CEO compensation and managerial decisions: evidence from acquisitions

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorBlazer, Eric L.en
dc.contributor.committeecochairDenis, David J.en
dc.contributor.committeememberThompson, G. Rodneyen
dc.contributor.committeememberBillingsley, Randall S.en
dc.contributor.committeememberChalmers, John M. R.en
dc.contributor.committeememberBonomo, Vittorio A.en
dc.contributor.committeememberKumar, Ramanen
dc.contributor.departmentAccounting and Information Systemsen
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-14T21:23:06Zen
dc.date.adate2005-11-10en
dc.date.available2014-03-14T21:23:06Zen
dc.date.issued1996-05-13en
dc.date.rdate2005-11-10en
dc.date.sdate2005-11-10en
dc.description.abstractWhile there is a wide body of literature examining the relation between CEO compensation and firm performance, few studies have directly tested the proposition that a strong pay-performance link: leads to improved future performance. This paper tests the hypothesis that a strong pay-performance link: leads to better managerial decisions. Following Jensen and Murphy's (1990b) methodology, pay-performance sensitivities are estimated for the CEOs of 105 NYSE and AMEX firms. The relation between the estimated pay-performance sensitivities and subsequent acquisition performance is examined for a sample of 140 acquisitions over the period 1980-86. Acquisition performance is measured by cumulative abnormal announcement returns for the event windows: [0], (-1,+1], [- 5, + 1], [- 5, +40], and [- 20, +40]. After controlling for other variables that are related to acquisition performance, a significant positive relation is observed between measures of pay-performance sensitivity and subsequent acquisition performance. The results suggests that a strong pay performance link may better align CEO and shareholder interest, and lead to improved future CEO performance. In addition, evidence is presented that suggests that optimal compensation design should jointly consider both stock options and traditional forms of compensation.en
dc.description.degreePh. D.en
dc.format.extentvi, 113 leavesen
dc.format.mediumBTDen
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.identifier.otheretd-11102005-141125en
dc.identifier.sourceurlhttp://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-11102005-141125/en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10919/40319en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherVirginia Techen
dc.relation.haspartLD5655.V856_1996.B539.pdfen
dc.relation.isformatofOCLC# 35195834en
dc.rightsIn Copyrighten
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en
dc.subjectfirm performanceen
dc.subjectCEO compensationen
dc.subjectacquisitionsen
dc.subject.lccLD5655.V856 1996.B539en
dc.titleCEO compensation and managerial decisions: evidence from acquisitionsen
dc.typeDissertationen
dc.type.dcmitypeTexten
thesis.degree.disciplineAccounting and Information Systemsen
thesis.degree.grantorVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universityen
thesis.degree.leveldoctoralen
thesis.degree.namePh. D.en

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
LD5655.V856_1996.B539.pdf
Size:
4.01 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download

Collections

Doctoral Dissertations