Rationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelps

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dc.contributor.authorEchenique, Federicoen
dc.contributor.authorLi, Anqien
dc.date.accessioned2023-01-20T18:53:47Zen
dc.date.available2023-01-20T18:53:47Zen
dc.date.issued2022-12en
dc.date.updated2023-01-20T16:12:26Zen
dc.description.abstractWhen information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors a “majority” group over “minorities” unless the latter are strictly more productive than the former (the relative size of the groups plays no actual role). Majorities therefore face incentives to in- vest in being productive to the principal, whereas minorities are discouraged from such investments. The principal, in turn, focuses scarce attentional resources on majorities precisely because they are likely to invest. Our results have welfare and policy implications, as they add to the discussion of affirmative action, as well as the empirical literature on implicit bias and discrimination in performance evaluation.en
dc.description.versionSubmitted versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.orcidLi, Anqi [0000-0002-3686-6178]en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/113327en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.titleRationally Inattentive Statistical Discrimination: Arrow Meets Phelpsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
dc.type.otherArticleen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Techen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Scienceen
pubs.organisational-group/Virginia Tech/Science/Economicsen

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