The impact of organizational reward and measurement systems on coalition formation in the buying center

Abstract

The effects of different types of reward systems on perceived conflict and coalition formation among those involved in organizational buying decisions are investigated. The buying decision process is examined as group behavior, and the group or buying center is used as the unit of analysis.

An experimental design is utilized to test a number of hypotheses concerning the impacts of cooperative, competitive, and independent reward systems on the level of perceived conflict and the extent of coalition formation within the buying center. Groups consisting of representatives from a number of different departments within a hypothetical organization are asked to make a series of vendor choice decisions while being evaluated in terms of one of these three reward systems.

The findings suggest that perceived conflict increases as one moves from a cooperative to an independent, and then to a competitive, reward system. Coalitions appear most frequently under an independent reward system, less frequently under a competitive reward system, and infrequently under a cooperative reward system. Implications are drawn both for buying and selling organizations.