but not for others. The study further indicates for most industry groups, the improvement experienced by adopters is not as significant as the improvement realized by the non-adopting segment of the industry. Lastly, when adopters are compared to non-adopting peers the study finds peers perform as well as or better than adopters. These results imply adoption of restricted stock plans works as intended for some industries by improving firm performance but may not improve performance to the levels reached by the industry as a whole.	en
dc.description.degree	Ph. D.	en
dc.identifier.other	etd-5312182239721111	en
dc.identifier.sourceurl	http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-5312182239721111/	en
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30589	en
dc.publisher	Virginia Tech	en
dc.relation.haspart	backend.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	chapter1.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	chapter2.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	chapter3.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	chapter4.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	chapter5.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	chapter6.pdf	en
dc.relation.haspart	etd.pdf	en
dc.rights	In Copyright	en
dc.rights.uri	http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/	en
dc.subject	performance plans	en
dc.subject	restricted stock	en
dc.subject	executive compensation	en
dc.title	Compensation Choice - The Effect on Firm Performance: An Interindustry Look at Performance Plans and Restricted Stock	en
dc.type	Dissertation	en
thesis.degree.discipline	Business (Accounting)	en
thesis.degree.grantor	Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University	en
thesis.degree.level	doctoral	en
thesis.degree.name	Ph. D.	en

Compensation Choice - The Effect on Firm Performance: An Interindustry Look at Performance Plans and Restricted Stock

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