Institutional Investor Cliques Information Dissemination, and the Value of Information: Evidence from Insider Trading

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Date

2023-04-19

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Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Virginia Tech

Abstract

I analyze the relationship between insider trading outcomes and insiders' information environment within a network. While most existing studies rely on one dimension of commonality (e.g., personal ties, professional ties, geographic proximity) to construct the social network, I document the formation of the institutional investor groups (cliques) that exogenously connect firm-level insiders within the social network. Using difference-in-differences designs examining changes in clique size, I provide empirical evidence on the information dissemination channels within a network in which its members are quasi-randomly selected. Insider transactions in larger cliques exhibit lower abnormal trading profits, higher level of trading frequency, and larger amount of trade size, suggesting information dissemination is increasing in clique size. Then, I provide empirical evidence that the association between the value of information and the information dissemination rate is monotonic, consistent with prior theoretical studies.

Description

Keywords

insider trading, inside information, social network, institutional ownership

Citation