Why the Medical Diagnostic Screening Perspective Misrepresents Frequentist Testing and Misdiagnoses the Replication Crisis
| dc.contributor.author | Spanos, Aris | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-02-12T15:33:20Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2024-02-12T15:33:20Z | en |
| dc.description.abstract | The replication crisis and the untrustworthiness of empirical evidence is often viewed through the lens of the Medical Diagnostic screening (MDS) perspective, conceived as a surrogate for Neyman-Pearson (N-P) testing. To shed light on this crisis theMDS Positive Predictive Value (PPV) is Metamorphosed into the M-PPV by identifying the false positive/negative probabilities with the type I/II error probabilities. The diagnosis based on M-PPV is that the untrustworthiness of empirical evidence stems from several misuses of N-P testing, including p-hacking, data-dredging, and cherry-picking. The appropriateness of the MDS perspective, as well as the ensuing diagnosis based on the M-PPV, are called into question since they invoke dubious analogies with N-P testing. It is argued that a more pertinent explanation is that the untrustworthiness of evidence stems from a much broader problem relating to the uninformed and recipe-like implementation of frequentist statistics without proper understanding of the invoked assumptions, limitations, and warranted evidential interpretations of the frequentist inference results. This broader perspective, in conjunction with the post-data severity evidential interpretation of the testing results, could potentially address the untrustworthiness of empirical evidence problem. | en |
| dc.description.notes | Source info: YJMPS-D-23-00048 | en |
| dc.description.version | Submitted version | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10919/117930 | en |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.rights | In Copyright | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
| dc.subject | Replication crisis | en |
| dc.subject | untrustworthy evidence | en |
| dc.subject | false positive/negative rates | en |
| dc.subject | medical diagnostic testing | en |
| dc.subject | Positive Predictive Value | en |
| dc.subject | type I and II error probabilities | en |
| dc.subject | trustworthy evidence | en |
| dc.subject | sensitivity | en |
| dc.subject | specificity | en |
| dc.subject | prevalence | en |
| dc.subject | post-data severity | en |
| dc.subject | statistical results vs. evidence | en |
| dc.title | Why the Medical Diagnostic Screening Perspective Misrepresents Frequentist Testing and Misdiagnoses the Replication Crisis | en |
| dc.type | Article - Refereed | en |
| dc.type.dcmitype | Text | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/Science | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/Science/Economics | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/All T&R Faculty | en |
| pubs.organisational-group | /Virginia Tech/Science/COS T&R Faculty | en |