Merge-Proofness and Cost Solidarity in Shortest Path Games

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dc.contributor.authorBahel, Ericen
dc.contributor.authorGómez-Rúa, Maríaen
dc.contributor.authorVidal-Puga, Juanen
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-18T13:24:44Zen
dc.date.available2025-02-18T13:24:44Zen
dc.date.issued2025-02en
dc.description.abstractWe study cost-sharing rules in network problems where agents seek to ship quantities of some good to their respective locations, and the cost on each arc is linear in the flow crossing it. In this context, Core Selection requires that each subgroup of agents pay a joint cost share that is not higher than its stand-alone cost. We prove that the demander rule, under which each agent pays the cost of her shortest path for each unit she demands, is the unique cost-sharing rule satisfying both Core Selection and Merge Proofness. The Merge Proofness axiom prevents distinct nodes from reducing their joint cost share by merging into a single node. An alternative characterization of the demander rule is obtained by combining Core Selection and Cost Solidarity. The Cost Solidarity axiom says that each agent’s cost share should be weakly increasing in the cost matrix.en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01574-7en
dc.identifier.orcidBahel, Eric [0000-0002-7537-4985]en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10919/124640en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringeren
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
dc.titleMerge-Proofness and Cost Solidarity in Shortest Path Gamesen
dc.title.serialSocial Choice and Welfareen
dc.typeArticle - Refereeden
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
dc.type.otherArticleen
dcterms.dateAccepted2024-11-08en
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Techen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/Scienceen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/Science/Economicsen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/All T&R Facultyen
pubs.organisational-groupVirginia Tech/Science/COS T&R Facultyen

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