The Effects of Management's Forecast Strategy on Venture Capitalist Investment Screening Judgment

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dc.contributor.authorFleming, Damon M.en
dc.contributor.committeechairCloyd, C. Bryanen
dc.contributor.committeememberYardley, James A.en
dc.contributor.committeememberJenkins, James G.en
dc.contributor.committeememberAxsom, Danny K.en
dc.contributor.committeememberBhattacharjee, Sudipen
dc.contributor.departmentAccounting and Information Systemsen
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-14T20:16:33Zen
dc.date.adate2006-10-10en
dc.date.available2014-03-14T20:16:33Zen
dc.date.issued2006-09-22en
dc.date.rdate2009-10-10en
dc.date.sdate2006-09-22en
dc.description.abstractPrior research indicates that management forecast strategies affect investors' perceptions of management, which, in turn, influence investors' judgments about the firm. The current study hypothesizes and demonstrates that decisions about the completeness and form of management's forecast disclosure affect venture capitalists' (VCs) investment screening judgments. In an experiment, 53 experienced VCs indicate whether they would recommend conducting due diligence on a new venture. I manipulate the completeness (inclusion vs. omission of quantitative data about the components of earnings) and form (point vs. range forecast values) of management's financial forecasts in a 2 X 2 between-subjects design. When management is more (less) complete in its forecast disclosure, participants make more (less) favorable investment screening judgments. Additionally, when managers provide less complete disclosures, the use of point rather than range forecasts leads to particularly unfavorable screening judgments, whereas when managers provide more complete disclosures, the use of point rather than range forecasts leads to particularly favorable screening judgments. Taken together, these results indicate that the completeness of forecast disclosure increases the favorability of screening judgments and decisions about the form of financial forecasts can offset some of the adverse consequences of less complete disclosure.en
dc.description.degreePh. D.en
dc.identifier.otheretd-09222006-152718en
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-09222006-152718/en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/29059en
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.relation.haspartFleming_Dissertation_ETD.pdfen
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectmanagement forecastsen
dc.subjectventure capitalen
dc.subjectinvestment screeningen
dc.subjectmanagement uncertaintyen
dc.subjectmanagement credibilityen
dc.subjectstrategic disclosureen
dc.titleThe Effects of Management's Forecast Strategy on Venture Capitalist Investment Screening Judgmenten
dc.typeDissertationen
thesis.degree.disciplineAccounting and Information Systemsen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.namePh. D.en

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